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ἐγὼ γὰρ διὰ νόµου 
νόµῳ ἀπέθανον, 
ἵνα θεῷ ζήσω. 
Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωµαι. 
 
For I, through the law, 
died [to? in? by? with?] the law, 
so that I might live [for? to? in? with?] God. 
I have been crucified with Christ. 
 
The ego-ideal’s imaginary identification 
Was killed by the law, 
In order to live with the Other. 
It saw das Ding. 
 
 
 
 
 
* * * * * 
 
 
 
 
Que suis-Je?  Je suis à la place d’ou se vocifère que « l’univers est un 
défaut dans la pureté du Non-Être »…  [Cette place] s’appelle la 
Jouissance, et c’est elle dont le défaut rendrait vain l’univers. 
 
 
What am I?  I am in the place from which ‘the universe is a flaw in the 
purity of Non-Being’ is vociferated… This place is called Jouissance, 
and it is Jouissance whose absence would render the universe vain. 
	   v	  
Abstract 	  
 	   Over	  the	  last	  few	  decades	  there	  has	  been	  a	  renewed	  interest	  in	  St	  Paul	  by	   continental	   philosophers,	  many	   of	   them	   from	   Lacanian	   traditions.	   	   This	  has	   arisen	   independent	   of	   the	   revolutionary	   developments	   in	   Pauline	  theology	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  	  This	  thesis	  bridges	  the	  gap	  between	  them,	  as	  a	   Lacanian	   study	   of	   Paul	   that	   is	   faithfully	   Lacanian	   and	   faithfully	   Pauline.	  	  Lacan’s	  thesis	  that	  the	  unconscious	  is	  structured	  like	  a	  language,	  and	  some	  of	  the	   accompanying	   structures	   he	   discovered,	   are	   found	   in	   Paul’s	   theology.	  	  Finding	  Lacan	   in	  Paul	  poses	  new	   solutions	   to	  many	  of	   the	  dilemmas	   facing	  both	   Lacanian	   readings	   of	   Paul	   and	   Pauline	   scholarship	   itself.	   	   A	   more	  faithfully	   Lacanian	   (and	   less	   Hegelian)	   version	   of	   Slavoj	   Žižek’s Paul loses 
none of his political usefulness, without requiring atheism.  The Pauline ‘event’ as 
Alain Badiou describes it is described again through Lacan, in a way that fits 
better with Pauline scholarship, allowing equal importance to both the death and 
resurrection of Christ.  Refusing to sacrifice an authentically Lacanian 
understanding of ‘alienation’ forces a more nuanced reading of Paul than some 
other similar attempts; but it also reframes what some Paul scholars mean when 
they claim that in Christ the believer undergoes an ontological transformation.  
Inserting a Lacanian Paul into the modern philosophical discourse reveals a Paul 
who can be politically meaningful beyond his relation to ‘Empire.’  Interwoven in 
this is a reading of Paul opposed to Stoicism, revealed by qualifying Stoic ethics 
as obsessional neurotic in structure.  This reading of Paul against Stoicism helps 
to demonstrate Paul’s relation to the ‘master signifiers’ of his time, which also 
	  vi	  
helps to clarify what happened in Pauline Christian ‘conversions,’ and provides 
another way to theorise about what Paul might mean for today.  This thesis 
demonstrates that Lacan’s concepts are helpful to Pauline scholarship, and that 
they are not irreconcilable with the historical critical method, in the hope that 
many more Lacanian Pauls might emerge in the future. 
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fourth chapter of Paul’s second letter to the Corinthians is abbreviated as 2 Cor 
4:3.   
 
References to the works of Sigmund Freud are from The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (24 vols.), trans. by James 
Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1966).  Citations follow the form SE# followed 
by the page number, where # is the volume number. 
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in English (1-3, 7, 8, 10, 11, 17, 20 and 23) are from the series edited by Jacques-
Alain Miller, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan.  They are referenced in footnotes 
with the format S# followed by the page number, where # is the seminar number, 
corresponding to the numbers given below, or in the main text with Seminar and 
the seminar number in Roman numerals.  The volumes of the series do not all 
have the same publisher, and some of the volumes have been produced at different 
points by different publishers.  The editions used here are as follows: 
 
1. Jacques Lacan, Freud’s Papers on Technique 1953-1954, trans. by John 
Forrester (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1975]). 
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2. Jacques Lacan, The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of 
Psychoanalysis 1954-1955, trans. by Sylvana Tomaselli (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1978]). 
3. Jacques Lacan, The Psychoses 1955-1956, trans. by Russell Grigg (London: 
W. W. Norton & Co, 1993 [1981]). 
7. Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, trans. by Dennis Porter 
(London: Routledge, 2008 [1986]).  (This is the most recent new edition, and 
employs different pagination to earlier copies of the same text.) 
8. Jacques Lacan, Transference, trans. by Bruce Fink (Cambridge: Polity, 2015 
[1991]). 
10. Jacques Lacan, Anxiety, trans. by A. R. Price (Cambridge: Polity, 2014 
[2004]). 
11. Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, trans. 
by Alan Sheridan (London: Karnac, 1977 [1973]). 
17. Jacques Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, trans. by Russell Grigg 
(London: W. W. Norton & Co, 2007 [1991]). 
20.   Jacques Lacan, Encore, trans. by Bruce Fink (London: W. W. Norton & Co, 
1988 [1975]). 
23.   Jacques Lacan, The Sinthome, trans. by A. R. Price (Cambridge: Polity, 2016) 
 
Lacan’s seminars that have not been officially translated, but have been translated 
unofficially by Cormac Gallagher from his personal notes, are available at 
<www.lacaninireland.com> [accessed 6.12.2016].  These include seminars 5-25 
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(1957-1978).  References to these are in the format S# as above, followed by the 
date of the individual lecture and the page number. 
 
References to the remaining seminars (4 and 26-27) will be cited individually 
from the French or unofficial translations.  Un-cited translations of these are the 
author’s, and, as with references to the French, are from the editions published by 
Seuil in Paris, from 1973 to the present. 
 
References to the articles Lacan published in Écrits are from Jacques Lacan, 
Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. by Bruce Fink (London: W. 
W. Norton & Co, 2006 [1966]).  They are cited as Écrits, followed by the page 
number. 
 
All New Testament quotations are from Novum Testamentum Graece 28th ed. 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2012), and translated by the author unless 
otherwise stated.  Greek that appears in the main text is left in Greek script where 
it appears only for the interest or reference of biblical scholars, but transliterated 
into Roman script where the Greek is important to or recurs in the argument.  The 
abbreviation NA28 is used, in reference to this edition of the Greek text.  The 
Bible translation most frequently referred to is the New Revised Standard Version 
Anglicized Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), which is abbreviated 
as NRSV.  Occasionally the abbreviation NIV is used for Holy Bible: New 
International Version (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001 [1984]), and KJV is used 
for Holy Bible: King James Version (London: Collins, 2011). 
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Quotes from the Septuagint (abbreviated as LXX) are translated by the author 
from Septuaginta, eds. Alfred Rahlfs and Robert Hanhart (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Bibelgesellschaft, 2006). 
 
All quotations of Epictetus are from Epictetus: The Discourses as Reported by 
Arrian, the Manual, and the Fragments, trans. by W. A. Oldfather (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1925), and are either Oldfather’s translation or, if 
stated, the author’s translation from the Greek contained in this edition.  The 
Discourses are cited as Disc. #.#.#, referring to the discourse number, the chapter 
and verse.  The Encheiridion/Manual and Fragments are cited as Ench. and Frag. 
 
The Paul and Lacan quotes from the front pages are my translation of Gal 2:19-
20a, followed by Bruce Fink’s translation of a quote from Lacan’s ‘The 
Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,’ Écrits, 694.  The French, 
from page 819 of the original edition, can also be found in Jacques Lacan, Écrits 
II (Paris: Seuil, 1971), 182.	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Chapter One 	  
Introduction 
 	  	  	  
1.  What Found St Paul? 
 
 In a session with his most famous obsessive neurotic patient, known as the 
Rat Man,1 Freud allegorised psychoanalytic inquiry into the unconscious traces of 
repressed memory by referring to the artefacts around his office: ‘The destruction 
of Pompeii was only beginning now that it had been dug up.’2 
What follows runs the risk of destroying Paul by digging him up.  This 
most certainly will not be the first time, given how often over the last two 
thousand years his corpus has been prodded by theologians and other intellectuals 
(indeed, much of the discussion of theological and philosophical uses of Paul 
below amounts to pointing this out); but what follows is not just historical 
criticism, nor just a philosophical reinterpretation.  By viewing the world of 
Paul’s argumentation through a Lacanian psychoanalytic lens I will attempt to lay 
bare the structures into which he found his thought, and perhaps also the inventive 
and enigmatic ways he manipulated those structures into an interpretation of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Real name Ernst Lanzer. 
2 SE10, 176. 
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new existence of the Christian subject, resurrected from the dead text of the 
paradox of jouissance. 
 The peculiar wording chosen above, ‘into which he found his thought,’ is 
intentional.  It mirrors the temporally bizarre experience of psychoanalysis, in 
which one does not ‘find’ some structurally eternal symbolic version of oneself 
already there, any more than one, conversely, puts a structure on top of what is 
not already there.3  The temporality of it all is confusing.  Lacan compares it to a 
sentence, which is read forwards but interpreted backwards, bereft of meaning 
until the words at the end of the sentence give one a sense of where the divisions 
were between the words at the beginning of the sentence.4  He graphs out the 
human subject in the same way, as a string of words that only exist in the present 
but only make sense when read retrospectively.5  Because of this structure of the 
human mind, one does not ‘find’ one’s unconscious written firmly in the past, or 
‘read into’ the unconscious what the conscious wants, but, rather, one ‘finds into’ 
the unconscious, discovering it not in the codification of the past, but within the 
very words one speaks in the present.  And there, one ‘finds,’ quite actively; or, in 
the case of Paul and Christianity, one finds and one founds. 
To psychoanalysis this is no paradox, because when one digs back far 
enough, scratching into one’s deepest memories and most embarrassing slips, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Lacan himself uses this language to compare psychoanalysis to religion in S11, 7-8, both of 
which employ a ‘hermeneutic demand,’ in which one does not necessarily ‘seek,’ but instead one 
finds what one has found already. 
4 S5, 6.11.1957, 6.  This concept is returned to several times in what follows. 
5 Écrits, 671-702.  Part of this graph is discussed in the final section of Chapter 4. 
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line between finding and founding begins to fade;6 particularly in Paul’s case, 
where the event that founds the new Christian subject is one that happened to the 
subject, not one that the subject actively and intentionally creates: the death and 
resurrection of Christ.7  What did Paul found when he found that he had found 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This is close to the idea of repetition, which Marcus Pound explores in more detail, via Lacan 
and Kierkegaard, and with reference to some of the theological uses of this concept, in Theology, 
Psychoanalysis and Trauma (London: SCM Press, 2007), 56-72.  The Lacanian subject does not 
necessarily remember and relate the past and dreams accurately, but, rather interprets them as she 
(mis-)remembers them.  This is why if the analysand asks to show the analyst photos from a 
holiday, the analyst instead asks her to describe the picture: the truth of the unconscious emerges 
within the interpretation and description of the memory, and the words used, rather than the 
‘memory itself.’  This is also why the Lacanian analyst does not tell the subject the ‘true’ meaning 
of her dreams, as the Jungian or Kleinian analyst might, attaching imaginary objects to other 
imaginary objects of eternal forms.  As Lacan says in S7, 90, ‘At the level of the unconscious, the 
subject lies.’  Instead, the Lacanian psychoanalyst practices what Philip Hill calls ‘equivocation,’ 
allowing the signifiers to relate to each other as the subject speaks, and allowing the subject to 
interpret them herself – aided by the fact that she presumes the analyst already to have a true 
interpretation, which the analyst does not.  This is only mildly related to the hermeneutical strategy 
termed ‘equivocation’ nearer the end of this chapter.  This is all from Philip H. F. Hill, Using 
Lacanian Clinical Technique —an introduction— (London: Press for the Habilitation of 
Psychoanalysis, 2002), 286-296. 
7 At various points Paul emphasises the passivity of the experience of being in Christ; for example, 
in Rom 6:5-11 Paul uses a series of passive verbs and compound verbs prefixed with σύν (‘with’), 
while describing how the Christian subject is united with Christ in death and resurrection: we 
‘grow together’ in the image of Christ’s death, our old ἄνθρωπος (person, appearance, ego-ideal) 
συνεσταυρώθη (co-crucified) with him, so that the body of sin is nullified, the one who has died 
with Christ is justified from sin.  If one looks at these verbs in Greek, most of them are neither 
present nor active, but either aorist (signifying something that happened once, in the past, with 
Christ’s death and resurrection) or perfect (signifying a present state existing as a result of a past 
event), and passive (signifying, particularly in a language that has active, middle and passive 
voices, that the subject is purely the object of the event).  On the significance of this united 
passivity in crucifixion and resurrection with Christ, see Michael Gorman, Inhabiting the 
Cruciform God: Kenosis, Justification and Theosis in Paul’s Narrative Soteriology (Cambridge: 
Eerdmans, 2009), 69-79; or, by the same author, Cruciformity: Paul’s Narrative Spirituality of the 
Cross (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2001), 45-48.  The centrality of this particular image to Paul’s 
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something?  The answer to this question lies not in the historical discovery of 
Paul’s opinions in their intellectual contexts, but in the psychoanalytic discovery 
of the structure of the event that Paul proclaimed had happened to him and to 
other subjects he calls ‘in Christ.’  The answer lies not in knowledge, but in the 
structure of the subject.8 
 The academic field of biblical studies has long known that when one 
attempts to interpret Jesus, one will always find oneself staring down a well at a 
reflection.9  Attempting to read the past as past, in some analytically objective 
fashion, will always be, to some extent, a reading into, a creation of the past as 
one wills it to be.  Psychoanalysis allows us, hermeneutically, to acknowledge 
this;10 to acknowledge that desire even finds its way into our constructions of our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
soteriology is of course debatable, but the presence of it in Paul’s concept of how the Pauline 
Christian subject experiences the event of Christ is less easily disputed. 
8 S17, 87-101.  The structure of the subject in relation to master signifiers is what organises 
knowledge, not vice versa.  This is a key Lacanian claim, in its many forms, and is the same claim 
as the statement that both the subject and a sentence are read retrospectively in the present.  This is 
all expanded upon below, in the discussion on Stoicism and obsessionalism in Chapter 4. 
9 There is an often repeated quote, usually attributed to Albert Schweitzer, about how Jesus 
scholars always wind up finding the Jesus they want to find, so are metaphorically staring down a 
well at their own reflection.  The actual quote, originally from George Tyrrell, not Schweitzer, is 
‘The Christ that Harnack sees, looking back through nineteen centuries of Catholic darkness, is 
only the reflection of a Liberal Protestant face, seen at the bottom of a deep well.’  George Tyrrell, 
Christianity at the Crossroads (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1909), 44. 
10 In Lacanian terms, this is the idea that the fantasy structures reality.  The fantasy, ‘an image set 
to work in a signifying structure’ (Écrits, 532), is the means by which the subject defends itself 
against the lack in the Other (see Glossary, Appendix A).  The Graph of Desire, which will be 
discussed below, graphs how the subject’s fantasy defends it from the lack in the Other.  Lacan 
reversed Freud’s presumption, that dreams are the place of pure desire and protect us from reality 
(to keep us sleeping), and instead argued that we structure (waking) reality according to fantasy, 
which is why we wake to it when our dreams get too close to the real of what we really want 
(Écrits, 520-521).  With a Lacanian view of reality, as structured by fantasy, it would be silly to 
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own pasts,11 and then ask how we are going to find into that structure, consciously 
putting words to the ‘bare bones’ that might never cease to be more constructed 
by our own desires than we would like to realise they are.  This is why 
psychoanalysis is always so exploratory in its form.  Moving freely without 
restraint from one topic to the next is necessary; because it never gets easier to be 
certain that the structure just found is not found intentionally. 
 What follows, then, is a finding of Lacan into a structure of Pauline 
theology, interpreting Paul’s texts as a series of signifiers that can only be made to 
mean something once entered retrospectively from a posterior position.  It is a 
psychoanalytic approach, treating the Pauline text as a historical source as 
malleable and fluid as the memories of every patient to sit on the analytical couch, 
even if the source text could be perfectly critically established.  This does not 
eradicate traditional hermeneutical difficulties – if anything, it exacerbates them.  
Instead, it allows me to employ historical critical methods in a way that is 
unashamedly historical critical, yet looking for a structural representation rather 
than a historical one.   
 If this project is daring, that is the reason why.  It is not an exercise in 
reader-response criticism, and it is not even an exercise in Lacanian discourse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
carry on with the pretence that historical Pauline theology can be objectively discovered.  More 
about the relevance of a Lacanian view of the subject for hermeneutics will be discussed below 
and throughout. 
11 It is an event frequently reported by psychoanalysts that in the progress of the treatment the 
analysand often realises how differently they remember their own pasts compared to what emerges 
to have actually happened – for example, dis-affected memories are a core symptom of 
obsessional neurosis (see below), or completely repressed memories in the case of the hysteric.  If 
the individual subject does not escape the effects of desire on memory, how much more will desire 
affect our collective historical memories, particularly for those historical subjects like St Paul that 
are always under interpretative revision? 
	  6	  
analysis.  The aim is to tie into the historical-critical method, using it to some 
extent, yet in a way that is framed by Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts, looking 
for a Lacanian psychoanalytic structure – much the same way that social-scientific 
interpretations of the New Testament employ sociological categories as a tool for 
historical criticism.  This works because psychoanalysis itself is an investigation 
into the past, but one that is aware that the remembered past is just as much 
created by the present as read by the present, which turn out to be related actions.  
The exact method of this mode of inquiry will be laid out below. 
There are at least four sides to the expected audience of this work.  Lacan 
now has at least two major audiences: the psychoanalytic practice he established, 
largely formalised into the World Association of Psychoanalysis (founded in 1992 
by Lacan’s son-in-law Jacques-Alain Miller), and the philosophical tradition he 
precipitated, including the Ljubljana school (most famously Slavoj Žižek), and 
others such as Alain Badiou.  The other side of this study is also broken into two: 
there has already been some theological interest in Lacan, but the study of Paul 
usually comes under the heading of ‘biblical studies’ as a historical critical 
discipline, and this project falls along that trajectory much more than that of 
theology.  So the potential audiences are: on the side of Lacan, both philosophy 
and psychoanalysis; and on the side of Paul, both theology and biblical studies. 
 Since the main goal of this study is to be a hermeneutical experiment with 
Paul, rather than a study of Lacan, the audience must chiefly be considered to be 
that of biblical studies and theology.  Consequently, much of the main text will be 
taken up with explanations of Lacan, who is so difficult a thinker that this would 
be the case regardless.  However, Lacan himself did have a more-than-passing 
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interest in Paul, and both sides of Lacan’s modern audience should find some 
interest in this study, which touches upon the relationship between his ideas and 
those of a thinker in whom he was interested, but perhaps only explored 
superficially.  Serious attempt is made to explain both sides to the other, 
constantly.  There are introductions to the ideas and interpretation of both Lacan 
and Paul below. 
 This may also mean that both sides of the audience find occasional 
sections somewhat incomprehensible.  Interpreting Paul to the level demanded by 
biblical studies requires constant reference to the Greek, and is aided by the use of 
some terminology specific to the field.  Greek references in the main text will be 
transliterated or translated wherever possible, with the required precision mostly 
confined to the footnotes and appendices.  Likewise, it is not possible to do an 
authentically Lacanian study that is both academically precise and totally readable 
to the newcomer, so some clarifications (largely confined to footnotes) might 
invoke the tired adage ‘it’s all Greek to me.’12  The glossary includes terminology 
from both sides of the study. 
 On both sides of this study it would be impossible to invoke the whole of 
the subject at once.  Both Lacan and Paul are thinkers whose ideas evolved over 
time and covered a lot of ground (though in both cases there are arguments over 
the extent of this evolution).13  Lacan covers so much ground over the twenty-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  Ironically, from the side of the audience much more likely to be versed in Greek.  As stated in 
the Referencing Scheme, above, Greek that appears in the main text is left in Greek script where it 
appears only for the interest or reference of biblical scholars, but transliterated into Roman script 
where the Greek is important to or recurs in the argument.   
13 In the debate on development in Paul’s thought, ‘the example most commonly cited has been 
that of Paul’s eschatology, the usual assumption being that the delay of the parousia weakened 
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seven years of his seminar, and arguably changes so much, that increased 
specification is urgently needed.  Since Lacan’s longest quote of Paul is his quote 
of Romans 7 in Seminar VII,14 I will focus on these sections, fanning out slightly 
to the years immediately preceding and following Seminar VII (Seminar V will 
turn out to be of great importance), and to the whole of Romans (and some of 
Paul’s other letters, but with the goal of interpreting Romans). 
Finally, one might understandably ask what unites Paul and Lacan enough 
that this project should even be given the time of day.  In his book The Word 
Made Strange, John Milbank devotes a chapter to a specific question: ‘Can 
morality be Christian?’15  He clarifies that he is not asking whether there can be a 
specifically Christian morality, but whether morality itself can be Christian.  
Having stated from the outset that the answer is definitively ‘no,’ he argues, 
mostly with reference to Nietzsche, that morality is based on the pre-existence of 
external threat, internal weakness, death and scarcity.  Moral systems depend 
upon these four things, and exist as reactions to them that also perpetuate them – a 
point that both Lacan and Žižek make about ‘charity.’16  Thus morality, including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Paul’s imminent expectation or changed his understanding of the process by which transformation 
into the resurrection body took place.’  James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle 
(Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1998), 21.  Development in Lacan’s thought will be discussed below. 
14 S7, 102-103. 
15 John Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1997), 219-232.  This is the follow-up book to the seminal Theology & Social Theory (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990), which founded the academic theological approach known as ‘radical 
orthodoxy.’  
16 Lacan at least makes a connected point to this, on S7, 229.  Slavoj Žižek makes precisely this 
point on a regular basis, such as in Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2010) 117; and First 
As Tragedy, Then As Farce (London: Verso, 2009), 53-55.  The point being made by Lacan and 
Žižek in these sources is that not only does charity often have the function of prolonging that 
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law, and especially when systematised into something ‘eternal,’ is eternally 
dependent upon its own negation; so the statement ‘morality is Christian’ would 
be immediately problematic.  Naturally, Milbank’s question leads him to Paul.  
‘The eternal demand for uniformity is paradoxically an emergency measure to 
sustain a unity of a thoroughly abstract kind.  And it is precisely because of this 
abstract character of the law that, as Paul realized, the law is a letter that can never 
be fulfilled.’17  In the next sentence he is led somewhere unwittingly Lacanian 
(italics original): ‘Not in the sense that love can never be fulfilled, since this 
follows from the inherently excessive, self-exceeding character of love, but in a 
sense which follows from law’s presumption that something is lacking, and that 
something will resist it.’  It is in the lack inherent to any system of law, the 
negation on which it depends, that both Lacan and Paul’s thoughts on morality 
find common ground.  Milbank then claims that Paul combats this lack with the 
plenitude of God, love and resurrection, which is not the particular direction in 
which this study will go.  However, he rightly touches on Paul’s awareness of the 
Nietzschean problem, regardless of how Paul solves it: ‘As Paul puts it [in Gal 
3:10-13], to be under the law is to be under a curse; to remain in the place of 
cursed impurity, and to have the threat of further slander hanging always over our 
heads.’18  This is indeed one of the factors that leads Badiou to say that ‘Nietzsche 
is Paul’s rival rather than his opponent.’19  What unifies Lacan and Paul most is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
which it formally opposes, but we also get a certain enjoyment out of the act of charity, which, 
more than curing the ill we seek to remedy, is usually the primary object of acts of charity. 
17 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 226-227. 
18 Ibid,, 227. 
19 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. by Ray Brassier (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), 72.  Ward Blanton elaborates upon a similar thought had by the 
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their unrelenting commitment to an ethics beyond the law (with different but not 
unrelated understandings of what is meant by ‘law’).20  For Lacan this is borne out 
in Seminar VII, in which he articulates the difficulty of transcending the law as the 
‘paradox of jouissance,’ and his response to it eventually culminates in his 
reading of Antigone (discussed in Chapter 6, below).  Paul is certainly not quite so 
anti-ethical, but there is a deep similarity in the way he is completely committed 
to persevering through the ethical dilemmas that Lacan later describes, until he 
can find his ethics, which, in the end, are based on a psychical transformation best 
described in Lacanian terms, and not inscribed on either side of the law/anti-law 
paradox.  Both Paul and Lacan understand the dilemma of a law based in ‘the 
letter,’ and both arrive at systems of thought that attempt, somehow, to transcend 
this difficulty without denying its inescapability.  Within this ground of overlap 
between Lacan and Paul is a certain fecundity; and it is the goal of this study not 
to find the greatest truth from within that ground, but merely to demonstrate its 
fecundity: to demonstrate the potential for both Lacan scholarship and Paul 
scholarship of a true discourse between the two, beyond surface readings of one 
by the other.  By the end of this thesis it will hopefully be apparent that reading 
Paul’s letters with Lacan can result in a helpful structure for bridging Paul’s 
context with our own, and also for bridging Paul’s philosophical and political 
ideas with some of those being suggested by continental philosophers today. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
great biblical scholar Albert Schweitzer, who suggested that ‘Had [Nietzsche] lived twenty 
centuries earlier, he could have become Saint Paul.’  Ward Blanton, ‘Paul and the Philosophers: 
Return to a New Archive,’ in eds. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries, Paul and the Philosophers 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 35-37. 
20 See the brief exploration of this subject at the end of section 6 of Chapter 5. 
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 I have now introduced the rest of what must be introduced in the 
introduction: introductions to both Lacan and Paul along with further comment on 
the source texts for this study; a survey of the relevant critical literature already in 
existence and a more specific elaboration of the hermeneutical method to be 
employed. 
 
2.  Introducing Lacan 
 
 The purpose of this introduction is not to introduce the reader objectively 
to the whole of Lacan’s thought.  Instead, the purpose is to introduce the reader to 
the elements of Lacan’s thought that are essential knowledge for this project, and 
that are not introduced later on. 
 The figure introduced here is only one specific Lacan, selected from 
among the many.  Firstly, it is the Lacan of psychoanalysis slightly more than the 
Lacan of philosophy (though understanding one always requires the other).  
Lacan’s system of thought is consistently a combination of both, and nearly every 
sentence we have recorded from his seminars and writings could be interpreted in 
a philosophical context just as much as a psychoanalytic one, with Lacan perhaps 
intending to mean both all of the time.  For example, his particular view of the 
human subject owes much to his attendance of Alexandre Kojève’s lectures on 
Hegel;21 so his most famous modern philosophical interpreter, Slavoj Žižek, 
successfully unites Lacan with Hegel into a philosophical critique of ideology, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Élisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, trans. by Barbara Bray (Chichester: Columbia University 
Press, 1997 [1993]), 98-103.  The Hegel-Lacan link is elaborated below. 
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dependent upon Lacan’s Hegelian view of the subject; on the other hand, Lacan’s 
view of the human subject as alienated from itself owes just as much to Freudian 
topography, and can be read without any awareness of Hegel.22  This reflects not 
only a divergence between readers of Lacan, but also a divergence between 
equally correct readings of Lacan: he was indeed simultaneously writing 
philosophy and psychoanalysis, and was actively and synthetically informed by 
both.  This must be stated at the beginning of a study of Lacan because the Lacan 
who is going to be presented is primarily the Lacan of psychoanalysis, who is 
often understood differently to the Lacan of philosophy, but not less correctly, and 
vice versa.  Nonetheless, despite the two different possible readings of many of 
Lacan’s ideas, nailing them down precisely always requires reading both 
philosophical and psychoanalytical backgrounds anyway. 
 The distinction between the two is unsurprisingly not clear-cut, but it still 
needs to be clarified methodologically.  Lacan’s thought can be characterised as 
increasingly philosophical in his later years, and increasingly concerned with 
mathematics and set theory.  In his earlier years, his thought fits more comfortably 
into traditional psychoanalytic modes of thought, though it never stops being fully 
psychoanalytic.  This is possibly because he was more concerned with fitting into 
the norms set by the IPA (International Psychoanalytic Association) before it 
expelled him, in 1963.23  For example, in his earlier writings he is already 
transforming the psychoanalytic concept of the Oedipus Complex into one that 
revolves around language more than sexuality (more specifically, grounding it in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Žižek’s Hegelian-Lacanian critique of ideology is discussed briefly below in reference to his 
reading of Paul.   
23 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, 244-259. 
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the symbolic rather than the imaginary), but his way of speaking about it does so 
without denying the legitimacy of a traditional understanding of it – he just 
designs a system that views language as the primary referent, in which things may 
well play out in the traditional form psychoanalysis describes nonetheless.  
However, in his later years he would shun the traditional view altogether, instead 
viewing the process as being entirely about language.24  Consequently, focusing 
on Lacan’s ideas from a more psychoanalytic than philosophical angle here results 
in using the early Lacan (pre-1963) more than the late Lacan.25 
 There are many good introductions to Lacan and his thought, so 
occasionally the reader will be pointed to these texts for more information on 
concepts that do not need to be explained fully here.  With the divisions just 
mentioned in mind, two of the best introductions from more of a psychoanalytic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Although Lacan made much use of a linguistic interpretation of the Oedipus Complex in the mid 
fifties (specifically S5), in S17 (1969-1970), 87-101, he says that he is moving away from Freud’s 
understanding of the Oedipus complex, and questions the extent to which Freud depended upon it, 
and on the myth of the primal murder of the Father.  In S17 he actually says that the Oedipus 
Complex is ‘useless’ in clinical context (p. 117), and develops the idea of the master signifier 
because the real father is precisely not the figure in relation to whom the hysteric’s condition 
develops.  Philippe Van Haute describes this shift in Lacan’s thinking in ‘“Freud’s Dream”? Some 
remarks on Lacan’s critique of the Oedipus complex in relation to his theory of hysteria in The 
Other side of Psychoanalysis,’ European Journal of Psychoanalysis <http://www.psychomedia.it/ 
pm/indther/lacan/van_haute.htm> [accessed 9.8.2016]. 
25 This is not to say that Lacan underwent some sort of radical reversal, a claim that risks 
emphasising development to the point of inventing inconsistency; but it is plain to see that Lacan’s 
notorious obscurity underlies an intended polyvalence that opens up so many possible 
interpretations that, when combined with the developments in his thought, it necessitates a specific 
positioning in interpretation in order to use his thought in any particular way.  Thus, this 
introduction is be more to the early Lacan than the late Lacan, more to his ideas as psychoanalytic 
than as philosophical (though understanding one requires the other), and more about his ideas that 
are directly relevant to this study than his ideas that will not be needed below. 
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angle are those of Malcolm Bowie and Joël Dor.26  Should one be looking for an 
introduction to the use of Lacan in philosophy (and gender studies, film theory, 
sociology, etc.), two of the best are by Sean Homer and Slavoj Žižek.27  There are 
also introductions to the clinical practice of Lacanian psychoanalysis.28  Élisabeth 
Roudinesco has written both a long intellectual biography of Lacan, and a short 
and exciting reflective biography focused more on the personality of Lacan.29  
The larger biography is extensively researched, and written by someone skilled as 
both a psychoanalyst and a historian, positioning Lacan’s ideas biographically 
with erudition and comprehensiveness. 
 It is difficult to know where to start when introducing Lacan.  Wherever 
one begins, it risks giving the impression that that is his ‘main idea;’ this is false 
and problematic, because, like with Paul, it is difficult to place any one idea at his 
‘centre.’30  Instead of starting with any one proposition, this introduction is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Malcolm Bowie, Lacan (London: Fontana Press, 1991).  Joël Dor, Introduction to the Reading 
of Lacan (New York: Other Press, 1998 [1985]). 
27 Sean Homer, Jacques Lacan (London: Routledge, 2005).  Slavoj Žižek, How to Read Lacan 
(London: Granta Books, 2006). 
28 Hill, Using Lacanian Clinical Technique.  Lionel Bailly, Lacan: A Beginner’s Guide (London: 
OneWorld, 2009) is also largely focused on the clinical side of Lacanian psychoanalysis.  Bruce 
Fink, A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 
1997), is more of a guide to the actual practice of psychoanalysis than to the theory of the clinic. 
29 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan.  Élisabeth Roudinesco, Gregory Elliott (trans.), Lacan In Spite of 
Everything (London: Verso, 2014 [2011]).  She has also written a history of psychoanalysis in 
France, translated by Jeffrey Mehlman, Jacques Lacan & Co (London: Free Association of Books, 
1990 [1986]). 
30 A most reasonable place to start might be with the equation that Freud + Saussure = Lacan; 
however: ‘An influential early formula for reading Lacan in the English language was “Freud + 
Saussure = Lacan,” [but] this misled many readers into reducing Lacan to a species of structural 
linguistics.’  Ian Parker, ‘Lacanian Discourse Analysis: Seven Elements,’ in Lacan, Discourse, 
	   15	  
composed in the form of a problematic: a situation that causes problems for the 
human subject, from the perspective of Lacanian psychoanalysis.  This can be 
done through a series of four propositions in logical sequence, justified in some of 
the ways Lacan justifies them, opening onto a view of how Lacan understands the 
human subject.31 
 Firstly, consciousness knows itself primarily through the medium of 
language.  While we can imagine images mentally, these are almost always 
images attached to words, and thinking in words is what the conscious mind is 
always doing.32  So (1) consciousness knows itself primarily through the medium 
of language, but (2) language comes from a place exterior to consciousness.  
Language is learned from others in infancy, rather than being in the brain from 
birth.33  Since (1) consciousness knows itself through language, and (2) language 
comes from a place exterior to consciousness, then (3) consciousness therefore is 
experienced as exterior to (alienated from) itself.  To make this opening 
problematic authentically Lacanian: (4) the subject that experiences itself as 
alienated from itself is not a substance, but is actually absent from the equation, a 
gap in language.  This is why identifications and self-understandings never quite 
seem to fit: the subject is alienated from itself in language. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Event: New Psychoanalytic Approaches to Textual Indeterminacy, eds. Ian Parker and David 
Pavón-Cuéllar (London: Routledge, 2014), 39. 
31 A good introduction to Lacan’s understanding of the human subject is Bruce Fink, The Lacanian 
Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
32 The inseparability of the signifier from its ideational content is a point made by phenomenology, 
but in Lacan’s work it is a point that comes primarily from the inseparability of signifier and 
signified in Saussurean linguistics, which will be discussed below. 
33 Though there could perhaps be some neurological argument about precocious knowledge of 
language, ‘language’ does not just mean awareness of signifier and signified, but also of a 
particular language’s form and structure, and one’s place within it. 
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 These four points open the way to the rest of Lacan’s thought.  They can 
be summarised as the symbolic, the Other, alienation and lack.  I will elaborate on 
these points individually, which will also pave the way to introduce the three 
orders (sometimes ‘registers’) of symbolic, imaginary and real (though these 
terms, each themselves evolving throughout Lacan’s career, cannot easily be 
described in full).34 
 
2.1. The symbolic: consciousness knows itself primarily through the medium 
of language. 
 Many introductions to Lacan seek out the genesis of his thought in perhaps 
his most famous idea: the mirror stage.35  In the mirror stage, the subject identifies 
with the body’s image, as an attempt to solve the problem that already exists: that 
language is how it knows itself, but language comes from somewhere else.36  So, 
what does it mean for language to ‘come from somewhere else’?  Let me begin by 
looking at some of the thinkers who influenced Lacan’s earliest work, working 
towards an understanding of ‘the symbolic.’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Some scholars capitalise the three orders, and others do not.  I do not. 
35 For example Homer, Jacques Lacan, 21-28; Bailly, Lacan, 28-40; Roudinesco, Lacan In Spite 
of Everything, 17-22.  This approach rightly places a central importance on the subject’s alienation 
from itself in Lacan’s thought; but beginning here makes a related, very important mistake: it 
lends primacy to imaginary alienation, when for Lacan this imaginary alienation is a symptom put 
in place in response to a symbolic alienation that already exists.  Perhaps they decide to begin here 
because it was one of Lacan’s earliest ideas that continued to be influential on his later work. 
36 This might sound farfetched, but Lacan is not necessarily suggesting that all infants are aware of 
the problem of their own alienation in language.  One does not need to be aware of the exact 
nature of a problem in order to attempt to solve it. 
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 This idea comes from various places, each of which has special 
significance for Lacan as a psychoanalyst.  Firstly, it comes from Lacan’s earlier 
years exploring Hegel, Heidegger and phenomenology.  From the mid-thirties 
Lacan had been increasingly involved in philosophical circles intensely studying 
these subjects.  More specifically, he was a regular attendee of Alexandre 
Kojève’s lectures on Hegel.37  There he heard the idea that existence is 
characterised by a rational process, and that that rational process is driven by ‘a 
truth without a subject.’38  Kojève ‘saw historical man as a void-creating subject, 
exercising his negativity in struggle and labor and driven by a desire that by its 
very nature could never be satisfied.’39  Leading to this, Hegel writes: 
 
The simple ‘I’ is this genus or the simple universal, for which the 
differences are not differences only by its being the negative essence of 
the shaped independent moments; and self-consciousness is thus 
certain of itself only by superseding this other that presents itself to 
self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness is Desire.  
Certain of the nothingness of this other, it explicitly affirms that this 
nothingness is for it the truth of the other; it destroys the independent 
object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty, 
a certainty which has become explicit for self-consciousness itself in 
an objective manner.40 
 
 
Anyone familiar with Lacan’s ideas can spot the forebears of several of them in 
this quote, which is why it is given in full here; but the one most relevant for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, 88-106. 
38 Ibid., 102. 
39 Ibid., 102. 
40 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 109 (B.IV.174). 
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early Lacan is the idea of consciousness knowing itself only through language, 
expressed early on in the ‘I,’ a signifier that comes from an Other, the whole of 
the world outside the subject, in which the subject must cover up a sort of 
nothingness in order for consciousness to know itself with certainty.  Whether or 
not this interpretation of the section is accurate, it is the interpretation Lacan 
heard.  Kojève, commenting on the wider section around this paragraph, said in 
1939 that 
 
Man is Self-Consciousness.  He is conscious of himself, conscious of 
his human reality and dignity; and it is in this that he is essentially 
different from animals, which do not go beyond the level of simple 
Sentiment of self.  Man becomes conscious of himself at the moment 
when—for the ‘first’ time—he says ‘I.’ To understand man by 
understanding his ‘origin’ is, therefore, to understand the origin of the I 
revealed by speech.41 
 
 
Again, one can see forebears of a few of Lacan’s ideas here, but, most 
importantly, that consciousness knows itself as conscious through the medium of 
speech and language.  So, when Lacan in 1945 presented a paper in which he 
argued that ‘Madness is lived entirely in the register of meaning,’42 a claim that 
arises from both his doctoral thesis and teachings he received from Gaëtan Gatian 
de Clérambault in 1929-1931,43 he argued it in a way so dependent upon the 
philosophies of Heidegger and Hegel that he was accused of being ‘irresistibly 
attracted by metaphysics (Heidegger, Hegel, and “beyond Hegel, the logic of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. by James H. Nichols Jr (London: 
Cornell University Press, 1969 [1947]), 3. 
42 Marcelle Marini, Jacques Lacan: The French Context, trans. by Anne Tomiche (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992 [1986]), 113. 
43 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, 27. 
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madness”).’44  Though there is no space here to discuss Lacan’s early dependence 
upon Heidegger, the point is that originally his view of the subject as caught up in 
the world of language, subject to a logic outside of itself, long predates the main 
arrival on the psychoanalytic scene of his understanding of human subjectivity in 
1953. 
 The second primary source for Lacan’s understanding of the symbolic 
examined here is Ferdinand de Saussure.45  This will position Lacan squarely as 
one who ties phenomenology and linguistics into a concept of how the subject 
responds to its own alienation in language. 
 Lacan’s debt to Saussure will be discussed much more below, specifically 
as it influenced his understanding of das Ding and the synchronicity of clinical 
structures (Chapter 2).  However, Saussure is also of immense importance to the 
most basic level of Lacan’s thought.  Saussure demonstrated the ease with which 
a string of signifiers, taken as phonemes (individual sounds) can slide in meaning 
until sense is attached retroactively.  He gives the example of the string of 
phonemes sižlaprã.  Depending upon how one divides the phonemes, into either 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Marini, Jacques Lacan, 113, records this accusation as having come from Henri Ey. 
45 Lacan’s understanding of the subject’s alienation in language was then heavily influenced by his 
experience of surrealist thought and his friendship with Salvador Dalí; and affected even more by 
the discoveries of Claude Lévi-Strauss and early structuralism.  Darian Leader’s introduction to 
Lacan, the text of which was most recently published as Introducing Lacan: A Graphic Guide 
(London: Icon Books, 2010 [1995]), places the most emphasis on the influence of surrealism upon 
Lacan’s theories.  For more see Jean-Michel Rabaté, ‘Lacan’s Turn to Freud,’ in The Cambridge 
Companion to Lacan, ed. Jean-Michel Rabaté (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
17-20.  Élisabeth Roudinesco, in both Jacques Lacan, 31 and Jacques Lacan & Co, 110-112, 
attributes Lacan’s move from a constitutionalist to a linguistic approach to psychosis to Salvador 
Dalí’s ‘The Rotten Donkey.’  Sadly there is not space here to discuss all of the major influences on 
Lacan. 
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si-je-la-prends or si-je-l’apprends, it can mean either ‘If I take it/her’ or ‘if I learn 
it.’46  Breaking strings of phonemes down into signifiers, Saussure then sees each 
signifier (once differentiated from those around it) as an inseparable unit of 
signifier and signified.  There is some difference between how Saussure and 
Lacan are translated, but the French terms are those usually translated as 
‘signifier’ and ‘signified’ in Lacan.  Saussure depicts the unit of signifier and 
signified as follows:47 
 
Signified 
 
Signifier 
 
 
The signified is the concept that the word represents (ideational content), and the 
signifier is the word itself.  The upward and downward arrows represent the 
inseparable interplay between the two, as the signified is brought into 
consciousness by the signifier, but that which the signifier means is dependent 
upon what is signified.  This fits nicely with what Lacan would have been reading 
in Heidegger and phenomenology about the inseparability the subject, the object 
and the perception of the object.48  Lacan makes much use of the Saussurean 
signifying unit, but he reverses it: 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. by Roy Harris (London: 
Duckworth, 1983 [1972]), 103. 
47 Ibid., 113. 
48 For example, Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. by Albert 
Hofstadter (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982 [1927, 1975]), 55-76 (§9.b-c). 
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Signifier 
 
signified 
 
 
This reversal is to demonstrate the primacy of the signifier as that which 
determines the meaning, a point demonstrated by the whole of Lacan’s 
philosophical system and psychoanalytic practice.  He then represents the signifier 
with S and the signified with s, giving a basic Lacanian signifying unit of:49 
 
 
S 
 
s 
 
 
Saussure follows up his portrayal of a signifying unit immediately with the 
point that ‘A language is a system in which all the elements fit together, and in 
which the value of any one element depends on the simultaneous coexistence of 
all the others,’ which, altered with Lacan’s inversion, is represented as:50 
 
S                      S                       S   
 
s                       s                       s 
 
 
Although this is an oversimplification of a single element of Saussure’s 
contributions to the field of linguistics as it existed in Lacan’s time, it is an 
important element in the background of how Lacan’s system of thought arose.  
The language through which the subject knows itself is Language as identified by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See, for example, Écrits, 428. 
50 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 113. 
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Saussurean linguistics, as well as the rational system from which the non-
substance behind Hegel’s ‘I’ is subtracted.  The subject knowing itself through 
language is part of what is meant by ‘the symbolic,’ the symbolic register.  The 
symbolic is the register of structures, of language, of the law and of the signifier 
and its games.  It is difficult to offer a definition of the symbolic so early, but 
suffice it to say, every aspect of Lacan that has been discussed so far has been to 
do with the symbolic. 
 
2.2. The Other: language itself comes from a place exterior to consciousness. 
 This is a claim that initially sounds quite simple: the subject does not 
invent the language it speaks; it learns the language as something that pre-existed 
beyond itself.  However, this surface meaning would hardly be enough to justify 
the complexity of emotions Lacan traces back to the anxiety caused by our 
alienation in language.  Žižek goes so far as to make this the core difference 
between Lacan and Heidegger: for Heidegger the subject exists in language, but 
for Lacan the subject suffers in language as it twists and contorts according to its 
laws.51  To explain just how oppressive is the subject’s thrownness into language, 
I turn now to a monumentally influential paper by Roman Jakobson. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Why Lacan is Not a Heideggerian,’ in lacanian ink 32, ed. Josefina Ayerza (New 
York: The Wooster Press, 2008), 143.  ‘[Man] dwells in a torture-house of language: the entire 
psychopathology deployed by Freud, from conversion-symptoms inscribed into the body up to 
total psychotic breakdowns, are scars of this permanent torture, so many signs of an original and 
irremediable gap between subject and language, so many signs that man cannot ever be at home in 
his own home.’ 
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 In 1956 Jakobson published a paper on the subject of aphasia (difficulties 
in speech).52  He was working from a Saussurean model of linguistics, and 
outlines two different axes along which difficulties in a discourse can arise: the 
metaphoric and the metonymic.  The metaphoric axis involves signifiers in a state 
of similarity (such as ‘love’ and ‘heart’): in metaphor, one signifier is used in 
place of another when the signifying units are similar (‘I offer you my heart’).  
The metonymic axis involves signifiers in a state of contiguity (such as ‘stock 
market’ and ‘wall street’): in metonymy, the signified of one signifier swaps with 
the signified of another when the signifying units are contiguous (‘on wall street’).  
In Jakobson’s view, aphasia occurs when there is a stoppage along one of these 
two axes.53  Russell Grigg and others have identified various problems with 
Jakobson’s article, from its claims about the origins of aphasia to his definitions 
of metaphor and metonymy.54  However, what matters here is the way Lacan uses 
the theory.  Later in 1956, Lacan wrote ‘The Instance of the Letter in the 
Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud,’55 in which he identifies the Freudian 
concepts of condensation and displacement in dreams with metaphor and 
metonymy.56 
 Examples of how Lacan schematises metaphor and metonymy using 
common examples from today’s language can be found in many of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Roman Jakobson, ‘Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances,’ in 
Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, Fundamentals of Language (The Hague: Mouton, 1956), 67-
96.  
53 Ibid., 90. 
54 Russell Grigg, Lacan, Language, and Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), 151-169. 
55 Écrits, 412-441. 
56 Ibid., 424-431. 
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introductions to Lacan’s work, in lieu of the obscure ways Lacan tends to 
communicate the idea himself.  Lionel Bailly uses the metaphor ‘a star is born’ to 
illustrate the first of these relations.57  In this metaphor, there are two signifiers at 
play, in a state of similarity: the unspoken signifier ‘person’ (whichever person is 
being called a ‘star’) along with its signified, and the spoken signifier ‘star’ along 
with its signified.  Let us say, to make things even clearer, that the person who ‘is 
a star’ is called Fred:58 
 
S1 (‘Fred’)                         S2  (‘Star’)                       
s1  (        )                            s2         (★)   . 
                         
 
 
In the phrase ‘a star is born,’ a metaphorical substitution takes place, in which, 
due to the intended similarity between ‘Fred’ and what is meant by ‘star,’ the 
unspoken signifying unit ‘Fred’ takes the place of s2, so that s1 becomes the 
signified: 
 
S2 
S1 . s2 
s1 
 
 
In metaphor a signified is replaced by a signifier of an unspoken unit, so that the 
original signifier is now ultimately paired with a new signified for the purpose of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Bailly, Lacan, 52. 
58 Perhaps the reason the signifier ‘Fred’ is the first to come to mind when imagining what to name 
a star is because of a star, Fred Astaire; or because Astaire not only sounds like ‘a star’ but is 
precisely the pronunciation of the Ancient Greek word for ‘star’ (ἀστήρ).  If either of these is true, 
this illustrates the point Lacan is getting to: metaphor and metonymy operate in the unconscious, 
due to the similarity or contiguity of signifiers.  The picture of Fred Astaire comes from his 
Wikipedia page at <www.wikipedia.org> [accessed 22.6.2016]. 
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the metaphor.  More simply, in metonymy the signified is replaced with another 
contiguous signified (not with a similar signifier).  A common example is the 
signified of ‘Wall Street’ being replaced by the signified of ‘the stock market,’ as 
the part comes to represent the whole due to the contiguity of the concepts.  One 
could string several of Bailly’s examples of metonymy into a sentence with four 
cases of metonymical substitution: ‘Downing Street wrote that the Crown will 
prosecute, as the pen is mightier than the sword.’  These can all be represented 
with the simple formula: 
 
S2 
s1 
 
 
Thus stated, the difference between metaphor and metonymy is that in metaphor 
the similarity between two signifying units allows one unit to swap for the 
signified of another, displacing it, whereas in metonymy the contiguity of two 
signifying units allows one to take over for the other, most commonly in the form 
of the part standing in for the whole. 
 Lacan used Jakobson’s development from Saussure to illustrate how the 
rules of the unconscious as outlined by Freud actually amount to Freud 
discovering that the unconscious is structured like a language.59  In Freud’s The 
Interpretation of Dreams he outlines the theories of condensation and 
displacement in dream work, in which one thing substitutes for another in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 This style of claim, stating that a present way of putting something is actually a restatement of 
something already said in the past, is the style of claim that will be made below regarding some 
aspects of Lacan’s thought and Paul’s thought, and termed ‘equivocation’ and ‘elaboration.’  
These are outlined in section 4.3 of this chapter. 
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unconscious.  When Lacan reads the terminology of Jakobson back onto Freud he 
leaves us with another sense in which the human subject is subject to rules it does 
not even know exist: if the unconscious actually operates according to these rules, 
then the conscious mind, the cogito, is truly alienated from that which determines 
it. 
 Both Freud’s initial claim about condensation and displacement in dreams 
and Lacan’s insertion of it into the terms of linguistics and the rules of the 
signifier are claims that are only backed up by clinical experience; though, over 
the years since Freud began his practice, there are endless clinical examples.  
Lacan’s own writing, like Joël Dor’s Introduction to the Reading of Lacan, 
explains metaphor and metonymy with common examples, but only seeks to 
prove their existence in the unconscious by commenting upon Freud’s case 
studies, which might not any longer be convincing enough for the sceptic.  
Bailly’s introduction, on the other hand, contains a long series of examples of 
instances of metaphor and metonymy in the dreams, speech and slips of his 
analysands.60  For example, one of his analysands recounted a dream in which she 
found herself crushing the feet of a monkey.61  She then recounted the dream 
again, but this time said that she was crushing the monkey’s ‘tootsies’ (toes).  In 
speaking about the dream she eventually remembered that ‘tootsie’ was the 
nickname her parents used for her sister, and the meaning of the dream began to 
unravel.  This is a case of metonymy, not metaphor, as the signifying units 
‘tootsie’ (as the sister’s name) and ‘foot’ are not similar, but, rather, contiguous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Bailly, Lacan, 55-61.  ‘Analysand’ is the word Lacan prefers to use instead of ‘patient’ or 
‘client.’ 
61 Ibid., 56. 
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(they are not different words for similar signifieds, but contiguous signifiers for 
different signifieds).  That is to say, the signified s1, the idea of the sister herself, 
through its contiguous signifier ‘tootsie’ (S1), came to be the signified of the 
contiguous S2, ‘foot.’  So metonymy is the linguistic function that produced the 
dream in the unconscious. 
  Lacan does much more with metaphor and metonymy, and the 
unconscious plays of the signifier, than could possibly be explored here.  The 
important thing to note is that this is part of what allows Lacan to say ‘The 
unconscious is the Other’s discourse.’62  ‘The Other’ is an extremely important 
term in Lacan’s thought, which means many things and is difficult to pin down to 
one consistent definition.  One part of it, though, is this very idea: that the 
unconscious functions linguistically, but language is something that comes from 
somewhere else, and the rules according to which the unconscious functions, and 
indeed, most of the time, the very signifying patterns that are transpiring 
according to these rules, remain unknown to us.  So language as a whole, as it 
exists outside of us, is ‘the Other;’ but so is the internality of language, the 
language so internal that it is equally unknown to us. 
 
2.3. Alienation: therefore consciousness is experienced as exterior to itself. 
Having introduced a few of the thinkers upon whom Lacan’s early ideas 
are dependent, it might be helpful to discuss the third point of my introductory 
Lacanian problematic using an example of the implications of the Lacanian 
subject on society and individuals. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Écrits, 10 and 316. 
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 An example of consciousness as language being experienced as exterior to 
itself in today’s society comes to us in the form of the self-consciousness of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people, particularly LGBT youth.  
The self-perception of sexuality and gender, especially in a Lacanian perspective, 
is a difficult topic.  A basic reason for this is that the signifier never quite seems to 
sum up or encapsulate the signified.  This is a very old philosophical problem, in 
part leading to Plato’s concept of the forms, and leading to the very existence of 
modern analytic philosophy – the attempt to overcome the imperfections of 
language.  However, the difference between any particular table and the signified 
of the word ‘table’ is a problem that pales in comparison to the difference between 
the signified of the word ‘bisexual’ (for example) and any particular person’s 
perception of the self.  This distance grows considerably when taking into account 
a Lacanian view of the subject, in which all parts of the subject’s conscious and 
unconscious structure, including gender identity and sexual orientation, are 
indebted to the signifier both for their origins and current form.  Even without this 
more controversial point, a Lacanian view of the symbolic origins of sexual 
orientation only adds to the symbolic alienation that already exists due to the 
subject’s existence in language.  The primary point here is that the words ‘lesbian’ 
or ‘male,’ etc., are words that describe the way a human feels about an element of 
their core essence, but they relate that essence-word to the world of matter, of 
perception, of social constructs, of biological existence.  Since what exists in the 
world, either our own bodies or the other humans to whom we are attracted, are 
people and not words, any word that we use to describe an essential relationship 
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to bodies or persons will not fully encapsulate that relation.  This leaves the 
subject alienated from itself in language. 
 Why is this example particularly apt?  In a way, this problem is no more 
acute than any cultural, racial or religious identification: the signifier (and its 
structural games) never quite matches up with the signified, and the gap can create 
emotional turmoil.  However, in the last few decades, ‘gay rights’ (or, more fully 
but not quite fully enough, LGBT rights), have been taken up by political parties 
on all continents, on the left, centre and sometimes right of the political spectrum.  
The emergence of LGBT rights as a commonplace political category has 
coincided with what some call a ‘proliferation of identities:’ the presence in 
modern politics of a continued drive towards more and more different ways of 
identifying.  These identifications in themselves are often liberating new ways of 
understanding oneself – the point here is not to criticise this positive move in 
society.  However, no new signifier will ever match its signified, especially over 
an extended period of time.  So in response to the emergence of an ever-
expanding list of signifiers with which one could identify, there is also a growing 
movement everyone will have heard at some point: ‘I don’t need your labels’ (a 
statement addressed directly to the Other if ever there was one!).  This is precisely 
the opposite of the ever-expanding world of identifications; or, rather, not its 
opposite but its obverse.  It results in the LGBT youth (or even adult!) being torn 
between identification and anti-identification, when in a world without this 
particular problem neither side would exist.  Identification brings the problem of 
socially fixing oneself in a way one might regret, and anti-identification does 
exactly the same should one later choose to identify.  Non-identification, simply 
	  30	  
exempting oneself from the situation, is a possibility, but is made difficult by a 
world that expects one either to have ‘pride’ and a place in the political discourse, 
or to be avowedly against the discourse and shout about the inefficacy of labels.  
So the subject is trapped in a discourse it did not write, alienated in the language 
that it must use to understand itself. 
 Everything in the world that the signifier fails at describing can be 
qualified by Lacan as ‘imaginary,’ meaning that it falls into the imaginary 
register/order.  The symbolic is the order of logic, of language as such, the world 
of the rules of a game.  The imaginary is the order of all of the content of that 
world.  It is not just the order of the physical/material, but also of all that appears, 
and even of signifiers when not discussing how those signifiers relate.  So, 
sexuality as a whole, and identification as well, are imaginary processes; but they 
happen according to the rules of the symbolic, and the modern LGBT person’s 
potential alienation in language is a failure of the symbolic to contain the 
imaginary. 
 It might seem at this point as though I am introducing parts of Lacan’s 
thought that could not possibly have any relevance to the interpretation of Paul.  
However, as I will argue in sections 4.1 and 4.2 below, and return to in chapters 5 
and 6, understanding exactly what Lacan means by ‘alienation’ not only helps to 
clear up some of the errors made and difficulties faced by other Lacanian readings 
of Paul, but will also be helpful when it comes to outlining positively what Paul’s 
ideas, in Lacanian terminology, actually are.  When I discuss Pauline soteriology 
in Chapter 6, the schematic suggested only makes sense if one already 
understands Lacan’s view of the human subject. 
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2.4. Lack: the subject that experiences itself as alienated from itself is not a 
substance, but is absent from the equation, a gap in language. 
 Part of what makes the Lacanian subject so alienated in language is the 
fact that the subject is, at its core, nothing; and here there is certainly an 
unbridgeable difference between not just Lacan and Paul, but Lacan and almost 
all Christian theology.  Most studies of Lacan and theology acknowledge this to 
some extent.  For example, Marcus Pound’s Žižek: a (very) critical introduction 
begins with the observation that Lacan, following Freud, said that ‘Religion in all 
its forms consists in avoiding this emptiness.’63  As will be outlined below, the 
emptiness to which he refers is the emptiness of das Ding, in the very place where 
Christian theology locates the soul (and also a place that can be covered with the 
signifier ‘God’).  Pound then argues that Lacan’s continual and generally positive 
dialogue with Catholics and historical theology justifies a Lacan-theology 
discourse nonetheless (a point that has been made often and is justified by the 
wealth of Lacan-theology discourse to be summarised below).64  Likewise in 
Theology After Lacan, Adrian Johnston’s rebuttal of a radical atheist reading of 
Lacan necessarily comes to the question of the soul, regarding which he rightly 
points out the inherent ambivalence in Lacan’s understanding of das Ding: the 
fact that there is in it both the lack of presence and the presence of lack, and that 
there is something vaguely positive in das Ding (i.e., jouissance).65  These 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Marcus Pound, Žižek: a (very) critical introduction (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2008), 13, quoting 
Lacan, S7, 130. 
64 Pound, Žižek, 13-16. 
65 Adrian Johnston, ‘Life Terminable and Interminable: The Undead and the Afterlife of the 
Afterlife—A Friendly Disagreement with Martin Hägglund,’ in Theology After Lacan: The 
Passion for the Real, eds. Creston Davis, Marcus Pound and Clayton Crockett (Eugene, OR: 
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concepts have not been introduced yet, and das Ding will be discussed in detail 
below; but it is clear that any theological dialogue with Lacan must pass through 
the place of the soul. 
 Some way towards bridging this gap can be made right away, though 
perhaps only a quarter of a bridge on either side.66  Tina Beattie attempts to 
confront the matter head-on, when in the introduction to her book on Lacan and 
Aquinas she states outright that she will ‘resist Lacan’s nihilism,’67 and then 
points out that Freud himself often made use of the term ‘soul,’ alluding to 
something more mystical and complex than the mind as the subject of 
psychoanalysis, but this was translated out in the standard English edition of 
Freud.68  However, be this the case for Freud, Lacan opted for the even more 
neutral word ‘subject,’ and discussed the subject primarily as something ‘barred,’ 
lacking, frighteningly empty.  From the other side, this discussion of ‘soul’ 
slightly misses the mark with Paul as well, who did occasionally make use of the 
Greek signifier ψυχή (psychē), but always as something completely inseparable 
from the body, the body being the thing that is to be resurrected into the afterlife.  
Indeed, this is the exact point Rudolf Bultmann made in his attempt to connect 
Pauline terminology with a Heideggerian view of the soul (Dasein), in response to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Cascade Books, 2014), 106-111.  The term jouissance, a Lacanian spin on ‘enjoyment,’ will be 
introduced in Chapter 2, and is defined in the Glossary, Appendix A. 
66 For an excellent related argument see Ward Blanton, A Materialism for the Masses: Saint Paul 
and the Philosophy of Undying Life (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2014).  He argues 
with sweeping comprehension that Paul always should have been read by the continental tradition 
as a materialist in line with the ‘underground current of aleatory materialism.’  This supports the 
thesis argued below, that Paul was ruined for continental philosophy by Nietzsche, and thus he 
represents a missed opportunity. 
67 Tina Beattie, Theology After Postmodernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3. 
68 Beattie, Theology After Postmodernity, 11. 
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which the more recent Paul scholar N. T. Wright says ‘this is the only thing on 
which Bultmann and I agree.’69  With the soul as something inseparable from the 
body, not as Plato’s eternal seat of rationality, is there really such a necessary 
discord between Lacan and Paul, both viewing human consciousness as 
something thoroughly embodied but also surprisingly malleable, either through 
psychoanalysis or participation in Christ?70 
 The closest these two bridges can be brought together is to discuss, as 
Johnston tends towards, the extent to which the lack/void in the Lacanian subject 
is surprisingly full.  Immediately after explaining how the unconscious operates 
according to the rules of metonymy and metaphor, Lacan asks whether it would 
be possible to come to understand oneself fully within the signifying play of the 
unconscious and then, finally, to ‘be there,’ to know that that is where the ‘I’ is.  
He answers in the negative, and then says this: ‘What we must say is: I am not, 
where I am the plaything of my thought; I think about what I am where I do not 
think I am thinking.’71  Since S and s are situated on separate planes, and since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 N. T. Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body: All for One and One for All – Reflections on Paul’s 
Anthropology In His Complex Contexts,’ in N. T. Wright, Pauline Perspectives (London: SPCK, 
2013), p. 470.  In both ‘Paul,’ in Shorter Writings by Rudolf Bultmann: Existence and Faith, ed. 
Schubert M. Ogden (London: Collins, 1960), 153-161 and Theology of the New Testament: 
Volume 1, trans. by Kendrick Grobel (London: SCM, 1952 [1948]), 191-238, Rudolf Bultmann 
uses Heidegger’s terminology to define Paul’s anthropological terminology.  This is an excellent 
example of the hermeneutical strategy termed ‘description’ below.  
70 Stanley Stowers takes this ‘materialist’ reading of Paul even further, pointing out how later 
theologians and philosophers have read Platonist and then Cartesian presumptions about 
subjectivity into Paul, forcing debates about the mind onto texts that Stowers reads in context of 
more practical concerns like self mastery.  Stanley Stowers, ‘Paul as a Hero of Subjectivity,’ in 
eds. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries, Paul and the Philosophers (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2013), 159-174. 
71 Écrits, 430. 
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meaning can never be fixed and the full workings of the unconscious cannot fully 
be discovered, ‘I think therefore I am’ absolutely leads to its opposite: ‘But “I” am 
not where I think.’  What thinks is not a thing that knows what lies beneath, 
before and around the signifier ‘I.’  This sounds so pessimistic that any Lacan-
theology dialogue should be immediately suspended; but there is more.  Within 
this pessimistic, ‘nihilistic’ world (as Beattie calls it), Lacan posits himself, as 
blissfully arrogant as ever, as the one who also has discovered a clinical trajectory 
towards the knowledge of the self.  This is not to say that Lacan thought that 
every subject possesses the power to understand oneself fully and come to think 
where one is not, but, rather that psychoanalysis provides a way to speak that 
which one did not know one was, and in so doing to alter the very form of one’s 
being through discovering it (to found in finding, to use the terminology above).  
This is neither nihilistic nor pessimistic, but actually rather hopeful.  Further, if 
one of the later theses of this study is correct, that ‘conversion’ and participation 
in Christ for Paul represents a psychoanalytic event, then, to the extent to which 
the subject in Lacan actually does have some semblance of positive being 
(through the full speech of the clinic), so also equally does the Pauline soul find 
its existence in recreation in Christ.  Thus the exact way in which Lacan is 
perhaps most anti-theological, with the human subject as lack rather than 
substance, is also the idea that most opens the possibility of meaningful dialogue 
with Paul – because it is this pessimism that also allows Lacan to believe in the 
possibility of real psychical change, the kind to which Paul is a witness. 
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 This introduction to Lacan is, as stated, nowhere near complete.  It is a 
theological scraping of the surface, leading to what comes below.  I can now, 
though, at least introduce the last of the three Lacanian registers: the real.  The 
real is the register of the impossible, of that which does not exist.72  The real is the 
gap in language, in which the subject finds itself; the piece not contained in 
metaphor and metonymy, despite the subject not actually having any positive 
identifiable ‘being’ outside of the play of language.  The real is also a concept that 
will make more sense after the introduction of das in Chapter 2. 
 One can see after all this that things are not quite so simple as saying that 
Lacan = Freud + Saussure, or anywhere near as simple as a ‘Hegelianized 
Freudianism.’73  Lacan was certainly attempting a ‘return to Freud,’ as he said; 
but he returns with far more than just Saussure, and the vision of the human 
subject as alienated from itself owes just as much to Hegel’s idealism as it does to 
Saussurean linguistics or Freudian topography.  I have introduced some of the 
influences on Lacan’s thought, but have not come close to introducing all of 
Lacan’s influences or ideas.  Nonetheless it should be clear how central the notion 
of the subject’s alienation in language is to Lacan’s thought; as well as the extent 
to which Lacan’s system of thought remains entirely psychoanalytic despite his 
revelations about psychoanalysis having largely come from elsewhere, only to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Though it might be frustrating that ‘real’ refers to that which does not exist, and ‘imaginary’ to 
that which does, this is the way it is.  ‘Imaginary’ has unnecessary baggage in English, but is 
simply a reference to the image, to that which relates to the world of perception.  ‘Real’ has a long 
history tracing back through Hegel and Kant, so might make more sense to the philosophical 
reader than the theological.  Mark Fisher puts it nicely: ‘For Lacan, the Real is what any “reality” 
must suppress; indeed, reality constitutes itself through just this repression.’  Mark Fisher, 
Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Winchester: Zero Books, 2009), 18. 
73 John Milbank, Theology & Social Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 310. 
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confirmed (in his view and the views of Lacanian psychoanalysts worldwide) by 
clinical experience. 
 
3.  Introducing St Paul 	  
 
Paul74 is Christianity’s earliest theologian, often earning the title, through 
scepticism or adoration, of the ‘founder of Christianity.’  As such, he is one of its 
most debated figures.  He is the earliest extant Christian source (not just the first 
theologian), and wrote something about how it is that Jesus affects human 
existence – every detail is hotly contested, and some of them will be discussed 
below.  Rather than attempting to present a neutral description of Paul’s life and 
beliefs (which would not succeed), what follows is a brief history of the 
interpretation of Paul, through which some of the many Pauls that have emerged 
throughout history might be glimpsed.  This introduction will also bear specific 
reference to Romans 7, which will be one of the key passages discussed in what 
follows.  A translation can be found in Appendix B, below.  Romans 7 could be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 ‘Paul,’ refers to the theologising character discernable from the content of Romans, 1 and 2 
Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 and 2 Thessalonians (which have similar theological 
content) and Philemon, augmented by Colossians and a cautious use of Ephesians, sometimes in 
opposition to the pseudo-Pauline theology of 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus.  Of course, by beginning 
from the presumption that these texts reveal a ‘theologising character’ I am already forcing an 
anachronous fiction onto them, as with any subject’s primal adoption of an ego identity; and the 
selection of texts that the author states are the ones presumed to be ‘authentic’ for the purposes of 
this study then bias the study to the image of Paul presented in those texts.  Nonetheless, every 
study of Paul must state which letters the author of the study believes to be authentic, and must 
begin with some pre-conceived understanding of who ‘Paul’ is.  The aim of a psychoanalytic 
study, as outlined repeatedly in this introduction, is to use certain tools that potentially allow one 
dig beneath the fantasies that every interpretation must begin by adopting.  Paul is referred to as 
‘St Paul’ in headings, but only as ‘Paul’ throughout the main text. 
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taken in many ways, either as Paul talking about the way he feels in the present, 
or Paul talking about his life pre-conversion, or Paul imitating someone else.  As a 
result, its interpretation has varied throughout history.  It is also the section that 
Lacan himself quotes in Seminar VII.75   
There is no shortage of introductions to Paul, but one that stands out as a 
simultaneously accurate, comprehensive, concise and up-to-date introduction to 
the critical issues in scholarship is David Horrell’s An Introduction to the Study of 
Paul.76  Modern historians of Paul tend to track three major events in the history 
of his interpreters: St Augustine, Martin Luther and E. P. Sanders.  I will take a 
brief look at some of the relevant parts of each of these, before summarising the 
major interpretative shifts since then.  It is virtually impossible to present an 
objective view of the scenario, particularly of the impact of the first three main 
thinkers, as the debates over their legacies are the content of so much Pauline 
scholarship since them.  As with the previous section, this is not a comprehensive 
introduction, but a scraping of the surface in order for the unacquainted to have a 
way in, and the subject matter of this study to be established – as such, it is 
probably guilty of summarising great trends in Pauline theology too briefly and 
crassly.  Specifically, this study is biased in favour of certain aspects of what have 
come to be called the ‘New Perspective(s) on Paul’ (or, at first, the ‘New 
Perspective’), which mostly begin with E. P. Sanders in 1977.77  Though Sanders’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 S7, 102-103. 
76 David G. Horrell, An Introduction to the Study of Paul 3rd ed. (London: T&T Clark, 2015). 
77 The amount that one covers with the term ‘New Perspectives’ of course varies.  Throughout this 
study I include any scholar who follows E. P. Sanders’ rejection of the idea that Paul opposed 
‘legalistic Judaism’ within this category.  However, Sanders’ replacement suggestion that first 
century Judaism was a monadic entity that can be qualified as ‘covenantal nomism’ has now also 
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argument has been widely accepted, it has also been revised in many different 
opposing directions by various scholars, and, of course, not all of the finer points 
of it have survived unaltered.  Hopefully the brief summary that follows will 
make that clear. 
 
3.1. St Augustine, Martin Luther and E. P. Sanders 
Though he was not Paul’s first major interpreter, the most influential of 
Paul’s early interpreters is St Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE).78  Augustine’s 
method was chiefly philosophical, examining the nature of the will and the 
subject’s ability to will moral action.  Augustine believed that there was a will to 
affect one’s moral behaviour, but not a will to affect one’s will, leaving one in a 
state of Original Sin, which he read onto the biblical Creation story.79  Augustine 
then saw Christians as having a sort of dual nature: sinners, still caught up in 
Original Sin, but forgiven and empowered by faith towards good works.  
Augustine thus laid the foundations for an autobiographical reading of Romans 7 
in which Paul expresses his post-conversion religious experience as essentially (as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
been heavily revised or rejected by most scholars (particularly inasmuch as Judaism in the first 
century was far too varied for such a monolithic qualification, leading to the occasional use now of 
the term ‘Judaisms’).  Most of the scholars with whom I interact fit more into the category of 
‘apocalyptic’ than ‘New Perspectives,’ but they are certainly not ‘Old Perspectives’ either.  This 
distinction will be maintained as much as possible, but the main goal is to introduce those 
unfamiliar with Pauline studies to the major shifts in thought, the biggest of which is the change 
from ‘old’ to ‘new.’ 
78 Eugene TeSelle, Augustine (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2006), vi. 
79 Stephen Westerholm says some of this in Perspectives Old and New on Paul (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2004), 6-9.  This is probably the best general introduction to the entire history of 
Pauline scholarship available.  For much more depth on Paul’s more recent interpreters, see N. T. 
Wright, Paul and his Recent Interpreters (London: SPCK, 2015). 
	   39	  
Luther would say) simul justus et peccator – constantly torn between sin and 
grace.80  This opens the way towards an assumption that Paul suffered from a 
guilty conscience, and that Christians have a dual state of perpetually redeemed 
sinner. 
Martin Luther (1483-1546 CE) completely transformed the interpretation 
of Paul.81  His impact was immortalised beyond what he could have expected, 
because (like all theologians and translators of Scripture) he translated his own 
theology into Scripture – three important examples of which will be seen below.  
Not only was he a personal influence on Tyndale’s translation of the Bible, but he 
was also the first person to mass-publish (via printing press) a translation of the 
Bible into a vernacular tongue without permission from the Church, so all 
subsequent translations have read the original languages with the impact of 
Luther’s translation already in mind, embedding his interpretation into the text 
itself.82 
Martin Luther was primarily concerned with the injustices he witnessed 
being perpetrated by the Roman Catholic Church (though at this time it was 
simply ‘The Church,’ at least in the West).  When he burst onto the scene in 1517 
with his ninety-five theses, his main objection was to the practice of telling the 
masses that if they do certain things (such as purchasing indulgences, or giving 
offerings, etc.) then they will go to heaven, or have less time in purgatory (or their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Richard Longenecker, Paul, Apostle of Liberty (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1964), 86-87. 
81 Alister McGrath, Historical Theology: An Introduction to the History of Christian Thought 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 164. 
82 See below for examples. 
	  40	  
deceased relatives will have less time in purgatory).83  Luther then read this view 
of the Church’s soteriology84 onto Paul, ‘with first-century Judaism read through 
the “grid” of the early sixteenth-century Catholic system of merit.’85  This resulted 
in Lutheran interpreters centuries later, most notably Rudolf Bultmann and Ernst 
Käsemann, being accused of the same error.86  Thus Paul’s phrase ‘works of the 
Law’ (ἔργα τοῦ νόµου) came to mean doing the deeds prescribed in the Jewish 
Law in order to attain salvation, parallel to the works prescribed by the Church in 
order to attain salvation, as Luther actively infused his false historical reading of 
Judaism with his reading of the contemporary Church: ‘This the Papists do not 
believe, but being blind and obstinate, they defend their abominations against 
their own conscience, and continue still in this their blasphemy, having in their 
mouths these execrable words: He that doth this good work or that, deserveth 
forgiveness of his sins; whosoever entereth into this or that holy order, and 
keepeth his rule, to him we assuredly promise everlasting life.’87  Generally, 
academics no longer widely presume this to be what was meant by the phrase 
‘works of the law.’88  Although Luther’s view of Judaism was not quite as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Martin Luther, Martin Luther: Selections from his Writings, ed. John Dillenberger (London: 
Doubleday, 1961), 489-500. 
84 The study of salvation. 
85 James Dunn, Jesus, Paul and the Law (London: SPCK, 1990), 185. 
86 E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1977), 42-48 on 
Bultmann and Paul, the Law and the Jewish People (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1983), 154-160 
on Käsemann. 
87 Commenting on Gal 2:16 in A Commentary on St Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, trans. by 
Philip S. Watson (London: James Clarke & Co, 1953 [1535]), 144. 
88 N. T. Wright nicely combats the old view in Pauline Perspectives: Essays on Paul, 1978-2013 
(London: SPCK, 2013), 332-355, where he argues from the Dead Sea Scrolls (specifically, 
4QMMT) that when Paul replaces the role of ‘works of the law’ for those in the Church with the 
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intensely anti-Semitic when writing his influential commentaries on Galatians and 
Romans as it would become by the time of his death, the argument that Paul’s 
position against Torah observance for Christians was due to Jewish ‘legalism’ 
opened the way for the much more anti-Semitic readings of Paul that E. P. 
Sanders would later critique (see below). 
Likewise, the phrase πίστις Χριστοῦ (pistis Christou), which Paul posits in 
opposition to ἔργα τοῦ νόµου (‘works of the Law’) and which up until Luther had 
usually been taken as a subjective genitive meaning ‘the faith of Christ,’89 Luther 
took as a rare case of the objective genitive, and translated it as ‘faith in Christ.’90  
In Luther’s attempt to use Paul against the perceived legalistic soteriology of the 
Church, he shifted Paul from being concerned with the impact of Christ’s faith 
upon the believer, to being primarily concerned with the importance of the 
believer’s own subjective faith.  Luther was influential in turning Christianity 
from a religion of the object – of God – into a religion of the subject, and this 
distinction is crucial when evaluating the veracity of modern philosophical 
interpretations of Paul.   
Luther’s interpretation also institutionalised Augustine’s assumption about 
the dual nature of humanity under Original Sin and Christ, when he translated the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘faithfulness of Christ,’ this is in regards to what functions as boundary-markers of those in 
covenant with God, and not in regards to how one attains salvation. 
89 The Latin phrase fidem Iesu Chrisi retains the same ambiguity, so it is not particularly easy to 
trace how the phrase was understood before the Reformation.  However, in the two main English 
translations to appear within a century of Luther, the Catholic Douay-Rheims version of 1582 and 
the KJV of 1611, both translate it as ‘faith of Jesus Christ’ (as a subjective genitive).  The phrase 
appears in Rom 3:22, 26 and Gal 2:16 (and elsewhere in other permutations).  The Holy Bible: 
Douay Version (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1956 [1582]). 
90 German: Glauben an Jesus Christus, in Rom 3:22, 26 and Gal 2:16.  Martin Luther, Die Bible 
nach Martin Luther (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1999). 
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genitive δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in Rom 1:17, probably best rendered ‘the righteousness 
of God,’91 as an objective or even ablative genitive, with ‘a righteousness that is 
before God’ (die Gerechtigkeit, die vor Gott gilt),92 which has made its way into 
the modern NIV translation as ‘a righteousness from God.’93  This ‘imputed 
righteousness’94 is given to the Christian as a new status (along with the 
remaining status as that of the sinner) in return for the believer’s faith.  In 
summary, Luther’s impact upon Pauline theology was to create or cement, in 
translation itself, the ideas of (a) the Jewish soteriological system of works-
righteousness; (b) faith as that which is on the part of the believer and is the only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 This phrase was the subject of much debate in the twentieth century, with Bultmann and 
Käsemann on opposing sides.  Sanders discusses this in Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 523-542.  
It is now the general consensus among nearly all except the most faithful in the Reform tradition 
that the phrase should be understood in line with the ‘righteousness of God’ in the Hebrew 
Scriptures (for example in Daniel 9).  There is, of course, still much debate, since the Reform 
tradition is not exactly small, and there are still some outside of it who maintain the Lutheran 
reading.  Alister McGrath frequently touches on this debate in Iustitia Dei: A History of the 
Christian Doctrine of Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 [1985]).  N. T. 
Wright, under the name Tom Wright (which he uses for books addressed more to a popular than 
academic audience) penned an extensive but polemical argument for his reading (in the tradition of 
‘the righteousness of God,’ but with a few more layers beneath it), in Justification: God’s Plan 
and Paul’s Vision (London: SPCK, 2009), 37-52.  More on the translation of this phrase can be 
found in any Romans commentary, under Rom 1:17. 
92 This has implications of a righteousness that is declared as such in front of a judge, which is 
precisely the image that Luther was trying to invoke.  Luther’s German is from Die Bibel nach 
Martin Luther. 
93 Holy Bible: New International Version (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001[1984]).  More recent 
revisions of the NIV now translate the phrase in line with the majority academic opinion, but the 
NIV had been the bestselling Bible translation for decades before that was the case. 
94 ‘Imputed righteousness’ is a term usually traced back to Luther, though probably actually first 
used by Melanchthon, used to translate a related Greek phrase not being discussed here.  Luther’s 
translation of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ was to bring it in line with his wider theology of imputed 
righteousness.  See McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 218-234. 
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access to salvation and (c) imputed righteousness as a state of the believer given 
by God without altering the believer’s status as ‘sinner.’  Luther had many other 
forms of impact upon Church history, many of which could be deemed positive 
legacies, at least by Protestant Christians; but these are three of the most 
important effects he had on the history of the interpretation of Paul. 
The centuries that followed were certainly not some monolithic entity in 
which all Paul scholars agreed upon a Lutheran reading.  The works of William 
Wrede and Albert Schweitzer differed in several marked ways, particularly in 
advocating a forebear of what came to be the ‘apocalyptic’ approach to Paul.95  
However, into the mid twentieth century a very Lutheran framework for Paul’s 
theology was still being maintained by the bulk of academia, permitting Rudolf 
Bultmann to argue with strong distinctions between Jew/Christian and pre-
faith/post-faith, as well as such a strong dependence upon Paul’s justification texts 
and a view of the Jews as ones who ‘work for salvation.’96  Krister Stendahl 
opened one of the paths towards the New Perspectives in 1963, with his article 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New, 101-116.  Albert Schweitzer, The Mysticism of Paul the 
Apostle (New York: Seabury Press, 1931). 
96 As Sanders points out (Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 44-47), this is particularly the case in 
Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting, trans. by R. H. Fuller 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1956), 59-71, where he offers an extensive caricature of first 
century Jews as legalistic, without any apparent interaction with Jewish scholars of Rabbinic 
literature.  Despite Bultmann’s usual rigour, Sanders’ criticisms of Bultmann on this issue are far-
reaching and devastating: Bultmann seems to have misunderstood most of the scholars he did read, 
being misled by headings without reading further, or stopping reading just before a section where 
a scholar changes his argument.  Bultmann did actually read the scholars who had already been 
disagreeing with Luther’s view, but misunderstands them and lends his weight instead, with milder 
terms, to the extremely anti-Semitic view espoused by Bousset and Weber. 
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‘Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West’.97  He argues that Paul did 
not have the guilty conscience that Augustine and Luther assumed he had, but that 
they were simply reading their own problems into Paul.  I will look at this in more 
detail in Chapter 5, below.  Stendahl’s argument has generally retained support 
since then, with only minor alterations. 
In 1921, 1948 and 1961, three Christian scholars who were particularly 
interested in Judaism and rabbinic studies made the claim that Jewish scholars 
themselves had been making for centuries: that Martin Luther did not understand 
Judaism (and, therefore, could not have understood Paul’s relation to Judaism).98  
For this point to be taken on board by a majority of New Testament scholars 
required the monumental 1977 work by the Jewish New Testament scholar E. P. 
Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, which marked the beginning of the ‘New 
Perspectives.’99  He argues that Luther’s characterization of Judaism as a ‘religion 
of legalistic works-righteousness’ was historically inaccurate.  More specifically, 
Sanders sees this view of Judaism as having been most strongly pushed since F. 
Weber’s work in the 1880’s, in which Christian theologians began moving from 
criticizing Jews as misunderstanding their own inherently Christian scriptures, to 
criticizing Jews for being conniving scheming practitioners of works-
righteousness.100  Another important implication of Sanders’ study is that not only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Krister Stendahl, ‘The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscious of the West,’ in Paul 
Among Jews and Gentiles, ed. Krister Stendahl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1976 [1968]), 78-96. 
98 These are G. F. Moore, W. D. Davis and Richard Longenecker, respectively, as recounted by 
Douglas Campbell in The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul 
(Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), 97. 
99 At first the accepted term was ‘The New Perspective,’ but increasingly this has become 
pluralised in order to note the variety of views since Sanders. 
100 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 33-59. 
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is Paul not anti-Semitic, but Paul’s statement that people are saved by grace is not 
something new.  For Sanders, Paul is merely carrying on the Jewish belief that 
God saves by grace (ֶדסֶח/hesed).  But whereas for the Jews, according to Sanders, 
the Law was a response to God’s grace that denotes justification (maintaining it, 
not earning it), now participation in Christ is a response to God’s grace, which 
denotes justification.101  For Sanders’ first century Palestinian Jews, the Law is a 
sign of status within the covenant with God; and for Sanders’ Pauline Christians, 
faith is a sign of status within the covenant of God.  While Martin Luther’s main 
point was that salvation is given and not earned, Sanders’ main point is that 
salvation had always been given and not earned, and Paul was therefore saying 
something else.  Thus, Sanders nudged Pauline studies back from being primarily 
about the subject’s faith to being concerned with the subject’s passive experience 
of the object, God, through the event of Christ.   
Most scholars now see Judaism in the first century as a much more diverse 
entity than Sanders suggested, and the scholars with whom I will interact here are 
primarily ‘apocalyptic’ (discussed in more detail below), rather than ‘New 
Perspectives.’  However, the important thing to draw from Sanders, and the 
reason the current study must discuss him, is that Luther’s construal of Paul 
depended upon a fundamentally incorrect understanding of first century Judaism, 
and it was Luther’s Paul on whom most philosophical interpretations of Paul 
were based.  So the New Perspective’s un-reading of Luther remains important 
for this study, even if the specifics of the New Perspectives’ re-readings are 
debated. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Ibid., 236-237. 
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3.2. Pauline Theology Since Sanders 
Since Sanders, many different interpretations of Paul have been offered.  
Within the decade following 1977, two people took up their places in what has 
been referred to as the ‘Triumvirate of the New Perspective’102 as early defenders 
of Sanders: James Dunn, perhaps the foremost New Testament scholar of the 
second half of the twentieth century, has advocated the view that justification is 
about demarcating who is within God’s covenant (not about working one’s way 
into heaven),103 so that Paul’s message in Romans is against ethnocentrism, that 
Israel no longer has the right to boast;104 and N. T. Wright, another leading New 
Testament scholar, who sees justification as a demonstration of God’s covenant-
faithfulness, as well as an act of re-creating the subject as faithful and 
righteous.105  Both of these scholars have written dozens of books and articles on 
Paul, so that fully summarising their contributions in a sentence would be 
impossible; but within the history of Pauline studies they are perhaps primarily 
known as major early defenders of Sanders’ work, taking it from being a singular 
thesis to a ‘New Perspective.’ 
The next major event in Pauline studies was the 1983 publication of 
Richard Hays’ doctoral thesis: The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 David E. Aune, ‘Recent Readings of Paul Relating to Justification by Faith,’ in Rereading Paul 
Together: Protestant and Catholic Perspectives on Justification, ed. David E. Aune (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 2006), 205. 
103 Dunn, Jesus, Paul and the Law, 190. 
104 James D. G. Dunn, Romans 1-8, Word Biblical Commentary 38A (Waco, TX: Word, 1988), 
lxxii. 
105 Though Wright has been making this point consistently for decades, he most recently and fully 
argued it in Paul and the Faithfulness of God (London: SPCK, 2013), 774-1042. 
	   47	  
Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11.106  Hays expanded on the centrality of the 
notion of ‘participation in Christ’ to Paul’s theology, by arguing that the phrase 
(pistis Christou) does not refer to faith in Christ, but to participation in the faith of 
Christ.  This is Hays’ first contribution to apocalyptic interpretations of Paul 
(described below) that have developed much more since, often depending upon 
this reinterpreted phrase as a central part of Paul’s reference to the narrative of 
Christ as the beginning of the apocalyptic victory of God.107   
The ‘apocalyptic’ stream of interpreters could currently be seen as 
stretching from Ernst Käsemann to Douglas Campbell (with an important forebear 
in Albert Schweitzer).  Käsemann was Bultmann’s most prized student, who 
legendarily began opposing Bultmann’s interpretations of Paul the moment he 
graduated.  Whereas Bultmann had made use of Luther’s interpretation of 
δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (dikaiosynē theou) as man’s imputed righteousness before God, 
Käsemann was the most influential scholar in bringing back the interpretation that 
this referred to the righteous status of God himself.108  This was part of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 The second edition was published in 2002 in Grand Rapids, by Eerdmans, with appended 
articles by James Dunn and a response by Hays.  Dunn is still regarded as the key opponent of 
Hays’ thesis, among many other proponents and adversaries.  One might note at this point that I 
have ignored the importance of social-scientific readings of Paul.  These are discussed in a bit 
more detail in the final part of this chapter. 
107 Hays’ thesis was not actually primarily about the reinterpretation of pistis Christou, but 
included that as part of his wider goal of demonstrating that Paul’s gospel presupposes a narrative 
of Christ, and that his gospel is an attempt to articulate the meaning of it (Hays, Faith of Jesus 
Christ, xxiii-xxiv).  This fits very well with the argument made by the study here, specifically 
Chapter 6, below: that Paul is not a philosopher building a rational argument, but rather is 
someone thrust into the interpretation of an event.  Hays develops his apocalyptic theology of Paul 
more fully in The Moral Vision of the New Testament (London: T&T Clark, 1996), 16-59. 
108 Ernst Käsemann, Commentary on Romans, trans. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1980), 24-30.  On p. 29 he says that the phrase ‘speaks of the God who brings back the 
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Käsemann’s apocalyptic theology of Paul: that a righteous God was soon going to 
bring the end of the world.109  Käsemann’s student J. L. Martyn redefined 
apocalypticism in his studies of Galatians, leading us to where the apocalyptic 
school is currently: the apocalyptic moment (the arrival of ‘the end times’, to use 
a non-Pauline phrase) is not in the future, but is the death of Christ.110 
Thus the theme of suffering began to become a central theme in 
interpretations of Paul, with Paul calling Christians to participate in the suffering 
of Christ. Michael Gorman has been highly influential in bringing out this 
theme,111 and Roy Harrisville has written an interesting book outlining how the 
tortured death of Christ can be seen as a fracture in the fabric of history – an 
apocalyptic interruption of God into history.112  Jürgen Moltmann’s early work 
was one inspiration for this trend in Pauline scholarship as well as being 
influential in the theological side of the Death of God movement.113  Notions of 
the suffering of Christ as an apocalyptic event have generally coincided with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
fallen world into the sphere of his legitimate claim… whether in promise or demand, in new 
creation or forgiveness, or in the making possible of our service, and… who sets us in the state of 
confident hope and… constant earthly change.’  On a separate note, it is worth pointing out that 
God is referred to with masculine pronouns throughout this work for absolutely no other reason 
than because this is the case in the letters of St Paul. 
109 N. T. Wright, ‘Paul in Current Anglophone Scholarship’ in N. T. Wright, Pauline Perspectives: 
Essays on Paul, 1978-2013  (London: SPCK, 2013), 480-481. 
110 J. Louis Martyn, Galatians, The Anchor Bible 33A (London: Yale University Press, 1997); and 
J. Louis Martyn, Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997). 
111 Gorman, Cruciformity.  The other book by Gorman mentioned above, Inhabiting the Cruciform 
God, is a particularly compelling work on the themes of kenosis and theosis (participation in God) 
in Paul. 
112 Roy A. Harrisville, Fracture: The Cross as Irreconcilable in the Language and Thought of the 
Biblical Writers (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006). 
113 Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God (London: SCM, 1974). 
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emphasis on the believer’s participation in Christ, which was also a central 
emphasis of Schweitzer and Sanders; thus leading Gorman to coin the phrases 
‘cruciformity’ and ‘co-crucifixion’ to summarise the believer’s relationship to 
Christ.114  Wright seems to be correct in his note that this theology might be in 
protest of ‘comfortable American religiosity,’ as it is explicitly for Gorman.115 
This brings us to Douglas Campbell, who, in his book The Quest for 
Paul’s Gospel, refers to the apocalyptic school of interpreters as advocating the 
‘PPME’ model: Pneumatological Participatory Martyrological Eschatology – 
theology that focuses on the Spirit’s work of transforming the Christian into one 
who participates in the suffering of Christ, as part of God’s eschatological 
intervention.116  Campbell designates three other schools in Pauline scholarship: 
JF (the ‘justification by faith’ school, consisting of those who still largely protest 
the key tenets of the New Perspectives, or form new interpretations of Paul still 
largely focused on the centrality of justification); SH (the ‘salvation history’ 
school, typified by N. T. Wright, who sees every aspect of Paul’s thought in light 
of the history of God’s plans for salvation, although Wright still has apocalyptic 
elements to his thought, and is a primary defender of the New Perspectives); and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Gorman, Cruciformity, 17-18 and Michael Gorman, Reading Paul (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 
2008), 51.  The question this theology should leave us with is in what sense are Christians co-
crucified with Christ?  Is there only a historical sense of the early Church being persecuted?  Is 
there something about Christian life that is inherently sacrificial?  Is this a Pauline call to 
asceticism?  More morbidly, is this some call for Christians actively to ensure their own suffering?  
This question has been answered in various and variously troubling ways throughout history.  As 
will be seen in Chapter 6, it is a helpful question to keep in mind when attempting a 
psychoanalytic interpretation of the Pauline Christian subject. 
115 Wright, ‘Paul in Current Anglophone Scholarship,’ 481.  Michael J. Gorman, Reading Paul 
(Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2008), 78-79. 
116 Douglas A. Campbell, The Quest for Paul’s Gospel (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 38-42. 
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AT (the ‘anti-theological’ school, typified by Heikki Räisänen, who sees Paul as 
an internally inconsistent charismatic preacher whose contradictions cannot be 
resolved – E. P. Sanders also frequently employs this method when otherwise 
stumped).117  Campbell is most notable for arguing that the PPME (apocalyptic) 
interpretation of Paul is correct, to the absolute exclusion of both JF and AT.  In 
his next book, The Deliverance of God, Campbell employs various exegetical 
strategies, with varying amounts of success, to show how every single text in 
which Paul appears to advocate a JF soteriological model is actually either Paul 
quoting a theological opponent, or the text has been misunderstood (he 
subordinates SH to PPME, eliminates JF, and thus negates the contradictions that 
lead to AT interpretations).118  In my MA dissertation (selections of which can be 
found in Appendix C) I examined Paul’s attitude towards φύσις (physis, nature) 
throughout Romans and the rest of his letters, in order to defend Campbell’s 
primary interpretative move, that Romans 1:18-32 is an example of speech-in-
character (προσωποποιία, in English prosopopoeia, or prosōpopoiia to 
transliterate without Latinisation) mimicking Paul’s theological opponent in 
Rome, rather than an opening argument in the voice of Paul himself.  This theory 
forms the bedrock of Chapter 5, below.  It has received some positive reception in 
America, but remains controversial to say the least. 
Another approach to Paul, with roots in claims made by Adolf Deissman a 
century ago,119 is to emphasise his perceived counter-imperial message.  This has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Campbell, The Quest for Paul’s Gospel, 22-52. 
118 He graphs his approach this way on 48-52 of The Quest for Paul’s Gospel, but carries it out in 
Romans in Deliverance of God. 
119 Wright, ‘Paul in Current Anglophone Scholarship,’ 484. 
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been spearheaded since the nineties by Richard Horsley and Neil Elliott, and 
helped along by N. T. Wright and some others.120  Interpreters of Paul have long 
been bound by Romans 13 to be obedient and supportive of government; but for 
Karl Barth, who was a member of the anti-fascist Confessing Church in 1930’s 
Germany, this was no longer an option.  To Barth, Romans 13 was neither for 
passive obedience, nor for revolution.121  Political interpreters of Paul have 
wanted to see his Christological language, his ethics, his church practice, and his 
theology itself, as directly counter-imperial, putting Christ in the place of Caesar.  
It is key to note here that Christ is not posited as another Caesar, but as an anti-
Caesar, who rules through his suffering and humiliation, and through non-
violence, love, hope and (true) pax.  John Howard Yoder foreshadowed much of 
this in 1972, but it was not until the nineties that the political Paul really started 
gaining prevalence.122 
One school of interpreters has not yet been mentioned: modern 
philosophical interpreters.  There have long been interpretations dependent upon 
finding Aristotle or Plato in Paul (and, to varying extents, both of these can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Neil Elliott, The Arrogance of Nations: Reading Romans in the Shadow of Empire 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008).  Richard A. Horsley, Jesus and Empire: The Kingdom of God 
and the New World Disorder (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003).  Horsley focuses more on Jesus 
and the Gospels, but has edited a number of collections of articles on Paul’s relation to the Empire, 
such as Paul and the Roman Imperial Order (London: T&T Clark, 2004). N. T. Wright balances 
his sympathies with this strand of thought with other aspects of his apocalyptic reading in Paul 
and the Faithfulness of God (London: SPCK, 2013), 1271-1319.  Marcus Borg and J. Dominic 
Crossan also fit into this category, but again work mostly with Jesus and the Gospels.   
121 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. by Edwyn C. Hoskyns (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1968 [1928]), 476-477. 
122 John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994 [1972]).  
Particularly on pp. 193-227, it is interesting to see how Yoder clearly fits before 1977, yet his 
social reading of justification has him edging towards what was coming. 
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done in certain texts).  Comparisons between Paul and Epictetus or Seneca have 
been popular since the Middle Ages.123  More recently, Troels Engberg-Pedersen 
has argued for a Paul heavily influenced by Stoicism.  He parallels Paul’s 
participatory soteriology with Stoic participation in Wisdom.124  This has led to 
much discussion about Stoic influence on Paul, and Stoic parallels in Paul, as well 
as arguments against any ancient philosophical influence on Paul.  Gerald F. 
Downing has argued for considerable Cynic influence on Paul, seeing Paul and 
Jesus as forms of Cynic philosophers.125  There have also been many readings of 
Paul by modern philosophers, some of which will be discussed in detail below. 
 
4.   Review of Similar Studies 
 
 Interest in Paul by Lacanian philosophers, as well as interest in Lacan by 
Paul scholars, has not been extensive enough to make possible a long review of 
previous studies of Lacan and Paul; and both of these sides have thus far been 
largely fraught with difficulty.  There have been a few exceptions, though, as well 
as other places to ground the sort of study that follows.  The relevant pieces to 
review fall into three categories: (A) studies of Lacan and Paul; (B) continental 
philosophical readings of Paul and (C) studies of Lacan in conjunction with other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 This was helped along by the emergence in the fourth century of a pseudonymously written 
collection of letters between Paul and Seneca.  See Wayne A. Meeks and John T. Fitzgerald, eds., 
The Writings of St Paul (London: Norton, 2007 [1972]), 149-153. 
124 Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000).  Engberg-
Pedersen seeks to demonstrate the structural equivalency of Paul’s theology with Stoicism, in 
terms of Paul’s vision of conversion and community life. 
125 Gerald F. Downing, Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches (London: Routledge, 1998). 
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thinkers, of a similar methodology/hermeneutic to this one.  Each of these 
sections include criticisms, demonstrating potential problems that can be corrected 
in my own approach, as well as some positives from which to find inspiration. 
 
4.1. Lacan and St Paul 
 The sort of project envisioned here, in which Lacan is brought into 
conversation with the Paul who is studied by scholars in biblical studies and 
theology departments, has very little precedent.  There exists one study with a 
largely similar methodology, by Itzhak Benyamini, and some of its findings will 
be of use for Chapter 6, below, with revisions.126  There have been several studies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Itzhak Benyamini, Narcissist Universalism: A Psychoanalytic Reading of Paul’s Epistles 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2012).  A chapter of this book is reprinted as ‘“Love your neighbour,” the 
Son, and the Sons’ Community: Reading Paul’s Epistles in View of Freud and Lacan,’ in eds. 
Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries, Paul and the Philosophers (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2013), 413-436.  He identifies the Pauline Christian community as one formed by narcissist 
identification with an image of Christ that is a reflexive image of the subject, but this core element 
of his theory (that the image of Christ is a reflection of the ego of the subject or community) is not 
something for which he ever argues persuasively; he makes this argument on pp. 19-26, but the 
texts he cites either plainly do not point toward this interpretation, or are much more easily 
interpreted as identification with an image of Christ that affects the believer, rather than being an 
image of the believer – for which I will argue in Chapter 6.  Like the current study, he adopts a 
‘critical psychoanalytic approach’ in search of the ‘unconscious core of Paul’s texts’ (ix); but he 
poses this as an alternative to (not a compliment to or mode of) historical criticism (xiii).  In each 
of the six chapters he applies this method to a different issue in Pauline theology, but his argument 
falters every time on a major historical critical point – or sometimes just on incoherent biblical 
interpretation.  For example, the first chapter presumes Paul is responsible for Western 
introspection and guilt (against the bulk of modern scholarship that no longer believes this, and 
without citing any examples of texts that show this to be the case).  The second chapter is 
dependent upon reading Rom 1:18-32 (discussed in Chapter 5, below) as a positive statement of St 
Paul’s opinion, against the bulk of modern interpretations that read it as some sort of rhetorical 
device that is somewhat or totally incompatible with Paul’s theology (again, see Chapter 5).  
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of Paul by continental philosophers influenced to varying extents by Lacan (to be 
discussed below); but there has been very little dialogue between Lacanian theory 
itself and academic Pauline theology.  One noteworthy exception is the recent 
doctoral thesis of Paul Axton, which has taken the Lacanian/Hegelian philosopher 
Slavoj Žižek’s use of Paul, and read it in dialogue with the Paul of biblical 
studies.127  These two thinkers (Žižek and Axton) will be my core examples of 
previous work on Lacan and Paul.  Peter Rollins has also done something similar, 
reading Paul with Lacanian psychoanalysis, though he usually writes for a popular 
rather than academic audience, and rarely writes on Paul specifically.128  Concetta 
Principe has recently sought to use Lacan with Walter Benjamin and Giorgio 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Perhaps his biggest errors come in chapters 5 and 6, reading Acts and the Synoptic Gospels into 
Paul, presuming that Paul endorses transubstantiation, and presuming that Pauline Christians 
spoke in tongues at baptism (against what is explicitly stated in Paul and the texts he cites in Acts, 
where it is an event specifically subsequent to water baptism).  This fault is made even worse 
when he accuses Paul’s image of Christ of being one of masochistic self-sacrifice (80-81), but in 
the two page argument cites no Pauline texts whatsoever, citing only Mark, and not interacting 
with either the complex question of the extent to which the notion of ‘sacrifice’ was actually 
central to Paul’s soteriology, or the question of the narrative substructure of Paul’s letters (the 
question of the actual narrative of Christ that Paul presumed).  Nonetheless, despite faults such as 
these, Benyamini’s psychoanalytic approach does yield some interpretations worth discussing in 
the study that follows, with qualification and modification. 
127 Paul Axton, ‘The Psychotheology of Sin and Salvation,’ (doctoral thesis, University of 
Nottingham, 2013).  Axton later reworked and published his thesis as The Psychotheology of Sin 
and Salvation: An Analysis of the Meaning of the Death of Christ in light of the Psychoanalytical 
Reading of Paul (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). 
128 Peter Rollins, The Idolatry of God: Breaking the Addiction to Certainty and Satisfaction 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2012), 95-140.  His work is always extremely worthwhile and 
interesting, though largely dependant upon Žižek, and occasionally, as with many of the 
philosophical Pauls to be discussed below, is inseparable from an ‘Old Perspective’ reading; for 
example, on p. 40 of The Idolatry of God he claims that ‘If an act is designed to bridge the gap 
between original sin [our original sense of loss] and the idol [any object of desire, objet petit a], 
then it falls into the theological category known in the biblical texts as “works”.’   
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Agamben to identify how Pauline messianism and the Pauline real appear in 
modern culture.129  This is an interesting approach, but not primarily concerned 
with the interpretation of Paul.130  Other thinkers, including Marcus Pound,131 
Ward Blanton,132 Clayton Crockett133 and Tina Beattie,134 have used Lacan to 
varying degrees in studying particular aspects of Christian theology, but without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Concetta V. Principe, Secular Messiahs and the Return of Paul’s “Real”: A Lacanian 
Approach (Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, 2015). 
130 Where she does focus on the interpretation of Paul her reading wavers between interesting, 
implausible and ill-argued.  She reads the notion of Paul’s own death with Christ and resurrection 
as equally important to Christ’s (111), cites the twentieth century’s most influential Paul scholar as 
‘J. P. Sanders’ (83), and, after quoting the two best-known Paul scholars to hold the minority 
opinion that Paul’s view of the law is incoherent (Sanders and Räisänen, see above), states that N. 
T. Wright’s standard, majority interpretation of Pauline coherence is ‘apparently anomalous’ (84).  
Still, the approach of looking deeper for the unconscious structure of Paul’s theology and the ways 
in which it relates to (or is sublimated) today, is an approach thoroughly endorsed here.  
131 Marcus Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, and Žižek: a (very) critical 
introduction.   
132 Blanton, Materialism for the Masses, 168-173.  In discussing Lacan’s use of Paul, Blanton 
notes that in Romans 7 ‘the apostle imagines an economy whereby a perverse mode of power 
operates behind the back of an otherwise docile or submissive imaginary self, this hidden 
operation functioning to effect the self’s problematic splitting or doubling.’  This reading of 
Romans 7 as a response to the problem of perversion is laid out in more detail throughout Žižek’s 
works (discussed below), and the study that follows will respond with a different model.  It is 
worth commenting that Blanton’s work is probably as close as we come to an interaction between 
a thorough understanding of Lacan and a thorough understanding of critical research on Paul – the 
current study echoes this, but looks exclusively at Paul and Lacan, not at Paul and continental 
philosophy as it occasionally includes Lacan. 
133 Firstly, on Paul, with occasional reference to Lacan: Radical Political Theology: Religion and 
Politics After Liberalism (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2011), 108-125.  Secondly, on 
Lacan, with occasional reference to Paul: ‘The Triumph of Theology,’ in Theology After Lacan: 
The Passion for the Real, eds. Creston Davis, Clayton Crockett and Marcus Pound (Eugene, OR: 
Cascade Books, 2014), 250-266. 
134 Tina Beattie, Theology after Postmodernity. 
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sustained Lacan/Paul dialogue.  Some of these studies will be discussed or 
referred to in the two sections that follow. 
 Slavoj Žižek has not written a book on Paul; however, his interest in Paul 
goes back at least to 1991,135 and since 1998 he has published no fewer than seven 
discussions of Paul of between three and thirty pages in length.136  Partially as a 
result of the varied natures and contexts of his short readings of Paul, he often 
approaches his thought from very different angles: chiefly via Hegel, Lacan and 
Badiou.  Obviously the second is what interests us most here; but its inseparability 
from his other readings of Paul (and of Christianity) will be shown as problematic 
to  my search for a Lacanian Paul (though not necessarily to his own wider 
argument).   
When Žižek discusses Badiou’s reading of Paul, which will be outlined in 
more detail below, he does so mostly positively, making some revisions to bring it 
closer into line with Lacan.  This is his approach for the bulk of two of his longest 
discussions of Paul, in The Ticklish Subject and Paul’s New Moment.137  In The 
Ticklish Subject his use of Badiou concludes that although Badiou correctly posits 
the resurrection of Christ in Paul as an ‘event’ (a very loaded core term in 
Badiou’s philosophy), Badiou’s reading fails to account for the Lacanian death 
drive, errantly positing an event completely in the domain of life.138  From Žižek’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Slavoj Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do (London: Verso, 2008 [1991]), 29 and 78. 
136 These are all be referenced below. 
137 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject (London: Verso, 2008 [1999]), 145-198 and Slavoj Žižek, 
‘Paul and the Truth Event,’ in Paul’s New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future of 
Christian Theology, eds. John Milbank, Slavoj Žižek and Creston Davis (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
2010), 74-99. 
138 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 176-180.  Adam Kotsko, ‘Politics and Perversion: Situating 
Žižek’s Paul,’ Journal of Cultural and Religious Theory, 9.2 (Summer 2008), 45-46, sees the 
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Hegelian perspective, he then reads Romans 7 as an acknowledgement of a 
Hegelian paradox that there is Evil only once the Law itself opens up and sustains 
the domain of Sin.139  From Žižek’s Lacanian perspective, he sees in Paul an 
awareness of the inevitable connection between law and death, as well as an event 
that in psychoanalytic terms amounts to a ‘“wiping the slate clean” that opens up 
the domain of the symbolic New Beginning, of the emergence of the “New 
Harmony” sustained by a newly emerged Master-Signifier;’140 but to him Lacan’s 
solution to this problem is not Badiouan (an event that opens a new domain of 
life) or Pauline (an event that replaces a morbid superego of sin with a law of 
love), but, rather, psychoanalysis merely possesses the power to wipe the slate 
clean, and does not make any prescriptions for what follows.141  This leads to the 
question: will a reading of Paul that is more Lacanian than Žižek’s produce a Paul 
more in line with the aims of psychoanalysis than Žižek’s?  Reading Romans 7 
from the angle to be suggested below, rather than Žižek’s, may just produce this 
result. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Žižekian correction to Badiou as a ‘broad critique.’  Badiou’s emphasis on the resurrection of 
Christ as an event, to the exclusion of any meaning attached to the death of Christ, is something 
that will be touched upon below.  Kotsko’s article is an excellent summary of some of Žižek’s 
many readings of Paul.  Another one, tracking the development of his turn to Paul, and how it 
relates to his political arguments, is Roland Boer, ‘Paul and Materialist Grace: Slavoj Žižek’s 
Reformation,’ in eds. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries, Paul and the Philosophers (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2013), 186-209.  The term ‘death drive’ is one of the primary concepts 
introduced in Chapter 3, below, and can also be found in the Glossary. 
139 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 174.  The relevant section of Rom 7 is translated in Appendix B, 
below. 
140 Ibid., 179 
141 Ibid., 178-180. 
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 There is a struggle throughout Žižek’s work resulting from the conflict 
between Hegel and Lacan in his interpretation of Paul – a struggle that the study 
which follows is positioned to resolve.  Žižek’s Hegelian reading of Paul sees the 
law/sin problem as a problem of ‘perspective,’ as noted above.  Thus, already in 
1991, Žižek claims that Paul’s Christ does not bring reconciliation by healing old 
wounds of scission, but by reversing the perspective of the scission.142  ‘The Fall’ 
is already humankind’s redemption, opening the way to liberty, and Christ 
sublates the law/sin dialectic as a law/love dialectic, allowing us to love without 
the morbid superego guilt of sin.143  He makes the same argument, adding to a 
page of text he borrows from The Puppet and the Dwarf, in The Monstrosity of 
Christ.144  Since in his view Paul’s solution is a sublation of a morbid dialectic as 
a less morbid dialectic (a new perspective rather than a new situation), this means 
that his reading of the voice of Romans 7 throughout these texts is as a positive 
example of the Pauline perspective on the human subject: an ego formerly trapped 
by superego guilt is now an ego whose problematic relation to the law is to a law 
of love (a perverse relation to the law has become a hysterical relation – see 
below).  In this reading, Romans 7 demonstrates that Christ has given Paul an 
awareness of the human subject as alienated from itself, and this new perspective 
on the situation is ‘salvation.’  The struggle this creates in Žižek’s readings of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do, 78. 
143 Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity (London: The MIT 
Press, 2003), 107-118.  As Hegelian readings of Paul go, this is certainly not far from 
psychoanalysis either, which ‘would seem to have as its sole goal the calming of guilt’ (S7, 5-6). 
144 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Dialectical Clarity Versus the Misty Conceit of Paradox,’ in The Monstrosity of 
Christ, ed. Creston Davis (London: The MIT Press, 2009), 270-273. 
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Paul is the tension between whether the subject is truly re-formed psychically, or 
merely re-perceiving (sublating) an old dialectic in a salvific manner. 
 When Žižek advocates an actual conversion in the Pauline Christian’s 
subjective state, he tends to draw upon Lacanian terminology: ‘As Lacan would 
have put it, one has to undergo the second, symbolic death, which involves the 
suspension of the big Other, the symbolic law that hitherto dominated and 
regulated our lives.’145  Or, as he explained in more Lacanian language in 1991: 
 
Saint Paul centred the whole Christian edifice precisely on the point 
which up to then appeared, to the disciples of Christ, as a horrifying 
trauma, “impossible”, non-symbolizable, non-integrable in their field 
of meaning: Christ’s shameful death on the cross between two robbers.  
Saint Paul made of this final defeat of Christ’s earthly mission (which 
was, of course, the deliverance of the Jews from Roman domination) 
the very act of salvation: by means of his death, Christ has redeemed 
humankind.146 
 
This sort of reading of Paul, as advocating a Lacanian psychoanalytic event, 
makes a much deeper claim about the Pauline subject than the Hegelian claim: not 
that the subject’s perspective or clinical structure changed, but that she passed 
through symbolic death into a new subjective state.  This is the sort of reading 
conducted in Chapter 6, below, integrated with Žižek’s reading of Antigone.  
However, particularly in Žižek’s writings since 2003, he begins to read the 
Pauline event identically to his Hegelian reading of Christianity in its entirety: as 
the religion of the death of God, chiefly signified in God’s abandonment of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Žižek, ‘Paul and the Truth Event,’ 98. 
146 Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do, 29. 
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himself on the cross.147  In 2009 Žižek wrote an article that calls itself ‘a Paulinian 
reading of Chesterton,’ but does not mention Paul or cite any of Paul’s texts after 
the first paragraph.148  Instead, it presents G. K. Chesterton’s Hegelian defence of 
orthodoxy, then argues for a Hegelian reading of the cry of dereliction (‘Father, 
why have you forsaken me?’),149 and then concludes that it is ‘the divine 
Substance (God, as a Thing-in-itself) which is sublated: negated (what dies on the 
cross is the substantial figure of the transcendent God) but simultaneously 
maintained in the transubstantiated form of the Holy Ghost, the community of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 As Kotsko notes in ‘Politics and Perversion: Situating Žižek’s Paul,’ 48-49, between the 
publication of The Ticklish Subject (1999) and The Puppet and the Dwarf (2003), two other 
important works are written: Eric Santner’s The Psychotheology of Everyday Life: Reflections on 
Freud and Rosenzweig (London: University of Chicago Press, 2001) and Giorgio Agamben’s The 
Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. by Patricia Dailey 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005 [2000]).  The former of these causes Žižek to think 
more deeply about the psychological relationship between Judaism and Christianity, and the latter 
opens up a wider dialogue about Hegelian sublation and Carl Schmitt’s ‘state of exception’ in 
Pauline theology.  The latter of these somewhat accounts for the increasing extent to which 
Žižek’s reading of Paul is more Hegelian than Lacanian. 
148 Slavoj Žižek, ‘From Job to Christ: A Paulinian Reading of Chesterton,’ in St Paul among the 
Philosophers, eds. John D. Caputo and Linda Martín Alcoff (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2009), 39-58. 
149 Žižek, ‘From Job to Christ: A Paulinian Reading of Chesterton,’ 53 and 56.  Though an 
interesting and powerful reading of the cross philosophically, it is full of problems exegetically.  
As argued here, it is irrelevant to Paul, who makes no reference to the cry of dereliction.  But, 
further: both instances of it in the Gospels (Mark 15:34 and Matt 27:46) are not addressed to 
‘Father,’ but to ‘my God;’ and, more problematically, although not all scholars support the claim 
(for example, R. T. France, The Gospel of Mark [Carlisle: Paternoster, 2002], 652-653 and Adela 
Yarbro Collins, Mark, Hermeneia [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007], 753-755), it can be argued that in 
quoting Psalm 22:1 (as these dying words of Christ most certainly are), Jesus is invoking the 
positive and victorious ending of that Psalm, in which God does come to deliver and not to 
forsake, in a hermeneutical strategy called metalepsis that Hays finds throughout the Gospels and 
Paul (Richard B. Hays, The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as an Interpreter of Israel’s 
Scriptures [Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2004], 106).  In this reading, the cry of dereliction was 
intended to be heard by Jews as a cry of hope in the victory of God. 
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believers which exists only as the virtual presupposition of the activity of finite 
individuals.’150  This argument, which also forms the climax of one of the films 
about his philosophy, The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology (2012),151 is at the core of 
his reading of Christianity: that in the cry of dereliction, the Other comes to know 
that the Other does not exist, and so the actual death of God in ideology becomes 
possible.  ‘At the very core of Christianity, there is another dimension.  When 
Christ dies, what dies with him is the secret hope discernible in “Father, why hast 
thou forsaken me?”: the hope that there is a father who has abandoned me.’152 
 So, on the one hand Žižek initially offers short explanations of the Pauline 
Christian event in Lacanian terminology.  On the other hand, he eventually comes 
to account for this event more in terms of Hegelian philosophy than Lacanian 
psychoanalysis.  This results in him not distinguishing his Hegelian reading of 
Paul (sublation of the law/sin dialectic as a law/love dialectic) from his Hegelian 
reading of Christianity (sublation of God as the God who does not believe in God, 
making Christianity the only way successfully to embed lack in the master 
signifier).  This leaves us with a Paul whose concept of Christian salvation is 
dependent upon the event of Christian atheism. 
This reading of Christianity is interesting, particularly as it relates to 
Žižek’s vision for the relation between Christianity, culture and politics: if 
Capitalism is perverse, always demanding we enjoy, then placing lack in the 
position of the Other, who currently demands we enjoy, is a political gesture.  
However, when Žižek writes his ‘Paulinian reading of Chesterton’ he quotes the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Žižek, ‘From Job to Christ: A Paulinian Reading of Chesterton,’ 58. 
151 The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology. Dir. Sophie Fiennes. British Film Institute. 2014. 
152 Žižek The Puppet and the Dwarf, 171. 
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cry of dereliction twice but fails to refer to Paul at all beyond the first paragraph, 
leading to a totally Hegelian reading of Christianity.  Since Pauline conversion, 
whatever it is, is most certainly not conversion to atheism, Žižek’s Lacanian 
Paulinism winds up being neither Lacanian nor Pauline.  Further, it fails to be 
Lacanian not just because it is subsumed by Žižek’s larger Hegelian 
programme,153 but also because Lacan was quite clear: God does not know he is 
dead, and God will never know he is dead, because jouissance forever remains 
forever forbidden.154  Lacan says this by way of introducing the lecture that 
follows one he ended by referring to the Hegelian understanding of the death of 
God that Žižek advocates.155  So Lacan states that Žižek’s goal of realising the 
death of God through Christianity cannot succeed, because the symbolic will 
always forbid jouissance.156  Axton also acknowledges that Lacan does not see 
Hegel as the answer to this problem.157  To be fair to Žižek, his programme 
acknowledges this, and seeks to get as close to the death of God as possible by 
incorporating the lack of God into the place of the Other that will always be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 That is to say, his Hegelian reading of Christianity.  The claim here is that Hegel becomes 
increasingly central to Žižek’s reading of Christianity, and that that reading of Christianity 
consumes his reading of Paul.  The claim is not that Hegel overtakes Lacan in Žižek’s thought in 
general, which would be a different question altogether. 
154 S7, 226-227.  The term jouissance, a Lacanian spin on ‘enjoyment,’ will be introduced in 
Chapter 2, and is defined in the Glossary, Appendix A.  Jouissance is always forbidden because it 
is a type of enjoyment that, although we do ‘get’ it to some extent, it does not exist in fullness.  
This will be clearer after discussing das Ding.  
155 Ibid., 218. 
156 There is a bit of a red herring here: Lacan’s point is more that the Other can never fully cease to 
exist, whereas Žižek’s goal is not to aim for this, but to seek a revelation of the lack in the Other 
that does exist.  Still, this tension does reveal a tension between Žižek’s political hopefulness and 
Lacan’s pessimism, even if there is no direct contradiction. 
157 Axton, ‘The Psychotheology of Sin and Salvation,’ 95-100. 
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somewhere in the symbolic (and, in the reading of Kotsko and Axton, thus 
advocating hysteria in a perverse society).  This makes sense.  However, one 
cannot read Paul as being in agreement with this political programme when put in 
terms of atheism.  What one can do instead is exactly what Žižek was doing 
before his Paul was drowned in Hegel: read the Pauline Christian as one who 
passes through the lack in the Other, experiencing symbolic death through 
sharing in Christ’s trauma, rather than through sharing in Christ’s ‘atheism.’  
This, then, is the lesson to be taken from Žižek’s reading of Paul: there is a Paul to 
be found who becomes acutely relevant to the modern political situation when 
read in Lacanian terms, because he reorients our relation to the master signifiers 
of today through the event of Christian conversion; but this Paul is not a Hegelian 
atheist. 	   Further,	   when	   Žižek	   mostly	   abandons	   Lacan	   for	   Hegel	   in	   his	  explanation	   of	   Pauline	   theology	   he	   also	   abandons	   the	   psychological	  explanation	  of	   exactly	  how	  Paul	  and	  early	  Christianity	  got	   there,	   leaving	  us	  with	  a	  Paul	  who	  discovered	  something	  that	  might	  be	  Hegelian,	  but	  not	  a	  Paul	  who	   was	   psychologically	   caused	   by	   the	   Christ-­‐event/narrative	   to	   discover	  something	  Hegelian.	   	  This	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  for	  leftist	  critical	  theory;	  indeed,	  from	  Žižek’s	  perspective,	  ‘the	  Paulinian	  community	  of	  believers	  is	  to	  be	  found	  today	  in	  radical	  political	  groups,	  not	  in	  churches.’158	  However,	   it	   lessens	  the	  extent	   to	   which	   Žižek’s	   Paul	   might	   actually	   lead	   to	   a	   practicable	   Christian	  theo-­‐politics,	   and	   also	   fails	   to	   explain	   exactly	   how	   Paul	   came	   to	   these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Slavoj Žižek, ‘The Necessity of a Dead Bird: Paul’s Communism,’ in eds. Ward Blanton and 
Hent de Vries, Paul and the Philosophers (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 176. 
	  64	  
Hegelian	  ideas	  (and	  thus	  how	  this	  event	  might	  be	  replicable	  to	  some	  degree	  today).	  	  It	  separates	  the	  theoretical	  idea	  of	  Christ	  from	  the	  psychical	  event	  of	  Christ.	  	  Thus	  in	  Chapter	  6	  I	  look	  for	  a	  Lacanian	  Pauline	  psychical	  explanation	  for	  the	  mass	  origins	  of	  Žižek’s	  Hegelian	  Paul.	  
 A few other points about Žižek’s Lacanian Paul should be made.  
Something I will also do is use the Lacanian clinical structures (psychosis, 
perversion, hysteria and obsessional neurosis), as a way to approach the situations 
into which Paul writes his interventions – these will be explained throughout the 
thesis, some initial comment can be made here.159  Žižek is precisely correct when 
he says that in 1 Corinthians Paul encounters the clinical structure of perversion, 
and that he refers to this same structure in Romans.160  This dynamic allows one 
to agree with Žižek’s statement that ‘Everyone who aims at really understanding 
Lacan’s Écrits should read the entire text of Romans and Corinthians in detail.’161  
However, Žižek’s reading of Romans 7 is that Paul is advocating a hysterical 
attitude to the law instead of a perverse one.162  Conversely, my reading is that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Each of these terms are also defined in the Glossary, Appendix A. 
160 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 171-172; ‘Paul and the Truth Event,’ 95-96.  I make this point at 
length in Chapter 3. 
161 Žižek The Ticklish Subject, 172-173; ‘Paul and the Truth Event,’ 96. However, as Žižek makes 
clear in The Puppet and the Dwarf, 113, in his view these are the key texts because they contain 
Rom 7 and 1 Cor 13, the ‘paradigmatic’ Pauline texts, not because the contents of the entirety of 
each of these letters is important.  This is a typical failure on the part of philosophical readings of 
Paul: they read the minor passages that ring of philosophical discourse and presume them to be 
paradigmatic.  Few Paul scholars would see either of these chapters as more important than, 
depending on the scholar, Rom 3 or 8; Gal 3; Phil 2 or 2 Cor 5, etc.  
162 According to Kotsko in ‘Politics and Perversion: Situating Žižek’s Paul,’ 47 and Axton, ‘The 
Psychotheology of Sin and Salvation,’ 111-116, hysteria is usually seen positively by Žižek, and 
Žižek’s reading of Rom 7 is that it is an example of Paul moving from a perverse position with 
respect to the law to a hysterical one.  Žižek does not state directly, in any of the texts consulted, 
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Romans 7:7-25 is Paul stereotyping an obsessional attitude to the law (not a 
hysterical one), and that Paul’s own solution is none of these. 
Another positive point in Žižek’s reading is that he does make an attempt 
to dialogue with academic biblical studies: at one point he even summarises the 
pistis Christou debate, and uses it as a way to cite Paul in connection with Hegel, 
attempting to solve the pistis Christou debate by suggesting that it is Christ’s faith 
(as characterised by faithfully dying despite feeling abandoned on the cross) in 
which we are to have faith.163  However, this dialogue with biblical studies has 
not led him to be aware of the fundamental issues of the New Perspectives, which 
puts him at odds with the Paul known by biblical studies. For example, despite 
having read David Horrell’s introduction to Paul and so commenting on the 
debate between participatory and substitutionary models of the atonement,164 
Žižek then carries on to presume that what Paul objects to is primarily the guilt 
imposed by the law (this view has long been abandoned by the New 
Perspectives),165 and specifically to endorse a Lutheran reading of Paul in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that he reads Rom 7 as a positive example of the hystericisation of perversion in Christian 
conversion, but this does seem to be an accurate description of what he suggests.   
163 Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf, 101-102.  This is really quite ingenious, and would go a long 
way towards reconciling the Lacan/Hegel problem in Žižek’s interpretation as described above, if 
he were to develop it instead of only talking about Hegel and the cry of dereliction.  The idea that 
we are to believe in Christ’s belief maintains a Lacanian structure, putting Christ in the position of 
the Other-supposed-to-know, but incorporating lack (belief, as opposed to knowledge) into this 
very place of the master’s knowledge.  The key distinction to make, which would perhaps make 
Žižek’s interpretation work, would be that this does not amount to suggesting that Paul’s Christ is 
an atheist, but rather that Christ’s belief, rather than knowledge, in the place of the Other, 
incorporates lack into the master signifier of Christian ideology. 
164 Ibid., 102-104. 
165 Ibid., 104-107, 113. 
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the law is seen as a purely negative force.166  Lastly, where Žižek does read Paul 
in Lacanian terms, he effortlessly matches Lacanian and Pauline concepts in a 
way I hope to replicate.  For example, in The Fragile Absolute, while offering a 
multi-faceted reading of Paul containing many more elements than those 
discussed above, he briefly discusses how the Christian subject, as a kainē ktisis 
(new creation), has passed through a violence of the death drive, beginning afresh 
from a zero-point and erasing one’s past through sublimation.167  Ultimately, it is 
this very act of sublimation that I will describe in more detail. 
  
 Žižek’s readings of Paul are in fact so multi-faceted that both the above 
summary and the work of Axton discussed below cannot possibly deal with every 
angle through which his rambling prose passes;168 but selectively discussing a few 
of these aspects is helpful nonetheless.  One aspect of Žižek’s reading that Axton 
emphasises heavily is Rom 7 as an example of a positive move from a perverse to 
a hysterical relation to the law.169  Axton’s way of remedying this problem is to 
carry on from Žižek’s reading of Rom 7 and read chapter 8, which allows him 
correctly to read the Pauline solution to the problem posed in chapter 7, instead of 
reading chapter 7 as the solution itself.  Of course, the debate as to the exact 
purpose of chapter 7 (and 8 for that matter!) is a primary discussion going back 
millennia in Pauline studies; but it is worth noting that Axton’s emphasis on 
chapter 8 as the solution to the problem is generally in line with Campbell’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Ibid., 118. 
167 Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute (London: Verso, 2008 [2000]), 118-120. 
168 Žižek’s prose, like Lacan’s, has the feel of the rambling speech and free association of a 
psychoanalytic session. 
169 Axton, ‘The Psychotheology of Sin and Salvation,’ 138-154. 
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reading, and other apocalyptic readings.  Even if we were to come from the 
opposite angle, and posit a Lutheran interpretation of Rom 3:21-26 as the main 
solution presented in Romans, this would be equally valid.  The point is that when 
Žižek finds his hysterical solution in Rom 7:7-25, he is positing a centre to Paul’s 
message in a passage that is not generally read as the ‘solution’ part of Romans. 
 Axton rightly reads Žižek’s approach, particularly in his more recent work, 
as being predominantly laid out in Hegelian terms.  So, citing page 292 of The 
Monstrosity of Christ, he notes that ‘Baptism, like the death of Christ, brings life 
and death into their properly “parallactic” relationship of being “one and the same 
event”.’170  Again, citing page 287 of the same, he reads Žižek as saying that for 
Paul ‘It is Christ alone that reveals the nonexistence of God, not through a 
symbolic gesture, but at the level of the real, opening up, as a result, new forms of 
human community built on an alternative subjectivity.’  Since Žižek’s reading is 
that Paul’s solution is to bring the real of God’s nonexistence into awareness, 
Axton rightly sees this (Hegelian) reading as insufficiently Pauline.  The primary 
problem with Axton’s approach is that, after a very good reading of Rom 7, when 
he reads Rom 8 as a more authentically Pauline solution to this Hegelian problem, 
the solution he argues for does not fit with a Lacanian view of the subject at all – 
which does not necessarily make it incorrect, but does make it less useful for the 
current study.  After very successfully using Pauline scholarship to critique and 
support different aspects of Žižek’s reading,171 he then goes on to argue for a 
reading of Paul against Žižek that fails to operate coherently in Lacanian terms.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Ibid., 190. 
171 Ibid., 202-235.  Specifically, noting that Romans 7 probably identifies a problem, not a 
solution, but biblically supporting Žižek’s understanding of Sin as a lie. 
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For example, he argues ‘against Žižek, that “death to sin” is an ontological 
participation in the death of Christ and not simply symbolic or subjective 
destitution as it involves being “joined to” Christ.’172  In Lacanian terms there is 
no such thing as an ontology that can be altered in terms not subject to the 
signifier, as the subject without the symbolic is nothing. Axton eventually 
suggests that the change in the Pauline Christian subject that Žižek describes is 
due to an ontological change rather than a symbolic change,173 and that this 
involves ‘the overcoming of symbolic alienation through adoption by God.’174  
The moment he suggests that alienation is resolvable through ontological change 
(or at all), his argument is no longer being done within the remit of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, since Lacanian alienation is the subject’s existence in language.   
The goal of this study is to find a way to hold these two sides together: 
acknowledging that Žižek’s Paul is a pawn in Žižek’s wider Hegelian reading of 
Christianity, and does not bear much resemblance to any of the Pauls of biblical 
studies; but also refusing to throw the baby out with the bathwater, and still 
attempting to find out what Paul’s theology looks like when described in Lacanian 
terms.  There is a radical solution to this problem: to deal with it not by positing 
Paul against Žižek’s interpretation of him (Axton’s approach), but by positing a 
Lacanian Paul against Žižek’s Hegelian interpretation of him. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Ibid., 237. 
173 Ibid., 243-245. 
174 Ibid., 253. 
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4.2. Continental Philosophical Readings of St Paul 
 Commentary on Paul by continental philosophers has a long history; but 
philosophical commentary on a Paul recognisable by biblical scholars does not.175  
Negative portrayals of Paul have been based upon Lutheran stereotypes, and 
positive portrayals of Paul have been based upon Lukan biography,176 rather than 
the content or impact of his teachings.  Serious dialogue with Paul has occurred to 
some extent, but often suffers from several pitfalls that will be discussed below.  
Of the many different studies of Paul by continental philosophers that do now 
exist, most do not make direct use of Lacan, so I will not go into depth on all of 
them.  The purpose of summarising and critiquing them here is not to survey the 
field of knowledge about Lacan and Paul, since this is not where they fit.  Instead, 
they are discussed here in order to see what approaches have been taken in 
continental philosophical readings of Paul, and what methodological errors can be 
avoided.  This section should be read as an ‘… and Paul’ section, complimented 
by the ‘Lacan and…’ section below, in order to supplement the scarcity of 
philosophical ‘Lacan and Paul’ studies already in existence. 
 It was Nietzsche who first set a strongly negative tone for continental 
philosophical readings of Paul, in a reading that ‘is unscholarly and so full of 
faults that only a pedant could have any wish to catalogue them.’177  Indeed, not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Ward Blanton summarises or refers to a large number of philosophical interactions with Paul in 
‘Paul and the Philosophers,’ 1-38.  The rest of the volume is incredibly useful as an overview of 
the many different angles and issues of the complex relationship between Paul and (particularly, 
continental) philosophy. 
176 That is, the story of Paul’s life found in the Acts of the Apostles, the second part of Luke-Acts, 
the two-part history traditionally attributed to St Luke. 
177 From Walter Kaufmann’s preface to The Antichrist in Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable 
Nietzsche, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (London: Penguin, 1954), 568.  Paul himself acknowledges 
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much would be gained here from such a catalogue; but, fulfilling his claim that 
the errors of great men are more fruitful than the truths of little men,178 some of 
his errors have been eternally repeated.  His book The Antichrist is an assault 
upon organised religion, and Paul’s founding role in Christianity in particular, that 
should not be dismissed despite its inaccuracy: its efficacy as a critique of power 
and ideology is no more diminished by its historical errors than is Foucault’s that 
followed it.  However, a few enduring errors, in this work and others, have also 
been found in successive readings of Paul (whether inspired by or merely first 
exemplified by Nietzsche). 
 Firstly, Nietzsche makes a mistake not unique to philosophical 
interpretations: he takes Paul as secondary to the Gospels, suggesting that Paul 
took the Church off-track from where it started.  In Will to Power, Nietzsche 
makes a series of such statements: ‘Christianity: a naïve beginning to a Buddhistic 
peace movement… but reversed by Paul into a pagan mystery doctrine;’179 ‘A 
God who died for our sins: redemption through faith; resurrection after death—all 
these are counterfeits of the true Christianity for which that disastrous wrong-
headed fellow [Paul] must be held responsible;’180 because of Paul ‘the concept 
“sin,” “forgiveness,” “reward”—all quite unimportant and virtually excluded from 
primitive Christianity—now comes into the foreground.’181  The problem is that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that contempt for his letters goes back to their original audiences, in 2 Cor 10:10.  The NRSV 
translates it beautifully: ‘For they say, “His letters are weighty and strong, but his bodily presence 
is weak, and his speech contemptible.”’  
178 Ibid., 30.  From ‘Fragment of a Critique of Schopenhaur.’ 
179 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1967), 167. 
180 Ibid., 169. 
181 Ibid. 
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Paul’s writings are decades prior to the Gospels, presumably the texts from which 
Nietzsche constructs his idealistic notion of ‘primitive Christianity.’182  This 
vision of Paul as the destroyer of the pure Christianity of the Gospels is not only 
anachronistic, but also risks a false positioning of Paul as one who took the 
earthly and made it theoretical (the allegation made in Antichrist), rather than as a 
theoretician trying somehow to respond to the earthly event to which he is also 
our first witness.183  It is worth noting this failure of Nietzsche’s because, as 
argued below, it affected the vision of Paul inherited by subsequent continental 
philosophers. 
 Secondly, Nietzsche makes the understandable mistake of reading Paul 
through Martin Luther.  This is a mistake Nietzsche had no choice but to make; he 
would have been reading Paul in Luther’s translation, as the son of a Lutheran 
minister in a country with a Lutheran state church.  However, by following 
Luther, he contributed towards the cementing of a Lutheran Paul in the 
continental philosophical tradition, which has not been subject to an un-reading of 
Luther from Paul in the way that modern biblical studies has, as will be seen 
below.  A ‘Lutheran’ Paul in Nietzsche is found most clearly in Daybreak 68, 
where he begins his detailed description of Paul by calling him a ‘very tormented, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Most of the Gnostic texts from which the modern sceptic might today construct a counter-
vision of primitive Christianity were not yet discovered when Nietzsche was writing; he also refers 
to the Gospels in Antichrist 44 as testimony to the ‘first community’ of Christians, which Paul, 
‘with the logician’s cynicism of a rabbi,’ corrupted. 
183 This idea of Nietzsche’s, that Paul took the fact of Jesus’ earthly life and turned it into 
interpretation, moving from primitive to institutional Christianity, is discussed by Béatrice Han in 
‘Nietzsche and the “Masters of Truth”: the pre-Socratics and Christ,’ in Nietzsche and the Divine, 
eds. John Lippitt and Jim Urpeth  (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000), 124-127.  Han does not 
point out the falsity in claiming that there is a primitive Christianity that can be known apart from 
Paul’s influence, since Paul’s letters are the closest we have to ‘primitive Christianity.’ 
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very pitiable, very unpleasant man, who also found himself unpleasant.’184  What 
makes this depiction particularly Lutheran in character is that Nietzsche then 
describes Paul as someone who had been consumed with the question of the 
Jewish Law, and with guilt over his own inability to follow it, for all of his days, 
leading to his conversion to Christianity, as a contrived way to escape the law.  
Nietzsche even makes the comparison: 
 
 
Luther may have felt a similar thing when he wanted in his monastery 
to become the perfect man of the spiritual ideal: and similarly to 
Luther, who one day began to hate the spiritual ideal and the Pope and 
the saints and the whole clergy with a hatred the more deadly the less 
he dared to admit it to himself – a similar thing happened to Paul. The 
law was the cross to which he felt himself nailed: how he hated it! how 
he had to drag it along! how he sought about for a means of destroying 
it - and no longer to fulfil it!185 
  
 
One can understand why Nietzsche presumed Paul felt like Luther, since this was 
precisely Luther’s presumption; but it is an assumption that has largely been given 
up by Paul’s modern interpreters.  One of the key claims that E. P. Sanders made 
about Paul was that ‘Paul did not, while “under the law”, perceive himself to have 
a “plight” from which he needed salvation.’186  Sanders’ claim is thus that Paul 
did not see the law as a failed trap meant to lead to guilt to lead to Christ, but, that 
Christ presented a solution to a problem Paul did not previously know existed (in 
this case, it was indeed the solution that posed the problem, not the problem that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, trans. by R. J. 
Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 40. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 443. 
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led to the solution). The presumption that Paul had a guilty conscience, and with it 
that this guilty conscience was the primary factor of his conversion, has been 
largely based upon Romans 7, which Sanders notes is not generally now seen as a 
reference to Paul’s former life (this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5, 
below).  It is important to introduce these details: on the one hand, Nietzsche’s 
portrayal of Paul is at least partly responsible for the lack of interest in Paul by 
continental philosophers for some time after him; but it also ensures that when 
that interest did eventually occur, the Paul in the mind of the philosopher was the 
Lutheran figure of extreme superego guilt.  This is a problem that needs 
addressing. 
 The final problem with Nietzsche’s Paul that needs to be discussed here is 
the death of Christ.  Paul’s theology has many parts, all interrelated to form a 
fairly coherent whole.  Though the coherence of Paul’s theology is debated, the 
extent to which every part depends upon the other parts is not.  Is the death or 
resurrection of Christ of greater importance?  This is not a question Paul would 
understand, because the two are always linked together.  For example, in Rom 
4:25 Jesus ‘was given over because of our trespasses and raised for our 
justification.’  In Rom 6:5: ‘For if we have grown together in the likeness of his 
death, then also we will be of his resurrection.’  Does Paul’s theology work 
without the resurrection of Christ, since it was Christ’s death that paid for sin?  ‘If 
Christ has not been resurrected then your faithfulness is useless; you are still in 
your sins.’187  Does Paul’s theology work without the crucifixion of Christ, since 
it is his resurrection that assures eternal life? ‘I have been crucified with Christ; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 1 Cor 15:17. 
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and I live no longer as “ego,” but something lives in me: Christ.’188  Romans 12 
demonstrates that the teachings of Christ make up the content of the life in Christ 
that Paul advocates.  However, in Nietzsche’s view, Paul invented Christian 
theology in order to cope with the death of Christ.189  When Nietzsche quotes 1 
Cor 15:17 it is not because the death and resurrection of Christ are inseparable in 
Paul’s theology, but because Paul maliciously wanted to promise something after 
death in order to con the people further.190  When Nietzsche talks of Paul’s talk of 
Christ, the concern is primarily with Paul’s theology of Christ’s death, and 
occasionally with resurrection as an afterthought, painting Paul as one obsessed 
with crucifixion; in Nietzsche’s view, Paul primarily needed the death of Christ, 
but then decided to add a little more, so made up the resurrection.191  This great 
imbalance in Nietzsche’s presentation of Paul, though only one part in a grand 
presentation of Paul as a mad and villainous wretch, has resulted in continental 
philosophers presenting Paul either in line with or against the image of a Paul 
obsessed with death, which is discussed below.  It is a drama that academic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Gal 2:19b-20a.  Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωµαι· ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐµοὶ Χριστός.  The odd 
translation given above serves not just to translate into psychoanalytic terms, but also to highlight 
the strange gap that exists in the Greek between the subjects of the verbs and the nouns placed in 
apposition to them at the end of the latter two phrases.  Though this gap of two to three words is 
perfectly acceptable in Greek grammar, it highlights the strangeness implied in first saying ‘I live 
no longer’ before getting to ‘[as] I,’ and in saying ‘he lives in me, Christ.’  A more ‘literal’ 
translation that preserves this might be ‘and I live no longer as I, but he lives in me, Christ.’  Still, 
this does not translate the ambiguity of first saying ‘something lives in me,’ before the singular 
subject is revealed to be masculine, Christ.  
189 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 171. 
190 Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, 616 (Antichrist 41). 
191 Ibid., 617 (Antichrist 42). 
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theological study of Paul enacts as well, but with a much greater sense of the 
mutuality and equality of importance of the different parts of Paul’s thought. 
 Jumping ahead to the world of continental philosophy in which Lacan 
found himself, it is a world in which most French philosophers were raised as 
Catholics, have read Nietzsche and do not talk about Paul.  Michel Foucault is 
widely noted to have made almost no reference to Paul, despite his interest in 
Christian origins – though Paul does eventually get a mention in his 1983-84 
lectures.192  Gilles Deleuze makes no more than the occasional passing reference 
to Paul, except in one essay that discusses how D. H. Lawrence’s reading of 
Revelation parallels Nietzsche’s reading of Paul, and seems totally to endorse 
both readings.193  Jacques Derrida makes several references to Paul, but never 
goes into any detail.194  One such reference reads ‘What I admire most in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Valérie Nicolet Anderson, ‘Becoming a Subject: The Case of Michel Foucault and Paul,’ 
Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory, 11.1 (Winter 2010), 127.  She cites Michel Foucault, 
Le Courage de la vérité: Le gouvernement de soi et des autres II, Cours au Collège de France 
(1983-1984).  It has now been translated as The Courage of the Truth (The Government of Self and 
Others II), trans. by Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 [2008]), and the 
chapter discussing Paul is pp. 325-342, where he briefly touches on Paul while tracking the 
changes in theological understanding of the word parrēsia from the Septuagint through to the 
Early Church.  This was his last ever lecture at the Collège de France, on 28.3.1984. 
193 Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. by Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997 [1993]), 36-52.  The essay is entitled 
‘Nietzsche and Saint Paul, Lawrence and John of Patmos,’ and was originally published in 1978.  
He also agrees with Lawrence that not only does Paul follow Christ and ruin his message, but Paul 
actually follows John of Patmos (the author of Revelation), ruining Christianity even more than he 
already had (this claim is repeated throughout, most clearly on pp. 50-51).  Since the actual 
chronological order is much more likely to be Paul ! Synoptic Gospels ! Revelation, not Jesus 
! Revelation ! Paul, this is not particularly plausible. 
194 Jennings lists them and gives comment on each one.  Theodore W. Jennings, Jr, Reading 
Derrida / Thinking Paul (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 10-16. 
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Nietzsche is his lucidity about Paul.’195  Studies on the relationship between each 
of these thinkers and Paul have been written nonetheless, but they generally use 
these thinkers for reading Paul, rather than using these thinkers’ readings of 
Paul.196  It is in this environment that Lacan shocks his readers by reading from 
Romans 7 as though he had written it himself, and then telling them that Paul 
makes great holiday reading.197  However, despite the resonances between Lacan 
and Paul’s thought to be explored below, there is no extended study of Paul to be 
found in Lacan’s seminars or writings; this could be because even though he 
mentions Paul positively in Seminar VII, he states many years later that this is an 
example of the fact that ‘I compromise myself by discussing people whose status 
and lineage are not, strictly speaking, the kind I keep company with.’198  
Ironically, despite the potentially Nietzschean nature of the link between Lacan 
and Paul explored in the first few pages of this study above, Nietzsche himself 
was the main reason Lacan was alone among his peers in showing any interest in 
Paul at all. 
 Yet recently there has been a well-known ‘turn to religion,’ specifically to 
Paul, in continental philosophy.  What sparked this?  Stanislas Breton provides 
one of the finest examples of a continental philosophical reading of Paul, but his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Quoted in Jennings, Reading Derrida / Thinking Paul, 16, from Jacques Derrida, ‘A Silkworm 
of One’s Own,’ in Acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anidjar (New York: Routledge, 2001), 325. 
196 On Paul and Foucault: Elizabeth A. Castelli, Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power (Louisville: 
Westminster-John Knox, 1991).  On Paul and Deleuze: Clayton Crockett, Radical Political 
Theology: Religion and Politics After Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 
126-144.  On Paul and Derrida: Jennings, Reading Derrida / Thinking Paul. 
197 S7, 102-103. 
198 S20, 12. 
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turn to Paul was one made as a theologian studying philosophy, not vice versa.199  
The same can be said of Jacob Taubes,200 whose philosophical study of Paul was 
certainly an influence in the ‘turn,’ at least for Giorgio Agamben.201  Breton’s 
study of Paul was published in 1988, and Taubes’ was in 1993 (though it was 
based on lectures he delivered in 1987).  However, by the mid nineties neither 
Breton nor Taubes had been translated into English or been widely read, nor had 
Agamben yet written on Paul.  The event that changed this is almost certainly 
Alain Badiou’s interest in Paul, as the first continental philosopher (not 
theologian) since Nietzsche, to devote a significant amount of study to Paul, with 
his 1996-1997 seminar, in which he would recommend reading Breton.202  
Badiou’s philosophical interest in Paul goes back at least to 1982, and probably 
not much earlier,203 when he began writing The Incident at Antioch, his play about 
‘Paula,’ a female Paul-figure in a twentieth-century context.204  The play 
obviously mimics the form of Pier Paolo Pasolini’s screenplay St Paul, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Stanislas Breton, A Radical Philosophy of Saint Paul, trans. by Joseph N. Ballan (Chichester: 
Columbia University Press, 2011 [1988]).  Sadly space constrictions do not permit a fuller 
discussion of Breton’s work here, as he is not a Lacanian, and more can be gained from discussing 
Badiou.  Nonetheless, his work was helpful in contributing to the method used in this study, and it 
should not be underrated just because it is not within the remit of this introduction. 
200 Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, trans. by Dana Hollander (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003 [1993]).  Based on lectures first delivered in Heidelberg in 1987. 
201 Taubes’ work is the first study of Paul mentioned in Agamben, The Time That Remains, 2. 
202 Alain Badiou, La Fondation de L’universalisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997), 
3. 
203 Though there is not much from Badiou before this period, references to Paul are scarce.  There 
are two in The Theory of the Subject, trans. by Bruno Bosteels (London: Continuum, 2009 [1982]), 
written between 1975 and 1979, neither of great significance. 
204 Alain Badiou, The Incident at Antioch: A Tragedy in Three Acts, trans. by Susan Spitzer 
(Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2013), vii. 
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Badiou discusses at length in his main theoretical work on Paul, Saint Paul: The 
Foundation of Universalism (the translation of the aforementioned seminar), 
where he also points out that Pasolini’s screenplay was published in French, 
which happened in 1980.205  Thus it is reasonable to suggest that Badiou’s interest 
in Paul, the first case of an important atheist French philosopher writing on Paul 
after Nietzsche, and the first Lacanian, was inspired by his reading of Pasolini 
somewhere between 1980 and 1982.  The presentation of Paul in this screenplay, 
as a radical communist revolutionary, marks a turning point towards a new Paul; 
an intervention, into the dominance of Nietzsche’s pessimistic picture, of a Paul 
who looks a bit more like the nonviolent political revolutionary described by 
some modern biblical scholars.  A few points about how continental philosophy 
got to its Paul, and what should be lauded or avoided, can be gleaned from 
Pasolini.   
 Pasolini presented a Paul who was, on the one hand, a bit like Nietzsche’s 
in terms of his eventual effect on the world; but also, who was trying to be a 
nonviolent antiestablishment egalitarian revolutionary.206  He created a Paul who 
is a split subject: simultaneously both institutionalising founder and political 
revolutionary.  He did so intentionally: ‘I make a double Saint Paul, I mean 
schizophrenic, completely dissociated in two: one is the saint (obviously Saint 
Paul had a mystical experience – that’s clear from the letter – that was authentic), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. by Ray Brassier (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003 [1997]), 37. 
206 Pier Paolo Pasolini, St Paul: A Screenplay, trans. by Elizabeth A. Castelli (London: Verso, 
2014 [1977]).  To quote Pasolini’s own view of Paul, quoted in p. xl of Castelli’s introduction: 
‘My violence against the Church is profoundly religious, insofar as I accuse Saint Paul of having 
founded a Church rather than a religion.  I do not revive the myth of Saint Paul, I destroy it.’ 
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the other is the priest… the founder of the Church.’207  The presentation of the 
‘saint’ side, the real hero of the screenplay, is possibly why there has been a 
philosophical turn to Paul; but the schizophrenic presentation, and the errors that 
caused it, have then been borne out in that philosophical turn, along with some of 
Nietzsche’s errors described above.  Within academic literature, a similarly 
schitzophrenic picture of Paul can be found in the work of Marcus Borg and J. 
Dominic Crossan, who go so far as to suggest ‘three Pauls,’ and then question 
how to deal with the apparent contradictions in Paul’s ideas, which is also a main 
theme of Douglas Campbell’s work, described above.208  The liberal-
communitarian Paul portrayed so well by Pasolini, especially in the New York 
scenes towards the end of the screenplay, is similar to the Paul described 
throughout David Horrell’s Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading 
of Paul’s Ethics.209   As discussed in the introduction to Paul above, the political 
Paul is certainly very well attested academically.  Though none of Pasolini’s Pauls 
are unattested in academic literature, his presentation of them has caused 
difficulties; beginning with the fact that the above-mentioned biblical scholars 
also mention the possibility of contradiction in Paul, but each find their own way 
to find coherence.  It is probably fair to suggest that Pasolini would have done the 
same, had he been reading an ancient philosopher rather than a contentious 
religious figure. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Ibid., xxxix.  Quoted in the introduction by Castelli. 
208 Marcus J. Borg and John Dominic Crossan, The First Paul: Reclaiming the Radical Visionary 
Behind the Church’s Conservative Icon (London: SPCK, 2009). 
209 London: T&T Clark, 2005. 
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 However, Pasolini was writing a screenplay, not theoretical prose.  Since 
his piece has narrative form, and since he is coming from an artistic direction 
rather than an academic one, he draws quite heavily from Acts.  This makes sense 
for a non-academic narrative piece; but Badiou and those that followed him are 
writing academic pieces, so following Pasolini’s dependence upon Acts could be 
problematic.  For example, Pasolini is quite clear that he dislikes Luke for 
‘ruining’ Paul, but the image of Paul as founder of the institutional Church comes 
in no small part from Acts.210  Pasolini’s split Paul is split in part because of the 
merger of primary and secondary New Testament sources on Paul; and not just 
Acts, but also the Pastoral Epistles.211  One way to find a philosophical Paul less 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 One does eventually grow weary of continental philosophers suggesting that one biblical figure 
was venerable, but another biblical figure was evil and ruined him, such as Nietzsche’s reading of 
Christ and Paul, Badiou’s reading (following Pasolini, discussed below) of Paul and Luke, or 
Deleuze’s reading (following D. H. Lawrence, discussed below) of John the Evangelist and John 
of Patmos.  Surely it is possible to read a biblical figure from a philosophical perspective and 
simply acknowledge that there are parts we like and dislike, without constructing a fantasy of 
purity and posthumous desecration? 
211 The Pastoral Epistles are the three letters in the New Testament that are traditionally attributed 
to Paul, but most universally acknowledged as pseudepigraphal by scholars: 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy 
and Titus.  1 Timothy’s extensive concern with the quiet submission of wives to their husbands, 
saved only through bearing children, and with the establishment of firm church hierarchy, far 
exceeds the concerns found in any of Paul’s authentic epistles (for example, 1 Tim 2:8-3:13).  Paul 
does mention hierarchy in the Church (Phil 1:1), but not in such a way as to be overly concerned 
with its rigid establishment and preservation; just as in 1 Cor 14:33b-36 and Eph 5:22-33, both of 
which might be authentically Pauline, he does ask women to stay silent in church and submit to 
their husbands.  However, even if these sections are Pauline, in Paul’s authentic letters they are 
balanced out with the claim that there is no longer ‘male and female’ in Christ (Gal 3:28); with 
reference to a female deacon in a church (Rom 16:1); a female apostle (Rom 16:7); women 
praying and prophesying, presumably in church (1 Cor 11:5) and a recurring concern for the 
egalitarian celebration of difference within the Church (Rom 14-15, 1 Cor 10, 11:17-32, Gal 3:26-
29).  Of course, there is endless debate surrounding each of these passages, as they have always 
been at the core of debates over the Church’s social teaching.  However, the point here is that the 
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plagued by Nietzsche’s critique is to look for him from the ideas contained in his 
authentic letters, rather than from the narrative in Acts.  This is part of what forms 
the approach in this study: I am not looking for a narrative of a Paul whom the 
Lacanian psychoanalytic tradition would call a hero, but for a Lacanian 
interpretation of the structure of Paul’s theology. 
I turn now to the work of Alain Badiou.  Although there are many 
philosophical readings of Paul that could be discussed here, Badiou’s work on 
Paul is useful for this study in four ways: firstly, its content is influenced by 
Lacan, though Badiou’s philosophy is largely distinct from its Lacanian origins; 
secondly, some aspects of his methodology will be copied directly in the study 
that follows; thirdly, some errors he makes, particularly following from Nietzsche 
and Pasolini, can be avoided and fourthly, there has been some interaction 
between him and Paul scholars that can be discussed (allowing criticism of not 
just Badiou, but also of the reaction from biblical scholarship to philosophical 
interest in Paul). There is one main source for Badiou’s interpretation of Paul, 
combined with many minor sources.  The main source is his book Saint Paul: The 
Foundation of Universalism, a translation of his 1995-1996 seminar.  His play 
The Incident at Antioch should be considered a narrative form of his earlier ideas 
about Paul.  He contributed an article about Paul to the volume St. Paul among the 
Philosophers, and many of the other articles it contains are biblical scholars in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conservative caricature of Paul that Pasolini presents alongside his revolutionary Paul, and which 
influenced later philosophers, would have been much milder had he or they been more aware of 
the pseudonymous nature of ‘Paul’s’ most conservative and institutionalising texts. 
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dialogue with Badiou and Žižek.212  He also wrote a short foreword to the English 
publication of Pasolini’s St Paul screenplay,213 and has discussed Paul 
occasionally in interviews.214   
Badiou’s reading of Paul, which he admits falls more into the critical 
category of reader response than historical criticism,215 has many aspects, and 
cannot properly be explained without going through much of the rest of Badiou’s 
philosophical system, which will not be explained here.  Indeed, it is so 
inseparable from the rest of his philosophy that the main critique that needs to be 
made of biblical scholars’ responses to Badiou is that they have responded to 
Saint Paul without reading Being and Event (which is not an easy task, but is a 
significant flaw in their responses nonetheless).216  Rather than pretending it is 
possible to go through the entirety of Badiou’s argument in a paragraph, I am just 
going to touch on a few of the ideas that positively relate to a Lacanian reading of 
Paul. 
The core of Badiou’s argument is that the Christian subject emerges as a 
result of the experience of the ‘event’ of Christ’s resurrection; ‘event’ being a 
very central and elaborately defined term in Badiou’s wider philosophy.  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Alain Badiou, ‘St Paul, Founder of the Universal Subject,’ in St Paul among the Philosophers, 
eds. John D. Caputo and Linda Martín Alcoff (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 
27-38. 
213 Alain Badiou, ‘Foreward,’ in Pier Paolo Pasolini, St Paul: A Screenplay, trans. by Elizabeth A. 
Castelli  (London: Verso, 2014 [1977]), vii-xi. 
214 For example, ‘An Interview with Alain Badiou: Universal Truths and the Question of 
Religion,’ ed. Adam S. Miller, Journal of Philosophy and Scripture, 3.1 (Fall 2005), 38-42. 
215 ‘My reading of Saint Paul is absolutely on the surface of the text and in this way it is not a 
hermeneutic.’  Ibid., 38.  
216 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. by Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2005 [1988]).  
This claim will be developed more below. 
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event of having faith in something external to the life/death situation of humanity 
(in resurrection), in the form of a ‘conviction’ (how Badiou translates pistis), 
constitutes a new subject.  Because the constitution of the subject through 
something that lies outside of the situation is the definition of the event,217 and the 
event is something Badiou arrives at through meticulously reasoning via set 
theory, the event is something universal, not tied to any predicates (to Badiou, the 
event is an eternal ontological possibility).  This means that the formation of the 
subject because of the event is a universal possibility, and the Christian subject is 
an example of the event breaking into the particular (‘Jew or Greek’) with the 
universal.  Thus Badiou’s argument is that the theology of Paul is a form of the 
foundation of universalism (meaning something very different than what 
‘universalism’ means to the theologian!).  This is a methodology that will be 
outlined in the next section below, and termed ‘description.’ 
Beyond this basic outline, another detail stands out as a particularly 
Lacanian aspect of Badiou’s interpretation: the constant theme of the alienation of 
the subject, which is not otherwise a major theme in Badiou’s work, at least not in 
these Lacanian terms.218  For example, Badiou describes Paul’s conversion as an 
‘aleatory experience’ that ‘summons the “I am” as such,’ instituting a new 
subject.219  The chapter ‘The Division of the Subject’ focuses on a number of 
ways in which the subject is divided, but the main one is the division between the 
flesh (as ‘conventional lawfulness and particular state of the world’) and the spirit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Or, more precisely, something presented but not represented by the state of the situation. 
218 Also, at least not as late as 1995 – Lacanian terminology and direct use is much more common 
in his earlier work Theory of the Subject. 
219 Badiou, Saint Paul, 17. 
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(‘private inhabitation by grace and truth’).220  This is a use of Lacanian 
terminology for a split that is still more Badiouan in nature, but this too changes 
nearer the end of the book, where Badiou interprets Paul’s ‘apart from the law sin 
is dead’ in a way that borrows from Lacan much more directly,221 leading him to 
point out the parallel between his own thought here and Lacan’s.  He quotes 
Lacan’s reformulation of Descartes after accounting for the de-centering 
(alienation) of the subject: ‘There where I think, I am not, and there where I am, I 
do not think.’222  Badiou’s brief commentary on Romans 7 here, explaining it in a 
Lacanian exegesis longer than the one Lacan himself provides in Seminar VII, is 
possibly the earliest theological/philosophical elaboration of Lacan’s use of Paul. 
 There are many aspects of Badiou’s methodology that deserve to be 
copied almost exactly.  Badiou’s understanding of Paul’s relationship to truth is 
perhaps the most astute aspect of Badiou’s work.  He treats Paul as a ‘poet-
thinker’ militant of the event, making local interventions on its behalf, rather than 
as a theoretical thinker as such.223  To elaborate this further, Paul is not a 
philosopher, but an ‘antiphilosopher,’224 even a ‘prince of antiphilosophers.’225  
Badiou placed Paul at the end of a series of seminars on four such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Ibid., 64. 
221 Specifically, on pp. 82-83 Badiou talks about the law as that before which one cannot really 
speak of a desiring subject, in a way that reads like an explanation of the bottom right corner of 
Lacan’s Graph of Desire. 
222 Ibid., 83, quoting a saying of Lacan that occurs, for instance, on Écrits, 430. 
223 Ibid., 1. 
224 Ibid., 27-29, 108. 
225 Alain Badiou, Lacan: L’antiphilosophie 3 1994-1995 (Paris: Fayard, 2013), 264, au. trans. 
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antiphilosophers: Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Lacan and Paul.226  Posing Paul as an 
antiphilosopher is quite simple: he basically says as much in 1 Cor 2:1-5, where 
he states that his preaching is not based on words of wisdom but Spirit, and faith 
does not rest on the wisdom of men but on the power of God.  Yet Paul’s texts 
have been philosophical enough to inspire millennia of philosophical 
commentary.  This is because Paul is a theoretician, but this theorising is by way 
of necessity, in response to an event, not because Paul is someone who set out in 
life to discover the truth through reason.  This is also why it is important that 
Badiou mentions that we only know Paul through his interventions: Paul is not 
objectively reasoning for fun or for career prospects, but is forced to reason in 
order to intervene on behalf of the event; an event which, Badiou claims, is the 
foundation of universalism.  Thus, Badiou’s complete claim: ‘Paul is an 
antiphilosophical theoretician of universality.’227  This is the most effective way 
out of the accusation of anachronism that can spring up when blending Paul with 
philosophy.  My claim is not that Paul was a philosopher, but that Paul defended 
the event by arguing philosophically against philosophy.  Paul can and should be 
discussed in philosophical terms as one in dialogue with philosophy; but he 
should not be discussed as though he were one whose interest was actually in 
philosophy itself.228  Badiou also here offers a significant correction to Nietzsche: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Ibid., 9.  He also refers here to Pascal, Rousseau and Kierkegaard as antiphilosophers, so in 
total listing six philosophers whose relation to truth is similar to that of St Paul.   
227 Badiou, Saint Paul, 108. 
228 The author of Colossians 2:8, who seems to have been very well acquainted with Paul’s 
theology, has Paul state how he feels about philosophy quite bluntly: ‘Look out, so that none of 
you will be ensnared by philosophy and deceit!’ 
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Paul was not a theoretician who turned the ‘earthy’ into the abstract, but an 
antiphilosopher forced by circumstance to defend an event with theory. 
 There are some other positive notes to make about Badiou’s methodology.  
Firstly, he begins his book by constructing a philosophical framework that applies 
both to Paul’s world and to ours, and then uses it to address him with the question 
‘What are the conditions for a universal singularity?’229  Likewise, I will construct 
a framework that allows us to address questions and criticisms to Paul.  Secondly, 
Badiou often builds a bridge in the other direction as well, from past to present, by 
translating Pauline words and phrases with modern referents, similar to 
Bultmann’s approach.230  For example, he makes the claim that Paul’s ‘brothers 
[and sisters]’ is ‘an archaic form of our “comrades”.’231  This stems from his 
reading of Pasolini, in which he praises him repeatedly for treating Paul as our 
contemporary, with something to say to the modern world.232  Thirdly, Badiou 
shows evidence of having done some research into modern biblical studies, being 
aware that Acts provides an unreliable narrative and that there are only six 
undisputed Pauline letters.233  These all inform the methodology outlined in the 
section below. 
Lastly, there is one aspect of Badiou’s methodology that is not a mistake 
per se, but represents something recognisable to Pauline studies as an old 
approach from which things have long since moved on.  Badiou posits Paul as 
being stuck between two discourses, the Greek and the Jewish, and invoking a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Ibid., 13. 
230 See note 67, above. 
231 Ibid., 20. 
232 Ibid., 36-39. 
233 Ibid., 18. 
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third discourse, the mystical, to split the two into a new universal discourse, 
Christianity.234  The view of Paul as trapped between discourses is the view of the 
religionsgeschichtliche Schule (history of religions school), and what Paul is 
referring to with the Jew/Gentile divide is the roles of the law and national/ethnic 
identity in response to grace, not the cultural/academic background of the ideas.235  
The history of religions approach is usually traced back to F. C. Baur, heavily 
influenced by Hegel, who posited early Jewish Christianity as thesis, Pauline 
Hellenistic Christianity as antithesis, and early Catholicism as synthesis.  But this 
approach has since broken down, not just because of the complexity and 
indivisibility of ‘Jewish’ and ‘Greek’ ideas in Paul’s world, but also, more 
recently, under the accusation of ‘orientalism:’ it essentially posits that oriental 
ideologies need the intervention of Western ones to save them.236  In order to 
avoid this approach, when discussing the roles of certain philosophies and 
signifiers below, these are in reference to ideas of which Paul was aware without 
invoking a false dichotomy that wasn’t actually in his mind.  Along with Badiou, 
some way to correct the Hegelian polarity of the religionsgeschichtliche school 
can be made by pointing out the structural identicality of certain ‘Jewish’ and 
‘Greek’ ideas, which will be explored more below.237   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Ibid., 40-41. 
235 Wright, Paul and his Recent Interpreters, 3-25. 
236 Anders Gerdmar, ‘Baur and the Creation of the Judaism-Hellenism Dichotomy,’ in Ferdinand 
Christian Baur und die Geschichtes des frühen Christentums, eds. M. Bauspiess, C. Landmesser 
and D. Lincicum (Tübingen: Mohr, 2014), 107-128. 
237 Badiou makes the claim on p. 42 of Saint Paul that both Jewish and Greek discourses employ 
the same ‘figure of mastery.’  Without reducing the abundance of Jewish and Hellenistic 
discourses that existed to monolithic stereotypes, or claiming that they were separable in the first 
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Having briefly discussed the content of Badiou’s argument, and then his 
methodology, there are a few criticisms of Badiou that can be made in order to 
avoid repeating them.  Some are merely products of a lack of interaction with 
Pauline studies, which is understandable since he set out to do a philosophical 
reader-response interpretation.  He treats Paul as a reformer of the message of the 
Gospels (perhaps as a result of his favourable reading of Nietzsche’s Paul),238 
despite acknowledging that Paul precedes them.239  Breton also sometimes 
perpetuates this Nietzschean error, such as when he presumes that ‘ransom’ 
language cannot originate in Paul because it is used in the Gospels.240 Badiou 
often makes points about Paul that could be much better supported if he were 
more aware of recent scholarship on Paul; for example, one of his main points is 
that the Christian subject does not pre-exist the event he declares.241  This is the 
same point made by Sanders and militantly defended by Campbell, as referenced 
above, that Christ is the solution to a problem not known until the solution is 
presented.  A much bigger demonstration of how much we need a philosophical 
reading of Paul that takes Pauline scholarship into account is Badiou’s statement 
that ‘the only continuity between the Good News according to Paul and prophetic 
Judaism is the equation Jesus = Christ.’242  This is most certainly not the only 
element of continuity between Paul and prophetic Judaism, and one is forced to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
century, a similar point will be made below about a discourse that was already united: Stoic Jewish 
philosophical defences of the Torah. 
238 Badiou, Saint Paul, 13. 
239 Ibid., 32. 
240 Breton, Radical Philosophy of Saint Paul, 81. 
241 Badiou, Saint Paul, 14. 
242 Ibid., 20. 
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wonder how much more of ‘the event’ Badiou would have found in Paul if he had 
been more aware of how indebted Paul is to the prophetic Jewish tradition.243 
Perhaps the biggest flaw in Badiou’s work is the antithesis he represents in 
a dialectic opened by Nietzsche.  As discussed above, Paul’s theology is 
remarkably holistic, consisting of many inseparable and equally important parts, 
including the life, teachings, death, resurrection and current spiritual/embodied 
existence of Christ.  Badiou rightly criticises Nietzsche for reading Paul as 
someone whose thinking constitutes ‘a moribund paradigm, an eventalization of 
the hatred of life.’244  For Badiou, death ‘cannot be constitutive of the Christ-
event.’245  However, Badiou then carries on this bizarre compartmentalisation of 
Paul’s thought, by claiming the opposite.  For Badiou’s Paul, the death of Christ is 
just another predicate absorbed and obliterated by the resurrection of Christ;246 
‘the event is not death, but resurrection;’247 it is the resurrection, and not the life 
or death of Christ, that is ‘the uniqueness of the real onto which [Paul’s] thought 
fastens.’248  He even goes so far as to say that ‘for Paul, we have the cross, but not 
the way of the cross: this will be my formula,’249 and, incredibly, ‘suffering plays 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Summarising the extent of this here would be difficult.  Rediscovering how indebted to 
Judaism, and to the prophetic tradition, is Paul’s theology, has been one of the core elements of the 
New Perspectives, and something N. T. Wright’s work particularly brings out.  Richard Hays’ 
book Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (London: Yale University Press, 1989), though 
now dated, is an excellent demonstration of just how deeply embedded are the references to the 
prophetic tradition (and the rest of the Hebrew Scriptures) in Paul’s thought. 
244 Badiou, Saint Paul, 65. 
245 Ibid., 68. 
246 Ibid., 63. 
247 Ibid., 66. 
248 Ibid., 61. 
249 Badiou, ‘St Paul, Founder of the Universal Subject,’ 33. 
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no role in Paul’s apologetic, not even in the case of Christ’s death.’250 This error 
in Badiou’s interpretation has been criticised by Paul scholars, including John 
Barclay and Daniel Boyarin.251  Even in readings of Paul that specifically take a 
philosophical angle, to produce a Pauline theology in which one aspect obliterates 
another is to produce something decidedly un-Pauline.  If Badiou had had more 
contact with modern biblical studies, he might have made the connection that the 
faith of Christ, meaning the faithfulness involved in going to the cross, is for Paul 
the central figure of fidelity that Badiou finds instead in Pascal in Being and 
Event.252 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 Badiou, Saint Paul, 66 
251 John Barclay, ‘Paul and the Philosophers: Alain Badiou and the Event,’ New Blackfriars vol. 
91, iss. 1032 (March 2013), 182-183; Daniel Boyarin, ‘Paul among the Antiphilosophers; or, Saul 
among the Sophists,’ in St. Paul among the Philosophers, eds. John D. Caputo and Linda Martín 
Alcoff (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2009), 113.  While discussing the reaction of biblical scholars 
to continental readings of Paul, it is worth mentioning a comment made by John Barclay at his 
Ethel M. Wood Lecture, ‘Paul and the Gift,’ delivered on 26.2.2014 at King’s College London.  
Barclay is one of the foremost Paul scholars in the world, holding one of the highest-ranking 
theology professorships, as the Lightfoot Professor of Divinity at Durham University, formerly 
held by James Dunn.  He has also written, to my knowledge, the only dedicated response by a Paul 
scholar to Badiou’s work (outside of the volume here discussed), mentioned above.  Yet he refers 
to the book Paul’s New Moment, a collection of continental readings of Paul containing one of 
Žižek’s works discussed above, as ‘so abstract as to be inaccessible beyond a circle of experts.’  
Barclay is no fool, but this bears witness to a general feeling of the insurmountable 
incomprehensibility of the ‘continental philosophical Paul’ by Pauline scholarship, whether we 
blame continental philosophers or Paul scholars more for this barrier. 
252 The overlaps between Badiou’s chapter on Pascal in Being and Event, 212-222, and many of 
the interpretations of Paul being presented by modern biblical studies are remarkable, but cannot 
be entered into here.  Badiou remarks in Lacan: L’antiphilosophie, 109, au. trans., that he could 
perhaps have used Paul for that chapter, yet never, as far as I know, fully develops a commentary 
on Paul’s notion of pistis as it relates not to the conviction of the event (as in Saint Paul: the 
Foundation of Universalism), but to fidelity to the event as laid out in Being and Event.   
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The last aspect of Badiou’s reading of Paul that needs to be discussed here 
is its relation to the response of biblical scholars that it earned. Paula Fredriksen 
accuses Badiou not only of de-emphasising the death of Christ in Paul’s theology, 
but also of ‘de-eschatologising’ Paul by only focusing on the universality of the 
event.253  E. P. Sanders responds to Badiou by discussing the theological meaning 
of ‘universalism,’ without really addressing the philosophical meaning Badiou 
employs (the universal offer of grace, the universal possibility of ‘the event’).254  
Dale Martin understands what Badiou means by universalism better, but still 
challenges it as an accurate reading of Paul.255  All of these criticisms suffer the 
same problem: they critique Badiou’s reading of Paul as it stands on its own, but 
Badiou’s reading of Paul does not at all stand on its own.  Throughout his book 
Saint Paul he uses, as always, the language he develops in Being and Event, but 
uses it as a language for communicating Paul’s theology.  Does Badiou ‘de-
eschatologise’ Paul?  Perhaps, in that he does not appear to emphasise 
eschatology in Saint Paul; but inasmuch as the event is a case of the future 
erupting into the present, every word of Saint Paul is eschatological – only one 
would not know it from reading only Saint Paul without Being and Event.  
Likewise, has Badiou misread Paul’s universalism?  Not at all.  Badiou’s claim is 
not that Paul advocates an identity that applies to all humans, but that the event of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Paula Fredriksen, ‘Historical Integrity, Interpretive Freedom: The Philosopher’s Paul and the 
Problem of Anachronism,’ in St. Paul among the Philosophers, eds. John D. Caputo and Linda 
Martín Alcoff  (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2009), 71. 
254 E. P. Sanders, ‘Paul Between Judaism and Hellenism,’ in St. Paul among the Philosophers, eds. 
John D. Caputo and Linda Martín Alcoff  (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2009), 74-90. 
255 Dale B. Martin, ‘The Promise of Teleology, the Constraints of Epistemology, and Universal 
Vision in Paul,’ in St. Paul among the Philosophers, eds. John D. Caputo and Linda Martín Alcoff  
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2009), 91-108. 
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which Paul was a ‘poet-thinker’ militant is the event as a universal possibility 
ensured by mathematical ontology that Badiou writes about in Being and Event.  
However, the blame here falls on both sides: while biblical scholarship has not 
widely read Badiou’s philosophy before criticising him, he has not written in such 
a way as to invite the world of biblical scholarship to dialogue with the wider 
theoretical body upon which his work depends.  In the study that follows, Lacan 
will be explained as much as possible, despite how difficult this often is; and, on 
the other hand, his ideas will be used in various ways (some influenced by 
Badiou’s methodology) to interpret Paul, who will be, as much as possible, the 
Paul who is read by the academic field that studies him. 
 
4.3. Lacan and… 
 I argued in the last two sections that most previous studies of Lacan and 
Paul have not been studies of Lacan and Paul: they have been either studies of 
Hegel and Paul, or studies of continental philosophy influenced by Lacan and a 
version of Paul that predates the subject of modern biblical studies.  There is one 
last category of relevant previously existing studies, which will prove more useful 
in developing a methodology: studies of ‘Lacan and’ someone else.  While there 
has not yet been a good study of Lacan and the Paul known to his academic 
interpreters, there have been several studies of Lacan and other thinkers.  I term 
such studies ‘conjunctive readings.’ 
 Lacanian conjunctive readings begin with Lacan.  Seminar VII begins with 
two chapters that set his seminar in context of the similarities and differences 
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between psychoanalytic ethics and Aristotle’s.256  His most famous conjunctive 
reading, of Kant with Sade, is discussed in chapters 2-3 below.  In a fascinating 
example of what I will shortly term ‘equivocation,’ he claims that Sade was in 
fact Kantian.257  Lacan’s affinity for conjunctive readings justifies such a reading 
of his own thought. 
 There have been several conjunctive readings of Lacan in recent years, 
which will serve to refine the methodology of my own.  With this as the goal, I 
will comment more on their methodologies than on their findings.  Four recent 
conjunctive readings of Lacan are Alenka Zupančič’s study of Lacan and Kant, 
Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan (2000);258 Marcus Pound’s study of Lacan and 
Kierkegaard, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma (2007); Tina Beattie’s study 
of Lacan and Aquinas, Theology after Postmodernity: Divining the Void—A 
Lacanian Reading of Thomas Aquinas (2013) and Samo Tomšič’s study of Lacan 
and Marx, The Capitalist Unconscious: Marx and Lacan (2015).259  From these 
four studies I will be able to discern at least six different conjunctive interpretative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 S7, 1-40. 
257 Interpreting Lacan’s article ‘Kant with Sade’ (Écrits, 645-668) is difficult, and will be 
discussed more in Chapter 2, below.  Žižek opposes others and reads Lacan as saying that ‘It is not 
Kant who is a closet sadist, it is Sade who is a closet Kantian,’ in ‘Kant and Sade: the Ideal 
Couple,’ lacanian ink 13 (New York: The Wooster Press, 1998), available online at 
<http://www.lacan.com/zizlacan4.htm> [accessed 5.8.2016].  Or, as Marc DeKesel puts it, Lacan 
regards Kant as ‘the truth of Sade.’  Marc DeKesel, Eros and Ethics: Read Jacques Lacan’s 
Seminar VII, trans. by Sigi Jöttkandt (Albany: State of New York University Press, 2009 [2001]), 
135.  Lacan gets closest to making his opinion clear in S7, 94-99, where he briefly developes an 
interpretation of the interrelation of Kant and Sade’s ideas, that ends with the statement ‘Kant is of 
the same opinion as Sade.’ 
258 London: Verso, 2011 (2000).  This is slightly older than the rest, but has been republished more 
recently and is still highly influential. 
259 Samo Tomšič, The Capitalist Unconscious: Marx and Lacan (London: Verso, 2015). 
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strategies, which I will term equivocation, elaboration, description, 
combination, synthesis and genealogy.  There have also been some shorter 
studies of Lacan and Martin Luther, which are interesting but would not 
contribute further to the development of my methodology.260 
 Throughout his book, Pound reads Kierkegaard and Lacan to be talking 
about the same thing, creating a ground for the interplay of their ideas.  For 
example, he does this with ‘repetition’ in Kierkegaard and Lacan,261 and by 
claiming that Kierkegaard wrote about our alienation in language before Lacan 
did,262 and by equating Kierkegaard’s ‘chatter’ to Lacan’s ‘empty speech’ by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Herman Westerink has written on the Reformation, and specifically Luther, in terms of Lacan’s 
thoughts on das Ding in Seminar VII: The Heart of Man’s Destiny: Lacanian Psychoanalysis and 
Early Reformation Thought (New York: Routledge, 2012), and ‘Spinoza with Luther?  Desire and 
the Problem of Evil in Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis,’ European Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
33.2 (2012), 1-20.  He helpfully notes the demonstrable influence of Luther’s thought on Lacan 
(especially on S7), though perhaps overstates the similarity between Luther’s and Lacan’s 
anthropologies: Luther saw humanity as having an evil heart, leading to a deep sense of guilt that 
is discussed in chapters 1 and 5 here; but for Lacan things are more complex than this, and the aim 
of psychoanalysis is to alleaviate guilt, not to show that guilt is justified (S7, 5-6).  Carl Raschke 
responded by noting the importance of Luther’s relationship to God as a sublimation of das Ding 
as a foundational moment in the history of Western Christianity, in his review ‘Luther, Lacan, and 
the Heart of Human Destiny – What Psychoanalysis Can Tell Us About Our Own Political 
Theology (A Review),’ Political Theology Today, 2.8.2013.  Raschke has developed this idea a bit 
further, leading to the conclusion that the last two thousand years of Christian musings amount to a 
prolonged Lacanian psychoanalytic session, in his paper ‘Subjectification, Salvation, and the Real 
in Luther and Lacan,’ in Theology After Lacan: The Passion for the Real, eds. Creston Davis, 
Marcus Pound and Clayton Crockett (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2014), 58-70.  Dominik 
Finkelde has also been developing a reading of Luther and Lacan, towards furthering Lacan’s own 
reading of Luther in S7.  He wants to ‘put Luther in the context of what Lacan sees in him, not of 
scholasticism.’  He said this in a presentation called ‘Luther and Lacan’ at the conference ‘The 
Actuality of the Theologico-Political’ at Birkbeck, University of London, on 24.5.2014.   
261 Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 66-71. 
262 Ibid., 88-94. 
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demonstrating a genealogy through Heidegger’s ‘idle chatter.’263  This approach 
highlights a natural fecundity resulting from the equivocation of concepts.  In the 
same way that Lacan’s reading of Freud sometimes gets summarised as saying 
that what Freud said was true but he was really talking about language,264 this ‘but 
he was really talking about’ sums up a part of my approach to Lacan and Paul.  It 
is, in essence, what Lacan does with Paul by translating hamartia (sin) as das 
Ding in Seminar VII.265  It is as if he is saying ‘Everything Paul said about Sin 
was true, but he was really talking about das Ding!’  Alenka Zupančič also 
employs the same strategy throughout her book, for example when she mentions 
an obscure passage from Kant where he suggests that ethical transformation 
amounts to an act of new creation ex nihilo, then asks ‘Is not Lacan’s own 
conception of the passage à l’acte itself founded on such a Kantian gesture?’266  
This structure of hermeneutical claim allows authenticity to both Paul and Lacan 
without sacrificing any historical veracity.  I term it ‘equivocation,’ as it involves 
taking an idea from one author and equating it directly to an idea from another, 
causing the interplay between contiguous ideas in both authors. 
 Tina Beattie provides an excellent example of a conjunctive reading 
employing ‘elaboration.’  Instead of writing a study on the relationship between 
Thomas Aquinas and Lacan, she uses Aquinas and Lacan to do theology, mostly 
using Lacan to read Aquinas.  She systematically seeks ‘continuities and 
discontinuities between Thomas and Lacan, [using Lacan] within Thomas’s own 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Ibid., 124-125. 
264 Ibid., 6; Axton, The Psychotheology of Sin and Salvation: An Analysis of the Meaning of the 
Death of Christ in light of the Psychoanalytical Reading of Paul, 103. 
265 S7, 102-103. 
266 Zupančič, Ethics of the Real, 11. 
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theology,’ and then uses her Lacanian critique of Thomas to take Thomism 
beyond modernity.267  The line between methodologies is not so clear-cut, as one 
could certainly argue that this is not far from Pound’s approach, and she is only 
mildly less synthetic than Zupančič (see below).  Yet her use of Lacan to further 
elaborate and criticise Aquinas’s ideas stands out, using Lacan to expand and 
‘update’ Aquinas.  The study that follows has its strongest similarity to Beattie in 
that it is primarily a Lacanian study of Paul, rather than a study of Lacan.  
Conversely, there is fairly little use of Paul to read Lacan.  The most inspirational 
element to draw from Beattie’s methodology is that she does not just use Lacan to 
critique Aquinas, but she then, consistently with the approach of Radical 
Orthodoxy, uses Lacan to bring Thomism to the present.  This is the biggest 
advantage of adopting the method ‘elaboration,’ alongside the other methods.  My 
ultimate goal here is to use a Lacanian understanding of Paul’s theology and the 
Pauline theological event in order to bring Paul to bear on the twenty-first century 
in a way that is much more Pauline than Žižek’s atheistic Hegelianism. 
 However, this leads into the territory of the third conjunctive methodology 
discernable from these four texts: description.  One key claim below is that Paul 
recognised some problems that Lacan articulated more precisely, such as 
alienation (where I agree with Žižek and Axton that Romans 7 at the very least 
demonstrates awareness of it), the paradox of jouissance (here I position Paul as 
precisely aware of both sides of this paradox, not just the paradox of perversion) 
and our subjection to the signifier (the source of our alienation in the paradox, 
articulated by Paul with reference to the Torah), and he described a solution that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Beattie, Theology After Postmodernity, 211. 
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is better formulated in Lacanian terms (the psychoanalytic nature of Christian 
conversion as Paul understood it).  When Pound notes that Lacan is the true heir 
of theology,268 this is because the problems to which Lacan’s thought responds 
can easily be retroactively reconfigured into theological territory.269  A better 
example of this is Badiou’s work, which, by studying ‘the event’ with Paul as a 
witness to it, studies the historical situation of Paul more than the thought of Paul, 
and describes it in different terms (as stated above).  So, this is description, in the 
case of the study that follows: to claim that an event to which Paul bears witness 
is a psychoanalytic event, and to wager that this claim might be worthwhile.   
Another fruitful method of conversation between Paul and Lacan is not to 
be found in the equivocation of their ideas, but in the combination of them, 
allowing them to play off of each other, and to compliment or combat each other.  
Tomšič demonstrates this when he juxtaposes different but related Marxian and 
Lacanian theories of alienation, in order to conclude that ‘While capitalism 
considers the subject to be nothing more than a narcissistic animal, Marxism and 
psychoanalysis reveal that the subject of revolutionary politics is an alienated 
animal, which, in its most intimate interior, includes its other.’270  Throughout the 
book Tomšič discusses Marx and Lacan’s differing applications of understandings 
of alienation, and the use of Marx’s idea by Lacan, so that by the end he is able to 
combine them into a Lacanian Marxist critique of Capitalism.  This is not too 
dissimilar an approach to Axton, above, who uses Žižek’s understanding of sin to 
discuss Paul’s soteriology, combining them into something he sees as both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 19. 
269 Ibid., 20. 
270 Tomšič, The Capitalist Unconscious, 233. 
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Pauline and Lacanian.  Combination is a suitable approach when Lacan and Paul 
are most definitely not saying the same thing, but might nonetheless be saying 
complimentary things. 
Of all of the conjunctive readings of Lacan, Alenka Zupančič’s work 
stands out as a true work of synthesis.  She takes on board a Lacanian critique of 
Kant (that his ethics are a discourse of the master) and a Kantian critique of Lacan 
(that the ultimate horizon of Lacanian ethics is one’s own life), and attempts to 
provide an ethics that synthesises Lacan and Kant without being susceptible to 
either of these critiques.271  Her method is flawless in its synthesis, drawing from 
both Lacan and Kant consistently, employing the methods described above but 
also treating them both on their own terms and working towards a unified ethical 
idea at the end of the discussion.  Žižek’s work also falls into this category, in that 
most of his writing can be regarded as a seamless synthesis of Hegel (and 
occasionally other German idealists) and Lacan.  Such a synthesis will not be 
quite as possible with Paul and Lacan; but, ironically, synthesis will at least be 
more possible with Lacan and Paul than with Hegel and Paul. 
 Though not quite meeting the requirements of what Nietzsche or Foucault 
meant by the term, ‘genealogy’ is still the best term for a sixth identifiable 
conjunctive methodology.  When Samo Tomšič sets out to write about Marx and 
Lacan, he is faced with the problem of Lacan’s well-known anti-revolutionary 
stance, and potentially conservative politics.272  This is not dissimilar to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Zupančič, Ethics of the Real, 5. 
272 Tomšič, The Capitalist Unconscious, 1-2.  There is an excellent discussion of Lacan’s politics 
in Alain Badiou and Élisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan Past and Present: A Dialogue, trans. 
by Jason E. Smith (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2014 [2012]), 19-30.  Lacan often 
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problem with some philosophical readings of Paul: Paul cannot be made an 
atheist.  Nonetheless, Tomšič remains true to both Marx and Lacan when he 
arrives at the thesis that Marx actually caused a shift in Lacan’s thought, from a 
Freudianism supplemented by structuralism to a Freudianism supplemented by the 
mental economy of the production of jouissance.273  Pound, Beattie and Zupančič 
at points also adopt a genealogical approach, tracing the direct or indirect 
influence of their other subject upon Lacan.274  However, when it comes to Lacan 
and Paul there is not much room for this sort of claim other than what Lacan 
states quite overtly: that his reading of desire’s dependence upon the law is the 
same phenomenon described by Paul.275   This is equivocation done by Lacan 
himself, leading to elaboration, and he explains himself enough that it does not 
leave anything to be gained through further genealogical claims.  What little 
reference to Paul and Paul’s influence there is in Lacan will be commented upon 
in passing.  Instead, the project that follows is non-genealogical: it intends to 
widen the dialogue that does not necessarily exist already.  
 In summary, these four conjunctive readings of Lacan with people other 
than Paul, as well as the thinkers discussed in the previous two sections, 
demonstrate at least six conjunctive methodologies.  Equivocation, elaboration, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
made his thoughts on revolution clear, for example in S17, 207: ‘What you aspire to as 
revolutionaries is a master.  You will get one.’ 
273 Tomšič, The Capitalist Unconscious, 11. 
274 Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 142-144; Beattie, Theology after 
Postmodernity, 4-5.  Zupančič does this consistently throughout Ethics of the Real, though it is 
much easier with Lacan and Kant since Lacan refers to Kant directly much more frequently. 
275 His exact wording is that in Romans 7, ‘the relationship between the Thing and the Law could 
not be better defined than in these terms’ (S7, 103).  In other words, Lacan reads Paul to be 
describing the same phenomenon precisely but briefly, while Lacan expands in more detail. 
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description and combination will be used extensively in the study that follows.  
Synthesis will also be attempted where possible, and genealogy will not.  These 
approaches help me to avoid the pitfalls inherent to an attempt actually to 
psychoanalyse Paul himself.  This was the approach of psychoanalytic historian 
Erik Erikson, who wrote a biography of Martin Luther that ‘simply imposes the 
classic Freudian topology of id, ego, and superego—or the developmental model 
of the oral, anal, and genital stages—on the life of Luther.’276  As Peter Gay notes, 
‘One cannot, when all is said, psychoanalyse the dead.’277  Instead of analysing 
the person Paul, when attempting ‘equivocation,’ ‘elaboration’ or ‘combination,’ 
this is an analysis of the structure of his theology.  
 
5.  Methodological Summary 
 
 Not much more needs to be said regarding methodology, which has been 
slowly unveiled throughout the literature review.  What follows is a sort of 
hermeneutical experiment, primarily attempting to demonstrate the fecundity of a 
field of overlap, through a multi-pronged conjunctive reading.  The goal is to mix 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 Raschke, ‘Subjectification, Salvation, and the Real in Luther and Lacan,’ 67-68.  Erik Erikson, 
Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History (London: W. W. Norton, 1958). 
277 Peter Gay, Freud for Historians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 3, 5 and 182.  On the 
pages immediately following Gay is also heavily critical of Erikson’s attempt to psychoanalyse 
Martin Luther, despite the fact that Gay’s book was written as a defence of the use of 
psychoanalysis in the study of history.  The middle phrase of the above quote, ‘when all is said,’ is 
even more crucial for Lacanian psychoanalysis than for Gay’s more ‘orthodox’ Freudian tradition.  
Lacanian psychoanalysis is the analysis of the unconscious as it hides in plain sight, in speech.  
Paul does not speak, so he cannot be psychoanalysed. 
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Lacan and Paul as much as possible, throwing them at each other in various 
different ways to see what emerges.  As a result, it should be stated from the start 
that the goal is not to plumb the depths of journal articles on Paul in order to find 
a truth that might be Lacanian, but, rather, to pair some of the interpretations of 
Paul from modern biblical scholars with the ideas of Lacan in a way that 
demonstrates the potential productivity of the discourse. 
There is far too much internal disagreement within the field of Pauline 
scholarship to be able to defend a ‘neutral’ reading of Paul at every turn, while 
making room for Lacan; instead, this study is merely a demonstration of how 
some of the many readings of Paul currently available can produce lines 
additional of inquiry with input from Lacan’s ideas.  The use of the work of 
Douglas Campbell should neither be taken by biblical scholars as a signal that a 
Lacanian reading of Paul is only possible via the most controversial of 
interpretations, nor as a signal to philosophers that Campbell’s work represents a 
consensus among Paul scholars (far from it – but neither does the work of any 
other one scholar).  Campbell’s work is used because the author agrees with many 
of his controversial stances, despite this not being the place to defend them at 
length. 
Further specification might be needed regarding how this study goes about 
equivocation, elaboration and description.  In attempting to adopt an approach that 
uses Lacan, while still remaining true to the methods employed by modern 
biblical scholars, it is necessary to defend equivocation, elaboration and 
description as forms of historical criticism.  ‘Historical criticism’ is a term that 
describes the approach of the vast majority of biblical scholars over the last two 
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centuries,278 and can be defined as the attempt to ascertain the historical truth 
referred to in a text.279 Historical critics and theological conservatives tend to see 
postmodern, structuralist, poststructuralist and deconstructive readings as opposed 
to historical readings; though it is important to note here that Lacanian readings of 
any sort have not happened widely enough to merit enough attention to be 
discounted with other poststructuralist readings.280   
Within the tradition of historical criticism a more recent field has emerged: 
social-scientific criticism.  This approach ‘[retains] a close link with the aims of 
historical criticism; the intention is that the use of the resources which the social 
sciences offer, alongside the other methods of textual and historical criticism, may 
enable a fuller and better appreciation of the biblical texts and communities within 
their historical, social, and cultural setting.’281  John Elliott adds to this definition, 
outlining three historical elements studied by the approach: (1) ‘the conditioning 
factors and intended consequences of the communication process; (2) the 
correlation of the text’s linguistic, literary, theological (ideological) and social 
dimensions; and (3) the manner in which this textual communication was both a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 Wright, Paul and his Recent Interpreters, 3-8. 
279 I. H. Marshall, ‘Historical Criticism,’ in New Testament Interpretation, ed. I. H. Marshall 
(Carlisle: Paternoster, 1977), 126-127. 
280 For example, see G. R. Osborne, ‘Hermeneutics/Interpreting Paul,’ in Dictionary of Paul and 
his Letters, eds. Gerald F. Hawthorne, Ralph P. Martin and Daniel G. Reid (Leicester: InterVarsity 
Press, 1993), 388-397, who groups all of these hermeneutical methods together, but devotes the 
most time to discussing deconstructionist readings, since it is Derrida who has had the most 
influence here, and Lacan virtually none. 
281 David Horrell, ‘Social-Scientific Interpretation of the New Testament: Retrospect and 
Prospect,’ in Social-Scientific Approaches to New Testament Interpretation, ed. David Horrell 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 3. 
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reflection of and a response to a specific social and cultural context.’282  Two of 
the most groundbreaking studies of Paul to have occurred since the start of the 
New Perspectives have taken this approach, studying Paul’s social world: Francis 
Watson’s Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles: Beyond the New Perspective283 and 
Wayne Meeks’ The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle 
Paul.284  Watson uses sociology to argue that ‘the social reality underlying Paul’s 
discussions of Judaism and the law is his creation of Gentile Christian 
communities in sharp distinction from the Jewish community.’285  Meeks studies 
the social life of people in the urban centres where Paul proselytised, including 
the class, political and ritualistic lives, to demonstrate the urban setting of Paul’s 
message.  Common sociological routes of inquiry in New Testament studies 
include the sociology of honour and shame;286 group develop-
ment/sectarianism;287 cleanness and uncleanness,288 etc.  Social-scientific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282  John Elliott, Social-Scientific Criticism of the New Testament (London: SPCK, 1993), 7. 
283  Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2007 (1986).   
284 Yale: Yale University Press, 1983.  Meeks published a revised second edition in 2003. 
285  Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 51.  In the second edition of this text Watson largely 
reworked his argument, having developed and changed many of his positions in the intervening 
twenty-one years; he remained, however, fully convinced of the merits of a sociological approach 
to the interpretation of Paul’s notion of justification. 
286 Robert Jewett, Romans, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006); David A. deSilva, Honor, 
Patronage, Kinship & Purity: Unlocking New Testament Culture (Downers Grove, IL: IVP 
Academic, 2000), 23-94; Bruce J. Malina, The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural 
Anthropology (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 2001), 27-57; Jerome H. Neyrey, ‘“Despising the 
Shame of the Cross”: Honor and Shame in the Johannine Passion Narrative’ in Social-Scientific 
Approaches to New Testament Interpretation, ed. David Horrell (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 
151-176. 
287 Bruce J. Malina and John J. Pilch, Social-Science Commentary on the Letters of Paul 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 20-25, 343-347; Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles, 
163-287; Malina, The New Testament World, 58-80 and 198-220; Robin Scroggs, ‘The Earliest 
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approaches include the psychological: John G. Gager applies cognitive dissonance 
theory;289 Gerd Theissen uses psychodynamic theory, examining at length the role 
of the unconscious in Pauline theology290 and Krister Stendahl’s seminal paper 
‘Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West,’ mentioned above, is 
essentially a psychological meta-critique of Pauline scholarship.  Theissen’s work 
also includes a long study of the role of psychology in Romans 7-8, which will be 
helpful for Chapter 5 below.291 
With psychological criticism as a minor strand of social-scientific 
criticism, itself a modern incarnation of historical criticism, Lacanian 
‘equivocation,’ ‘elaboration’ and ‘description’ as outlined above can be posited as 
orthodox approaches within academic biblical studies.  The kind of elaboration 
attempted below takes Pauline theology and elaborates how, within a Lacanian 
psychology, its claims can fit into a Žižekian programme and be of greater 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Christian Communities as Sectarian Movement,’ in Social-Scientific Approaches to New 
Testament Interpretation, ed. David Horrell (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 69-92. 
288 Jerome H. Neyrey, ‘Clean/Unclean, Pure/Polluted, and Holy/Profane: The Idea and the System 
of Purity,’ in The Social Sciences and New Testament Interpretation, ed. Richard L. Rohrbaugh 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1996), 80-104; deSilva, Honor, Patronage, Kinship & Purity, 241-
316; Malina, The New Testament World, 161-197. 
289 John G. Gager, ‘Christian Missions and Theory of Cognitive Dissonance,’ in Social-Scientific 
Approaches to New Testament Interpretation, ed. David Horrell (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 
177-194. 
290 Gerd Theissen, Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology, trans. by J. Galvin (London: T&T 
Clark, 1987).  Theissen’s work will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
291 Theissen, Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology, 177-265.  For more on the history of 
social-scientific readings of the New Testament, see David G. Horrell, ‘Whither Social-Scientific 
Approaches to New Testament Interpretation? Reflections on Contested Methodologies and the 
Future,’ in After the First Urban Christians: The Social-Scientific Study of Pauline Christianity 
Twenty-Five Years Later, eds. Todd D. Still and David G. Horrell (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 6-
20.  Horrell actually cites Theissen as the originator of social-scientific methods in New Testament 
studies, with his work in the 1970’s. 
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political and cultural relevance than when viewed in nothing but historical 
context.  The kind of description attempted below uses the psychological 
structures attested to by Lacanian psychoanalysis to evaluate Paul’s social and 
psychological world, in order then to interpret the psychical event he presumes to 
have happened to himself and those in his churches, later termed ‘conversion’ by 
his interpreters.   These approaches transfer Paul’s message into a psychoanalytic 
framework so that equivocation and combination can also take place, leading 
eventually to synthetic claims.  (Combination and synthesis are perhaps the 
additional steps being made here that are not made by historical-critical social-
scientific approaches – but they are grounded in the other methods.)  The use of 
Lacan to discuss Paul’s historical context292 supports the claim that this study is 
historical-critical in form, and is a Lacanian form of historical social-scientific 
criticism; but the use of Lacanian psychoanalysis for historical criticism also 
allows us to bridge historical and modern horizons successfully. 
This thesis is structured like Seminar VII: it introduces das Ding, then 
discusses the paradox of jouissance, then presents a reading of Antigone in light 
of it, then concludes with some assorted implications.  Chapter 2 lays a 
framework for the use of Lacan that follows by explaining two terms that are key 
to the study: das Ding and the paradox of jouissance.   It then creates a link 
between past and present by showing that the paradox of jouissance, still a 
psychical reality today, was experienced in ancient Mediterranean culture as 
illustrated by the conflict between Nero and Stoic thought.  Chapter 3 is a reading 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Which, as I argue in chapters 2-4, involves studying the relations to jouissance in his world, as 
well as the clinical structures of both Stoic ideology and the perverse response his gospel 
sometimes caused. 
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of 1 Corinthians, demonstrating that Paul’s theology forced him to deal with the 
reality of the paradox of jouissance, and in this letter he did not yet know how to 
respond to it.  Reading 1 Corinthians also sets up a discussion of Paul’s relation to 
desire, which must be discussed in a Lacanian study.  Chapter 4 is an extended 
argument that Stoic philosophy in Paul’s time represented the ‘obsessional side of 
the paradox.’  This also introduces the concept of master signifiers.  Both of these 
arguments set up Chapter 5, which reads Paul as consciously framing his 
theological opponent as someone overly troubled by the symptoms of his 
obsessional Stoic theology.  This clarifies Paul’s position with respect to the 
paradox of jouissance, but does not discuss the actual solution Paul presents, 
which is laid out in Chapter 6 with reference to Lacan’s reading of Antigone.  
Chapter 7 is a brief conclusion, summarising the argument, outlining some 
criticisms of Paul, Žižek, Badiou and Lacan, and then asking the question of 
where all this might lead in the future. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Das Ding and the Paradox of Jouissance
 
 
 
 
1.  Das Ding and the Death Drive 
 
 In this section I will explain Lacan’s understanding of the Freudian death 
drive, with reference to Lacan’s concept of das Ding, which he argued could be 
found in Freud’s work.  This paves the way for a reading of 1 Corinthians and 
then of Romans that uses a Lacanian psychoanalytic and philosophical 
framework, constructing a philosophical interpretation of Paul’s theology while 
remaining mindful of the historical-critical method. 
Throughout the seventh year of his seminar, 1959-1960 (Seminar VII, The 
Ethics of Psychoanalysis), Lacan spoke about ethics in relation to the Thing, le 
chose, das Ding.1  It appears only that year of his seminar, and very sparsely in 
Écrits.2 After this the concepts underlying das Ding were rolled into his evolving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In the French Lacan uses both le chose and das Ding regularly and interchangeably, occasionally 
also using the English ‘the Thing.’  I mostly use the German, aside from occasional exceptions 
where it does not fit. 
2 Écrits, 550, 724. 
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notions of the objet petit a and the real.3  Despite the eventual obsolescence of the 
term in Lacan’s own thought, it remains important to my study because Lacan 
found it easiest to explain using Paul’s own ideas,4 and because many of my 
arguments below will depend upon das Ding and the death drive.  Firstly, I will 
detail some of the many facets of Lacan’s concept of das Ding: its development in 
relation to the ideas of Immanuel Kant, Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein and 
Ferdinand de Saussure; and also how das Ding is the void around which language 
is structured, and is related to the figure of the mother and maternal enjoyment. 
The history of Lacan’s understanding of das Ding goes back to the death 
drive (Todestrieb)5 in Freud’s later writings, specifically, Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle.6  Freud had noticed that the internal conflicts engulfing the human 
subject are not simply reducible to the primary process (the pleasure principle, the 
instinct to seek pleasure and the reduction of unpleasure) and the secondary 
process (the reality principle, the struggle to come to terms with the way things 
really are).  Rather, there is another instinct at work in the human: the death drive.  
Since Freud saw human consciousness and the unconscious as the transfer of 
energy according to certain rules and processes, the death drive was the tendency 
of all life forms to work towards the state of inertia from which they began.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 
1996), 205. 
4 Lacan mentions St Paul six times throughout the seminar, but the most striking is his extended 
quote from Romans 7 on p. 102. 
5 Sometimes translated as ‘death instinct’ in Freud and psychoanalytic literature. 
6 SE18, 3-64.  Lacan connects das Ding with the death drive, which Freud began to write about 
here. 
7 SE18, 46-51. 
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By Lacan’s time, Melanie Klein had developed the idea of the death drive 
to the point that she assigned ‘a major role to the death instincts from the 
beginning of human existence, and not only inasmuch as these instincts are 
oriented towards external objects, but also in that they work within the organism 
and induce anxiety about disintegration and annihilation.’8  As psychoanalysts 
around the world were forming ranks behind either Melanie Klein or Freud’s 
daughter Anna, Lacan was instead formulating a psychoanalytic view of the 
human subject not focused on the strength of the ego or the power of the death 
drive, but on the signifier.  His battle was on the one side against the ego-
psychology of Anna Freud et al., and on the other also against Klein’s dependence 
upon notions of instinct.  Put in theological terms, the disagreement with Klein 
was with the idea that Original Sin is the human instinct to do evil.  According to 
Lacan, the Freudian drive has nothing to do with instinct.9  So, in opposition to 
the burgeoning power of the concept of instinct in contemporary psychoanalysis, 
Lacan developed the idea of das Ding (though, as we will see below, he of course 
claims that the idea is entirely founded in authentic Freudian thought). 
The foundations for das Ding are laid in the theoretical work surrounding 
the Oedipus complex and the paternal metaphor in Seminar V, which were largely 
developed in response to Klein.  This is clear from the outset of the section, when 
on pages 4-5 of the lecture of 15.1.1958 Lacan places his vision of the Oedipus 
complex in context of Klein’s alleged overdependence upon a precocious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. by Donald Nicholson-
Smith (London: Karnac Books, 1988 [1973]), 101.  For example, see Melanie Klein, The Psycho-
Analysis of Children, trans. by Alix Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1959 [1932]), 210-216. 
9 Écrits, 722. 
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knowledge in every child of the imaginary (the physical genitals of the parents).10  
Lacan reconfigures the Oedipus complex around his linguistic understanding of 
what happens in castration: it is not that the physical father gets in the way, but 
that the child accepts a signifier of paternal prohibition; the child accepts that 
something is getting in the way of it being the sole thing that the mother (or 
primary caregiver) desires.  In Lacan’s system there is no need for the child to 
have a precocious knowledge of its parents’ sex lives or organs.  Instead, ‘the 
father’ is a metaphor;11 a signifier taking the place of the signifier of the mother’s 
(or other care-giver’s) desire, of which the child had hoped itself to be the 
signified. 
In this symbolic relation, the child’s development is not related to 
imaginary objects (such as a real physical phallus) but to its place in a relationship 
of signifiers.  This opens the way for Lacan to continue his attack on Klein: Klein 
not only placed the Oedipus complex in relation to imaginary objects, but, along 
with many other psychoanalysts at the time (such as Winnicott), believed that 
even before language there is an imaginary satisfaction of need through 
hallucination, as a result of instinct.  This is the place at which Lacan’s criticism 
of Klein is most focused: Klein ultimately depends entirely upon instinct, without 
explaining how it is that the child reaches such a union of perception and need.  
For Klein the child is born with the ability to be satisfied by hallucination of that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Lacanian opposition to Kleinian dependence upon the idea that children are aware of the real 
phallus (as opposed to the symbolic phallus) is illustrated by this typically Lacanian comment by 
the psychoanalyst Phillip Hill: ‘Generally it is only Kleinians and young children who confuse the 
penis with the phallus,’ in Using Lacanian Clinical Technique—an introduction— (London: Press 
for the Habilitation of Psychoanalysis, 2002), 168. 
11 S5, 15.1.1958, 14. 
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which it needs.  It has the instinct to hallucinate the satisfaction of its needs.  But 
if this is the case, why ever accept reality?  Why are we ever unsatisfied by our 
ability to achieve satisfaction through the hallucination of objects?12 
Lacan’s answer, conceptually prefiguring das Ding, is that instinct is 
always already desire, and desire is always under the signifier.13  It is not 
‘instinct’ that knows what it wants and desires it, but, rather, need does not make 
itself known without the signifier.  There must be the Other, and the desire of the 
Other, and the other of the Other who prohibits something (tells you that you do 
not already possess it and something is keeping it away from you), before there 
can be any desire at all.  Another way of putting this is that unless there is 
something or someone getting in the way of the subject having an object, then the 
subject has the object and it is not desired.  When the subject employs a signifier 
to try to get the object, that signifier, like all signifiers, comes from the Other;14 
so, desire is the desire of the Other.  Lacan’s symbolic structure for the Oedipus 
complex and castration allows him to remove instinct from the equation 
altogether.  What remains, then, is the signifier acting as a lure to bring desire into 
existence from a void that could not properly desire before this, not having 
language.  The void, pre-conscious matter without desire or language, will 
become Lacan’s das Ding, a part of his growing understanding of ‘the real,’ and 
the eventual possibility in Lacan’s thought of the objet petit a. 
In the human, ‘the hallucinatory response to need is not the emergence of a 
phantastical reality at the end of the circuit inaugurated by the exigencies of need,’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 S5, 5.2.1958, 4-5. 
13 Ibid., 6. 
14 Écrits, 684: the subject speaks the language of the Other to others. 
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but rather ‘has this character of being something which has a relationship of such 
a kind with this object, that it deserves to be called a signifier.’15  It is related to an 
object (as Winnicott argued), but this object is a signifier; not a response to an 
instinct, but a signifier that acts as a lure and awakens instincts already in 
relationship with other signifiers – with the signifier, for example, that is directly 
opposed to it, signifying its absence (the phallus). 
 Lacan gives an example of this from Freud.  According to Lacan,16 when 
Freud’s daughter Anna is hungry and dreams of food she does not just dream of 
food, but specifically dreams of the foods that her father has already prohibited 
(‘cherries, strawberries, raspberries, flan’).17  It is not that there is an instinct or 
need that is capable of producing hallucinations of its own, but, rather, there is no 
need without signifiers to lure it into existence, since human consciousness of 
need occurs in a way bound to the signifier.  No matter how hungry one is, what 
one dreams of is the signifier.  While one could perhaps argue that the object of 
which one dreams is a representation of the thing, rather than of the signifier, 
psychoanalytic experience confirms what Ferdinand de Saussure theorised: the 
two are inseparable.18 
 So Lacan positions himself against Klein, for whom there are instincts and 
need before signification, instead arguing that there are no instincts, and even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 S5, 5.2.1958, 7. 
16 I was unable to locate the source of this example in Freud’s own writings. 
17 S5, 5.2.1958, 7. 
18 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. by Roy Harris (London: 
Duckworth, 1983 [1972]), 65-70.  This fact of the unconscious is a core element of Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory: even in a dream where no words are spoken, the images in the dream relate 
in the unconscious as signifiers, through metaphor and metonymy (see Chapter 1, section 2.2).   
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need cannot exist without the signifier.  This leaves us with the question, then, of 
what it is that does exist before and without the signifier?  What is it that one 
needs before it is signified, and what is it that does the needing before it is 
represented by a signifier?  Many years later Lacan eventually named the 
unconscious (or a certain aspect of it) parlêtre, a speaking being.19  This is 
because the unconscious is not a repressed, thinking, other being, but is a being 
that only emerges within speech itself.  Human consciousness is inseparable from 
the language it uses about itself, and the linguistically structured unconscious 
emerges through speech.  So what is there before and beyond speech?  The 
answer that Lacan comes to in Seminar VII is das Ding. 
Das Ding is what remains beyond signifier and signified.  It is at the point 
of discussing the relationship between pleasure and reality principles, and 
between the subject and the signifier, that Lacan takes up this discussion in 
Seminar VII, on the way to introducing das Ding.  He again says that the primary 
process in the unconscious results in us hallucinating what we want,20 but now 
argues from Freud’s texts themselves (specifically the Entwurf) that that which 
appears takes the form of a signifier.21  The thing that is desired when a baby cries 
‘would remain obscure and unconscious if that cry did not lend it, as far as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Jacques-Alain Miller, in his concluding speech to the ninth Congress of the World Association 
of Psychoanalysts on 27 April 2014, pins the coining of the neologism parlêtre to Lacan’s 
untranslated article ‘Joyce le Symptôme II’ in Autre Écrits (Paris: Seuil, 2001), 568, where he 
refers to a particular form of the unconscious (‘la forme de cet ICS’) that he terms parlêtre, in 
reference to the unconscious as it emerges in the James Joyce’s Ulysses.  Miller’s speech, 
‘L’inconscient et le corps parlant,’ is available translated at <http://www.lacan.com/ 
actuality/2014/07/lecture-by-jacques-alain-miller-paris-41514/#more-506> [accessed 18.8.2016]. 
20 S7, 36. 
21 Ibid., 37. 
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conscious is concerned, the sign that gives it its own weight.’22  When he then 
actually introduces the concept of das Ding it is at this precise point at which he 
arrived in Seminar V: das Ding is that which the subject has/is without signifier or 
signified, that which is there before the signifier has allowed need to exist in the 
form of desire. 
Lacan finds his structuralist point of entry into Freud in the notions of 
Wortvorstellungen and Sachvorstellungen, word-representations and thing-
representations.23  Although Lacan does not mention Saussure by name in the 
whole of Seminar VII, his interchangeable use of these two German terms of 
Freud’s with ‘signifier’ (for Wortvorstellung) and ‘signified’ (for 
Sachvorstellung) ties the discussion to the Saussurean linguistics Lacan had long-
since embedded in his thought.24  Freud uses these in his article ‘The 
Unconscious’ as two different things that appear in the unconscious: 
representations of words, which are always opposed to representations of things.25  
But Lacan notes that Freud chooses not to form the word Dingvorstellung, using 
the other German word for ‘thing.’26  Why?  Lacan then points to a roughly 
contemporary letter of Freud’s to his friend Fleiss, in which he is talking about the 
subject’s very first experiences of reality in the form of the Nebenmensch, the 
neighbour.27  Das Ding is the neighbour (the whole of outside reality) first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid., 37-38. 
23 Ibid., 52. 
24 See Chapter 1, section 2.1, above. 
25 SE14, 201. 
26 S7, 54-55. 
27 Letter 52 (6.12.1896), found in SE1, 233-239. 
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experienced as something outside, something alien (fremde).28  Based on this, 
Lacan can defend his position that the reason Freud refers to signifieds in the 
unconscious as Sachvorstellungen is because Ding is already the word he is using 
for the whole of reality as first experienced apart from the signifier, before it has 
arrived – nomenclature consistent with that of Kant.  This is reality as experienced 
before the signifier has aroused need.  However, das Ding never stays the same: 
every time the subject encounters it in reality there is something different about 
it.29 
This could be because of the connection Lacan’s concept has to Kant, 
who, ‘better than anyone else, glimpsed the function of das Ding.’30  Lacan 
mentions this having just described das Ding as ‘the thing in its dumb reality’ and 
‘the beyond-of-the-signified.’31  This is similar to Kant’s Ding an sich, which is 
the thing as it exists in itself, unmediated by perception and essentially 
unknowable to the subject.32  Lacan is appropriating the Kantian concept of the 
Ding an sich, the thing in itself that must exist but cannot be known or perceived, 
and seeing it in Freud’s unnamed beyond of the Wortvorstellung (signifier) and 
Sachvorstellung (signified). 
This is one of the senses in which das Ding is the original lost object, 
which one never really had.  So Lacan claims that when Freud in 1925 wrote an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 S7, 62. 
29 Ibid., 62-63. 
30 Ibid., 65-66. 
31 Ibid., 65. 
32 Immanuel Kant, Prologemena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. by Gary Hatfield (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004 [1783]), 85 (§13, Note II). 
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article entitled ‘Verneinung,’ negation, on the lost object, it is about das Ding.33   
The pleasure principle, then, rather than simply regulating a quest for more 
pleasure and less unpleasure, is regulating a circling around the lost object, never 
getting close enough to realise it is not there, nor far enough away to stop thinking 
it is just out of reach.  It is this sense of das Ding that will become the objet petit 
a, around which the drive circles.34  The rest of Seminar VII is about the subject’s 
relation to das Ding as a lost object it never had, which is what all signifying units 
have as the void around which they are wrapped.35 
Is Lacan correct in his interpretation of Freud, positing das Ding as an 
authentically Freudian concept?  His case is strong, but perhaps still 
unconvincing.  While he might be correct that Freud avoided coining the phrase 
Dingvorstellung because he already had in mind a Kantian concept of Ding as 
connected to that which is not included in representation, this does not really 
amount to a Freudian idea, and certainly not an idea with any significant place in 
his thought.  However, all this means is what we already knew: Lacan 
intentionally tries to posit his own system as authentically Freudian, particularly 
in his earlier years when he was still accountable to the International 
Psychoanalytic Association.  Whether or not das Ding is an authentically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 S7, 70. 
34 S11, 178. 
35 It is in this sense that Lacan compares das Ding to the inside of a vase or pot, drawing on 
Heidegger’s metaphor, though the origins of Lacan’s understanding of das Ding are much more 
dependent upon the other thinkers stated here than on Heidegger.  S7, 148-150 citing Martin 
Heidegger, ‘The Thing,’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2001 [1971]), 161-184. 
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Freudian concept, it is a foundational concept in Lacan’s linguistic return to 
Freud, and, in his understandings of the death drive and jouissance. 
Lacan finishes his second lecture on das Ding drawing helpful connections 
between das Ding and other concepts, which sets up his writings on Kant and 
Sade:  ‘There is no Sovereign Good – the… Sovereign Good, which is das Ding, 
which is the mother, is also the object of incest, is a forbidden good, and… there 
is no other good.’36  Here, locked up in the real, is the only universal good: the 
repressed memory of oneness with the (m)Other, before desire and incest 
prohibition entered via the signifier, before the Other (in this case the mother) was 
other.37  Thus in das Ding is the subject of the incest prohibition, the desire of the 
mother. 
 
What we find in the incest law is located as such at the level of the 
unconscious in relation to das Ding, the Thing.  The desire for the 
mother cannot be satisfied because it is the end, the terminal point, 
the abolition of the whole world of demand, which is the one that at 
its deepest level structures man’s unconscious.  It is to the extent that 
the function of the pleasure principle is to make man always search 
for what he has to find again, but which he never will attain, that one 
reaches the essence, namely, that sphere or relationship which is 
known as the law of the prohibition of incest.38 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 S7, 85. 
37 It is important to note here that das Ding is not just the memory of the initial relationship with 
the mother, or else Lacan would be Melanie Klein, and we would be back with a theory of 
instincts evolving in relation with a human.  Rather, Lacan is specific that das Ding is related to 
the primordial relationship with the mother, but he is seeking ‘to reestablish a broader function’ 
than Klein does; for him das Ding is the world before a signifier got in the way of the mother.  See 
S7, 130-131. 
38 S7, 82. 
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The developmental phase during which the subject was actually fully dependent 
upon and fulfilled by the mother is the world so complete that there is no demand, 
only das Ding.  To return there would be overwhelming.  The subject ‘cannot 
stand the extreme good that das Ding may bring him.’39  This is the reason that 
the pleasure principle causes him to circle around it. 
Suffering begins to be tied into das Ding from page 146 of Seminar VII: 
‘The Thing is that which in the real… suffers from the signifier.’40  While in 
English we discuss suffering and evil as two separate things, Lacan uses only the 
French le mal.41  First using the example of the medieval Cathar heresy, Lacan 
argues that le mal is what we call das Ding, partially in order to stay away from it.  
We have learned this from the time of the incest prohibition (which, for Lacan, is 
primarily about our relation to desire in language, rather than exclusively about 
the real mother).  We tell ourselves that das Ding is suffering/evil, and that 
accessing it is sin.   
At this point, where we flee from das Ding for fear of its overwhelming 
power to give us what would bring so much completion that consciousness could 
not bear it, Lacan is ready to use the language of ‘aggressivity’ that 
psychoanalysis traditionally ties to instinct, but now in his own fashion.  When 
Freud talks about the love of the neighbour he finds it a repulsive concept because 
the neighbour is just as deeply aggressive by instinct as he is.42  But for Lacan it is 
not instinct that causes aggressivity to be turned back in against the subject, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid., 90. 
40 This is repeated on p. 154. 
41 S7, 220, n. 1. 
42 SE21, 142-143.  My edition: 79-80. 
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das Ding: ‘For as soon as I go near it, as Civilization and its Discontents makes 
clear, there rises up the unfathomable aggressivity from which I flee, that I turn 
against me, and which in the very place of the vanished Law adds its weight to 
that which prevents me from crossing a certain frontier at the limit of the Thing.’43  
There must always be something in place to stop us from getting to das Ding 
(whether sublimation, incest prohibition, ‘Sovereign Good’ or the Moral Law, 
etc.).  In the history of each subject it is necessary for our own protection from 
das Ding that we receive from the Other the law; any law, that will keep us 
protected from that which many call sin: das Ding. 
One can see here why Lacan sees fit to quote Paul’s letter to the Romans, 
and does so so naturally that he quotes it directly, exchanging ‘sin’ for ‘the 
Thing,’ and not telling his audience that he is quoting someone until afterwards.  
Lacan says: 
 
Is the Law the Thing?  Certainly not.  Yet I can only know of the 
Thing by means of the Law.  In effect, I would not have had the idea 
to covet it if the Law hadn’t said: “Thou shalt not covet it.”  But the 
Thing finds a way by producing in me all kinds of covetousness 
thanks to the commandment, for without the Law the Thing is dead. 
But even without the Law, I was once alive.  But when the 
commandment appeared, the Thing flared up, returned once again, I 
met my death.  And for me, the commandment that was supposed to 
lead to life turned out to lead to death, for the Thing found a way and 
thanks to the commandment seduced me; through it I came to desire 
death.44 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 S7, 229. 
44 Ibid., 102, quoting Rom 7:7-11. 
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I will return to the relationship between this section of Romans and Lacan’s 
thought in Chapter 5.  For now it suffices to say that here we find, first expressed 
by Paul, the link between das Ding and the death drive that Lacan will map out 
much later in the Seminar. 
 So far I have outlined several aspects of das Ding: (1) it is rooted (for 
Lacan, and possibly also for Freud) in the Kantian Ding an sich, an element as it 
exists unknowable beyond what is perceived; (2) the concept is developed in part 
to counter a Kleinian emphasis on instinct, and is the thing that is nothing before 
the signifier acts as a lure; (3) Lacan argues that Freud had a notion of das Ding, 
and that this is what remains beyond the Vortvorstellung and Sachvorstellung (the 
signifier and signified); (4) this places Freud in context of Saussure, with the 
Freudian Ding as what remains beyond signifier and signified; (5) as such, Lacan 
develops the theme of das Ding as the void around which all language is 
constructed; (6) the mother as alienated from the self prior to language is a 
formative experience of das Ding and (7) as a remainder of pre-linguistic maternal 
enjoyment, and as something beyond language that has the power to render 
language (and with it desire) null, das Ding is overwhelming in its potential for 
enjoyment.  It is the last of these aspects that, for Lacan, leads to us erecting moral 
systems, concepts of the Good, and using them to refuse ourselves any access to 
das Ding.  If we get too close to it, we aggressively turn ourselves away from it.  
Thus, for Lacan, das Ding and language are the cause, not the result, of aggressive 
‘instinct.’ 
 By way of evaluation of this subject, it is fair to comment that none of 
Lacan’s concepts can be taken uncritically as some sort of eternal truth, 
	   121	  
particularly when it comes to claims that there is no such thing as instinct without 
the signifier.  Especially now, in 2017 rather than 1959, it is impossible to deny 
the existence of the entire field of neuroscientific inquiry, and the very real 
importance of a theory of instincts to the stuff of the brain.  However, this is 
neither what Lacan requires nor what Lacan does.  He is not attempting to deny 
the existence of chemical reactions in the brain or the role of genetics in the 
formation of the subject.  Instead, like psychoanalysis itself, his thoughts trace 
themselves back to a phenomenological theory more than a scientific one.  
Although Freud in his earlier work was obsessed with neurological theorisation,45 
his theory of the mind traces further back to his attendance of Franz Brentano’s 
lectures on phenomenology, at the very beginning of modern phenomenological 
inquiry.46  So although there are a handful of studies into the relationship between 
neuroscience and the Lacanian view of the human subject,47 neuroscience, and the 
scientific inquiry into the nature of human instinct are not ultimately a successful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 See Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), in SE1, 283-397; Peter Gay, Freud: A 
Life for Our Time (London: W. W. Norton, 2006 [1988]), 78-80.  Although Gay’s biography is a 
much more in-depth introduction to Freud, Richard Wollheim goes into more detail on this period, 
in Freud (London: Fontana, 1991 [1971]), 42-64. 
46 Wollheim, Freud, 34-36.  From pp. 34-35: ‘We need to grasp an underlying philosophical 
assumption that Freud retained throughout his work and which probably derives from the 
Viennese philosopher Franz Brentano, whose seminars he had attended as a student.  And that is 
that every mental state or condition can be analysed into two components; an idea, which gives the 
mental state its object or what it is directed upon, and its charge of affect, which gives it its 
measure of strength or efficacy.’  
47 Two of them can be found in Adrian Johnston and Catherine Malabou, Self and Emotional Life: 
Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2013).  
Éric Laurent has also written on psychoanalysis and neuroscience, such as ‘Uses of the 
Neurosciences for Psychoanalysis,’ The Symptom, 11, trans. by Marcus A. K. Andersson (Spring 
2010), <http://www.lacan.com/symptom11/?p=73> [accessed 16.8.2016].  
	  122	  
critique of Lacanian concepts, including das Ding (and, in conversation with 
Lacanian analysts, they are generally quite quick to point this out).  Lacan’s view 
of the human subject as only knowable to itself through a language received from 
the Other, an imperfect language that can never retrieve a Ding that is unknowable 
through language, remains as legitimate as ever; that is, as legitimate as can be 
shown from the religion of ‘analytic experience.’ 
Inasmuch as the subject is the result of the encounter of language with das 
Ding, and all language is constructed around an empty space, Lacan can claim to 
be a creationist, as opposed to an evolutionist: for him, human consciousness as 
we know it is not something that evolves naturally for the subject, but something 
that is created by an exterior force (the Other, language as it pre-exists the subject) 
when it meets the void of das Ding.48  This distinction between him and others is 
clear: for Klein and Winnicott, and Freud, the death drive exists because of a 
natural tendency for order to return to chaos, for energy to return to zero 
(entropy); but from Lacan’s perspective, there is no ‘instinct’ without the 
signifier.  So the death drive is not a natural instinct to tend towards death, 
explainable only as a part of nature,49 but, rather, it is a product of the trace 
memory of das Ding: the desire to return to the nothing before the signifier.  The 
will to destruction is actually the will to a new thing, a fresh start: an Other-
thing.50 
This completes the Pauline thought that Lacan quoted above: ‘through 
[das Ding] I came to desire death.’  It is, quite literally, das Ding (the thing we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 S7, 149-150, 259-264. 
49 Lacan criticises this idea on S7, 259-263. 
50 S7, 262. 
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have called ‘sin’) that makes us desire death.  The desire for death is not actually 
the desire to be exterminated, but the desire to trade the old signifier in for a new 
one; it is the desire to return to das Ding, the land before the signifier, and start 
again.  This is why Lacan praises the early Christians for believing that it is the 
Word that leads to new life.51 
The drive is the fact of desire’s constant wish for das Ding, for the 
nothingness that is the signified of the signifier and the repressed memory of 
maternal jouissance (‘enjoyment’).  Drive is not hunger or thirst; these are needs.  
Drive is not instinct; that is animals being programmed to survive.  Instead, ‘drive 
is the impact of language upon the body.’52  In Seminar XI Lacan will outline how 
the drive’s relation to the objet petit a manages the overwhelming jouissance we 
desire in das Ding, which Lacan describes in Seminar VII.53  By this time Lacan 
will have developed the thesis that ‘every drive is virtually a death drive,’ because 
every drive is a result of the signifier.54  At the point of Seminar VII, however, 
Lacan is only addressing the death drive, which is the subject’s wish to return to 
the place before the signifier and begin again.55   
This is why jouissance is enjoyment that does not exist.  Jouissance is 
enjoyment that comes from the object, das Ding; but das Ding does not exist.  
Das Ding is that which is excluded from language, the trace memory of maternal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid., 263-264. 
52 This is a quote of the Lacanian psychoanalyst Phil Dravers, from his New Lacanian School 
lecture entitled ‘Desire, Drive and the Objet a,’ at Conway Hall, London, on 3.6.2015. 
53 This is Jacques-Alain Miller’s reading of the relationship between S7 and S11, as cited by 
Dravers in the lecture cited above. 
54 Écrits, 719, from ‘Position of the Unconscious,’ which was written during Seminar VII but 
rewritten during Seminar XI. 
55 S7, 261-262. 
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enjoyment, even of our existence in the womb.  Das Ding is also death.  Since we 
only ever enjoy das Ding through sublimation (the raising of an object to the 
dignity of das Ding), jouissance is enjoyment that only ever comes through 
sublimation.56  It is a shade of enjoyment that comes from not getting what we 
want – or from getting the thing that we did not want instead.  After examining 
some of the other concepts that arise out of Lacan’s discussion of das Ding and 
the death drive I will outline more of how they provide a framework to understand 
better the historical and philosophical context of Paul’s letters and theology. 
 
2.  The Failure of the Marquis de Sade 
 
Freud began thinking about the aggressive instinct in humans because, in 
his view, psychologists thus far had failed to account for sadism, a sexual practice 
named after the ‘master of perversions,’ the Marquis de Sade.57  The works of 
Sade were of particular interest to Lacan.  This traces back to the time 
immediately after the war, when French and German intellectuals were beginning 
to try to offer explanation for the horrors of the Holocaust.58  Lacan was not a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 ‘Sublimation’ is defined briefly in the Glossary, Appendix A, and explored in more detail in 
Chapter 4, below. 
57 SE21, 119-120.   
58 Élisabeth Roudinesco, Lacan In Spite of Everything, trans. by Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 
2014 [2011]), 143.  Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Edmund Jephcott (trans.), Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002 [1947]), 63-93.  Many of Lacan’s 
commentators believe his claim that he is the first to pair Kant with Sade (Écrits, 645), though 
Rabaté points out that this requires the Lacan never to have read Adorno and Horkheimer, which is 
possible but unlikely.  Jean-Michel Rabaté, ‘Kant with Sade, Lacan with Adorno: “Enjoying 
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philosopher to shy away from encountering the horror of the human capacity, and 
so turned to Sade as an example of someone committed to the endless pursuit of 
enjoyment, regardless of moral judgments.  His writings on Sade mostly occur 
between 1959 and 1963, opening with a large section in Seminar VII, and largely 
closing with his now infamous article ‘Kant with Sade.’59  Lacan’s work on Sade 
not only helps provide a way into a historical critical Lacanian reading of Paul (as 
argued in Chapter 3), but is also conceptually significant for Paul’s 
understandings of the law and desire.  Ultimately Lacan’s interpretation of Sade’s 
failings helps to paint a full picture of the way humans relate to jouissance, and 
also sets the stage for his reading of Antigone. 
The Marquis de Sade was born into the extravagant world of the mid-
eighteenth-century French aristocracy.  He followed his duty, married the woman 
whom his father chose, and then sought pleasure elsewhere.  Simone de Beauvoir 
puts his actions down to the fact that the aristocracy was losing its former power: 
Sade used his time in brothels to enact fantasies wherein he was a feudal tyrant, 
demanding whatever he wanted.60  Throughout the rest of his life he either abused 
and assaulted countless men and women (prostitutes, hired servants, or whomever 
else he fancied) or did so in non-abusive ways that still provoke interest,61 while 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bodies,” the Ram and the Law’ (unpublished manuscript), <http://www.apres-coup.org/mt/ 
archives/title/2005/01/kant_with_sade.html> [accessed 4/4/2016]. 
59 Marcelle Marini lists all of Lacan’s references to Sade from this period.  Jacques Lacan: The 
French Context, trans. by Anne Tomiche (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 
1992 [1986]), 187. 
60 Simone de Beavoir, ‘Must we Burn Sade?’ in The One Hundred & Twenty Days of Sodom, 
trans. by Annette Michelson (London: Arrow Books Ltd, 1989 [1955]), 8. 
61 There is much debate over the extent to which, in his life rather than his writing, Sade was 
actually abusive towards others.  For example John Phillips, How to Read Sade (London, Granta 
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writing works containing sexual fantasies far exceeding any acts he would 
actually carry out, and also containing detailed philosophical interludes (or 
viewed the other way, detailed philosophical tracts with gory sexual fantasy 
written around them).  He was imprisoned in the Bastille for ten years and 
elsewhere for another twenty, but during the Revolution managed to become both 
a judge and an elected politician. 
His works of fantasy eventually led to him being declared mad.  His 
lengthy tome The One Hundred & Twenty Days of Sodom was written from 
within the Bastille, and is a collection of every form of depravity that the Marquis 
could muster.62  The storyline is as follows: four very wealthy men (including a 
duke and a bishop) have seemingly endless supplies of money, and use it to 
organise a hundred and twenty days of pleasure for themselves.  They source the 
finest sex-slaves in all the land (through paying procuresses and pimps to abduct 
hundreds of adults and teenagers, then choosing thirty-two from among them, and 
at one point enjoying selling the remainder into slavery), and then use them for 
their fantasies.  These fantasies include a great deal of torture and murder, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Books, 2005), 1, 15-18, is largely defensive of his historical character, and concludes that ‘there is 
no indication that [he] was ever seriously suspected of having committed any of the appalling 
crimes represented in his anonymous fictions.’  On the other hand, Vincente Palomera, ‘The 
Sadean Fantasy’ in NLS Seminar on ‘Kant with Sade’: Fantasy and the Limits of Enjoyment 
(unpublished manuscript), 44, admits that Sade did engage in some sadistic activity, but it was 
apparently mild enough that the women involved defended him, and ‘He was not a blood-monster, 
not at all.’ 
62 Marquis de Sade, The One Hundred & Twenty Days of Sodom, trans. by Austryn Wainhouse 
and Richard Seaver (London: Arrow Books Ltd, 1989), 183.  This summary is given here only to 
give a flavour of the sort of work Sade produced.  Lacan’s discussions of Sade draw from many 
different sources, and discuss Sade’s work in general just as much as any particular piece.  
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insatiably creative abuse, and an endless list of obscene acts that need not be 
described here. 
Lacan tells us directly why he reads Sade: it is ‘an experiment that through 
its action cuts the subject loose from his psychosocial moorings – or to be more 
precise, from all psychosocial appreciation of the sublimation involved.’63  He 
reads Sade as an experiment in the psychical affect that the work has upon the 
reader; this is the same reason he then reads Antigone, inviting comparison 
between the impact upon the subject had by both works.  Sade’s goal was, in 
Lacan’s interpretation, ‘a sexual jouissance that is not sublimated.’64  
Sublimation, in Freud’s vocabulary, is a sexual instinct enjoyed as something else 
(say, as renunciation, art, physical labour, etc.).65  Lacan’s definition of 
sublimation is ‘to raise an object to the dignity of the Thing.’66  So, when he 
interprets Sade as aiming for a sexual jouissance without sublimation, what Sade 
is really trying to do is to access das Ding directly, through sexual acts.  Since das 
Ding is the place to which the death drive attempts return, a place of incredible 
violence towards the self, aimed at eliminating the signifier, Sade uses a 
considerable degree of violence in his attempts to get there. 
Lacan’s contentious claim here, contra Freud, is that this is what the love 
of the neighbour really looks like.  To do unto others as we would have them do 
unto us is for everyone to seek das Ding through each other, because das Ding is 
the only universal thing that everyone wants (by virtue both of being a maternal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 S7, 248. 
64 Ibid., 250. 
65 SE21, 99-107.  CD 36-44. 
66 S7, 138. 
	  128	  
thing we desired before the signifier, as well as being the universal object of 
desire without a particular signifier, unlike every other object).  However, since 
das Ding is the obliteration of the subject’s existence in language, attempting to 
(re-)find jouissance means doing violence to the neighbour.  Lacan’s claim that 
the Golden Rule of ‘love thy neighbour’ requires doing a certain violence to the 
neighbour also refers back to his initial argument for das Ding, though he does not 
say this explicitly.  As stated above, his argument for das Ding is partially based 
on Freud referring to how the very first time a subject sees something of the 
Nebenmensch (‘neighbour,’ though here and in Freud it refers to one’s external 
surroundings) als Ding (as ‘thing’), it experiences this Ding as fremde (alien).67  
Freud uses ‘neighbour’ to mean everything external to the subject, and Ding to 
refer to that very first time a bit of one’s surroundings is experienced as 
separate/alienated from oneself.  Lacan then argues against Freud that it is not the 
natural fact of entropy that is the basis of the death drive, but instead it is the 
desire to (re-)find das Ding.68  So there is a slight pun here: since das Ding is der 
Nebenmensch/neighbour, it is the neighbour within the neighbour that requires 
‘Love thy neighbour’ to involve harming them. 
Sade is unique because he is not merely writing a singular fantasy about 
some sadistic thing he enjoys; instead, the Marquis de Sade embarked upon a 
lifelong journey, attempting to pursue jouissance completely without inhibition, 
immediately implementing whatever came into his head.69  His commitment to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Ibid., 61-62. 
68 Freud, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, argues for the death instinct from nature’s movement 
from order to disorder and life to death.  See above. 
69 Écrits, 667. 
	   129	  
jouissance was one aimed at the central emptiness of the other,70 always trying to 
go beyond the limit to discover the laws of the neighbour’s space.71  This glimpse 
of how das Ding exists in every neighbour led Sade to believe that nature contains 
an imperative to do evil, because nature is ‘a vast system of attraction and 
repulsion of evil by evil.’72 
Marc DeKesel states clearly the problem that Sade, and the rest of his 
contemporary libertines, then ran into: 
 
Certainly, the Sadian heroes break with the most elementary social 
and ethical laws (including the incest prohibition) and in this way 
profess to give free rein to the orgy of excess and crime that 
represents in their eyes the free reign of nature. However, simply the 
fact that they must endlessly repeat that the law no longer rules 
already in itself provides a sort of negative proof of how the law 
remains immune from all transgression. The fact that Sade’s heroes 
must declare time after time that the law is null and void indicates 
that it has never really been cornered, proving its inviolability by 
default. Perpetually repeating how all laws are empty nothings and 
God a hideous delusion only makes it clearer how persistently the 
law and the lawgiver always remain standing.73  
 
Sade is forced to maintain the social reference.74  It is because of the extent to 
which Sade attempts to be uninhibited in his pursuit of jouissance that he 
ultimately reveals jouissance’s inescapable paradox: attempting to touch das Ding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 S7, 248. 
71 Ibid., 243. 
72 Ibid., 243. 
73 Marc DeKesel, Eros and Ethics: Read Jacques Lacan’s Seminar VII, trans. by Sigi Jöttkandt 
(Albany: State of New York University Press, 2009 [2001]), 136. 
74 S7. 248. 
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in someone else through transgression of the law only reveals the extent to which 
this move is always dependent upon the law, and thus upon the signifier. 
This paradox of jouissance is outlined in the two lectures prior to the 
discussion of Sade’s work in Seminar VII.75 Lacan outlines two paths, one 
towards the jouissance of das Ding, and one towards the law.  However, even 
after the death of God there is only more prohibition stopping one from finding 
jouissance, and this prohibition is required to sustain the place of jouissance 
beyond prohibition.  ‘Whoever enters the path of uninhibited jouissance, in the 
name of the rejection of the moral law in some form or other, encounters obstacles 
whose power is revealed to us every day in our [analytic] experience.’76  Sade 
comes close to removing all of these obstacles, in his relentless quest for evil, but 
ultimately reveals two final barriers (see below).  The other approach one could 
take, of course, is to give up on jouissance and seek always to obey the law.    The 
problem here is that ‘whoever attempts to submit to the moral law sees the 
demands of his superego grow increasingly meticulous and increasingly cruel.’77  
We never get to a point of feeling as though we have perfectly fulfilled the law; 
instead, we get a form of enjoyment from the guilt that our inevitable failure 
brings.  If one imagines jouissance to the left of the subject and the law to the 
right, turning to either side results in a shade of enjoyment coming from being 
turned away from das Ding.  The fact that both routes are ultimately identical is 
the paradox of jouissance; our happiness is founded upon this circuit with respect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Ibid., 205-234. 
76 Ibid., 217. 
77 Ibid. 
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to the law and jouissance.78  Thus we know from the start that Sade is not going to 
succeed in his attempt at uninhibited jouissance.  This is also why Lacan states 
that it is impossible to kill God, because to most he is already dead and yet the 
law still exists (meaning the Other, God, still exists).  God may be dead, yet 
jouissance remains forbidden.  In summary, either jouissance remains forbidden 
because attempting to get it by breaking the law results in us eternally finding the 
law still standing, never lying broken; or jouissance remains forbidden because if 
we try to follow the law we will never find ourselves satisfied by the amount of 
law we have followed – we always need more law, and enjoy the guilt when we 
fail.  I write more on this ‘neurotic’ side of the paradox in Chapter 4. 
Both of Lacan’s major writings on Sade conclude noting instances of what 
is essentially the same problem for Sade: he deduces from nature an imperative to 
do evil to the evil neighbour in the neighbour, but he cannot come to terms with 
the neighbour in himself, for ‘What is more of a neighbour to me than this heart 
within which is that of my jouissance and which I don’t dare go near?’79  At the 
end of Lacan’s main lecture on Sade in Seminar VII, he points out that although 
Sade repeatedly stated that he wished his existence as signifier to end with his 
death (his grave to be covered over with bracken), he also takes pleasure in the 
idea of killing people in such a way as to send them straight to hell so that they 
can suffer there also.80  Lacan suggests that in his desire for his victims to survive 
death and suffer in hell, Sade betrays his own desire to go on past the first death 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Ibid., 237 
79 Ibid., 229.  This quote is from the lecture before Lacan begins to speak about Sade, but should 
be read as an allusion to the end of the lecture that follows it, in which Lacan reveals Sade’s failure 
to live up to his own imperative. 
80 Ibid., 249-250. 
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and not suffer the second, i.e., to remain alive as signifier.  In the final analysis, 
the Marquis de Sade fails to pursue das Ding uninhibited.  And so, ‘In this sense, 
even the sadist remains the subject (bearer) of a persistent fidelity to the law, 
illustrating in this manner the primacy of the law and the symbolic order.’81   
 Two years later Lacan ended his article ‘Kant with Sade’ with essentially 
the same conclusion, though this time regarding Sade’s rejection of the death 
penalty: ‘Sade does not have neighbourly enough relations with his own malice,’ 
for, in his rejection of the death penalty for himself Sade ‘stopped at the point 
where desire and the law become bound up with each other.’82  If he was truly 
willing to accept the evil that lies at the heart of every human, and of his own 
desire, he would not have objected to the state dealing him death.  In the end he 
turns away from das Ding and accepts the law; and so ‘There is precious little 
here—in fact, nothing—by way of a treatise that is truly on desire.’83  Sade 
demonstrates the paradox of jouissance and the truth about das Ding, but we need 
Antigone for a treatise on desire. 
In the first conclusion above (Sade’s failure to desire his own death as 
signifier in Seminar VII), Sade is found to have displaced the realisation of his 
absolute contingency upon the signifier onto the object of his torture, and thus 
disavowed it in himself, enabling him to express a (false) desire to have the 
signifier die with him.  In Lacanian psychoanalysis there are four ways in which 
any particular subject might exist, which psychoanalysts term ‘clinical 
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structures.’84  They are the psychotic, perverse, hysterical neurotic and 
obsessional neurotic structures.  More will be said about these over the following 
chapters, but in Sade we encounter the perverse structure: the disavowal of a 
signifier of castration, displacing it onto another subject, and seeking to cause in 
them the anxiety disavowed in oneself.85  Most commentators on the article ‘Kant 
with Sade’ note that this is also the structure Lacan describes at length in his 
notorious article.86  Sade’s pursuit of uninhibited jouissance demonstrates that 
‘the perverse subject has to give himself or herself up completely in the name of 
the Other’s jouissance.’87  Sade’s heroes must place themselves in the position of 
the Other in order to enjoy causing anxiety in the subject.88  So while the neurotic 
distances herself from a will of jouissance, the pervert tries to occupy the position 
of the will of jouissance.89  These are the two sides of the paradox of jouissance: 
the pervert, like Sade, who tries and fails to occupy the position of the Other while 
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85 S10, 46-51, 152-154.  Joël Dor, The Clinical Lacan (New York: Other Press, 1999 [1997]), 39-
44.  Philip Hill, Using Lacanian Clinical Critique, 163-167.   
86 This position is taken by Alexandre Stevens in ‘The Paradox of the Universal,’ in NLS Seminar 
on ‘Kant with Sade’: Fantasy and the Limits of Enjoyment (unpublished manuscript), 16-29; by 
Palomera in ‘The Sadean Fantasy’; by Pierre-Gilles Guégen in ‘Desire and Jouissance,’ in NLS 
Seminar on ‘Kant with Sade’: Fantasy and the Limits of Enjoyment (unpublished manuscript), 46-
60; by Pierre Naveau in ‘The Mother-Daughter Relationship,’ in NLS Seminar on ‘Kant with 
Sade’: Fantasy and the Limits of Enjoyment (unpublished manuscript), 61-73 and Rabaté in ‘Kant 
with Sade, Lacan with Adorno.’ 
87 Rabaté, ‘Kant with Sade, Lacan with Adorno,’ 5. 
88 Naveau, ‘The Mother-Daughter Relationship,’ 63. 
89 Palomera, ‘The Sadean Fantasy,’ 32-33.  ‘Will of jouissance’ is a term Lacan only uses in ‘Kant 
with Sade.’ 
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running after jouissance; and the neurotic, trapped in the law and hopelessly 
trying to escape jouissance, whom I discuss at length in chapters 4 and 5. 
Though his language, particularly regarding ‘Sade’s maxim’ in ‘Kant with 
Sade,’90 can cause some confusion, it is clear that Lacan is not suggesting that 
there is an ethical imperative we should follow to do evil to one another.  Rather, 
the life and work of the Marquis de Sade are employed in both Seminar VII and 
‘Kant with Sade’ as an illustration of the paradox of jouissance, and the extent to 
which even the most extreme libertines are still trapped under the signifier, 
incapable of escaping the law.91  With the tools of Lacan’s understanding of the 
death drive, and of the relation to suffering and das Ding in jouissance, some 
headway can be made in analysing the relations to jouissance that existed in 
Paul’s time, and the response to them of Paul’s own writings about the law and 
desire. 
 
3.  The Paradox of Jouissance: Nero v. the Stoics 
 
It is to this paradox of jouissance that I now turn.  As argued above, for 
both Lacan and Freud there are structures in place that allow us to carry on 
without ever finding das Ding, keeping sight of the jouissance that lies just past 
the barrier nonetheless.  This is why, despite Freud saying that we possess an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Écrits, 650. 
91 And thus, in Lacan’s final Sade-related curve ball, even the great pervert Sade was, in a way, a 
neurotic trapped in his own law (S7, 250). 
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‘inborn human inclination to “badness”,’92 and Lacan referring to the ‘evil heart’ 
within us,93 there is a tremendous difference between a psychoanalytic view of the 
human subject and an Augustinian or Calvinist one.  It is not simply the case that 
all are evil or that all possess the capacity for evil, but rather, for every subject 
there is already a psychological mechanism in place to allow us to enjoy evil 
without getting closer to it than we can bear.  It is true that we want to do evil, but 
also true that we are inescapably subject to a structure preventing us from 
accessing the greatest evil, our own jouissance.  It is not just that some voice in 
our heads is telling us ‘no,’ but that this very ‘no’ is part of the enjoyment of the 
paradox; and when we run in the opposite direction, not towards law but towards 
enjoyment, we find that we only have access to that enjoyment through law.  ‘The 
basic paradox of jouissance is that it is both impossible and unavoidable: it is 
never fully achieved, always missed, but, simultaneously, we can never get rid of 
it—every renunciation of enjoyment generates an enjoyment in renunciation, 
every obstacle to desire generates desire for an obstacle and so forth.’94  One finds 
only jouissance when running towards law, and one requires law in order to 
pursue jouissance, for, ‘As soon as I go near it… there rises up the unfathomable 
aggressivity from which I flee, that I turn against me [which is the superego], and 
which in the very place of the vanished Law adds its weight to that which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 SE21, 120.  Freud compares his own hesitance to acknowledge the existence of an instinct of 
death by comparing this hesitance to the fact that ‘“little children do not like it” when there is talk 
of the inborn human inclination to “badness”, to aggressiveness and destructiveness, and so to 
cruelty as well.’  According to the Standard Edition footnotes, the quotation is from a poem by 
Goethe.  CD 55. 
93 S7, 229.  
94 Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2011), 304. 
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prevents me from crossing a certain frontier at the limit of the Thing.’95  That is 
part of what the works of the Marquis de Sade reveal: the true horror of a world in 
which we traverse the self-imposed unconscious barriers that are there to stop us 
from getting what we want, and thus the true horror of what we want.  However, 
the primary purpose for the discussion of Sade in both ‘Kant with Sade’ and 
Seminar VII is to show that the paradox of jouissance encapsulates both a life 
aimed at law and a life aimed at enjoyment: Sade’s greatest efforts to enjoy 
without law could never successfully produce an enjoyment not ultimately 
contingent upon the letter.96 
The paradox of jouissance is the paradox of being trapped in the law and 
so never getting jouissance: when on the intentionally transgressive side of the 
paradox, one cannot transgress without law, and so needs law in order to continue 
transgressing.  This transgressive but always necessarily ‘legal’ part of the 
paradox reveals how the whole thing is a ‘dialectic of happiness.’97  It is the 
subject’s desire for happiness that causes her to recoil both from the moral law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 S7, 229. 
96 Slavoj Žižek, in his article ‘Kant and Sade: the Ideal Couple,’ in lacanian ink 13 (New York: 
The Wooster Press, 1998), 12-25, argues that in ‘Kant with Sade’ Lacan is not intending to leave 
the reader only with the knowledge that Sade is the truth of Kant, but that even here Lacan is 
specifically setting up the reader for the study of Antigone that he does in Seminar VII.  This is the 
correct conclusion that should be drawn from both of Lacan’s studies of Sade, for, as argued 
above, both have the primary purpose of pointing out the subject’s utter contingency upon the 
signifier whether applying Kant’s imperative as Kant understands it or as Sade’s work interprets it.  
So Sade does not manage to succeed in non-pathological behaviour even though he declares 
perversion non-pathological; ultimately it will be Antigone who succeeds in following Kant’s 
categorical imperative, not by declaring perversion non-pathological (becoming the jouissance of 
the Other), but by declaring desire non-pathological (becoming the desire of the Other, which is 
the subject’s essence).  This will be expanded upon later. 
97 S7, 237 
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(whether the imperative of Kant, Christ or any other Sovereign Good), and from 
the horror of uninhibited pursuit of jouissance;98 but in this recoiling from the end 
of both sides of the paradox there is a degree of happiness.  In this sense, 
happiness is to be found in not getting what you want.  DeKesel even goes so far 
as to make this notion, of relative distance from das Ding within the paradox of 
jouissance, the dominant theme he draws from Seminar VII.99  Nonetheless, 
despite there being some degree of happiness to be found for the subject in the 
paradox itself,100 and no way out of it, many are driven to psychoanalysis by the 
discomfort of their symptomatic relations to the law and jouissance, leading both 
Lacan and Paul to write in response to it.  In other words, Lacan and Paul are 
attempting to find ways to help us cope with neurosis that are not just attempts at 
perversion (and vice versa!), both of which can be symptomatic in ways some 
would rather not have to enjoy.101 
In Paul’s time there was a philosophical school advocating a relation to 
das Ding that falls on the neurotic/law side of the paradox: Stoic philosophers 
believed in the renunciation of desire in the name of self-control (law).  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Ibid., 239. 
99 DeKesel, Eros and Ethics, 18-23. 
100 Lacan uses the Greek εὐδαιµονία (eudaimonia), thus referencing Aristotle and the whole 
history of the philosophy of ‘happiness.’ 
101 More will be said about the meaning of ‘neurosis’ later.  In his discussion of the paradox of 
jouissance the analyst and commentator Bruce Fink warns against attempting to cure a neurosis 
with perversion (Sade’s approach), precisely because of the logic of the paradox: most perverse 
behaviours are dependent upon a neurotic relation to the law, transgressing for the sake of 
transgression even when the specific law transgressed isn’t itself problematic.  Again, this is the 
reason Lacan considers Sade’s attempt to free himself from the law with perversion to be a failure.  
Bruce Fink, Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in Lacanian a Key 
(London: Routledge, 2014), 60. 
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Stoicism the wise man acts in accordance with nature by following a virtue ‘based 
on knowledge,’ and through self-control exercises reason over the 
passions/emotions (πάθεα, pathea), which are always products of some form of 
error.102  The Stoics (and Kant) seek freedom from the passions through complete 
submission to the law; and in both the cases of Kant and the Stoics, submission to 
the law comes about through pure reason, exercised through self-control.  Much 
more on the Stoics and neurosis will be said in Chapter 4, at which point it should 
be clear that in Paul’s time, when Stoicism was the largest philosophical school, 
the Stoics were a popular representative of the neurotic side of the paradox of 
jouissance. 
Conversely, in Paul’s time there were also people who were committed to 
the uninhibited pursuit of jouissance – to the Sadean attempt at the symbolisation 
of das Ding – in a way that is not possible in the modern world of surveillance 
and a much more developed legal code.103  Even 230 years ago, when Sade 
recorded fantasies about the uninhibited pursuit of jouissance, he was imprisoned 
and then executed for it; but in Paul’s time, even those without substantial money 
or power could exercise what little power they had in futile pursuit of the horror 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Christopher Gill, ‘The School in the Roman Imperial Period,’ in The Cambridge Companion to 
the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 41.  Kurt von Fritz, 
‘Stoa,’ in Oxford Classical Dictionary, eds. N. G. L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1970), 1015. 
103 This should not be taken as a comment on whether modern surveillance and law are ‘good’ or 
‘bad.’  Lacan’s approach is to describe the subject’s relation to the law, and attempt to cure 
unwanted symptoms that arise from it, not to comment on the objective ethical status of the law 
itself.  As such, Lacan’s own political views were much more complex than a simple positive or 
negative stance towards state authority.  See Samo Tomšič, The Capitalist Unconscious: Marx and 
Lacan (London: Verso, 2015), 233-238 or Élisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, trans. by Barbara 
Bray (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1997), 158. 
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of das Ding: slaves were cheap, brothels were omnipresent, and patriarchs were 
unquestioned.  Ancient literature is riddled with descriptions of people whose 
insatiable lusts for the mythical Ding just past the barrier of the law were 
rigourously pursued.  One such person was the emperor Nero. 
In his biography of Nero, Suetonius describes some of his sexual habits.104  
He notes the well-known instance of Nero having his lover Sporus castrated in 
order to ‘transform him into a woman’ and prove his divinity over nature (an 
inherently anti-Stoic aim); but there is also an element of this being one of many 
instances of Nero wanting to demonstrate his own possession of the other’s body.  
More interestingly, it describes Nero’s desire to use Sporus ‘as his wife’ in public 
(in the eyes of the Other), while being paraded around.  But das Ding then gets 
closer in two other psychoanalytically interesting notes: Nero was rumoured to 
have desired his own mother, having acquired a concubine who was said to 
resemble her; and it was also said that from the stains on his clothes it was 
obvious that when he was with his mother he was up to something.  This is 
interesting whether rumoured or actual: either it shows an instance of a man who 
attempts lawlessness in desiring his mother, or it shows that a man famous for 
sexual liberty is presumed to desire his mother.  Nero demonstrates the aspect of 
das Ding that is maternal jouissance in the pursuit of his mother, and so also 
demonstrates that in Paul’s time there was an awareness of the pursuit of one’s 
mother as a possible part of the perverse pursuit of jouissance.  Thirdly, Nero’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 The following is all from Suetonius, Lives of the Twelve Caesars, trans. by H. M. Bird (Ware, 
Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1997), 258-259 (sections 28-29).  Lacan directly 
compares the behaviours described by Sade to those described by Suetonius in S7, 246, though he 
does not specify to which behaviours in Suetonius he refers. 
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pursuit of jouissance eventually led to a point where he enjoyed dressing in the 
skin of an animal and attacking people’s genitals.  In psychoanalysis, the desire to 
use specific parts of the body is called the desire for the partial object,105 and 
Lacan reads it in Sade as an effect of the pursuit of jouissance: as das Ding gets 
closer, the body fragments into pieces, because when one presumes oneself to be 
pursuing the object him/her/itself, the true object (das Ding) lurks behind and is 
never truly gotten; thus, to continue the pursuit, one must move on to the partial 
object, the pieces of the body (since once cannot actually move on to das 
Ding).106  This is the third way that Nero acts as a paradigm for the extent to 
which the Sadean perverse pursuit of jouissance was something conceptually 
possible in Paul’s time – if not for everybody, then certainly at least for those with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 The term ‘partial object’ is psychoanalytically loaded, particularly in Lacan’s time.  It was 
deployed extensively by the object relations school, against which Lacan argued regularly.  
Melanie Klein developed a theory of good and bad objects in relation to the infant’s experienced 
of particular partial objects of the mother, the mother’s breasts.  Instead of wanting to analyse the 
subject’s relation to particular partial objects, here Lacan sees the subject/partial-object relation as 
an effect of the subject’s relation to the object, that being das Ding.  This is part of how the entire 
programme Lacan sets forward in Seminar VII can be seen in part as a continuation of his diatribe 
against Klein and the object relations school (Winnicott, Fairbain et. al., and Maurice Bouvet in 
France), and of course, conversely, their opponents in Anna Freud and the ego-psychology school.  
Lacan’s meta-psychological system is not based upon strengthening the ego’s relation to objects or 
to strengthening the ego itself, but rather the subject as a relation to das Ding, which is itself a 
product of the subject as a speaking being.  For more on Lacan and object relations theory see 
DeKesel, Eros and Ethics, 16-23; LaPlanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, 273-
281; Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 123-124.  Seminar IV is a 
discussion of object relations, written against Klein, Bouvet and Winnicott, though, typically for 
Lacan, it does not address them directly.  Instead, he begins to move the discussion towards the 
symbolic definition of castration he will outline in Seminar V (see above), and leaves the question 
of the part object open (Marini, Jacques Lacan: The French Context, 162-163). 
106 S7, 248-249. 
	   141	  
money and power; which, since desire is the desire of the Other, places the 
perverse pursuit of jouissance in the field of desire for everyone. 
In summary, Nero’s attempt at Sadean perversion takes three easily 
identifiable forms: (1) he attempts to escape the master signifier of the law 
(‘nature’), but all of his attempts therein are dependent upon the signifier and so 
cannot escape it; (2) he attempts to find the maternal jouissance of das Ding 
directly in both a prostitute who resembles his mother as well as in his mother 
herself, but, in the sequence in which Suetonius records, he does not find himself 
sated and so moves on to (3) the diffusion of jouissance in partial objects.  In all 
of these cases Nero thinks that he will be able to gain real pleasure from so 
enacting his every liberated desire (like the eighteenth century libertines), and is 
really trying, but fails.  However, he does arrive at the exact Lacanian libertinist 
conclusion that a world posited against law should precipitate: ‘he was absolutely 
sure that no man was chaste or pure in any part of his body, but rather that most 
people disguised their viciousness and cleverly concealed it; and thus in those 
who confessed their lewdness to him he pardoned all other crimes as well.’  His 
Sadean libertinist pursuit of uninhibited jouissance led him to a Sadean inversion 
of the law; and yet, like Sade, he found himself never achieving complete 
jouissance and eventually begging to survive his own death sentence.107  Both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Suetonius, Lives of the Twelve Caesars, 277 (section 49).  Although the case of Nero is quite 
different to Sade, there is something similar in their attitudes towards their own deaths.  Sade begs 
to survive his death sentence, while Nero commits Suicide; but Nero’s suicide was committed 
while centurions were coming to kill him, and he is recorded as having spent the moments up until 
he died instructing people to dig his grave in front of him and bury his body intact immediately, to 
ensure he makes it to the afterlife unharmed; he is also recorded here to have begged Sporus to 
wail a lament while he dies.  His death thus represents even more of a desire to survive as signifier 
than does Sade’s: Sade begged for his life and demonstrated in his torture of others a wish to 
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claimed to recognise the universal evil in humanity, but failed to recognise it in 
themselves.  So, just as the Stoics demonstrate for us the failure to reach 
tranquillity or equilibrium through the neurotic/law side of the paradox, Nero 
exactly replicates what Lacan demonstrated through Sade about the 
perverse/transgressive side of the paradox: it is impossible to escape the signifier, 
and even those who spend their lives attempting to only wind up begging to be 
included in the order of the signifier when faced with their own actual abolition. 
 The Stoic/libertine (neurotic/perverse) dichotomy is the hermeneutical 
horizon of the text that should not be neglected by historical-critical interpretation.  
Just as in today’s world there are structures of enjoyment being analysed by 
Lacanian cultural critics like Slavoj Žižek,108 so in Paul’s world there were 
structures of enjoyment that historical critical approaches should be mindful of; 
and good historical critical interpretation should build bridges between these two 
horizons. 
Nero was probably the emperor during the time when Paul wrote his letter 
to the Romans, or possibly very shortly afterwards (54-68 CE).  Whereas now 
Nero’s behaviour would result in life imprisonment, and would barely be 
comprehensible as the behaviour of a human, in Paul’s time it was merely 
detestable behaviour – but behaviour that was written about, gossiped about, and 
permitted to continue for fourteen years.  The point made here, regardless of any 
debate over the historicity of events as portrayed by Suetonius, is this: in Paul’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
survive death; Nero specifically demanded to be immortalised as signifier in his death, and 
ensured a safe journey to the afterlife.   
108 Most of Žižek’s work falls into this category, but a particularly effective example is his 
Violence (London: Verso, 2009). 
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time it was perceived that some pursue jouissance ruthlessly, while others 
renounce desire in the name of the law (nature).  Suetonius records that which was 
known about the Emperor who reigned while Paul wrote most of his letters,109 
from the perspective of the rumours that dominated the discourse a few decades 
later.110  Conversely, both casual and devoted followers of Stoic wisdom and 
Jewish religions believed ardently that the mind can be trained to control the body 
and successfully overcome the seductive power of das Ding.  This first century 
incarnation of the paradox of jouissance plays out over the coming chapters, as it 
becomes evident that Paul’s letters were written in a world where jouissance was 
conceptualised in relation to perceptions of libertines like Nero (even before Nero 
was emperor), and neurotics like the Stoics. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Wayne Meeks and John Fitzgerald’s edited collection The Writings of St Paul (London: 
Norton, 2007), 1-97 uses the most accepted dating, placing the entire authentic Pauline corpus 
except the very early 1 Thessalonians between 54 and 62 CE.  This dating is based upon the 
tradition of dating Paul’s letters using the chronology given in Acts.  In Douglas Campbell’s 
recent Framing Paul: An Epistolary Biography (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2014), he strikes against 
the grain and attempts to date all of Paul’s letters from internal evidence alone, ‘by concentrating 
almost entirely from epistolary material, storming out of the room if Acts data is introduced 
prematurely into the framing’ (24).  He arrives at dates between 41 and 51 CE for the entire 
extended Pauline corpus, including 2 Thessalonians, Ephesians and Colossians as authentic (412-
414).  The most recent major commentary on Romans, Robert Jewett’s Romans, Hermeneia 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007) dates its composition to 56-57 CE, placing the focus of the 
current study a few years into Nero’s reign.  While the dating of Paul’s letters remains imprecise, 
and ultimately grounded in one’s presuppositions about the priority of the Lukan account, it 
suffices to say here that my purpose is a structuralist Lacanian reading of the historical context; 
what Nero reveals about the relation to the Other’s jouissance of the first century Mediterranean 
man regards the cultural, linguistic and sexual environment of a time much wider than Nero’s 
reign.  Indeed, Nero’s relationship to jouissance is just as much a product of the world in which 
his reign began as it is a sign of the world others inhabited during his reign. 
110 Suetonius’ Lives of the Twelve Caesars was first published around 121 CE.  Courtenay Edward 
Stevens, ‘Suetonius Tranquillus,’ in Oxford Classical Dictionary, eds. N. G. L. Hammond and H. 
H. Scullard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 1020.  
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The sublimation of das Ding is still the story of the human subject, only 
now with different social laws and different objects.  We may take for granted that 
from the perspective of modern human rights, society should be structured in such 
a way that a woman is not forced into prostitution because she disobeyed her 
father; but this ‘modern advantage’ does not reduce the New Testament’s value as 
an ethical, philosophical or psychoanalytic text.  In fact, our modern advantage 
serves to highlight the question: how does Paul’s theology relate to modern 
jouissance, and to that which is written into the Other of modern humans?  What 
are our social and psychical laws today, and does Pauline theology relate to them 
in a similar way?  These are a few of my questions for a Lacanian reading of Paul, 
especially beyond the arguments made in chapters 5 and 6.  Although it is not 
fully possible in this study to build all of the possible bridges from past to present, 
the sketch of the paradox of jouissance outlined in this chapter should be read as a 
framework for future work on what Paul might mean today. 
 
Before moving on, a disagreement with Lacan opens the way for me to 
interpret Paul differently than he did.  Near the end of the lecture of 16 March 
1960,111 just after the very first time Lacan describes the paradox of jouissance as 
split between a direction of transgression and a direction of law (though he hasn’t 
yet named this the paradox of jouissance), he pauses to make a biographical 
comment about Paul.  ‘Sin needed the Law, Saint Paul said, so that he could 
become a great sinner – nothing, of course, affirms that he did, but so that he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 S7, 205-219. 
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could conceive of the possibility.’112  This is probably a reference to the very 
same passage Lacan refers to near the end of the next session, when he says that 
‘if the moral law is, in effect, capable of playing some role here, it is precisely as a 
support for the jouissance involved; it is so that the sin becomes what Saint Paul 
calls inordinately sinful.’113  This is Romans 7:13, which says, ‘Did the good, 
therefore, cause my death?  May it never be!  But sin, so that it may be made 
apparent as sin, through the good, worked death in me, so that sin might become 
inordinately sinful through the commandment.’114  As will be seen in Chapter 5, 
this passage is fraught with all sorts of difficulties; particularly the question of 
whose voice it represents.  Although it will be contended that this is an instance of 
prosōpopoiia in Paul, Lacan’s comment here is incorrect regardless.115  When 
Lacan states that nothing indicates Paul was ever ‘inordinately sinful,’ he forgets 
the life Paul left behind.116 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Ibid., 217. 
113 Ibid., 233. 
114 In order to accommodate Dennis Porter’s translation of Lacan, and also Lacan’s use of 
Aristotle, I have translated τὸ ἀγαθὸν as ‘the good,’ and retained the valid translation ‘inordinately 
sinful.’  I have not capitalised ‘sin,’ in order not to comment on debates over whether there is a 
difference between sin with or without the definite article, which is left up to the reader.  This 
translation is identical to the one offered in Appendix B. 
115 Prosōpopoiia is ‘speech in character,’ a rhetorical strategy in which the author plays the part of 
another.  It is defined in the Glossary in Appendix A, and is a key term in Chapter 5. 
116 A related criticism could be made of Eleanor Kaufman, who takes from this verse (Rom 7:13) 
that Paul is caught up in a dialectic of life and death, despite wanting to choose life, because this 
verse demonstrates ‘a desire at work in Paul’s letter that shows a drive toward that unrealized 
opportunity [of inordinate sinfulness].’ Eleanor Kaufman, ‘The Saturday of Messianic Time: 
Agamben and Badiou on the Apostle Paul,’ in eds. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries, Paul and the 
Philosophers (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 300-301. She correctly argues that 
Paul authentically sought freedom from a dialectic of law/sin, the very dialectic that Sade could 
not realise had trapped him (referred to in this study as the paradox of jouissance); but Rom 7:13 
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The Acts of the Apostles (7:54-8:3) first mentions Paul as a young man 
named Saul who approves, or possibly even orchestrates, the murder of the first 
Christian martyr St Stephen, and proceeds to organise the very beginning of the 
persecution of Christians.  Luke’s account here can be trusted, since in Phil 3:6 
Paul himself refers to this, as does the author of 1 Tim 1:13.  Taking Paul’s own 
words as evidence, he mentions ‘inordinately ravaging and persecuting’ the 
Church (Gal 1:13), using the same phrase translated as ‘inordinately’ above.117  
Clearly Paul was not a foreigner to the idea of the perverse enjoyment of 
suffering, treating humans as pure objects.  Neither were those who made up his 
church innocent of perverse enjoyment; in 1 Cor 6:9-11 Paul casually refers to 
members of the church at Corinth as having been ‘perverts, idol worshippers, 
adulterers, sissies, child-abusers, pilferers, greedy drunken verbally-abusive 
swindlers.’118  Lacan’s error here means that his conception of Paul was not one 
that allowed for him to be someone whose ‘conversion’ experience was 
psychoanalytically significant, because he has glossed over both the secondary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
causes her to posit that Paul is nonetheless trapped in another deadly dialectic.  In Chapters 5 
below I argue that this section of Rom 7 does not reveal that Paul was trapped in the paradox of 
jouissance, or in the life/death dialectic, but rather that Paul was acutely aware of these problems 
and portrayed his opponent as trapped in both of these things until he accepted Christ. 
117 καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν. 
118 I have chosen words and grammar carefully in this translation, to reflect the tone evident in this 
list of ways in which the Corinthian congregants had previously behaved.  Though Paul often uses 
lists of ten, possibly to mirror the Decalogue, this is not a list of words for offenders of each of the 
Ten Commandments.  Rather, here Paul is using highly derogatory language, possibly inventing a 
word for men who have sex with men, and using the only biblical instance of the slang word for a 
man perceived as overly passive/effeminate (µαλακοὶ).  πόρνοι is translated as ‘perverts’ because 
it is a word referring to whatever one views as sexually immoral.  I have translated the repeated 
conjunction οὒτε as a comma, and omitted οὐ (and changed nouns into adjectives) in order to 
communicate the rambling nature of this extensive list. 
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(Lukan) and internal (Pauline) references to Paul’s own previous symptomatic 
behaviour (his persecution of the Church).  This does not necessarily mean that 
Paul’s clinical structure was that of a pervert, but, at least, that Paul was well 
acquainted with the perverse behaviour he criticises – and thus it is possible that 
the ‘inordinate sinfulness’ referred to is something with which he was well 
acquainted.119  It also opens the way to my main thesis, which will be worked out 
in chapters 5-6: that the Christian subject about which Paul writes is one who has 
been through a psychical event akin to that of the psychoanalytic clinic.  Lacan 
could not possibly have seen this, because he clearly did not have Paul’s ‘previous 
life’ in mind when reading his letters. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 As noted by Alexandre Stevens in ‘The Paradox of the Universal,’ 28, it is possible for there to 
be elements of a perverse structure without the analysand actually being that clinical structure.  We 
cannot truly know Paul’s clinical structure without hearing him speak; but one can nonetheless 
comment on elements of a perverse structure that his early lifestyle of persecution demonstrates. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The Paradox of Jouissance and Corinthian 
Perversion
 
 
 
 
1.  ‘All Things are Lawful’ 
 
In this chapter I argue that in 1 Corinthians Paul responds to the fact that 
his kerygma resulted in a libertinism.1  This libertinism is the libertinism of Sade, 
because it is a libertinism trapped in the paradox of jouissance.  Paul has freed the 
Corinthians from the law, so they express their ‘freedom’ from the law by 
transgressing it.  As such, like Sade, they are not actually free from it, and Paul 
has just moved them from the neurotic side of the paradox to the perverse.  
Though of course Paul would not have framed the problem in psychoanalytic 
terms, this potentially puts Paul’s subsequent writings in the shadow of the 
problematic of the paradox of jouissance.  At the end I clarify Paul’s exact 
position with respect to desire in 1 Corinthians – which will be described as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ‘Kerygma’ is the theological term (from the New Testament Greek word) for one’s 
proclamation/message.  See the Glossary in Appendex A. 
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‘knee-jerk’ response to the libertinism he accidentally caused – through entering 
the debate over Paul’s relationship with Stoicism in 1 Corinthians 7.2 
I use the word ‘libertinism’ to refer to the perverse attempt to access das 
Ding through transgression, as described by Sade and practiced by Nero.3  I use 
the word ‘liberalism’ to refer to Paul’s message of freedom from the law, 
whatever it was that meant.4  Paul’s first canonical letter to the Corinthians is an 
example of him struggling with the paradox of jouissance, in that his liberalism 
(attempted freedom from the law) has led to a libertinism (attempted opposition to 
the law), and he has not at this point come up with a solution to the problem that 
is consistent with the rest of his teaching.  Demonstrating that he is aware of the 
contours of the paradox of jouissance by the time he writes 1 Corinthians means 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 After much deliberation, ‘knee-jerk’ really is the best way to describe Paul’s attitude to desire 
and the law 1 Corinthians – though that is not to say that the whole of the letter beyond this aspect 
is knee-jerk.  It will be argued that Paul’s responses to the problems in Corinth that disturbed him 
are immediate, reactionary and poorly thought-through.  ‘Knee-jerk’ sums up these other 
adjectives nicely.  Other adjectives that have been thrown at all or parts of 1 Corinthians are ‘non-
Pauline,’ by Jerome Murphy O’Connor in ‘The Non-Pauline Character of 1 Corinthians 11:2-16?,’ 
Journal of Biblical Literature,  95.4 (Dec., 1976), 615-621, and ‘reactionary’ by David A. 
Ackerman in Lo, I Tell You a Mystery: Cross, Resurrection, and Paraenisis in the Rhetoric of 1 
Corinthians (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2006), 76.  According to Anthony 
Thiselton, First Corinthians, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Cambridge: 
Eerdmans, 2000), 491, Wolfgang Schrage reads 1 Cor 7, which will be discussed below, ‘not as 
systematic,’ but ‘as what emerges in confrontation with specific and contingent issues in Corinth.’ 
3 M. D. Goulder, ‘Libertines (1 Cor 5-6),’ Novum Testamentum, 41 (1991), 334-348, argues that 
the people in question are not libertines, but rather are those extending a spiritual freedom from the 
freedom to eat meat sacrificed to idols to a sexual freedom of the body.  Nonetheless, the libertines 
in the Corinthian church are a precise fit for the meaning of ‘libertine’ set out by Lacan. 
4 An excellent study of Paul’s liberalism is James Dunn Christian Liberty: A New Testament 
Perspective (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1993).  It, and most similar studies (such as Robert Jewett, 
Christian Tolerance: Paul’s Message to the Modern Church [Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1982]) focus on Rom 14-15, but 1 Cor 8-10 is no less relevant. 
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that when he wrote his letter to the Romans it was a problem of which he was 
already aware, a fact that will be further demonstrated from evidence in Romans 
itself in Chapter 5. 
In 1 Corinthians Paul responds to two issues, concerning which he has 
been written directly (cps. 7-10).5  He also writes about six issues that he has 
heard about from other sources (such as ‘Chloe’s people,’ 1:11), in cps. 1-6 and 
11.6  Next follows a section on spiritual gifts and love (cps. 12-14), which seems 
to be something he speaks about because he wants to, rather than because he is 
responding to a specific situation.7  This could be his ‘advanced material,’ to 
follow on from the infants’ milk (beginner teaching) that he previously stated is 
all he has yet given them (2:17-3:23).  He concludes by recapping his vision of 
the gospel itself (cp. 15), and then giving some concluding greetings and 
comments, and signing the letter with his own hand (cp. 16). 
There is much debate over the ideologies and practices of the members of 
the church at Corinth.8  Among the many views, some even claim that the 
Christians at Corinth had been heavily impacted by Stoic philosophy, though this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 These are: whether to marry/remain married to unbelievers (cp. 7) and whether to eat food 
sacrificed to idols (cps. 8-10). 
6 These are: divisions in the church (cps. 1-4); a man who is sleeping with his step-mother (cp. 5); 
Christians suing other Christians (6:1-11); Christians sleeping with prostitutes (6:12-20); the role 
of women in the church (11:2-16) and disorder during the Lord’s Supper (11:17-34). 
7 He explicitly says in 12:1 that he is speaking because he does not want them to be ignorant: οὐ 
θέλω ὑµᾶς ἀγνοεῖν.  So he claims that here he speaks from his desire, not from theirs. 
8 Wolfgang Schrage outlines at least thirteen different theories about the nature of the Corinthian 
church, in Der erste Brief an die Korinther vol. 1, Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum 
Neuen Testament (Zurich and Braunschweig: Benziger Verlag, 1991), 38-63; as cited in Richard 
B. Hays, First Corinthians, Interpretation (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1997), 8. 
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is argued based on 1 Corinthians 15,9 and the same point could hardly be made 
from the chapters discussed below (5-7).  The chief obstacle to theorising about 
the problem Paul was responding to is the fact that he begins the letter by stating 
that there are several factions in Corinth, and one of them is those people 
following himself (1:10-17); since he does not state which of the many problems 
he responds to belongs to which faction, it makes speculation about the character 
of each of the factions difficult.  However, ‘the long tradition of modern 
scholarship since F. C. Baur associates [the Pauline faction] with convictions 
about radical emancipation from the law (cf. 6:12), perhaps claiming Paul’s own 
authority for a quasi-libertarian position.’10  At least some of the problems to 
which Paul responds bear the mark of his own teaching, and so were probably 
committed by ‘his’ faction.  This is what is argued below.  We know that Paul is 
responding to a letter written to him because he introduces some of the material 
responding to it with the words ‘concerning what you wrote about’ (7:1).11  Paul 
defends himself against the allegation that these problems are the result of his 
teaching by claiming that he was only giving them milk as to infants, and not yet 
full teachings (3:1-3).  Later he again takes a defensive tone, clearly 
distinguishing between that which is merely his opinion and that which is his 
command as an apostle (compare 7:6, 12 and 25 with 7:10 and 40; or 10:15 with 
14:37).   
Giving a clue to the contents of the received letter, Paul four times quotes 
the phrase ‘all things are lawful’ in order to respond with a reason why this should 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Albert B. Garcilazo, The Corinthian Dissenters and the Stoics (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2007). 
10 Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 125. 
11 περὶ δὲ ὧν ἐγράψατε. 
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not be used as an excuse specifically to do evil, in 6:12 and 10:23.12  This leads 
most scholars to presume, quite rightly, that the author of the letter Paul has 
received is someone from the Corinthian church complaining that others in the 
church are taking this phrase as a justification for their own libertinism.13  An 
important question is whether this phrase originated with Paul, thus proving that 
the Corinthian problem resulted from Paul’s own teaching, or with the 
Corinthians, from an influence beyond Paul.  This question, as with many 
questions regarding the reconstruction of the situational context to 1 Corinthians, 
is impossible to answer definitively.  C. K. Barrett argues that the Corinthians’ 
libertinism came from a gnostic source, but is open to the idea that ‘Corinthian 
gnostics could have used in their sense words that Paul had uttered in another.’14  
Hans Conzelmann states that the Corinthians derive this maxim from Paul’s 
doctrine of freedom, and that Paul seems to recognise it.15  He also cites Hans 
Leitzmann, who argued in his German commentary of 1949 that this maxim was a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In both instances Paul quotes πάντα µοι ἔξεστιν twice, with a response following each.  In the 
second case he edits µοι out of what is presumably the whole phrase.  His responses are ‘but not 
all things are beneficial;’ ‘but I will not be mastered by anything;’ ‘but not all things are 
beneficial’ (again) and ‘but not all things build up.’ 
13 Nearly all scholars agree that the phrase ‘all things are beneficial’ is a Corinthian maxim, quoted 
in the letter to Paul.  See Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians, Sacra Pagina (Collegeville, 
Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 1999), 243; Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, Hermeneia 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), 108; J. Paul Sampley, ‘First Letter to the Corinthians,’ in The 
New Interpreter’s Bible, 10, ed. Leander E. Keck (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2002), 860; C. K. 
Barrett, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, Black’s New Testament Commentaries (London: A 
& C Black, 1992), 144; Thiselton, First Corinthians, 460; Gordon Fee, First Corinthians, New 
International Commentary of the New Testament (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1987), 251.  A notable 
exception is B. J. Dodd, ‘Paul’s Paradigmatic “I” and 1 Cor 6:12,’ Journal for the Study of the 
New Testament, 59 (1995) 39-58. 
14 Barrett, First Epistle to the Corinthians, 145. 
15 Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 108-109. 
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slogan of Paul’s own.16  Though still not wagering full endorsement of the theory 
that the slogan is Paul’s, Hays goes furthest among English-speaking 
commentators in stating that ‘The inspiration for this idea may well have come 
originally from Paul himself (cf. 9:1, 19); at least, many of the “wise” Corinthians 
might have supposed that Paul would agree with their slogan.  Was he not the 
great apostle of freedom from the rules of the Jewish Law?’17  This is as far as one 
can take this theory with confidence: whether or not the maxim is one that the 
Corinthians learned from Paul himself, the Corinthian church was founded by 
Paul and still (in whole or in part) submitted to his authority, and brandished the 
maxim that all things are lawful, in defence of behaviour of which it turned out 
Paul himself did not approve. 
Raymond Collins ties the Corinthians’ use of this phrase to Stoic 
criticisms of Roman royalty, playing off of precisely the same dichotomy posited 
in Chapter 2, above.  He points back to 1 Cor 4:8, in which Paul accuses the 
Corinthians of having ‘become kings’ independently of his teaching.18  In the 
decades immediately following Paul, the leading Stoic philosophers Seneca and 
Dio Chrysostom criticised Roman emperors for their behaviour, specifically 
accusing them of acting as though πάντα ἔξεστι, as though all things were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 108.  Conzelmann does not give a specific page reference to this 
argument in Leitzmann and Kümmel’s commentary, but does state that where he only mentions 
one of them in his citation it is because he has seen elsewhere that he, and not the other, is the 
originator of the argument in question.  Hans Leitzmann and Werner Georg Kümmel, Handbuch 
zum Neuen Testament, 9 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1949). 
17 Hays, First Corinthians, 101. 
18 Collins, First Corinthians, 186-187. 
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lawful.19  Similarly, and directly contemporary to Paul, Collins cites the leading 
Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus as having said that Caligula justifies his 
actions with ‘it’s lawful for me,’ ἔξεστιν µοι.20  It would be a step too far to 
conclude that the Corinthians were intentionally claiming a libertinism for 
themselves that traditional moralisers mockingly attributed to depraved despots; 
yet within the discourse of the time they occupied a position logically aligned with 
those who make up my example of first century libertinism.  Intentionally or not, 
they used the same slogan positively that libertinist emperors were negatively 
accused of using by the Stoics. 
 
2.  Sinning in the Name of the Lord 
 
Not only the language and the maxim, but also the specific activity of the 
Corinthians establishes them as Sadean libertinists.  After his lengthy argument 
for unity in the church (cps. 1-4), the first moral issue Paul writes about is in 
response to him hearing that ‘there’s a perversion among you so bad that even the 
gentiles aren’t doing it: so that some man has his father’s wife’ (5:1).  A few 
things are notable here.  Firstly, Paul makes it clear that this is not an isolated 
case.  Rather, Paul has heard that there is a general sexual 
immorality/fornication/perversion (πορνεία, porneia) among them, and that this is 
a sexual immorality that is somehow worse than that normally found among 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Collins, First Corinthians, 187.  Since Seneca wrote in Latin I presume these words come from 
Dio Chrysostom, and Collins is reporting that Seneca said something similar. 
20 Collins, First Corinthians, 243.  Collins does not say from where in Musonius Rufus he has 
drawn this quote. 
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gentiles.  In other words, the gospel (or perhaps even Paul’s message in particular) 
has resulted in many of them behaving worse than they did before they were 
Christians.  Secondly, the statement of the particular man’s sin is grammatically 
presented as a consequence clause: he sleeps with his father’s wife as a 
consequence of the fact that there is general immorality worse than that of the 
unconverted.21  The sin is a result of the libertinism, not ‘libertinism’ a description 
of the sin.  Thirdly, this is something specifically and repeatedly prohibited in the 
Torah (Lev 18:8, 20:11; Deut 27:20), and Paul makes no reference to this 
whatsoever.  Not only is this evidence that Paul does not consider the Torah to be 
law for Christians, it also shows that the very problem he responds to is one he 
created: the Corinthians believe all things are lawful, and so set out to do that 
which the law prohibited.  This is the perverse side of the paradox of jouissance: 
attempting to be free from the law they run towards transgression, but in 
transgression are still equally bound to the law, as their desire is tied to the law’s 
prohibition, and every transgression further establishes the omnipresence of the 
law.  One could not even argue that Paul is exaggerating and really they were just 
finding a theological justification for actions that were permissible before 
conversion: marrying one’s step-mother was also illegal in Roman law,22 and 
Stoic philosophers (in this case Cicero) detested the idea of a woman laying with 
her step-son; so Corinthian libertinism resulted in the transgression not just of the 
Jewish law, but also of state law and common moral law.23  It is clear that, as far 
as Paul is concerned, the Corinthian Christians’ behaviour was a libertinism they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The consequence clause is ὥστε γυναῖκά τινα τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχειν. 
22 Collins, First Corinthians, 209. 
23 Hays, First Corinthians, 81, citing Cicero, Pro Cluentio, 5:14-6:15. 
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claimed resulted from the gospel itself – the gospel that Paul had brought to them.  
This perfects them as examples of Lacan’s interpretation of Sadean/perverse 
behaviour: they intentionally sought freedom from the law through its 
transgression.  This is why it is so important that Paul claims they are guilty of 
things ‘even the gentiles aren’t doing’ (5:1).  In attempting to be free from the law 
by transgressing it, the Corinthian Christians are behaving in ways that Paul 
deems worse than if they hadn’t converted at all. 
This point can be clarified further following a grammatical judgment.  1 
Corinthians 5:3-5 appears as follows in NA28:24 
 
[Phrase 1]  [3] ἐγω µὲν γάρ, ἀπὼν τῷ σώµατι παρὼν δὲ τῷ πνεύµατι, 
 For I on-the-one-hand, being-apart in-the body am-present on-the-other-hand in-the spirit, 
 
 
[Phrase 2]  ἤδη κέκρικα ὡς παρὼν τὸν οὕτως τοῦτο κατεργασάµενον· 
            already having-judged as being-present the-[man] thusly this-[thing] having-done; 
 
 
[Phrase 3] [4] ἐν τῷ ὀνόµατι τοῦ κυρίου [ἡµῶν] Ἰησοῦ 
              in  the   name     of-the   lord     [of-us]     Jesus 
 
 
[Phrase 4] συναχθέντων ὑµῶν καὶ τοῦ ἐµου πνεύµατος 
          when-gathered-together  you   and    -      my        spirit 
 
  
[Phrase 5] σὺν τῇ δυνάµει τοῦ κυρίου ἡµῶν Ἰησοῦ, 
      with  the   power  of-the   lord      of-us     Jesus, 
 
 
[Phrase 6] [5] παραδοῦναι τὸν τοιοῦτον τῷ Σατανᾷ εἰς ὄλεθρον τῆς σαρκός, 
                             to-hand-over   the such-a-person to  Satan   for destruction of-the flesh, 
 
 
[Phrase 7] ἵνα τὸ πνεῦµα σωθῇ 
               so-that [his] spirit will-be-saved 
 
 
[Phrase 8] ἐν τῇ ἡµέρᾳ τοῦ κυρίου. 
                     on the    day   of-the    Lord.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 NA28 is the most recent critically established text of the New Testament.  Bibliographic 
information can be found in the front pages and the bibliography. 
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I divided it into phrases in order to show where the debate arises.  Despite 
most translations dividing the sentence into two or three, this is in fact one 
particularly long run-on sentence.  Within this sentence, phrase 3 can be paired 
with a number of different phrases in the run-on sentence, or perhaps more than 
one.  Conzelmann lists six different possibilities, not including the one argued for 
here.25  The decision by the editors of NA28 to end phrase 2 with a semicolon 
biases the translator to attach phrase 3 to one of the phrases following it rather 
than anything preceding it, though neither is more grammatically valid.  So, for 
example, in Tom Wright’s translation he pairs phrase 3 with phrase 4, translating 
v. 4 as ‘When you are assembled together in the name of our Lord Jesus, and my 
spirit is there too with the power of our Lord Jesus.’26  This means he agrees with 
the decision made by Thiselton in his massive and extensively researched 
commentary, where he reflects on the possibilities listed by Conzelmann and 
decides that phrase 3 describes phrase 4.27  However, Thiselton’s primary reason 
for concluding thusly is that if Paul is stating that the Corinthians are gathered in 
the name of the Lord, this is a speech-act.28  While this fits nicely with Thiselton’s 
interest in speech-act theory and biblical hermeneutics, the fact that this could be a 
reference to a speech-act is in no way an argument that it is, regardless of how 
nicely it fits in with Thiselton’s particular philosophical interests. 
In this case, the punctuation of the Textus Receptus is actually preferable, 
which maintains the ambiguous phrasing of the run-on sentence by punctuating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 97. 
26 Tom Wright, The New Testament for Everyone (London: SPCK, 2011), 374. 
27 Thiselton, First Corinthians, 393-394. 
28 Thiselton, First Corinthians, 394. 
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with commas instead of full stops or semi-colons.  Perhaps even more 
surprisingly, one could then argue that the King James Version translates it best 
by replicating this overuse of commas and re-creating the Greek ambiguity for the 
English reader.  The New Revised Standard Version then follows the lead of its 
predecessor the Revised Standard Version, in a tradition going back to the King 
James Version and the Textus Receptus’s punctuation, and translates vv. 3-5 as 
follows:  ‘For though absent in body, I am present in spirit; and as if present I 
have already pronounced judgment in the name of the Lord Jesus on the man who 
has done such a thing.  When you are assembled, and my spirit is present with the 
power of our Lord Jesus, you are to hand this man over to Satan for the 
destruction of the flesh, so that his spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord.’  
Without any grammatical reason to divide the phrases any particular way, 
especially once it has been acknowledged that all punctuation (including that of 
NA28) is an addition to the text, there is a division between commentaries, which 
tend to give historical reasons to attach phrase 3 to later parts in the sentence,29 
and translations, particularly ones in the tradition of the King James Version, 
which tend to read the phrase as a continuation of what came before it. 
However, since neither historical nor grammatical arguments provide any 
conclusive evidence, is it simply the case that we should follow the lead of the 
Textus Receptus and attempt to take no side at all?  The NRSV perhaps provides a 
way forward.  In a footnote it notes another possible translation: ‘Or on the man 
who has done such a thing in the name of the Lord Jesus.’  Among English-
speaking commentators it seems only Richard Hays defends this reading.  For, he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For example Barrett, First Corinthians, 124-125 and Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 97. 
	   159	  
says, this interpretation ‘would fit well with the hypothesis that the Corinthians 
were actually boasting about this man’s freedom from ordinary sexual constraints: 
the man would be explicitly claiming in the name of Jesus to be beyond the 
jurisdiction of merely human moral laws.’30  There are no grammatical reasons or 
convincing historical reasons to read phrase 3 with any other phrases in the 
sentence, but to read it with the two words immediately preceding it is both 
sequentially intuitive and contextually intuitive: a core purpose of this entire letter 
is to respond to the Corinthians’ use of the slogan ‘all things are lawful;’ a slogan 
either contained within or enabled by the gospel taught by Paul.  It is thus most 
reasonable to match phrase 3 with the latter half of phrase 2: ‘…having judged as 
though I were already present the man who is doing such things in the name of the 
Lord.’  Of all of the moral problems to which Paul responds in 1 Corinthians, the 
one given highest priority (the first moral issue he addresses after addressing 
schisms in general) is the issue of a man sleeping with his stepmother in the name 
of the Lord.  The man is not doing this because this is what gentiles do, but 
because Corinthian libertinism was practicing freedom from the law through the 
specific transgression of the Torah; and, perhaps coincidentally, in this case also 
through the transgression of the very first law, the paternal incest prohibition. 
Having objected to the use of his own kerygma as a cause of libertinism, 
one might expect Paul to proceed to give a theological argument for a Christian 
ethics that results from his gospel and is not libertine in nature.  This is where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Hays, First Corinthians, 84.  Hays also notes that to take phrase 3 with phrase 4, as do Thiselton 
and Wright, is made less likely (though not impossible) by the Greek word order.  In other words, 
it seems unlikely that Paul would state the formula through which they gather before the fact of 
them gathering. 
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Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians disappoints.  In response to the man sleeping 
with his stepmother in the name of the Lord, Paul does not argue for why this is 
immoral from a Christian perspective.  Instead, he presumes knowledge that the 
act is immoral, and then implores the Corinthians to expel the guilty man from 
their community.  Thiselton argues that Paul is arguing based on his theology 
here, noting that he uses ‘old/new’ imagery in allusion to the New Creation, and 
refers to the atonement with the reference to the πάσχα (which could mean 
‘Passover’ or ‘Passover Lamb’).31  While both of these allusions are possible, they 
are theological references adding weight to an apostolic command, not 
theological/moral arguments for that command.  Further, when expanding upon 
exactly whom the church should expel, Paul gives a sin list that Brian Rosner has 
argued is drawn from those whom it is said should be killed in Deuteronomy.32   
Whether or not Paul is imitating deuteronomic prohibitions, the justification given 
for why the man’s actions are immoral is only the ἤδη κέκρικα (‘I have already 
judged’) of v. 3, having already judged the man’s actions to be κακίας καὶ 
πονηρίας, bad and evil (v. 8).  That is to say, Paul’s argument is based upon his 
own prior understanding of the act as evil, so its ultimate source is likely to be the 
religious prohibition from the Torah with which Paul was brought up, and 
Rosner’s assertion provides evidence of this.  So although he (surely 
intentionally) does not quote Lev 18:8, 20:11 or Deut 27:20, these verses are the 
ultimate ground of his moral reasoning.  This means that, despite his best efforts, 
he has responded to the libertinism he accidentally created with law, and not with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Thiselton, First Corinthians, 403-404. 
32 Brian S. Rosner, Paul, Scripture and Ethics (New York: Brill, 1994), 69.  See also Hays, First 
Corinthians, 87-88. 
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an elaboration of what he thinks should replace the law in the ethical actions of 
Christians.  If this is correct – and Paul has taught freedom from the law, it has 
been interpreted in defence of libertinism, and Paul has accidentally tried to rein it 
in with law (and not with the theology he intended to be liberal) – then 1 
Corinthians is indeed the bearer of a knee-jerk, ‘anti-theological’ response.33 
Likewise there is a problem with his response to the Corinthians’ (or his 
own) slogan ‘all things are lawful,’ discussed above.  None of the four responses 
he provides consist of or precede a description of what exactly constitutes that 
which is not lawful for Christians, or what positively replaces/reinterprets the law 
for Christians.  In 1 Cor 6:12 Paul responds to the maxim with ‘but not all things 
are beneficial’ and then ‘but I will not be mastered by anything.’  The latter of 
these echoes Stoic language.34  Neither of these responses is particularly 
Christian: Paul does not respond positively with a defence of Christian ethics.  
Instead, he tries to do damage control with slogans that do not stem from his own 
theological system.  In what comes next, he argues that Christians should not be 
joined with prostitutes because they are the body of Christ, and prostitutes would 
pollute the purity of Christ’s body.  He even makes a joke at the end of this 
section, discussing the Church and prostitution, concluding with ‘For you were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 ‘Anti-theological’ in the sense of being a non-theological response to a problem caused by 
theology, but also in the sense Douglas Campbell attaches to the term in The Quest for Paul’s 
Gospel: A Suggested Strategy (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 29-34 (discussed in the introduction to 
Pauline scholarship above).  Campbell uses the term to denote any approach to Paul’s theology 
that reads him as internally contradictory and inconsistent, an approach against which he posits 
himself as the strictest opponent.  The suggestion above amounts to an ‘anti-theological’ 
interpretation of 1 Corinthians, by way of introduction to a theological interpretation of Romans.  
Or, in other words, Paul’s theology is mostly consistent but he does make mistakes. 
34 Hays, First Corinthians, 103. 
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bought with a price; so glorify God with your body’ (1 Cor 6:20).  Calling the 
Corinthians God’s prostitutes might have been amusing, but it is not particularly 
connected to the rest of Paul’s theology.  So when J. Paul Sampley comments on 
this section he fills in the gaps by saying ‘We can see elsewhere in Paul’s letters 
that a believer’s obligation is to love (Rom 13:8), to put one’s faith, that is one’s 
right relation to God, into expression via love (Gal 5:6).’35  The fact that Sampley 
has to reach into Paul’s other letters in order to find a properly theological 
response to the Corinthians’ maxim demonstrates Paul’s failure here: not an 
absolute systematic failure, but, in this instance, a knee-jerk response that will be 
reconsidered later.36 
The problem posed for Paul, of responding to a libertine expansion of his 
own liberal gospel, is one that persists through the rest of the letter; particularly, 
the rest of cps. 5-11, dealing with moral issues.  Within this letter, Paul’s 
approach is consistent: he finds ways to limit libertine behaviour without 
sacrificing any of his original liberalism.  However, on a theological level, his 
responses seem poorly considered.  This is not overly surprising, since he is 
providing an immediate response to what he considers an incredible abuse of his 
own message.  Indeed, this could well be the letter he refers to in 2 Cor 2:4 has 
having been written ‘out of great affliction and distress… with many tears.’37  He 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Sampley, ‘First Corinthians,’ 860-861. 
36 It will be argued in Chapter 5 below that in his letter to the Romans Paul attempts to think 
through the issue more carefully and systematically. 
37 Douglas Campbell makes a convincing argument that 1 Corinthians is the so-called ‘Letter of 
Tears’ in Framing Paul: An Epistolary Biography (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2014), 61-80; though 
this has not been the commonly accepted academic view since the mid nineteenth century.  
Margaret Thrall, in 2 Corinthians 1-7, International Critical Commentary (London: T&T Clark, 
2004), 57-61, summarises the original arguments by Fredrick Bleek in 1830 against the 
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does not provide thought-out theological approaches, but instead fishes for 
immediate responses.  This creates an unusually complex and unsystematic 
relation to desire. 
 
3.  In Your Desire, Do Not Sin38 
 
One final example makes this clear, and takes us in the direction of that 
which remains to be solved after 1 Corinthians.  In 1 Cor 7:1 Paul begins a 
response to another quote from the letter he received: καλὸν ἀνθρώπῳ γυναικὸς 
µὴ ἅπτεσθαι (‘it is good for a man not to touch a woman/his wife’).39  His 
response is complex and multi-faceted, with different pieces of advice to men and 
women in various situations; however, the constant theme is that it is generally 
better not to be married, except for in some situations.  The precise reason for this 
view is contested, and requires some untangling.  Dale Martin argues at length 
that Paul was influenced by Stoic philosophy to oppose desire itself, and saw 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
identification of 1 Corinthians as the Letter of Tears, one of which is that Paul considered himself 
to be at fault for the problems caused, and, so the argument goes, in 1 Cor 5 Paul is not at fault.  
However, as I have argued, this is precisely what Paul thought in 1 Cor 5: that their libertinism 
was caused by his own message.  This and several others of Bleek’s arguments are countered by 
the reading provided above.  Thus, it being reasonable that Paul himself does refer to 1 Cor as 
having been written in great distress, it is even more reasonable to refer to his arguments as ‘knee-
jerk.’ 
38 This is of course a reference to Eph 4:26, ‘Be angry but do not sin!’  This verse acts as 
additional justification for the main argument of this section: Paul is not against emotion or desire, 
even though he occasionally balks at the thought of their excess. 
39 The main issue of contention in this verse is whether this Corinthian slogan regards intercourse 
(‘touching’) with a woman to whom a man is already married, or any woman at all.  γυναικὸς can 
mean either. 
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marriage only as a tool for the reduction of desire.40  William Loader (among 
others), arguing from an expertise more focused on first century Judaisms than 
Hellenism, disagrees with Martin and says both that Stoicism was not opposed to 
passion within marriage, and that Paul sees both passion within marriage and 
celibacy as gifts.41  Stoicism actually had a wide range of views on desire and 
marriage in the first century, many of them cited by Foucault in his work on 
Roman sexuality.42 
One point of entry into the debates over Paul’s relation to desire in 1 Cor 7 
is through v. 9.43  It is generally paired with the preceding verse, in which Paul 
says ‘To the unmarried and widows I say that it is good for them to remain 
[unmarried] as I am.’  Verse nine then reads εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐγκρατεύονται, 
γαµησάτωσαν, κρεῖττων γάρ ἐστιν γαµῆσαι ἢ πυροῦσθαι, which can be translated 
as ‘But if they are not exercising self-control let them marry, for it is better to 
marry than to [burn with] desire.’  Here there are a few necessary debates, one of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Dale Martin, Sex and the Single Savior (London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), 65-76, 
111-116.  Dale Martin, The Corinthian Body (London: Yale University Press, 1995), 198-228. 
41 William Loader, Sexuality in the New Testament (London: SPCK, 2010), 45-48, 108-116. 
42 Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality: 3, trans. by Robert Hurley 
(London: Penguin, 1990 [1984]), 154-164.  Foucault also discusses first century Stoic and cynic 
attitudes towards marriage, in greater detail, in his lectures at the Collège du France of 4 and 11 
February, 1981, which are due to be published in English later this year.  Michel Foucault, 
Subjectivité et Vérité (Paris: Seuil, 2014), 98-148. 
43 In some ways exegesis and Lacanian psychoanalysis are similar pursuits: phonemes and 
signifiers mean nothing certain in isolation, but form a chain that must be entered into at some 
point.  The point of entry of a chain of signifiers, whether they stem from a deceased author or a 
living analysand, does not matter nearly as much as where the chain ends up at the end; and the 
chain can only ‘end up’ somewhere after having been entered into.  For more on the relation 
between hermeneutics and Lacanian psychoanalysis see Ian Parker, ‘Negotiating Text with 
Lacan,’ in Lacan, Discourse, Event: New Psychoanalytic Approaches to Textual Indeterminacy, 
eds. Ian Parker and David Pavón-Cuéllar (London: Routledge, 2014), 52-65. 
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which relates to the translation of the final word, πυροῦσθαι, rendered here as ‘to 
desire.’   
The word’s literal meaning is ‘to burn,’ which is its most widely attested 
usage in extra-biblical sources, as well as in the Septuagint.44  M. L. Barré45 and 
K. C. Russell46 have written defending this reading, with G. F. Snyder arguing for 
it in his commentary.47  In such a reading, Paul’s suggestion is that it is better to 
find a place for desire in marriage than to succumb to it outside of marriage and 
be thrown into hell, which would fit with his suggestion about what to do with the 
man in 1 Cor 5 discussed above (‘hand him over to Satan’), and with the 
metaphor used in 1 Cor 3:13 of one’s works being tested by fire on ‘the day’ (of 
judgment).  It does not fit, however, with the absence of any reference to eternal 
suffering as being in fire, or indeed to any word for ‘hell,’ in Paul’s letters.48   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Friedrich Lang, ‘πυρόω,’ in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, 6, trans. by Geoffrey 
W. Bromiley, eds. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1968 [1959]), 
948-949. 
45 M. L. Barré, ‘To Marry or to Burn: pyrousthai in 1 Cor. 7:9,’ Catholic Biblical Quarterly, 36 
(1974), 193-202.  His argument is based on Septuagint, Qumran and New Testament lexicography. 
46 K. C. Russell, ‘That Embarrassing Verse in First Corinthians,’ Bible Today, 18 (1980), 338-341.  
His argument is based on analysis of rhetorical strategy. 
47 G. F. Snyder, First Corinthians: A Faith Community Commentary (Macon, Georgia: Mercer 
University Press, 1992), 97. 
48 Alfred Schmoller’s Handkonkordanz zum griechischen Neuen Testament (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Bibelgesellschaft, 1989) helped in finding all of Paul’s uses of the words πῦρ and πυροῦσθαι.  
Though there are references to God’s wrath and eternal punishment in Paul, there are not 
references to hell as such, and Paul’s eschatological focus is upon the presumption that whatever 
‘divine punishment’ consists of, it transpires entirely on an earth onto which all humans have 
resurrected in Christ (Rom 11:32 and 1 Cor 15:20-28).  Indeed, most recent major studies of Paul 
focus on the themes of sin and death, and justification and participation in Christ, to the exclusion 
of any detailed discussion of ‘hell,’ for example, James Dunn’s The Theology of Paul the Apostle 
(Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1998) and N. T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God (London: 
SPCK, 2013).  While this ‘sidelining’ of hell occurs without note in Dunn and Wright’s works, 
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Most commentaries other than Snyder instead opt for a figurative reading 
of πυροῦσθαι, as something like ‘burning desire.’  Though the verb is used 
literally (‘to burn’) in its three non-Pauline occurrences in the New Testament,49 
its only other use by the authentic Paul is in 2 Cor 11:29, where its precise 
meaning is again uncertain, but it is certainly figurative as opposed to literal.50  
The Theological Dictionary of the New Testament notes a strong attestation in the 
Greek world for the translation ‘to be consumed with the fire of sexual desire,’ 
which it states with some confidence is its ‘clear sense’ in 1 Cor 7:9.51  The 
number of arguments made on both sides throughout the centuries would be 
insurmountable here.  However, having examined all of it, Thiselton decides on 
the latter reading (‘burning desire’) for two reasons: (1) because it lines up with 
‘positive’ views about sexual intimacy and marriage as God-given (this point, 
however, is irrelevant from a historical-critical perspective) and (2) because it is 
combined with ἐγκρατεύονται (cognate with ἐγκράτεια, ‘self-control’), which ‘has 
a long history in Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman philosophy from Plato to the first-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Douglas Campbell refers to it frequently in his tome on Romans, and puts it bluntly just before his 
conclusion: ‘It does not follow from the fact that Paul occasionally endorses an aggressive process 
of divine action… that this process is functioning in a theologically foundational location within 
his thinking.’  Douglas Campbell, The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of 
Justification in Paul (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), 929-930, italics original; see also 87-95 and 
924-927. 
49 2 Pet 3:12; Rev 1:15, 3:18. 
50 The New Revised Standard Version translates πυροῦσθαι here as ‘indignant,’ and the sentence 
would make little sense if Paul intended the word literally.  It is also used in Eph 6:16, though 
Ephesians is rarely considered authentically Pauline, or, more commonly recently, the last two 
chapters are considered a pseudepigraphal expansion of an original Pauline circular letter.  See 
John Muddiman, The Epistle to the Ephesians, Black’s New Testament Commentaries (London: 
Continuum, 2001), 1-54.   
51 Friedrich Lang, ‘πυρόω,’ 949-950. 
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century Cynic and Stoic traditions.’52  This is the most persuasive argument yet, 
and is also aided by the fact that among Jewish authors πυροῦσθαι is most 
frequently used in a figurative sense by the Stoic-Jewish philosopher Philo, who 
‘usually employs the term figuratively for “to be enflamed” with emotion, 
whether favourably or unfavourably.’53  Philo was, much more clearly than Paul, 
heavily influenced by Stoicism.  Further, Dale Martin has demonstrated very well 
that ‘burning’ was such a common metaphor for desire that it is perfectly 
legitimate, should it be well argued, to read it as a reference to desire in general, 
not just to intensely passionate desire.54  This completes the argument for the 
above translation ‘But if they are not exercising self-control let them marry, for it 
is better to marry than to [burn with] desire,’ given above, which sounds so Stoic 
that it then warrants all of the comparisons with Stoicism made in 
commentaries.55  But we still do not know whether Paul is opposed to all desire as 
such, or just this ‘burning’ desire. 
At this point Paul’s precise meaning hinges on the extent to which Stoic 
thought influences him.56  Thiselton surveys some of the many studies on the 
potential Stoic influence on 1 Cor 7,57 and points to Will Deming’s study of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Thiselton, First Corinthians, 518. 
53 Friedrich Lang, ‘πυρόω,’ 949. 
54 Martin, Sex and the Single Savior, 68-70.  See also Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and 
Gender from the Greeks to Freud (London: Harvard University Press, 1990), 25-62 for a detailed 
analysis of the role of the notion of ‘heat’ (among other things) in ancient sexuality. 
55 Nearly every commentary makes some sort of comparison between Stoicism or Cynicism and 1 
Cor 7, including every commentary discussed in this chapter. 
56 The most important major study of the relationship between Paul’s thought and Stoic philosophy 
is Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000).  Much more on 
the relationship between Paul and Stoicism will be said in the following three chapters. 
57 Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 487-492. 
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place of 1 Cor 7 in Stoic-Cynic debates about the merits and disadvantages of 
marriage.58  As mentioned above, Dale Martin takes the theory of Stoic influence 
even further and reads Paul as saying that marriage is a tool for the reduction of 
desire, not its expression.59  Such a neurotic approach would be of great relevance 
to the current study.  The most often cited single text used for placing Paul in this 
context is Epictetus’s Discourses, 3.22.76.60  I will now evaluate the extent to 
which the Stoic material may actually be seen as a background to Paul’s text, and 
then look at the text’s internal evidence for its precise relationship to the Stoic 
background, which I will argue is not as extensive as it seems.  Proposed 
translations of 1 Cor 7:1-9 and the relevant section of Epictetus can be found in 
Appendix B. 
Discourses, 3.22.76 is by no means the only Stoic passage on marriage or 
desire; but it is the one most frequently cited as an example of a Stoic argument 
analogous to Paul’s.  It concludes the section 3.22.67-76, in which Epictetus 
discusses whether the ideal philosopher (Epictetus refers to him as ‘the Cynic’) 
should marry.  The conclusion is that a philosopher should not marry, so that, like 
a king, he has time to devote to more important pursuits.  While Epictetus would 
like to imagine an ideal world in which all men are wise (‘sages,’ as traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Will Deming, Paul on Marriage and Celibacy: The Hellenistic Background of 1 Corinthians 7 
(Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2003). 
59 Martin, Sex and the Single Savior, 65. 
60 Thiselton, First Corinthians 487-488; Martin, The Corinthian Body, 203; Loader, Sexuality in 
the New Testament, 112.  Of these, Dale Martin is alone in not citing Deming, Paul on Marriage 
and Celibacy as the reason he is discussing Epictetus.  I argue below that Epictetus’ comment isn’t 
as relevant as it might seem.  Rather than this argument flying in the face of all commentary on the 
passage, it is merely a comment on Deming, who, in discussing Epictetus, caused everyone else to 
need to pass comment on what had been discussed prior. 
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translations render it), he grants that in the present world in which this is not the 
case, and not all are philosophers, the philosopher should not be tied down by a 
role including a commitment to the duty of family life.  After arguing this his 
interlocutor interjects, reminding him that Crates, the founder of the Cynics, was 
himself married.  Epictetus responds by pointing out that Crates’ marriage was out 
of passionate love, and to a woman who was also wise like him.  Thus he refutes 
the objection by restating his original point: marriage is usually done out of duty 
and comes with more time-consuming duties; and in a world in which most are 
not wise philosophers, it is better not to marry. 
Epictetus clearly thinks that a marriage based on passionate desire is, if 
anything, the only form of marriage into which a wise philosopher should enter, 
but that most marriages are done for duty.  This reflects the most common view of 
the day: that marriage is primarily a matter of duty and only rarely entered into 
because of love.  So, when Caesar Augustus passed a law in 17 BCE encouraging 
men to marry (in itself evidence that marriage was commonly seen as a duty), he 
quoted the following from an old speech, saying it seemed written for the hour: ‘If 
we could survive without a wife, citizens of Rome, all of us would do without that 
nuisance; but since nature has so decreed that we cannot manage comfortably with 
them, nor live in any way without them, we must plan for our lasting preservation 
rather than for our temporary pleasure.’61  Contrary to Epictetus, most other Stoics 
take precisely this view, in line with which was Augustus: not that the only time 
marriage is ideal is the exceptional one based on passionate love, but that all men 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 From Mary R. Lefkowitz and Maureen B. Flant, eds., Women’s Life in Greece & Rome 
(London: Duckworth, 2005), 103. 
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should perform the social duty of marriage, that this is natural, and that desire 
within marriage should be controlled and moderated. 
So Musonius Rufus, Epictetus’s teacher and direct contemporary to Paul, 
said that sex is justified when it is in marriage and for child-bearing, and unjust 
when it is ‘mere pleasure-seeking.’62  Then Hierocles, a Stoic philosopher in the 
second century, inverts Epictetus’s view precisely: ‘The married life is to be 
preferred by the wise man, but life without a wife is not, except in special 
circumstances.’63  For him, and most Stoics, having children is in line with nature; 
and he goes even further: ‘living with a wife even before childbirth is 
advantageous,’64 ‘having all things in common, including their bodies.’65  So he 
‘marvels’ at those who think that married life is burdensome (such as, perhaps 
intentionally, Epictetus).66  For Hierocles marriage should be entered into even by 
someone who is strong, self-controlled and moderate, and there is no hint at all 
that the sex within marriage should be without desire.67   
Gretchen Reydams-Schils correctly notes that Stoic views on marriage 
varied; but Epictetus’s views on marriage are in the minority at best, and the pro-
marriage views of his teacher Rufus seem more reflective of Stoicism, and much 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Abraham J. Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, A Greco-Roman Sourcebook (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1986), 153.  The following citations are all from this compendium, which 
contains, among other things, a rare example of an English translation of Hierocles. 
63 Ibid., 100. 
64 Ibid., 102. 
65 Ibid., 103. 
66 Ibid., 103. 
67 Ibid., 103. 
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of the rest of society, at large.68  This is a very important point. Even though 
Epictetus says something that sounds similar to Paul, that marriage is only 
suitable in cases of passionate love, he says this decades after Paul, and says it in 
opposition to the usual view espoused by the Stoics – that marriage is a duty 
stemming from nature.  It is difficult to see, then, how it is relevant to the question 
of what Paul meant.  Further, Epictetus says it for very different reasons to Paul: 
Epictetus argues against the Stoic view that marriage is a duty and argues that the 
only way it is not just a ‘common marriage’ is if it arises out of love.  Paul makes 
no reference to marriage being about love in this passage, nor any specific 
reference to marriage as duty, but rather addresses marriage as something that 
might be necessary due to porneia (7:2), or is already present (7:10-24) and 
already as though not existing due to the imminent return of Christ (7:29-31).  
Despite not specifically mentioning it, Paul’s	   discussion	   of	   marriage	   makes	  sense	   within	   the	   context	   of	   the	   common	   conception	   of	   marriage	   as	   duty,	  shared	   by	   most	   Stoics,	   in	   which	   marriage	   is	   not	   seen	   as	   a	   tool	   for	   the	  reduction	   of	   desire.	   	   There	   is	   therefore	   no	   evidence	   here	   that	   Paul	   saw	  marriage	  as	  a	  defence	  against	  desire	  as	  such,	  since	  this	  is	  not	  a	  Stoic	  view	  that	  Paul	  would	  have	  been	   replicating.	   	   Instead,	   it	  makes	  more	   sense	   in	   context	  that	   Paul	  was	   defending	   against	   specifically	   ‘burning’	   desire,	   lest	   it	   lead	   to	  
porneia.	   	   Between	   Martin	   and	   Loader’s	   positions	   summarised	   above,	   the	  evidence	  seems	  to	  side	  with	  Loader. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Gretchen Reydams-Schils, The Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 143-176. 
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It is better to marry than ‘to [burn with] desire,’ yet at the end of the 
chapter Paul says that as long as one’s desire (θέληµα) is under control, one can 
marry and do well (though ‘the one who does not marry will do even better’).69  
Martin is correct that Paul does not refer to desire positively, here or elsewhere, 
but there is certainly a ‘neutral’ desire that can be a part of a good, procreative, 
marriage, as opposed to a burning desire that leads to porneia.  Though θέληµα is 
not negative in Stoicism either, and is not the ‘desire’ that Stoicism sought to 
reduce, it is certainly a form of desire in a Lacanian sense, and it is something 
Paul sought (like the Stoics) to control, rather than to eliminate.  Paul did have a 
concept of neutral/necessary desire (θέληµα) as opposed to excessive (and 
sometimes bad) desire (ἐπιθυµία), and, at least with a Lacanian wider view of 
‘desire,’ this is precisely consistent with the Stoic norm before Epictetus’s 
anomalous anti-marital position.70  Paul, here and elsewhere, treats desire 
(θέληµα) as a neutral thing, natural and beneficial when under control.  
Conversely, when Paul condemns ἐπιθυµία (epithymia), which he does often, this 
is in reference to ‘excessive desire,’71 not desire in itself.  This is consistent with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 1 Cor 7:36-38. 
70 Epictetus’s anti-marriage view is actually more in line with the Cynics; though they opposed 
marriage in order to fornicate more freely, whereas Epictetus opposed it as a distraction from the 
duties of a philosopher. 
71 Schmoller, in his Handkonkordanz zum griechischen Neuen Testament, 184, lists ten 
occurrences of ἐπιθυµία in the authentic Pauline epistles.  While these references are mostly 
negative, they are occasionally positive, such as in 1 Thes 2:17 where Paul tells the Thessalonians 
that he longs ἐν πολλῇ ἐπιθυµίᾳ to see them, or Phil 3:23, in which we are presumably meant to 
read Paul’s verbalisation of the death drive as a positive. 
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his use of it to translate the commandment traditionally translated ‘Thou shalt not 
covet,’ which is not a prohibition of desire in itself.72 
The answer to the above questions, of Paul’s views of marriage and desire, 
is that in 1 Cor 7:8-9 Paul argues for marriage as a place for desire without too 
much jouissance (‘burning’), because excessive jouissance might lead to porneia, 
the thought of which (and presence of which) he cannot bear; and the first 
instance of porneia he feels the need to oppose is the man sleeping with his 
stepmother in the name of the Lord.  The claim that Paul’s primary purpose here 
is to oppose porneia, not desire, is consistent with Paul’s own stated purpose in v. 
2, and does not require theorising about underlying Stoic philosophical motives.73  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 For example, Rom 7:7. 
73 In 1 Thessalonians, probably Paul’s earliest extant letter, the relation to Stoicism, desire and 
porneia is similar.  As stated above, in 1 Thess 2:17 he uses epithymia positively, but in 4:3-6 uses 
language reminiscent of the Stoics to implore the Thessalonians to avoid porneia by controlling 
their own bodies, in order to avoid allowing their excessive desire to lead them farther than it 
should (µὴ ὑπερβαίνειν), so that they would not be like the gentiles in the passion of excessive 
desire (ἐν πάθει ἐπιθυµίας).  Paul, consistently from the start, does not respond to porneia with the 
Torah, but does believe that excessive desire can lead to it, and is not yet sure how Christian ethics 
(and not Stoic injunctions), can respond to this.  So in a letter in which the rest of his ethics are 
deeply Christian (see 1:2-3 or 5:13-15), when it comes to his fear of porneia his imperatives seem 
unfounded in the rest of his thought, and so here he depends upon his prejudice against the ‘ways 
of the gentiles’ (just as we also see in 1 Corinthians).  Yet he also sometimes seems to strike 
against Stoic thought: in 5:14 his attitude towards the weak is to console and encourage them, 
upholding them in their weakness, not to tell them to accept their illness as nature’s will (see 
Seneca’s advice in the fifth section of Chapter 4, below).  Whereas Seneca in Letter 122 condemns 
staying awake at night and connects this to those who engage in drunkenness (see citations in 
Appendix C, 1.3), Paul’s advice is that we should neither drink nor sleep at night, but keep awake 
and sober to watch for the one who comes like a thief in the night (1 Thess 5:5-8).  Paul may 
sometimes retreat to Stoic-like reason, but it is foolish to suggest that this is a major or central 
influence on his ethics.  He is not unequivocally negative about desire, so long as we resist the 
temptation to read the occasional use of Stoic signifiers as a wholesale endorsement of a 
mythically monadic view of ‘Stoicism.’   
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He sometimes argues using Stoic terms and with reference to Stoic concepts, but 
not for the reason that desire itself is necessarily evil.  When	   he	   does	  appropriate	   from	   Stoicism,	   or	   at	   least	   from	   the	   discourse	   of	   self-­‐mastery,	  with	  his	  ‘do	  not	  allow	  yourself	  to	  be	  mastered’	  responses	  to	  libertinism,	  this	  is	  part	  of	  his	  knee-­‐jerk’	  relation	  to	  desire	  in	  1	  Corinthians.	  	  In Lacanian terms, 
throughout 1 Corinthians he advocates obsessional neurosis (seeking self-control) 
as the prophylaxis against perverse libertinism, because jouissance (‘desire that 
burns’) involves getting too close to das Ding (maternal enjoyment, porneia).  His 
preaching resulted in one side of the paradox of jouissance, so he combats it with 
the other. 
While this is not the first time it has been suggested that parts of 1 
Corinthians should be read as containing an urgent and immediate (‘knee-jerk’) 
reaction, rather than as a thoughtful and consistent argument,74 it is made clearer 
that this is the case with a Lacanian analysis of the problem Paul was facing, just 
as the development of his response to the problem will be made clearer through a 
Lacanian analysis of Romans.  So far my conception of Paul’s gospel is floating 
in the breeze, being no more nuanced than any other ethical system that lies 
trapped in the paradox; but, helpfully, not so Stoic that it is by nature not 
Lacanian.  After explaining more of what is meant by ‘obsessional neurosis’ 
(which so far has been employed without as much qualification as ‘perversion’), I 
will turn to see how Paul progresses to approach this problem in his letter to the 
Romans. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 See n. 2, above. 
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Chapter Four 
 
The Paradox of Jouissance and Stoic 
Obsessionalism
 
 
 
 
1.  Obsessive Neurosis1 
 
 So far I have laid out the theoretical basis of the paradox of jouissance.  It 
can be described as composed of a perverse and a neurotic side, and Paul’s first 
canonical letter to the Corinthians is an example of Paul responding with a knee-
jerk neurotic message to a situation in which his kerygma resulted in perversion.  
Expanding upon Lacan’s reading of Sade demonstrates the perverse side of the 
paradox: one cannot gain freedom from the law through its transgression.  So far I 
have also suggested that Stoic moralisation represents a neurotic approach to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Translations of Freud tend to use the adjective ‘obsessive’ with neurosis, and the adjectival noun 
‘the obsessive.’  Translations of Lacan, and English-speaking Lacanian psychoanalysts, tend to use 
the adjective ‘obsessional’ with neurosis, and the adjectival noun ‘the obsessional,’ following the 
French obsessionel.  Accordingly, in order to match up with quotations, ‘obsessive’ will be used 
when discussing Freud and ‘obsessional’ when discussing Lacan, with some overlap.  This seems 
the clearest way forward, without altering all of the quotes one way or the other.  Their meanings 
are the same, and the difference, like with ‘fantasy’ and ‘phantasy,’ is merely a result of historical 
psychoanalytic discourse happening between German, French and English.  This first section of 
the chapter is mostly concerned with Freud, so the heading above is ‘obsessive neurosis.’ 
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law.  However, before progressing with a Lacanian reading of Romans, more 
depth regarding the clinical structure of obsessional neurosis is required.  As I will 
argue in the following chapters, it is a helpful category for unpacking not only the 
paradox in which Paul found his ethical ideas played out, but also the intellectual 
field in which he wrote, and the history of interpretation of his letters that 
followed.  After outlining obsessional neurosis in more detail it will be possible to 
read Paul’s theology as it is precisely argued in relation to the signifier and human 
behaviour. 
 However, this does not permit blasé statements about the clinical 
structures and diagnoses of long-deceased historical figures.  Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is particularly concerned with the speech of the subject, so it is 
impossible to make any conclusive statements about a deceased subject’s clinical 
structure.  Nonetheless, since obsessional neurosis is a clinical structure it enables 
a structuralist reading of history at its finest: we can talk about the structure of 
Stoic ethics as a way of thinking, and the structure contained within Paul’s ideas 
and those of other figures.  This is a form of ‘elaboration,’ as outlined in the 
Introduction.  While one might agree completely with Roland Barthes’ or Michel 
Foucault’s assertions of the death of the author, this is no reason not to posit an 
obsessional neurotic structure to the ideas of, for example, Kant or Augustine.2  
So, having said that, what is obsessional neurosis?  What marks a set of ideas or 
an ideological system as obsessional neurotic in structure?  I will examine how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Freud himself eventually moved away from seeing certain ideas as obsessive, preferring instead 
to talk about obsessive structures or obsessive thinking (SE10, 221-222).  However, this is 
consistent with what I am suggesting: I use obsessional neurosis here less as a structure for an 
individual human or an individual idea, but for a set of ideas, or a way of thinking. 
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obsessional neurosis is laid out by Freud and Lacan as a diagnostic tool for 
individual humans, but then argue that structure can just as easily be identified in 
systems of thought; particularly, Stoic philosophy as it existed in Paul’s world. 
 ‘Obsessional neurosis’ is a term characterising a set of symptoms, which is 
given various different definitions by Freud, Lacan and other psychoanalysts, and 
defined in various ways at different points by each of the above.  Lacan describes 
the obsessional neurotic in many different ways, listed below. These descriptions 
are by no means mutually exclusive, but formulating a precise definition for a 
term that has a usage long predating Freud requires tracing it back historically, 
then forward through Freud to Lacan, to understand what is meant by this 
signification of a collection of symptoms.  Although modern psychoanalysts of 
various traditions, as well as psychological schools outside of psychoanalysis, 
have many different opinions about the nature and causes of obsessional neurosis, 
the purpose of the inquiry into Freud’s ideas below is only to provide a 
background to the Lacanian understanding.  For this reason, modern non-Lacanian 
theories will not be examined here.  However, tracing back to Freud’s 
understanding is entirely necessary, because Lacan does not invent his own theory 
of obsessional neurosis from scratch or lay out in a dedicated work what his 
precise understanding of it is;3 instead, he comments upon it in brief throughout 
his career, always while detailing his reading of the Freudian concept.  I begin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 He does have one dedicated work on neurosis, largely focusing on obsessional neurosis in 
particular, which will be referred to below: ‘The Neurotic’s Individual Myth,’ Psychoanalytic 
Quarterly, 48 (1979 [1953]), 404-425.  However, it is too early a piece to treat as a sole indicator 
of his thoughts on the matter, and too brief to contain the nuance of some of his later ideas.   
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with Freud’s understanding of neurosis in general, before getting to obsessive 
neurosis in particular. 
 The term ‘neurosis’ traces back to the eighteenth century, and originally 
referred to a disease of the nerves (thus the French, névrose).4  Freud then 
recounts that between 1893 and 1895, while studying cases of hysterical neurosis 
with Joseph Breuer, they found that most hysterical symptoms were not ultimately 
caused by the nervous system, but by an inability to deal with powerful traumatic 
experiences.5  Although their claims were not immediately met with the 
recognition they would eventually receive, 1895 marks the year in which they 
published Studies in Hysteria and began to transform the understanding of 
neurosis from an essentially biological one to an essentially psychological one.6  
In its first chapter they write jointly, and claim that ‘We found, to our greatest 
surprise, that the individual hysterical symptoms immediately disappeared without 
returning if we succeeded in thoroughly awakening the memories of the causal 
process with its accompanying affect, and if the patient circumstantially discussed 
the process in the most detailed manner and gave verbal expression to the 
affect.’7  This is a central claim to Freud’s work that he still maintains in his 
Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis twenty years later: ‘The thesis that 
symptoms disappear when we have made their unconscious predeterminants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Charles Rycroft, Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis (London: Penguin, 1995), 109. 
5 SE16, 274-275.  In this chapter I refer to Freud frequently, but only ever by reference to the 
Standard Edition.  Should one wish to know from which of Freud’s works any individual quote is 
drawn, without the need to access the Standard Edition itself, every source is listed individually in 
the bibliography, below the Standard Edition as a whole. 
6 SE2. 
7 Ibid., 6.  Italics original. 
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conscious has been confirmed by all subsequent research.’8  ‘In other words: The 
hysteric suffers mostly from reminiscences.’9  Through studying hysteria, a form 
of neurosis, they came to redefine neurosis. 
 This metaphorical substitution, in which the signifier ‘neurosis’ swaps the 
signified ‘disease of the nerves’ for ‘disease of the mind,’ marks the beginning of 
the subject of Freudian inquiry.10  Throughout the rest of Freud’s career he would 
develop his theory of neurosis.  Although in 1926 he is still rethinking and 
clarifying various aspects of the theory in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety,11 he 
is working from a fairly consistent outline of the theory as he paints it in The 
Unconscious (1915)12 and Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916).13  
This outline of neurosis forms the bedrock of psychoanalytic theory, and is 
refined and expanded upon by all later psychoanalysts.14 
A symptom is a substitute for an unfulfilled instinctual satisfaction.15  
While there are different types of instinctual satisfaction, Freud defines all 
obsessive neurotic symptoms as substitutes for sexual satisfactions.16  The process 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 SE16, 280. 
9 SE2, 7.  Italics original.  
10 This is appropriate since, in Lacanian terms, every non-psychotic subject begins with the 
acceptance of a metaphorical substitution, the paternal metaphor (see Chapter 2, above). 
11 SE20, 77-181. 
12 SE14, 159-215. 
13 SE15 and SE16. 
14 See, for example, Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis (London: Routledge & 
Kegan, 1946), a textbook that greatly expands upon Freud’s theory while sticking to the original 
model, or Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (London: Routledge & Kegan, 
1937), a tome in which Horney asks the question of whether there are common features to the 
neurotic personality in a given culture. 
15 SE20, 91.   
16 SE16, 298-300.   
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that leads to a neurotic symptom begins with repression,17 and repression can 
happen when the libido is frustrated by the reality principle.18  That is to say, the 
ego, in the face of its interpretation of reality, finds the idea of the satisfaction of a 
certain instinct unbearable.19  In what Freud would call ‘economic’ terms (to do 
with the transfer of energy in the brain), the satisfaction of the instinct might be 
unbearable because it is incongruous with reality, but, in the case of a traumatic 
neurosis, the instinct is unbearable because there is an excess of stimulation – ‘an 
experience which within a short period of time presents the mind with an increase 
of stimulus too powerful to be dealt with or worked off in the normal way.’20  Or, 
conversely, a symptom could arise as a result of a repression of an instinct that 
was too little, the symptom then allowing the ego to achieve its substitute 
satisfaction despite the underwhelming instinct.21  
In response to an excess or lack of excitation, the ego deflects the instinct, 
preventing it from becoming conscious.22  Cathexis is withdrawn from the idea to 
which the instinct was attached, so the idea can then be called unconscious (un-
conscious).23  This is repression.  However, repression leaves the subject in a state 
of tension because the instinct is still present in the unconscious, despite the de-
cathected idea.24  So neurotic subjects usually find themselves with unexplained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid., 294.   
18 Ibid., 358.   
19 SE20, 91, 94.  
20 SE16, 275.   
21 Ibid., 300-301.   
22 SE20, 91; SE14, 166.  
23 SE16, 294-296.   
24 Ibid., 349-350.   
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feelings of anxiety, which is a central affect of neurosis.25  The symptom then 
forms as a way to resolve this tension.  The ego sends a signal of unpleasure to 
repress the instinctual impulse, and it then finds satisfaction elsewhere.26  
‘Neurotic symptoms are the outcome of a conflict which arises over a new method 
of satisfying the libido.’27  At this point the libido might perhaps find an alternate 
satisfaction, which the subject will be unable to explain.  For example, Freud 
describes a case in which a woman compulsively asks her maid to spill ink on the 
table cloth, and it eventually emerges that she feels upset that her much beloved 
husband failed to cause her to stain the bed sheet on their wedding night.  Since 
she loves her husband she feels unable to acknowledge this anger, so it is 
repressed and emerges instead in the symptom involving the maid.28  But what 
happens when the repressed idea, connected to the deflected instinct, cannot find 
expression in a symptom? 
This brings us to the key to Freud’s explanation for the various forms of 
neurosis, including obsessive neurosis: regression.  Obsessive neurosis is, in its 
simplest sense, neurosis experienced more intensely as obsessive or compulsive.  
However, Freud, and others after him, found common traits and causes to neurosis 
when it is obsessive or compulsive.  Through clinical experience, Freud found 
that all those who suffered with obsessive neurotic symptoms eventually revealed 
similar causes to those symptoms, which he explains through the idea of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 SE20, 92-93; SE16, 411.   
26 SE20, 94-95.   
27 SE16, 358-359.   
28 Ibid., 261-264.   
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regression, detailed below.  Some of these common characteristics and symptoms 
of obsessive neurotics, according to Freud, are as follows:29 
 
• Anxiety.30  Anxiety is described as the central affect of obsessive 
neurosis, leading Karen Horney to describe it as the ‘dynamic 
centre.’31  It can be an affect that proceeds immediately from the 
unconscious,32 but for the obsessive neurotic it is usually also 
experienced as a result of the other symptoms below. 
• Compulsive ideas (obsessions) or actions (impulses).33  These 
compulsions are a form of repetition, and the subject is compelled 
to repeat them again and again.34 The compulsions are experienced 
as imperatives or prohibitions that make little sense to the subject, 
but which must be obeyed nonetheless.  
• Ambivalence or internal conflict.  Ambivalent behaviour towards 
the superego, sometimes striking against it, and sometimes obeying 
it.35  ‘One part of the personality champions certain wishes while 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Otto Fenichel’s textbook The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis is also used here because, 
unlike most psychoanalysts of his generation, he is one who receives unanimously positive review 
from Lacan, who even borrows an idea from him (the idea that the girl is the phallus).  This puts 
him in an excellent position as a source for the background to Lacan’s understanding of 
obsessional neurosis.  See, for example, Écrits, 471 and 617. 
30 SE20, 92-93.   
31 Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, 41. 
32 SE14, 179.   
33 SE16, 258-259.   
34 Richard Wollheim, Freud (London: Fontanta, 1991 [1971]), 137.  SE16, 270, 274-275. 
35 Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, 290-291. 
	   183	  
another part opposes them and fends them off.’36  The compulsive 
commands/prohibitions themselves conflict, such as in a 
compulsive thought of protecting someone being immediately 
followed by a compulsion to hurt them,37 or impulses that are 
symptoms of conflicting deflected instincts (such as hate and 
love).38  The compulsive commands might seem to be missing a 
(repressed) logical step, which leads to heightened anxiety from 
confusion.39 
• Doubt.40  They draw themselves away from reality by constantly 
talking about the things about which no one really knows: 
‘paternity, length of life, life after death and memory.’41  This 
doubt, as well as the ways that the obsessive neurotic masks it in 
speech about uncertain subjects, is a symptom of the ambivalence 
and internal conflict described above, as well as being a partial (but 
never complete) satisfaction of the desire to see and know 
described below.  It is also, like the ambivalence described above, 
a symptom of conflicting repressed instincts.42 
• Feelings of diminished freedom.  Fenichel puts it well: ‘In 
compulsions and obsessions, the fact that the ego governs motility 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 SE16, 349.   
37 SE10, 193-195, 242-243.   
38 Ibid., 191-195.   
39 Ibid., 226-228.  The contradictions that arise from the repressed logical step are one of the key 
features that Lacan will emphasise.  
40 Ibid., 232-233.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 238-241.   
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is not changed, but the ego does not feel free in using this 
governing power.’43  Part of the cause of this feeling of diminished 
freedom is the presence of inhibitions, reduced bodily or mental 
functions, in which the ego does not feel free because anxiety, 
superego, or a symptom have forced a lowering of function 
(though sometimes inhibitions exist for none of these reasons).44 
• Superstition.45  Usually intense superstition felt as an impulse or 
prohibition,46 but simultaneously intellectually disavowed as 
nonsensical.47  This is often connected with an increased tendency 
towards religiosity,48 religion itself being something Freud 
considered neurotic.49 
• Orderliness.  A compulsive need for orderliness or cleanliness.50 
 
Beyond the symptoms the obsessive initially presents are some common 
elements revealed by Freud’s obsessive analysands throughout therapy: 
 
• The compulsions, imperatives and prohibitions are often felt as 
connected to childhood paternal commands,51 and always trace 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, 268. 
44 SE20, 87-90.   
45 SE10, 229-232.   
46 SE6, 260-269.  
47 SE10, 230.   
48 Ibid., 233.   
49 SE21, 84-85; SE23, 80-93.  Moses and Monotheism, 80-93. 
50 Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, 284. 
51 Ibid., 58. 
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back to commands coming from a parent.52  However, it is 
important to note that although the superego 
imperatives/prohibitions are connected to parental commands and 
memories of childhood, this accounts for the form of the 
commands, not their source.53 
• Fear.  Very often the impulse repressed was a fear, and the 
conversion of fears into obsessions is easily observed.54  In the 
case of the client Freud calls the Rat Man,55 his obsessions took the 
place of his fear that his father would die, which was actually a 
repressed wish that his father would die.56 
• Guilt.  ‘Every neurosis conceals a quota of unconscious sense of 
guilt, which in its turn fortifies the symptoms by making use of 
them as a punishment.’57  The sense of guilt is exceptionally strong 
in obsessive neurosis, though this isn’t always apparent to the 
subject before analysis.58  ‘A feature in the character of obsessional 
neurotics is a scrupulous conscientiousness…  If their illness 
becomes more acute, they develop a sense of guilt of the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 SE10, 204-214.   
53 Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, 269-270. 
54 Ibid., 269-270. 
55 This is Freud’s most important obsessive neurotic patient, about whom he wrote the most.  
Lacan also devoted considerable study to the case of the ‘Rat Man’ (real name Ernst Lanzer), and 
stated that the case of the Rat Man ‘should be read like the Bible’ (S5, 14.5.1958, 13). 
56 SE10, 178-183.   
57 SE21, 139.   
58 SE19, 48-59.  The Ego and the Id, 389-401. 
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intense degree.’59  The fact that the actual source of this guilt is 
hidden from the subject him/herself is part of the cause of the 
obsessive’s anxiety.60 
• Belief in the omnipotence of thoughts.61  This is a term that Freud 
was introduced to by the Rat Man after his analysis had been 
completed, as a description of how ‘the uncanny’ had led him to 
believe that his thoughts had real power (that is, that the threat 
coming from his superego, that if he did not do a thing then 
someone would die, actually had the power to result in death).62 
• Connected to this is the obsessive neurotic’s preoccupation with 
thoughts as opposed to actions.63  Compulsive thinking is 
abstract and disconnected from the real world;64 and as fear of 
actions increases, so also do deliberative thoughts about the 
preparations for actions.65 
• Dis-affected memories.  Unlike hysterics who tend to have 
repressed memories, obsessives tend to have memories that remain 
conscious, but the emotions attached to them have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 SE13, 68.  
60 SE13, 69.   
61 SE10, 233-235.   
62 Freud recounts this years later in Totem and Taboo (1913), SE13, 85-88.  The function of 
‘uncanny’ events as confirmation of the omnipotence of thoughts (or of animism, magic, 
superstition, etc.) was also the subject of The Uncanny (1919, SE17, 217-256). 
63 SE10, 244-245.  
64 Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, 297. 
65 Ibid., 298. 
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repressed.66  Of course, Freud’s entire programme is dependent 
upon the phenomenological teaching of Franz Brentano, and he is 
not suggesting that memories exist in the brain without any affect 
attached to them; quite the opposite, it is because memories cannot 
exist without affect that when it appears they do the reality turns 
out to be that the affect is existent but repressed.67 
• Defence of the symptom through resistance.68  Despite having 
come for relief from the symptom, obsessive neurotics demonstrate 
exaggerated defence of the symptom.  Though all psychoanalytic 
patients engage in resistance to some degree, the pervert does so to 
a much lesser extent, and the obsessive neurotic expends great 
effort to cling on to the symptom.  Five forms of resistance are: 
repression/anticathexis (see below), transference onto the analyst, 
gain from illness (assimilation of the symptom by the ego), 
unconscious resistance and guilt itself.69  
• The form of resistance most aggressively engaged in by obsessive 
neurotics is anticathexis.  Freud first began using this term in The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1900), in reference to when an idea or 
position in opposition to the repressed thought is cathected in place 
of it.70  Obsessive neurotics constantly find themselves desiring 
one thing then its opposite, or repressing hate so consciously 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 SE16, 282-284.   
67 Wollheim, Freud, 34-36. 
68 SE16, 286-294.   
69 SE20, 160.  
70 SE5, 605. 
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striving to love, or having obsessive thoughts about something 
extremely unhygienic but also demanding cleanliness.71 
• Infantile sexuality.72  ‘Obsessional neuroses make it much more 
obvious than hysterias that the factors which go to form a 
psychoneurosis are to be found in the patient’s infantile sexual life 
and not in his present one.’73 
 
 The obsessive neurotic subject is brought to the point of desiring 
psychoanalysis by the anxiety produced by the constant state of conflict described 
above.74  Freud’s theory, which he saw as confirmed in his clinical experience, 
was that the first cause of the obsessive neurotic’s anxiety is the frustration of the 
libido seeking a release of energy, which then regresses back to modes of 
enjoyment it previously held.75  He first recorded the beginnings of this theory in 
his 1908 paper ‘Character in Anal Eroticism,’ in which he noted the continued 
observance of similarities in character between infants in the anal-erotic stage 
(aged 1-3, when learning to control bowels) and adults with obsessive neurotic 
symptoms.76  These character traits are (1) orderliness, (2) parsimoniousness and 
(3) obstinacy.  He argues that these character traits in adults are either 
prolongations or sublimations of the instincts in infancy, or reaction-formations 
against them.  So, when analysing the Rat Man a year later he explains his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 SE20, 256-259.  . 
72 SE10, 204.   
73 Ibid., 165.  Italics original.   
74 SE16, 349-350.   
75 Ibid., 343-344, 359.   
76 SE9, 167-175. 
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tendency to gain satisfaction from thought instead of action by calling it a 
regression, back to the stage in which so many infants enjoy delaying the action, 
refusing to let the parent take away the freedom to enjoy defecation whenever 
they please.77  However it was not until he had formally developed his theory of 
the different stages of libidinal development through which all infants pass (in 
1910-1912) that he had groundwork for a unifying theory of the regressive form 
of obsessive neurosis.78  In 1913 he first outlines his theory that, although there 
are many constitutional and accidental determinants factoring in on the choice of 
neurosis, it is by regression that all neurotic structures are formed: ‘the total 
function of the libido passes through “fixation points” throughout infancy, to 
which it might regress if the subject falls ill through some external disturbance.’79  
He abandons earlier theories that the difference between hysteric and obsessive 
choice of neurosis is due to activity or passivity, and instead sees the difference 
between them as a question of how far back the libido regresses before finding a 
satisfactory arrangement.  This theory works well for him both in the obvious 
anal-erotic features of the Rat Man’s obsessive neurosis (whose initial complaint 
was that he could not escape the obsessive image of rats burrowing into his 
father’s anus), as well as in that of the patient he calls the Wolf Man, whom he 
treated from 1910-1914, suffering with obsessions and bowel/intestinal 
problems.80 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 SE10, 244-246.   
78 J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. by Donald Nicholson-
Smith (London: Karnac Books, 1988 [1973]), 386. 
79 ‘The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis,’ SE12, 311-326. 
80 SE17, 3-122.  His real name was Sergei Konstantinovitch Pankejeff, and the case study is titled 
From the History of an Infantile Neurosis. 
	  190	  
 The fully developed theory, then, is stated in Freud’s Introductory 
Lectures (1917), as well as in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1924).81  In 
response to reality (which covers a number of different causes) the libido 
regresses to find satisfaction in organisations it had previously outgrown.  It 
withdraws from the ego and its laws and flows backwards, cathecting previously 
repressed positions.82  This escape is made possible through the presence of past 
fixations/fixing points – modes of enjoyment that had existed and then were 
repressed, such as the enjoyment of the sensation of defecation, or of holding it in 
despite the commands of one’s parents, or the enjoyment of thought, ownership, 
or pity as an infant.83  The foundation for the development of the neurosis is laid 
when the child first progresses on from the anal stage, when, optimally, they 
would have passed through to the phallic stage, in which pleasure becomes 
founded on the genitals and identification with the same-sex parent, thus (for a 
male) overcoming the Oedipus complex.84  For the obsessive neurotic, the genital 
organisation of desire is found to be feeble, so the libido reverts to a previous 
fixing point.85  The anal stage involves both anal-eroticism and anal-sadism, in 
which the infant enjoys the pleasure and pain associated with defecation, as well 
as the defiance associated with retention and the submission associated with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 SE16, 358-377; SE20, 113-117.  Introductory Lectures, 404-424; ISA, 38-42. 
82 SE16, 359.   
83 Ibid., 360-361.   
84 SE20, 113.  ISA 38. 
85 In the paper of 1913 mentioned above he theorises that there may be another two ‘fixing points’ 
between the anal stage and the phallic stage: the narcissistic stage, and possibly another pregenital 
sexual stage in which there is an object choice but it is not yet genital.  However, even in 1924 
(SE20, 113-114) he only reads this case as exceptional, and not necessarily indicative of a stage 
through which all infants pass.   
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expulsion.86  So while for ‘normal’ people the latency period begins with a 
strengthening of the superego against the Oedipus complex, for the obsessive 
neurotic it begins with an over-strengthening of a very aggressive superego, due 
to the anal-sadistic mode of enjoyment.87  This over-strengthening of an 
aggressive superego then produces reaction-formations against it, such as 
conscientiousness and pity; and, likewise, the anal-eroticism produces a reaction-
formation of cleanliness/orderliness. 
 
2.  Lacan’s Obsessional Maxims 
 
The reason for this summary of Freud is that when Lacan discusses 
obsessional neurosis, he is speaking of the same group of people as Freud, with 
the same symptoms.88  It is easy to see from the lists of symptoms above why 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 For more on these see Freud’s essay on ‘Infantile Sexuality,’ SE5, 173-206, specifically 185-
187. 
87 SE20, 114-115.  ISA, 40. 
88 Needless to say, one would not find Freud’s theory outlined in DSM-V or a neuroscience 
journal.  An example of a modern neuroscientific approach to ‘neuroticism’ (the psychiatric term 
for a collection of symptoms similar to psychoanalytic obsessionalism), see Colin G. DeYoung, 
Jacob B. Hirsh, Matthew S. Shane, Xenophon Papademetris, Nallakkandi Rajeevan, and Jeremy R. 
Gray, ‘Testing Predictions from Personality Neuroscience: Brain Structure and the Big Five,’ 
Psychological Science, 21.6 (2010), 820-828.  An earlier version of the article can be found for 
free at <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3049165/> [accessed 26.1.2017].  The 
study used MRI scans of 116 people to link the ‘Big Five’ personality traits in psychiatry 
(extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness/intellect) to increased 
activity in certain parts of the brain, counting itself successful with the first four of five.  On 
neuroticism, it concludes that ‘neuroticism was associated with reduced volume in dorsomedial 
PFC and a segment of left medial temporal lobe including posterior hippocampus, and with 
increased volume in the mid-cingulate gyrus, including both gray and white matter. These 
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Freud was compelled to speak of an obsessive neurotic structure as opposed to an 
obsessive neurotic thought; it is the structure of all of these symptoms in relation 
to their causes that merits the collective designation ‘obsessive neurotic thought.’  
This structure became one of the four main ‘clinical structures’ of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, alongside hysteria, perversion and psychosis, into which Lacan 
would categorise all human subjects.  Since Lacan’s interpretation of obsessional 
neurosis is both a return to and a reformulation of Freud’s idea, but with the 
emphasis shifted from sexuality to language, it was necessary to outline the 
Freudian theory he modifies.  So, what is Lacan’s understanding of obsessional 
neurosis? 
 Within Lacan’s earlier texts (culminating with Seminar VII), the references 
to obsessional neurosis are mostly in passing.  However, there are also three main 
texts primarily concerned with obsessional neurosis: ‘The Neurotic’s Individual 
Myth,’ ‘The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power’89 and the 
final lectures of Seminar V, numbers 22 to 28 in particular.90  All three of these 
were written in the context of debate with the IPA, so the way he phrased his 
interpretation of obsessional neurosis morphed throughout this period: from more 
traditional psychoanalytic terms, towards the formulations in Seminar VII and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
associations are consistent with the theory that Neuroticism represents the primary manifestation 
in personality of sensitivity to threat and punishment, encompassing traits that involve negative 
emotion and emotional dysregulation.’  The interesting question of the overlap between 
neuroscience and psychoanalysis, as well as the reasons for Lacanian psychoanalysts’ general 
disinterest in the question, have been pointed out elsewhere in this study.  Just as Lacan de-
emphasises the role of temporal regression in the development of neurosis, so also the neurology 
of obsessionalism does not affect discussion of its symbolic form. 
89 Écrits, 489-542. 
90 Lectures dating from 14.5.1958 to 2.7.1958. 
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Seminar VIII.  Seminar V provides the happy median in this development: he 
discusses obsessionalism in more depth than when referring to it in context of 
later arguments, and, unlike some of the smaller texts he wrote in this period, is 
not specifically writing against anyone else.  A good book on Lacan’s clinical 
structures (though it sometimes over-simplifies things), is Joël Dor, The Clinical 
Lacan.91  
Much more than the average philosopher or psychoanalyst, Lacan was a 
thinker deeply associated with teaching in the form of maxims.  Throughout his 
seminars, he would frequently quote his own maxims and formulations, using 
them as springboards for arguments that might otherwise lack anything 
memorably reducible.  Lacan’s discussions of obsessional neurosis are no 
exception, and throughout his career he produced many maxims that seem to 
reduce the obsessional to a particular structure.  In Lacanian style, I begin my 
investigation of Lacan’s concept with a survey of some of his maxims (and a few 
longer statements) that see obsessionals reduced to individual sentences.92 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 New York: Other Press, 1999 (1997). 
92 Regarding the use of male-gendered pronouns in these maxims, Lacan, writing in the late 
nineteen-fifties and in a romance language in which gender is much more deeply entrenched than 
in English, uses masculine pronouns for the generic.  Further, one could also accuse him of 
following the psychoanalytic tradition of seeing obsessionals as always male and hysterics as 
always female, and this deserves to be clarified.  He is not rigidly following this old 
psychoanalytic presumption.  In Seminar III, after using the generic male pronoun for a hysteric, 
he says that ‘The obsessional is precisely neither one [gender] nor the other – one may also say 
that he is both at once’ (S3, 249).  Lacan’s thoughts on gender, discussed at length in Seminar XX, 
are far too complex for this footnote, but one can definitely observe that although Lacan’s 
psychoanalytic terminology is gendered (he uses the term ‘phallus’ and non/nom-du-père), and 
these terms are not totally devoid of reference to the way gender tends to play out in many 
people’s infancies, his use of these terms is in reference to the function of language in and on the 
unconscious.  Quotes from Lacan here will be given without anglicising his gendered use of 
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Maxim/Saying Year Source 
‘What is the obsessional waiting for?  The death of the 
master.’ 
1954 S1, 286.  See also: Rome 
Discourse, 79, where Lacan 
says the same thing in 1953. 
‘If the obsessional mortifies himself, it is because more than 
any other neurotic, he binds himself to his ego, which bears 
within itself dispossession and imaginary death.’ 
1955 S2, 268. 
‘What is an obsessional?  In short, it’s an actor who plays his 
role and assures a certain number of acts as if he was dead.’ 
1956 S4, 27 au. trans. 
‘The obsessional tends to destroy his object… It is the aiming 
at desire itself, at the beyond of demand which is constitutive 
of the obsessional.’  In aiming at desire itself the obsessional 
attempts the ‘destruction of the Other.’  
1958 S5, 14.5.1958, 14, 17. 
‘The obsessional is a Tantalus.’93 1958 S5, 21.5.1958, 8. 
‘The obsessional is always in the process of asking for 
permission.’ 
1958 S5, 21.5.1958, 8. 
‘The obsessional resolves the question of his desire by 
making of it a prohibited desire.  
1958 S5, 21.5.1958, 11. 
The obsessional ‘spends his time destroying the desire of the 
Other,’ so that his relationship with the Other is fully 
articulated at the level of demand, that his own desire might 
be destroyed. 
1958 S5, 18.6.1958, 11-13. 
In obsessional neurosis the subject is related to an object ‘that 
gives too much pleasure.’   
1959 S7, 64. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
pronouns, but this should not be taken as an indication that Lacan’s clinical structures are 
descriptive of genders.  For more information on gender and obsessional neurosis see Serge Cottet, 
‘On Feminine Obsessional Neurosis,’ trans. by Alexandra Beaurieux in The Psychoanalytical 
Notebooks Issue 18: Obsessional Neurosis, ed. Philip Dravers (London: London Society of the 
New Lacanian School, 2009), 67-85 or Marc Strauss, ‘On Female Obsessional Neurosis,’ 
European Journal of Psychoanalysis, <http://www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/on-the-female-
obsessional-neurosis/> [accessed 8/6/2016]. 
93 For the sake of maintaining some hint of brevity this quote does not appear again in what 
follows below – and neither does Lacan elaborate on this statement at all after delivering it.  This 
is a shame, as Tantalus is a beautiful metaphor for the obsessional’s woes.  For some excellent 
commentary on this metaphor, see Bogdan Wolf, ‘The Mysterious Ways of the Obsessional,’ The 
Psychoanalytical Notebooks Issue 18: Obsessional Neurosis, ed. in Philip Dravers (London: 
London Society of the New Lacanian School, 2009), 149-150. 
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The obsessional is characterized by ‘impossible desire,’ that 
is, ‘desire instituted in its impossibility.’ 
1961 S8, 366.  He has made similar 
statements since 1958.94 
The obsessional suffers ‘a thought that burdens the soul, that 
it doesn’t know what to do with.’ 
1973 Television, 6.95 
 
It is easy to track the slow shift in the emphasis of his statements about 
obsessionals (though some of this is due to the debates he was involved in at these 
different points).  From 1953-1957, or seminars I-IV (including passing comments 
in Seminar III not listed above), his emphasis is on the obsessional’s unconscious 
relation to death.  This is first enunciated before his seminars had begun, in the 
paper ‘The Neurotic’s Individual Myth,’ in which he outlines a theory that all 
neurotics have some sort of unconscious founding myth like that of the Rat Man, 
and the players involved are not just the three players of the Oedipal drama, but 
also death (specifically, imaginary unrealised death).96  In Seminar IV this concept 
begins to be merged with his phenomenology of the Other, as the obsessional 
subject is one whose legalistic relation to the Other allows him to relate to his own 
life as if he were dead, as if he were a marionette.  After Seminar V, and the 
connected essay ‘On the Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its 
Power,’ his structuralist reading of the neuroses shifts from the emphasis on the 
repetition of childhood figures towards the structure of one’s relation to the Other.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Écrits, 528; S5, 18.6.1958, 11. 
95 Jacques Lacan, Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, ed. Jacques-Alain 
Miller (London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1990 [1974]), 6. 
96  Owen Hewitson, ‘Reading “The Neurotic’s Individual Myth” – Lacan’s Masterwork on 
Obsession,’ <http://www.lacanonline.com/index/2013/09/reading-the-neurotics-individual-myth-
lacans-masterwork-on-obsession/> [accessed 8/6/2016].  He suggests that Lacan’s assertion that 
the figure of death is present in the narcissistic relation is a result of the influence of Alexandre 
Kojève’s reading of Hegel. 
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This is linked to his criticism of over-emphasis on temporal regression, and is 
where we find the most detailed description of the structure of obsessional 
neurosis in fitting with the paradox of jouissance.97 
 
3.  The Obsessional Neurotic Structure 
 
Lacan’s discussion of the structure of obsessional neurosis in Seminar V 
begins at lecture 22, of 14.5.1958.  After criticising theories of obsessional 
neurosis that focus solely on regression,98 Lacan sets out to establish the ‘essential 
structure’ of obsessional neurosis, which in his view is its structure in reference to 
demand, desire and the Other.99  He then fires off a number of short points, 
summarising some of the key points in the development of Freud’s idea: Freud 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Lacan’s de-temporalising of regression really merits its own discussion here, since this is the 
process through which obsessionalism really becomes transferable to ideology: one can speak of 
an obsessional structure of ideology because to Lacan regression is about the fixing points in the 
present structure of the unconscious, regardless of how one developed through Freudian stages to 
get there (though he never directly controverts Freud’s schema of regression either).  Sadly, 
discussing this in full would be beyond the remit of a Lacanian study of Paul.  Two quotes make 
the point quickly: ‘Needs become subordinate to the same conventional conditions as does the 
signifier in its double register: the synchronic register of opposition between irreducible elements, 
and the diachronic register of substitution and combination, through which language, while it does 
not fulfil all functions, structures everything in interpersonal relations’ (Écrits, 517).  ‘The 
regression [that] people foreground in analysis (temporal regression, no doubt…) concerns only 
the (oral, anal, etc.) signifiers of demand, and involves the corresponding drive only through them’ 
(Écrits, 530).  Nonetheless, he does still state that ‘insofar as the anal stage is involved, you would 
be wrong not to distrust the relevance of your analysis if you have not encountered this on every 
occasion’ (S8, 204-206).   
98 He also here criticises the perceived ‘splashing about’ of Karl Abraham’s attempt to explain 
obsessional neurosis through object relations theory and the partial object.  
99 S5, 14.5.1958, 12.  All of these terms can be found in the Glossary (Appendix A). 
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observed that the obsessional repressed enjoyment of a trauma, unlike the hysteric 
who repressed memory of a trauma; the obsessional is marked by an affective 
ambivalence between love and hate; the obsessional’s symptoms trace back to a 
precocious separation of life and death instincts.  So, Lacan concludes, how 
should we fit this into our dialectic of desire and demand?100  In this dense section 
Lacan is pointing out that even Freud’s understanding of it was so multi-faceted, 
and developed so much over time that it is difficult to find an essential structure; 
and if one does, it is a structure characterised by relation to the instincts, which 
Lacan has reformulated in terms of demand, drive, desire and need (i.e., in terms 
that become wholly dependent upon the lure of the signifier, and the symbolic 
nature of the paternal metaphor/castration complex). 
In his first attempt to outline the structure of obsessional neurosis in these 
terms, he describes it like this: 
 
The obsessional in so far as his fundamental movement is directed 
towards desire as such, and above all in its constitution as desire, 
implies in every movement towards the attainment of this desire 
what we call the destruction of the other, even though it is in the 
nature of desire as such to require this support of the other.  This 
desire of the other is not a way of access to the desire of the subject 
[as in hysteria], it is quite simply the place of desire, and every 
movement in the obsessional towards his desire runs into something 
which is absolutely tangible in, what I may call, the movement of 
their libido.  The more something plays the role in the psychology 
of an obsessional of object, even a momentary one, of desire, the 
more the law of approach as one might say of the obsessional with 
respect to this object, will be conditioned by something which 
manifests itself literally in what one can call a veritable lowering of 
libidinal tension at the moment that he approaches it, and to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 All of this happens on p. 13 of Gallagher’s translation. 
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extent that at the moment that he hold this object of his desire, for 
him nothing more exists. 
You will see this.  It is absolutely observable.101 
 
Before expanding upon the meaning of this quote, it is worth pointing out 
here how much Lacan’s speech, at least as transcribed and translated by Gallagher 
above, resembles the clinical speech of the obsessional: it is riddled with 
interjections and clarifications (even more-so than his speech always is), which 
serve the purpose of responding to the objections of the other before they are 
raised; particularly ‘what we call,’ ‘as one might say,’ and ‘what one can call.’  
Perhaps unintentionally, his speech itself here makes the point at which his 
argument is aimed: in the obsessional neurotic there is an attempt to destroy the 
Other.  This is not a literal attempt at murdering one’s father (or some other 
other), but the attempt to obliterate the Other as other through the reduction of its 
voice as subject.  So the example Lacan gives immediately before the above quote 
is of a toddler who demands a box from the parents, and boils this demand down 
to an insistence that either the parents love him and give him the box or do not 
give him the box because they do not love him.  Thus the relation to the parents as 
Other is one of desire reduced to demand; and demand does not require the Other 
to be other.  (Did Lacan demonstrate this obsessional neurotic way of speaking 
because his own psychoanalysis revealed him to be an obsessional neurotic?  We 
do not have access to that information specifically102 – but his psychoanalyst son-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 S5, 14.5.1958, 16-17.  Gallagher’s translation of his original notes from 1958 does capitalise 
the O on ‘Other,’ but most of the occurrences of this word here would probably be capitalised in a 
modern edition. 
102 Élisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, trans. by Barbara Bray (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997 [1993]), 69-82.  We know next to nothing about the content of Lacan’s 
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in-law perhaps alludes to the answer when he notes that whenever Lacan spoke of 
obsessional neurosis, ‘Clearly [he] knew what he was talking about.’103  Further, 
such an allusion should not be considered beyond the realm of possibility when 
referring to a man who obsessively listed every book, artwork and other 
possession he owned, and then organised his lists into lists of lists.104  This is, of 
course, just musing, for ‘you cannot psychoanalyse the dead;’ but it is worth 
asking this question nonetheless, to make the point that there is nothing ‘wrong’ 
with being obsessional neurotic, and that is not what one should take away from 
the chapter that follows this one.  It is a category that can help historical analysis, 
and not an intrinsically negative category.) 
The purpose of the extended quote above is to defend the statement that 
the obsessional tries to destroy her object, and she does so in order to aim at desire 
itself, beyond demand.105  This is achieved by, as with the example of the toddler, 
turning one’s desire into an absolute condition, something that must be met with 
the force of an absolute imperative or prohibition.  Doing this destroys the Other, 
absolutising desire as such, in a way that attempts to have desire without the 
Other.  Of course, desire comes from the Other (this is one of Lacan’s key 
concepts: desire is a product of language, and language comes from and exists as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
own analysis, other than that it lasted for six years, and was made extremely tumultuous by 
various factors, not least of which was Lacan’s presumption of his own superior intelligence to 
that of his analyst’s, Rudolph Loewenstein. 
103 Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘The Pivot of the Desire of the Other,’ trans. by Adrian Price, 
Psychoanalytical Notebooks Issue 18, ed. Phil Dravers (London: London Society of the New 
Lacanian School, 2009), 25. 
104 Élisabeth Roudinesco, Lacan: In Spite of Everything, trans. by Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 
2014 [2011]), 109-128. 
105 S5, 14.5.1958, 14. 
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Other); the subject hears the imperatives and prohibitions as coming from the 
Other.  So the obsessional subject is simultaneously attempting to destroy and 
reinforce the Other as other.  In the end it is this contradiction itself, not the half 
of it that attempts to absolutise desire, that succeeds in preserving desire: ‘desire 
carries in itself this internal contradiction which makes of it the impasse of the 
desire of the obsessional.’106  In terms of how one analyses the obsessional, then, 
Philip Hill’s textbook Using Lacanian Clinical Technique focuses almost 
exclusively on the contradictions presented by the obsessional’s compulsions and 
prohibitions, recommending analysts to use the analysand’s demands to reveal 
them.107  This is precisely in keeping with the approach recommended in Lacan’s 
other text on obsessionals from 1958, ‘The Direction of the Treatment and the 
Principles of its Power.’108  The contradictions that stem from attempting to 
destroy and reinforce the Other, as well as the contradictions that result from any 
attempt to find something absolute in the Other (the Other being language, and 
thus being a system of contradictions that always fail at concrete description), 
allow for the preservation of desire, fixing it in place and prevent regression back 
to das Ding. 
In the next lecture, that of 21.5.1958, Lacan further describes the 
obsessional’s desire, in a way that Jacques-Alain Miller helpfully puts in terms of 
a Lacanian matheme:109 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Ibid., 16. 
107 Philip H. F. Hill, Using Lacanian Clinical Technique –an introduction– (London: Press for the 
Habilitation of Psychoanalysis, 2002), 138-162. 
108 Écrits, 489-542. 
109 Miller, ‘The Pivot of the Desire of the Other,’ 14. 
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( [d(A)]  !  [d//A]  !  [d//A0]  !  [d0//A0]  !  [d(A)] ) 
 
The sequence here is as follows: 
 
1. d(A) ‘Desire is the desire of the Other.’  The subject desires an object 
because the Other has prohibited it (the maternal object, or das Ding, or 
any object).  Or the subject desires an object because the Other desires it.  
Or the subject desires an object because of a repressed metaphorical 
substitution relating it to another object.  This precise relation of the 
subject to every object as a result of language is developed much more in 
Lacan’s later works, with the concept of the objet petit a.110 
2. d//A The obsessional subject attempts to absolutise desire itself, separating 
it from the Other: by taking on desire as a complex contradictory system 
of absolute imperatives and prohibitions, the subject seeks desire 
transubstantiated as demand, without the Other. 
3. d//A0 This equates to an attempt to destroy the Other: separating desire 
from the Other reduces the Other as subject, the Other as other. 
4. d0//A0 Since desire is the desire of the Other, this has the effect of also 
nullifying desire.  In the extended quote above, Lacan states that as the 
obsessional attempts to move towards any of its objects he experiences a 
reduction in libidinal tension.  This is the reason why.  Attempting to 
exclude the Other from the situation reduces desire.  Using the example of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Particularly S11 where the objet petit a is a signifier for the object of desire that is leftover 
when the symbolic meets the real, and S17, where this same notion is developed as ‘surplus 
jouissance,’ influenced by Marx’s ‘surplus value.’ 
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the toddler who destroys the Other by making his desire into an 
unconditional demand, the toddler desires the object less as soon as the 
Other is absent from the picture: if getting the object is simply a matter of 
giving the parents an either/or demand to which they either submit or 
refuse, then getting the object is less fun, and the toddler will move on to 
demand something else. 
5. d(A)  The equation cancels out, and we are back at the beginning.  As 
Miller puts it, ‘Then comes the bad surprise, your desire is also reduced to 
zero… Once you’ve got to this point of impasse, you have to rush back 
and reconstitute the beginning, and then, it goes round.’111  
 
There is much more that could be said about the structure of obsessional 
neurosis.  Lacan does not fail, in the remaining lectures of Seminar V, to discuss 
many more aspects of the obsessional structure, relating much of Freud’s theory 
to the structure he posits.  Moving on to Seminar VIII, Lacan eventually realises 
that he has not yet told his seminar attendees about the formula for the structure of 
obsessional neurosis, despite having lectured on the subject so many times, and 
writes it on the board:112 
 
A ! φ (a, a’, a”, a”’,…) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Miller, ‘The Pivot of the Desire of the Other,’ 14. 
112 S8, 250.  As with all of the mathemes, graph and formulas used in this study, the purpose of 
giving this here is not to confuse any non-Lacanians who have read thus far.  It helps to tie the 
study into Lacanian academic discourse, and many of the graphs and formulas used in this and the 
following chapters also help to demonstrate equivocation between Lacan and Paul.  
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This could be read as ‘the lack in the Other in relation to objects of desire situated 
as a function of erotic equivalences.’113  This equation communicates the structure 
of the cycle Miller systematised above: It is the lack in the Other, the fact that the 
Other is not actually an absolute complete being but is characterised by lack, that 
produces the signifier φ, the phallus – for many psychoanalysts, bearing some 
relation or other to the literal penis, but for Lacan, the signifier of the object of 
desire that is produced by prohibition, produced by the gap between signifier and 
signified that prohibits ever ‘getting’ what we want.  The lack in the Other 
produces the phallus, which, for the obsessional, is experienced as an endless 
chain of signifiers, due to the process above in which desire transubstantiated as 
demand requires infinite signifiers as objects.  By this point, having come from 
the articulation of the obsessional in relation to death and the Oedipal triangle in 
his earliest seminars, through the articulation of the obsessional in Seminar V (the 
obsessional transubstantiates desire as demand in order to destroy the Other and 
create a contradiction in which desire is preserved), and the obsessional in 
Seminar VII whose neurotic relation to an unbearable das Ding is one side of the 
paradox of jouissance, Lacan in Seminar VIII sums up the obsessional one more 
time, in a way that agrees with all of the above and was stated already in 1958: the 
obsessional is characterised by ‘impossible desire.’114  As Esthela Solano-Suarez 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 The barred capital A is his symbol for the lack in the Other, and the second half of the formula 
is stated as above on p. 252.  See entries on the Other and lack in the Glossary, Appendix A.  Also, 
the term ‘erotic equivalences’ should not necessarily be read to refer exclusively to what common 
speech would term ‘sexual,’ as it is merely Lacan using the language of psychoanalysis to describe 
his thought.   
114 See the bottom of the table of quotes above. 
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puts it, ‘By destroying desire, he preserves it and maintains it at the level of 
impossibility.’115 
A few more notes round out the complex structure Lacan presents for the 
obsessional, and add to the list of obsessional symptoms/affects from the previous 
two sections. 
 
• Lacan calls ‘Oblativity’ (oblativité) an obsessional fantasy.116  The 
reason for saying this is to combat practices of other analysts that 
he thinks encourage this fantasy; however, this specific 
characterisation will be useful for the current study.  It follows 
quite naturally from the structure detailed above, as a word to 
describe the obsessional strategy of enforcing the absoluteness of 
the Other (whom he simultaneously attempts to destroy), and of the 
persecutory prohibitions and compulsions that the obsessional feels 
as coming from the Other. 
• ‘The obsessional is always in the process of asking for 
permission.’117  The wording of this quote is important.  It is not 
that the obsessional likes to ask for permission often, but that, in 
the context of psychoanalysis but also in life in general, the 
obsessional is always in the process of asking for permission – life, 
for the obsessional, consists of comporting oneself in such a way 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Esthela Solano-Suarez, ‘Learning to Read Obsessional Neurosis,’ trans. by Philip Dravers, in 
The Psychoanalytical Notebooks Issue 18: Obsessional Neurosis, ed. Philip Dravers (London: 
London Society of the New Lacanian School, 2009), 35. 
116 S5, 21.5.1958, 12. 
117 Ibid., 8. 
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as to be permanently dependent upon the Other for permission.  
Part of this structure involves near-constant guilt, no less a 
component of Lacan’s obsessional than Freud’s obsessive. 
• The obsessional wants to dominate his experiences through 
thought.  Whether because of the anal fixations or the will to 
embed the desire of the Other (language) in demand, obsessional 
neurosis involves wanting to ‘dominate the experience through 
thought,’ through ‘mastery,’ hoping ‘that the signifier can absorb 
the whole of the real and that he would be able to trace the entirety 
of his experience through thought.’118  So Lacan calls obsessional 
neurosis ‘a thought that burdens the soul, that it doesn’t know what 
to do with.’119 
• Part of the reason for the obsessional structure is the too-much-
ness of jouissance, pressing us back to look for ways to have 
desire without actually pursuing what we desire.120  Lacan’s 
interpretation of regression is that the fixation of desire into an 
obsessional structure is a way to stop oneself from regressing ‘all 
the way back,’ to das Ding.121  The reason for the clinical structure, 
and, as it happens, for two of the other three structures, is because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Philippe de Georges, ‘A Thought that Burdens the Soul,’ trans. by Bogdan Wolf, in The 
Psychoanalytical Notebooks Issue 18: Obsessional Neurosis, ed. Philip Dravers (London: London 
Society of the New Lacanian School, 2009), 55. 
119 Lacan, Television, 6. 
120 Écrits, 700. 
121 S5, 4.6.1958, 7-8. 
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we are caught in a paradox between das Ding and jouissance; this 
is just another articulation of the paradox of jouissance. 
 
In conclusion to this description of the obsessional structure, it should also 
be stated that this is in no way a complete picture of the Lacanian obsessional 
structure.  It has barely mentioned the way Lacan links the obsessional structure 
to the initial response to the paternal metaphor; it has not mentioned the fact that 
the obsessional’s relation to demand stems from the demand for love;122 neither 
has it entered into the place of ‘anxiety’ in all of this for Lacan (which would 
necessarily involve stretching the discussion to Seminar X); it has not described 
what exactly the ‘anal stage’ means for Lacan, or the relation between obsessional 
neurosis and the mirror stage, and it might justly be accused of conflating need 
into demand for the sake of brevity.123  However, in limited space, this is 
reasonably accurate summary of the core of Lacan’s conception of the obsessional 
neurotic structure; and, further, it is a structure that, to answer the question posed 
near the beginning of this section, can describe a system of thought just as much 
as a person. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 S5, 14.5.1958, 14-15; 4.6.1958, 4-6. 
123 The description of obsessional neurosis here is accurate, but perhaps glosses over the role of 
need.  In Lacan’s terms, ‘need’ is the closest one comes to a term for that which is purely 
biological, and ‘demand’ is a more relational term for what the subject demands of the Other.  
‘Drive’ and ‘desire’ also have totally distinct meanings.  Differentiations between them can be 
found in most clinically-based introductions to Lacan, including Hill, Using Lacanian Clinical 
Technique, 46-55; Lionel Bailly, Lacan (London: Oneworld, 2009), 109-127 or Joël Dor, 
Introduction to the Reading of Lacan (New York: Other Press, 1998), 181-194. 
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4.  The Structure of the Paradox of Jouissance 
 
Lacanian psychoanalysis today recognises three ‘clinical structures,’ 
nosological categories that Lacan referred to as ‘Freudian structures:’ psychosis, 
perversion and neurosis, with the two varieties of neurosis being obsessional and 
hysterical.124  I have chiefly been looking at two of these structures, the perverse 
and obsessional.  To put these in context, Bogdan Wolf summarises all four 
nicely, fitting with the descriptions of obsessionalism and perversion above (the 
other two summaries are also highly apt but do not directly concern us here):  
‘The obsessional believes in absolute being.  The pervert believes in absolute 
jouissance.  The hysteric believes in absolute love.  The psychotic does not 
believe.’125  So far I have been developing a picture of the paradox of jouissance 
as an opposition between a Sadean/Neronian/libertine/perverse/jouissance side on 
the one hand, and a Kantian/Stoic/legalistic/neurotic/law side on the other.  Now 
it becomes necessary to tread more carefully; for not all of these terms necessarily 
sit in apposition to one other in perfect comfort.  Further, to be precise, on the 
neurotic side of the paradox sit both obsessionals and hysterics (as part of the 
same neurotic ‘dialect’), despite having somewhat different laws set up for 
themselves. 
However, regardless of who sits where in the paradox of jouissance, the 
paradox as seen in the particular historical setting studied here is between the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Evans, Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1996), 194, 
points out this evolution in terminology.  See the Glossary (Appendix A) for definitions of each of 
the clinical structures. 
125 Adapted slightly from Wolf, ‘The Mysterious Ways of the Obsessional,’ 146. 
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perverse structure on one side, and the obsessional on the other, with Stoicism 
being a system of thought that has an obsessional structure (as I argue more 
below).  Paul finds himself arguing in context of exactly this articulation of the 
paradox.  So, the paradox in which Paul finds his thought trapped is between the 
perversely structured action he accidentally precipitated at the church in Corinth 
(as argued in Chapter 3), and the obsessional structure he encountered in a 
theological opponent at Rome (as will be argued in Chapter 5).  In order to 
formulate this, we need a matheme for the perverse structure, to add to the 
matheme for the obsessional structure.  According to Lacan in ‘Kant with 
Sade,’126 the perverse structure is formulated as: 
 
a ! $ 
 
This reads left to right, with the object itself (a) being what relates to the subject 
($), who, in attempting to pursue jouissance without inhibition, becomes totally 
enslaved to the law and whatever objects its signifiers offer the deluded 
‘transgressing’ subject.  The subject disavows its own lack and madly searches for 
a, presuming it will be found in transgressively objectifying other subjects, but 
remains locked in relation to it, never actually finding it.127  Reversing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Écrits, 653. 
127 This italicised ‘it,’ the objet petit a, is the ‘it’ of the Tom Milsom song ‘Take Me Out,’ Organs 
(London: Dog Dream, 2013), with the lyrics ‘You’ve got it and I want it / This is what we can’t be 
without / Dark scheming and light dreaming / This is what it is all about.’  The perverse structure 
is the attempt to get this it not through love, but through transgression, while disavowing the lack 
that ensures we will never have it.  In the line ‘this is what it is all about,’ declaring that the 
endless cycle of wanting but not having is what makes up human existence, the song is placed well 
outside of a perverse structure, because it knows that this it is never truly gotten; the singer knows 
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perverse matheme to read right to left, so that the subject can be placed in the 
middle of the perverse structure to the left and the obsessional structure to the 
right, Paul’s theoretical position in the paradox of jouissance can be formulated 
like this: 
 
$ ! a " $ ! A ! φ (a, a’, a”, a”’,…) 
 
The subject (not Paul himself, but the human subject in the trap to which Paul’s 
theology is eventually forced to respond) is caught in the middle.  Stoic 
philosophy and Paul’s opponent in Rome turn right, towards the Other, and enter 
the obsessional’s paradox, believing in the absolute being of the Other (and 
engaging in an unconscious game of attempting to destroy and reinforce the 
Other), but then finding desire strengthened and maintained by the infinite series 
of objects produced in the place of the phallus, which the Other, barred, fails to 
possess.  The series of objects is infinite, as one never gets to a ‘complete’ (non-
lacking) Other, no matter how much one obeys the law – the Other never gives 
you what you want; so, around we go in the obsessional’s paradox.  Conversely, 
some members of the church in Corinth turned to the left, engaging the perverse 
paradox: the object, a, as that which is in relation to the subject, given over to the 
quest for jouissance from the position of the object, disavowing lack; but trying to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that lack is what keeps us going, so there is no disavowal of lack.  The perverse structure, whether 
of Sade, Nero or the Corinthian, disavows lack, and believes that it can indeed be gotten, and it 
can be gotten through transgression.  Thus the structure of the pervert is much simpler than that of 
the obsessional: it is just a, which the subject believes she can acquire, forever remaining un-
acquired, spurring the subject on to increasingly transgressive acts.  Lack, the object petit a and 
perversion are all defined in the Glossary, Appendix A. 
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be the object and disavow lack forces an encounter with it, as the signifier is 
inescapable, and at the end of the perverse side of the paradox the subject finds 
himself still bound to the signifier, and still ‘barred.’128  And around we go.  The 
paradox of jouissance posed in this way, in terms of two of the clinical structures, 
is of course not a paradox in which anyone finds themselves consciously making a 
decision.  The adult speaking subject is already a clinical structure.  This 
articulation of the paradox, however, is precisely the paradox in which Paul finds 
his theological argument, caught between systems of thought and action 
characterised by opposing structures; trapped in a paradox (of jouissance) 
between two paradoxes (of perversion and obsession).129  As I continue not only 
this structure, but also the three lists of symptoms and characteristics of the 
obsessional neurotic, will be helpful in describing Paul’s theoretical position 
(since Lacan formulates an obsessional structure, but does not alter the Freudian 
symptomology).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 The word ‘barred’ for Lacan refers to the fact that the subject is always bound to the signifier, 
and to the bar in the signifying unit that separates the word from ‘that which it means’ (the 
signified).  Since the signifier is never identical to the signified, but the subject knows itself as and 
through the signifier, the subject is thus always ‘barred,’ split in two with ‘that which thinks’ never 
being able to get truly beyond the finitude and lack inherent to its alienation in language. 
129 The three paradoxes could be (over)simplified as such: 
The paradox of jouissance: whether you run towards or away from jouissance you get a bit of it, 
but never enough. 
The perverse paradox: attempting to get jouissance through transgressing the law (running away 
from it) only succeeds at sustaining the law, preventing full jouissance. 
The obsessional paradox: attempting to get jouissance through obeying the law (running towards 
it) infinitely increases the amount of law one feels one needs. 
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5.  The Obsessional Neurotic Structure of Stoic Ethics 
 
 It is finally time to pin first century Stoic thought to an obsessional 
neurotic structure.  The claim that follows is one of form and structure, not 
regarding any specific historical thinker.  Even in terms of such abstractions, I 
noted in the previous chapter the amount of internal debate that took place within 
Stoicism.  This combined with the fact that the school spanned across several 
centuries with only a few extant sources per century makes general abstractions 
much more difficult.130 As a result of this, what follows is an attempt at 
diagnosing a constant structure to an evolving system of thought, specifically as it 
existed in first century Rome whenever this is possible, with reference to the 
points that have already been discussed, and to Stoic thinkers as contemporary to 
Paul as possible.  This means chiefly looking at Seneca (d. 65 CE) and Epictetus 
(d. c. 130 CE), since Dio Chrysostom (d. c. 110 CE) was just as much a Cynic as 
a Stoic (though these categories do get blurred in the first century), and Musonius 
Rufus (exiled 66 CE) is not widely extant.131 
 My first claim is that the signifier ‘nature’ (φύσις/physis, or natura in 
Latin) functions as the master signifier in Stoic philosophy, the ultimate ground of 
all ethics.  ‘Master signifier’ is not a term used in any of the main works I have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 For example, one could say that Stoic philosophers did not believe that God was conscious, but 
the definitions of both ‘God’ and ‘conscious,’ as well as the range of Stoic philosophers’ positions 
on precisely this issue, changed greatly over time.  John Sellars, Stoicism (London: Routledge, 
2006), 91-95. 
131 These dates are from Sellars, Stoicism, xviii, except for that of Dio Chrysostom, from 
Christopher Gill, ‘The School in the Roman Imperial Period,’ in Brad Inwood (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 53. 
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discussed so far.  It is used much less frequently by Lacan himself than by some 
modern Lacanian philosophers.132  Despite only coming into use by Lacan in his 
seventeenth seminar, of 1969-70,133 it is a core term in Žižek’s masterful 
explanation of Lacan’s Graph of Desire, which is first fully introduced in Lacan’s 
1960 text ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire.’134  This is 
because the place labelled as either S1 or s(A) in Lacan’s graphs is the S1 that 
becomes the ‘master signifier’ in Lacan’s later seminars.135  To be more precise, 
when Lacan describes the function of master signifiers in the discourse of the 
master in Seminar XVII, the master signifier (meaning any master signifier) 
functions according to the rules laid out in the Graph of Desire nine years earlier.  
In order to make the claim below that physis functions for the Stoics as a master 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Žižek uses the concept regularly in his critique of ideology, for example 111-113 of The 
Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 2008 [1989]), or Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the 
Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso, 2012), 597-599, 646-647, which explains the 
concept quite nicely.  The emerging field of Lacanian discourse analysis has also taken to the 
concept, as can be seen in Mark Bracher, Lacan, Discourse, and Social Change: A Psychoanalytic 
Cultural Criticism (London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 53-80 and in the constant references 
to it (see the index) in Ian Parker and David Pavón-Cuéllar, eds., Lacan, Discourse, Event: New 
Psychoanalytic Approaches to Textual Indeterminacy (London: Routledge, 2014). 
133 The term is used frequently throughout Seminar XVII, where Lacan first develops the ‘four 
discourses,’ one of which, the discourse of the master, has the master signifier in place of S1.  S17, 
32-33, 89-93.  Though nine years apart, his description of the way a master signifier as S1 relates 
to ‘knowledge’ as S2 is fully consistent with S1 and S2, or s(A) and (A), in the Graph of Desire as 
presented in the ‘Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,’ Écrits, 671-702.  
134 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 111-116.  ‘The Subversion of the Subject and 
the Dialectic of Desire’ can be found in Écrits, 671-702.  Žižek’s comments are in explanation of 
the section 681-690, the first of Lacan’s four graphs and the bottom half of the completed graph.  
Lacan has been developing the graph since its earlier forms began appearing in Seminar V.  See 
S5, 6.11.1957, 4-9; 27.11.1957, 4-5 and 5.2.1958, 8-9 for a few places where this is happening.  
135 Alfredo Eidelsztein, The Graph of Desire: Using the Work of Jacques Lacan, trans. by 
Florencia F. C. Shanahan (London: Karnac, 2009), 108-109. 
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signifier (and thus both S1 and s[A] as well), it is necessary to detour, as briefly as 
possible, into the Graph of Desire. 
 Lacan’s first and second graphs, which become the bottom half of the final 
(fourth) graph, are as follows:136 
 
 
             
 
Both of these graphs illustrate the passing of the subject, from bottom right 
around to bottom left, through the signifying chain.  These graphs begin to sketch 
how the subject exists synchronically in language.  Since the line from left to right 
in the first graph represents the signifying chain, the points at which the subject 
crosses the line, from right to left, can be called S2 and S1.137  The first graph 
depicts that in a chain of signifiers (say, for example, a sentence, though that is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 These are from Écrits, 681 and 684. 
137 It may be helpful here to see what this looks like.  Eidelsztein, The Graph of Desire, breaks 
Lacan’s first graph itself into three, the third of which (p. 85) depicts S1 and S2: 
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not the only application of this graph), the subject encounters the chain first 
before it is able to interpret it in completion.  That is to say, the subject begins to 
hear the sentence, and is greeted with signifiers, before the conclusion of the 
sentence allows the beginning of the sentence to have meaning.138  In the same 
way, the titular opening sentence of Mark’s Gospel (‘The beginning of the good 
news of Jesus the Messiah the son of God’) does not arrive at its meaning until 
near the end of the Gospel when Jesus, in his crucifixion, is finally revealed as the 
son of God (Mark 15:39).139  In the same way also, the subject in infancy learns a 
language that already exists outside of the subject; language is a complete code 
that exists outside of the subject.  This is why Lacan says that 
 
The Other, as preliminary site of the pure subject of the signifier, 
occupies the key [maîtresse] position here, even before coming into 
existence here as absolute Master…  For what is omitted in the 
platitude of modern information theory is the fact that one cannot even 
speak of a code without it already being the Other’s code… the subject 
constitutes himself on the basis of the message, such that he receives 
from the Other even the message he himself sends.  Thus the notations 
of A and s(A) are justified.140 
 
In order to arrive at a point that explains the meaning of a signifying chain, the 
subject must first pass through some other point in the signifying chain, that is to 
say, encounter the signifying chain as such before it signifies anything in 
particular.  Lacan calls the point at which one first encounters the Other the point 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 S5, 6.11.1957, 6. 
139 Since the inclusion of the words ‘son of God’ in the first verse of Mark is contested, one could 
make the same point with the word ‘Christ’ (or ‘messiah’): that the meaning of the word is 
unknown, even after Peter’s revelation in chapter 8, until the crucifixion makes it clear. 
140 Écrits, 683. 
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de capiton, quilting point, or ‘button tie’ as Bruce Fink translates it.141  The reason 
there is a sort of ‘quilting’ effect here is that it is only when there is an S1 or s(A) 
discovered, a primary signifier for the Other, that the sentence/language/ideology 
can begin to make sense.  Thus there is a retroactive effect here: the subject first 
passes through a signifier (S2), simultaneously passing through language as Other 
(A), but the Other has no content until the subject then passes through an S1, an 
s(A), a ‘master signifier,’ and gives it some.  In Seminar XVII Lacan begins to use 
the term ‘master signifier’ for S1,142 but one can see in the quote above that the 
origins of this are already in Lacan’s head in 1960, when commenting on Hegel 
and referring to S2 as the master (maîtresse) position that exists before coming 
into contact with S1, the absolute master.  Žižek gives an excellent example of 
why this schema is important when he points out that the signifiers ‘freedom,’ 
‘state,’ ‘justice’ and ‘peace’ all exist for both the Cold War American and the 
Cold War Russian; but when the Russian is addressed with the master signifier 
‘Communism’ (or another master signifier), these words take on different 
meaning than they do for the American and her master signifiers.143  Thus Lacan 
graphs the common observation of structural linguistics that ‘a signifier only takes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Ibid., 681-682. 
142 S17, 29-38, 88-93.  In the first of these two sections it might sound obscure as to whether the 
master signifier is meant to be S1 or S2, but this is made clear in the second section, particularly by 
its position in the discourse of the master as laid out on p. 92 compared with on pp. 29 and 39.  
This should be made more clear in the explanations above. 
143 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 112-113. 
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on value by virtue of its relation with other signifiers,’144 but does so in a way that 
mimics the observations noted by Louis Althusser’s concept of ‘interpellation.’145 
 Since this ‘absolute master’ is what signifies retroactively the ‘master 
position,’ S1 being used to interpret S2, s(A) designating (A) and taking its place, 
it can be called the ‘master signifier’ that gets used to name the Other.  We do not 
know the Other as other (language as itself), but instead know it via the master 
signifier that designates it.  So with Bogdan Wolf’s summary of the obsessional 
neurotic’s relation to the Other given above, the obsessional neurotic is one who 
believes in the absolute being of that which is signified by the master signifier.  
The first reason to evaluate Stoic philosophy as obsessional neurotic in structure 
is that its master signifier is φύσις (physis), and it ascribes to physis absolute 
being, in such a way as simultaneously to destroy and reinforce the Other, 
transubstantiating desire as demand.  The argument below has two parts: (1) that 
physis is the Stoic master signifier, and (2) that the Stoic relation to physis is 
obsessional neurotic in structure. 
 Having clarified what is meant by ‘master signifier,’ it should not be too 
controversial a point to state that this is precisely the function of physis in Stoic 
philosophy, at least in Stoic ethics.  A master signifier functions as a central 
explanatory point giving meaning to other signifiers, and this is what physis was 
to the Stoics.  The Stoic ethical ideal is to live ‘according to nature’ (usually a 
translation of κατὰ φύσιν, though it can be written in various ways in Greek, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Ian Parker, ‘Lacanian Discourse Analysis: Seven Elements,’ in Lacan, Discourse, Event: New 
Psychoanalytic Approaches to Textual Indeterminacy, eds. Ian Parker and David Pavón-Cuéllar 
(London: Routledge, 2014), 41. 
145 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 112.   
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seen throughout Paul’s letters).146  This places physis at the centre of all ethical 
statements made by Stoics, whether the signifier is present in the statement or not.  
So, for example, with the signifier present Epictetus argues, as always, from the 
first principle that that which is in accordance with nature is reasonable:147 
 
Does family affection seem to you to be in accordance with nature and 
good?—Of course.—What then?  Is it possible that, while family 
affection is in accordance with nature and good, that which is 
reasonable is not good?—By no means.—That which is reasonable is 
not, therefore, incompatible and one of them is in accordance with 
nature, the other must be contrary to nature, must it not?—Even so, 
said he.—148 
 
Thus Epictetus can state that although investigating logic and syllogisms is good, 
it is in ‘devoting [oneself] to keeping in a state of conformity with nature’ that one 
really makes progress – and will always make progress.149  As Brian Johnson 
notes, the reason that Epictetus can say that ‘the self-controlled individual is 
following nature’ is because ‘he accepts the Stoic model of the cosmos in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Sellars, Stoicism, 125. 
147 One might object here that Epictetus is being used as an example of Stoic thought despite being 
used in Chapter 3 above as an example of an exception to Stoic thought.  However, it is much 
more reasonable to use Epictetus as an example of how the Stoics related to the signifier physis, a 
core element of Stoic thought with which he is in agreement (and must be as a Stoic philosopher), 
than in the case of his dissenting views on marriage, with which he was clearly in the minority.  
Also, as stated above, there are not many options for primary Stoic sources near contemporary to 
Paul other than Seneca and Epictetus. 
148 Epictetus, Disc. 1.11.17-18.  The similarity in style between Paul and Epictetus that has been 
pointed out so many times is evident here, particularly with Epictetus’ use of the phrase translated 
as ‘By no means.’  However, one wonders if the translator here (W. A. Oldfather) was influenced 
by traditional translation of Paul.  ‘By no means’ is a fair idiomatic translation of Paul’s frequent 
expression µὴ γένοιτο (see Rom 3:4, 6, 11, etc.), but a more questionable translation of Epictetus’ 
οὐ δοκεῖ µοι, which might be better translated as ‘it doesn’t seem so to me.’ 
149 Epictetus, Disc. 3.6.3-4. 
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obligations follow as a consequence from nature because of God’s providence 
over the world.’150  Although the Stoic understanding of the divine is complex and 
quite dissimilar to a Judeo-Christian god, one can see that for the Stoic ethicist it 
is the signifier physis as S1 that becomes the signifier for the Other, S2; s(A) 
occupying the place of ‘the universe’ or ‘God,’ giving them meaning, grounding 
Stoic ethics.  Thus, in the occasional ethical statement where Epictetus does not 
mention physis directly, one can still hear the principle of living life according to 
whatever is ‘really’ the state of things in nature: ‘If you undertake a role which is 
beyond your powers, you both disgrace yourself in that one, and at the same time 
neglect the role which you might have filled with success.’151  Physis is the 
signifier grounding ethics even when it is not present. 
 Of course, physis meant many different things, and there are many ways in 
which it was the centre of Stoic ethics (and, in different ways, most other 
contemporary Western philosophical ethical systems).  A complete survey of the 
Stoic use of physis is not possible here, though some way towards it has been 
made in previous work, reprinted here in the appendix.152  Despite the additional 
work that could be done, I have already gone far enough here in demonstrating 
that physis is a Stoic ethical master signifier.  Lacan’s claim is not that everyone 
has one master signifier, but that master signifiers exist for the subject and in a 
discourse, and it is clear at the very least that physis is a Stoic master signifier, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Brian E. Johnson, The Role Ethics of Epictetus: Stoicism in Everyday Life (Plymouth: 
Lexington Books, 2014), 44, referencing Epictetus, Disc., 3.1.8. 
151 Epictetus, Encheiridion, 37. 
152 Appendix C, ‘Paul’s View of Physis.’  This survey includes Epicurean and Cynic uses of 
physis, because it concludes that they all share a common meaning and use of the word, despite 
using it for different purposes. 
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which is enough to ground the reading of Romans that follows.  However, 
Stoicism using physis as a master signifier does not actually equate to it being 
obsessional neurotic.  The reason Stoicism is obsessional neurotic is not because 
of the identity of its master signifier, but because of its relation to this master 
signifier, which represents the Other.  
 The first step on the way to demonstrating this relation is that the Stoic 
relation to the signifier physis as master signifier is one that posits a belief in its 
absolute being.  The easiest way to demonstrate this is not through the statements 
made about physis, but by the expectations placed upon it, the demands made of 
it.  This can be illustrated with a reading from Seneca.  In his 78th letter he writes 
to a friend who is suffering with a constant runny nose, and after summarising 
some of the advice he is likely to get from his doctor, he says this: 
 
‘My own advice to you – and not only in the present illness but in 
your whole life as well – is this: refuse to let the thought of death 
bother you: nothing is grim when we have escaped that fear.  There 
are three upsetting things about any illness: the fear of dying, the 
physical suffering and the interruption of our pleasures.  I have said 
enough about the first, but will just say this, that the fear is due to the 
facts of nature, not of illness.  Illness has actually given many people 
a new lease of life; the experience of being near to death has been 
their preservation.  You will not die because you are sick, but 
because you are alive.  That end still awaits you when you have been 
cured.  In getting well again you may be escaping some ill health but 
not death.  Now let us go back and deal with the disadvantage which 
really does belong to illness, the fact that it involves considerable 
physical torments.  These are made bearable by their intermittency.  
For when pain is at its most severe the very intensity finds means of 
ending it.  Nobody can be in acute pain and feel it for long.  Nature in 
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her unlimited kindness to us has arranged things as to make pain 
either bearable or brief.153 
 
After this Seneca goes on to describe some of the ways that pain naturally brings 
itself to an end, and in the following pages describes just how thought can be his 
solution, that ‘if by contrast you start giving yourself encouragement, saying to 
yourself, “It’s nothing – or nothing much, anyway – let’s stick it out, it’ll be over 
presently”, then in thinking it a trivial matter you will be ensuring that it actually 
is.  Everything hangs on one’s thinking.’154 
 Though mentioned only twice in this section, physis (in Seneca’s Latin, 
natura) stands behind the whole thought: nature has decreed when and how you 
will die, so there is no point in worrying about death.  Since your fear is actually 
of nature, not illness, stop fearing nature and instead align yourself to its will.  
Nature will ensure that pain goes on no longer than nature intends.  In this train of 
thought the desire of the Other, physis/natura, is separated out from the Other, 
being known by humans to such a degree that the subject, through thought, can 
master suffering.  This ascribes a great plenitude or absoluteness to the Other, 
claiming that physis should be so trusted that the concerns of life float away.  
While for most humans life’s events transpire in a way Heidegger might call 
‘inauthentic,’ letting things happen as they happen (physis acting as it pleases), 
Stoicism removes this element of the desire of the Other: in claiming that we 
should submit fully and calmly to the desire of physis, all power of physis to hurt 
us or shock us is removed.  Thus we pass from d(A) to d//A, with the Other 
understood, its desire now firmly ‘on our side.’  However, with physis now 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Seneca, Letters from a Stoic, trans. by Robin Campbell (London: Penguin, 2004 [1969]), 132. 
154 Ibid., 134. 
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accounted for in our thoughts and actions, its own desire is nullified, as d//A takes 
us immediately to d//A0.  This point in the paradox is precisely the one Seneca 
advocates, when he follows up his thoughts on thinking with a very orthodox 
Lacanian rant on how everyone’s desire actually comes from the thinking of 
others (desire is the desire of the Other): one thinks one wants to be rich because 
other people think being rich is good, etc, leading to his claim that we even want 
suffering because we enjoy bragging to others about the extent of our suffering.155  
Further, through mastering oneself through thought, getting to this point of d//A0, 
the power of the desire of physis being obliterated, Seneca is advocating the next 
step, the common goal of the Stoics, that desire itself be reduced because physis 
has been mastered through logic and thought: d0//A0.  His final advice is 
essentially to stop desiring life itself: ‘An illness that’s swift and short will have 
one of two results: either oneself or it will be snuffed out.  And what difference 
does it make whether I or it disappears?  Either way there’s an end to the pain.’156  
Is that the end of things?  Did Seneca succeed in preaching and practicing a 
successful Stoic philosophy leading to the ataraxia (tranquillity) of d0, desire 
reduced to nothing through the successful punctuation and completion of the 
obsessional’s paradox?  We do not know whether the man to whom Seneca wrote 
suddenly reached complete peace with his illness, but history has been unkind to 
Seneca’s personal ataraxia: ‘He has been charged throughout the ages with 
hypocrisy, stemming from the apparent incongruity between his high-minded 
moral precepts and some of the details of his life (including his role as tutor to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Ibid., 134-135.  This section really does make an excellent defence of one aspect of what is 
meant by ‘desire is the desire of the Other,’ represented by d(A). 
156 Ibid., 136. 
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tyrannical Emperor Nero).’157  It might not be fair to judge him for whom he 
taught, but on the other hand might be fair to judge him for being lured into the 
luxurious life of the royal court after claiming that the desires for wealth and 
power are merely the desire of the Other; and he certainly does not seem to have 
been successful in teaching his ways to Nero.  Here the sides of the paradox meet: 
Paul tried to apply a bit of neurosis to a bit of perversion in his first letter to the 
Corinthians (countering attempted freedom from the law with more law).  Much 
more acutely, Seneca embodied a perfectly obsessional philosophical system, yet 
tutored my paradigmatic ancient example of the perverse side of the paradox  
(Nero, above) to no avail.  Around we go: d(A)  !  d//A  !  d//A0  !  d0//A0  !  
d(A).   
 A few more points need to be made, in additional demonstration of the 
obsessional structure of Stoic thought, compared with the lists of obsessional 
symptoms/characteristics above: 
 
• Despite ‘obsessive structure being known to be common among the 
intelligentsia,’158 there is a concerted effort in Stoic philosophy in 
particular to ‘master the real through thought,’ a key symptom of 
obsessional neurosis noted above, with Seneca’s emphasis on thinking.  
This is very clear in the quotes from Seneca above, or in passages like the 
twentieth chapter of Epictetus’s third book of Discourses, an extended 
argument that one’s logical faculties can be employed to turn everything 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Sellars, Stoicism, 12. 
158 Écrits, 686. 
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that physis gives us into a good, even death.159  These passages also 
demonstrate the relation between obsessional neurosis and das Ding, the 
source of both the death drive and the ‘too-much-ness’ of jouissance, 
regression to which the obsessional structure exists to prevent. 
• Stoic philosophers most certainly do not report a sense of ‘diminished 
freedom,’ as noted in both Freud and Lacan’s obsessional/obsessive 
structures, above.  On the contrary, Stoic philosophers write at length 
about how reason in line with nature allows a much greater freedom, 
enabling the subject to decide which impressions and impulses to select 
and which to deselect.160  However, opponents of Stoicism, as well as 
proponents of Stoicism, acknowledged the deep tension caused by the 
simultaneous emphases on determinism and freedom,161 it being very 
difficult for them to continue talking about greatly increased freedom 
whilst having a much stronger point about the inescapable causality in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Epictetus, Disc. 3.20, particularly vv. 1-4 and 13-15. 
160 This can be seen in the selections of Epictetus and Seneca discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs, as well as most of Epictetus’ writings, within which the freedom to discern between 
impressions that are under and not under our control is a major theme.  One instance of this is 
Disc. 1.22.9-10: ‘What, then, does it mean to be getting an education?  It means to be learning how 
to apply the natural [φυσικὰς] preconceptions to particular cases, each to the other in conformity 
with nature [τῇ φύσει], and, further, to make the distinction, that some things are under our control 
[ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν] while others are not under our control [οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν].’  Note, however, that ‘freedom’ 
itself (ἐλευθερία) is not a word commonly used in the discussion, since at the time it was still a 
word associated more with politics than philosophy.  Dorothea Frede, ‘Stoic Determinism,’ in The 
Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 200.   
161 Frede, ‘Stoic Determinism,’ 180. 
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universe, even in the human mind.162  So, while a sense of ‘diminished 
freedom’ does not appear to have been a problem for individual Stoic 
philosophers, it was seen as a theoretical problem for the structure of the 
system of thought as a whole, and it is that structure itself, not the people, 
that is here being diagnosed as obsessional neurotic. 
• In this situation it is then reasonable tentatively to suggest, though it will 
not be further argued here, that the constant Stoic emphasis on enlarged 
freedom despite causality represents a classic obsessional neurotic reaction 
formation, a form of resistance. 
• Again, since I am discussing the structure of the system of thought, not 
any individual Stoics, the Stoic war on the pathea (passions) is the 
structural element akin to the obsessional’s dis-affected memories.  
While the Stoic philosopher works consciously to suppress the passions 
through thought (again, as exemplified by the quote from Seneca above), 
the obsessional neurotic works unconsciously to repress the passions 
through de-cathexis and the symptom.  Dis-affected memories are part of 
the obsessional individual’s symptom, and, equally, dis-affected actions 
are part of the obsessional ideology’s symptom. 
• Another criticism ancient Stoic philosophers often received was that they 
did not actually need their concept of God.163  Their understanding of 
physis worked just as well whether or not they added the word ‘God’ to it.  
Yet they often worded their intellectual dependence upon a good physis as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Frede, ‘Stoic Determinism,’ 192-201 is mostly about the great difficulty caused for Stoic 
philosophers (such as Cato) by this dilemma.  See also Sellars, Stoicism, 99-104. 
163 Sellars, Stoicism, 93. 
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a trust in God, and theorised about just how their concepts of God and 
physis related to each other.164  They ‘regarded theology as part of physics, 
more specifically as that part which does not focus on the details and the 
purely physical aspects of cosmic processes, but rather on their overall 
coherence, teleology, and providential design, as well as on the question of 
how this cosmic theology relates to popular forms of belief and 
worship.’165  Thus the Stoic philosophical system produced an 
unnecessary oblativity, further aligning the system of thought with the 
personality of the obsessional neurotic individual.  Though their system of 
thought was structured in such a way that they could have treated physis as 
something that speaks for itself, simply as reality as we know it, their 
obsessional relation to physis involved them applying oblative theological 
terminology to it nonetheless. 
 
In the paper found in the appendix below it is argued that Stoics, 
Epicureans and Cynics all meant the same thing by physis; the signifier and its 
signified were nearly identical.166  However, it is the relation of the Stoics to this 
master signifier that can be classified, in a remarkably precise way, as structurally 
obsessional neurotic.  The structure is one of preserving the place of desire in its 
impossibility, through simultaneously believing in the absoluteness of the Other 
(its signifier being physis), while also attempting to destroy the desire of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Sellars, Stoicism, 90-95.   
165 Keimpe Algra, ‘Stoic Theology,’ in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 153. 
166 Appendix C, ‘Paul’s View of Physis.’ 
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Other, which they do by consciously choosing dependence upon the Other to such 
an extent that its desire no longer has any power, and all that remains is the 
demand that the Other protect them (demand in the psychoanalytic sense of the 
form of the relation, not in the sense that they consciously make demands of 
physis).  This obsessional neurotic structural relation to the Other then produces 
the same characteristics and symptoms within the system of thought that 
obsessional neurotic clinical structure causes in the individual subject.  This 
structure of Stoic thought will be helpful in placing Paul’s theological arguments 
in context of the paradox in which he found himself trapped, already in 1 
Corinthians, but more consciously in Romans (next chapter). 
A Lacanian critique of Stoicism, and of why, in the end, an obsessional 
neurotic system of thought is not a way one should consciously choose to attempt 
escape from the horror of das Ding (though obsessional neurosis is the way many 
of us have chosen to live with das Ding nonetheless), can be demonstrated via 
Star Trek.  In Star Trek, as many will be aware, there is an alien race called the 
Vulcans.  The Vulcans are, essentially, successful Stoics.  This is because ‘the 
ancient philosopher Surak, revered as the father of Vulcan civilization, led his 
people some two thousand years ago to reject their emotions in favor of a 
philosophy that embraced pure logic… Vulcan society is now based entirely on 
logic, and any trappings of emotion are considered to be socially unacceptable.’167  
Though this is stated as having originally been a conscious move towards a stoical 
philosophy, it is clearly also something constitutionally possible for the Vulcan 
race in specific: the character Spock has a human mother and a Vulcan father, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Michael Okuda, The Star Trek Encyclopedia: A Reference Guide to the Future, Updated and 
Expanded Edition (New York: Pocket Books, 1999), 553. 
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‘as a result, he [is] torn between two worlds, the stern discipline of Vulcan logic 
and the emotionalism of his human side.  The struggle to reconcile his two halves 
would torment him for much of his life.’168  Whether this constitutional ability of 
the Vulcan race to function entirely logically is due to their genetics and 
neurology, or due to the success of their culture in eradicating emotion, or perhaps 
some evolutionary mix of the two, the point is that even being half-human makes 
it constitutionally impossible to function in this successfully totally logical way.  
That is to say, the point is that the Vulcans are capable of this logic because they 
are aliens, and not human.  For the human to try to live a dispassionate perfectly 
logical life is not only impossible because of the inescapability of human 
emotions, but also because the lack in the Other, the imperfection of language, 
means that it is no more possible for the obsessional to find absolute being in law 
than it is for the pervert to find absolute jouissance in transgression.  
Subordinating one’s life to the language of logic does not remove das Ding from 
the game, it only establishes a relation to the Other that is itself a way of 
defending oneself from das Ding and preserving desire; at least for the speaking 
human.  The Vulcans are the fantasy of the obsessional, but they can never be the 
end of the obsessional, because language guarantees that we will continue desiring 
to desire. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Okuda, Star Trek Encyclopedia, 458. 
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Chapter Five 
 
The Paradox of Jouissance and Romans 
 
 
 
 
 In this chapter, I make use of some of the ideas of Douglas Campbell and 
Stanley Stowers, towards a reading of Romans within the Lacanian framework 
now established.  I attempt not to get bogged down in a defence of Campbell, as 
that would be a large task and is not the purpose here; though with such a 
contentious scholar it is inevitable to some extent.  Instead I argue that the figure 
in Rome whom Campbell posits Paul to be opposing is someone Paul stereotypes 
as one deeply indebted to Stoic philosophy (thus partially infusing Campbell’s 
reading with that of Stowers); and that, in opposing this man, Paul finds himself 
arguing against Stoic ethics.  In line with the findings of the previous chapter, this 
positions Paul as one opposed to an obsessional system of thought, and thus as 
one who is aware of both sides of the paradox of jouissance as it was popularly 
present in his time (as a tension between perversion and obsessionalism).  Aware 
of this paradox, Paul attempts to present an understanding of the Christian subject 
as one whose ethics are not subject to it.  He is looking for a solution to the 
problem of the law’s relation to the paradox.  The nature of this solution will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  In this chapter I outline the psychoanalytic 
positioning of Paul’s solution, not the solution itself; a psychoanalytic positioning 
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that, by acknowledging rather than denying the present human reality of the 
paradox of jouissance, thus places itself firmly in context of our alienation in 
language, a prerequisite for a real dialogue with modern Lacanian philosophy.  
Just before concluding, I digress briefly in order to theorise about how this 
position of Paul’s theology affects the interpretation of the history of Pauline 
studies. 
 Reading Romans for the purpose of one chapter in a larger study is 
difficult; not only because it necessitates depending heavily upon other scholars’ 
readings, but also because it requires focusing on only small parts of the letter, 
which of course form a coherent whole (though scholars often come to very 
different interpretations of the letter depending upon which section they take as 
the main argument).  Thus it is not possible to work to the usual depth employed 
in academic biblical studies, but the footnotes will be used to make further 
reference to wider research, and to position this work more precisely.  This is not 
a ‘rereading’ in the scope of Stowers or Campbell, or even, in primary purpose at 
least, a new reading of any sort; instead it is a reading of only some parts of 
Romans, dependent upon other scholars’ previous work but with some new ideas 
suggested, supplemented by and geared towards a Lacanian reading of Paul. In 
what follows I will pay most attention to Romans 1:18-32 and 7:7-25, because 
these are main the sections that will be determined to be written in the voice of 
Paul’s opponent, through the rhetorical strategy of prosōpopoiia, ‘speech-in-
character.’  Translations of these sections can be found in Appendix B, below, 
which also makes note of which parts are intended to be read in the voice of ‘the 
Teacher.’ 
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1.  History of the Interpretation of Romans 1 and 7 
 
 There is a long history of debate over the question of voice in Rom 7; that 
is, the question of in whose voice Rom 7:7-25 (or certain shorter passages within 
it) are intended to be read.  While the suggestion that Rom 1:18-32 is written in a 
non-Pauline voice has occurred less frequently, it has not universally been seen as 
a positive statement of the foundation to Pauline theology, and the question of its 
intended voice is certainly raging now. 
 Among ancient commentators, however, Rom 1:18-32 was taken as 
Pauline opinion.  Patristic commentators from Origen to Augustine affirm the 
passage as Pauline in voice.1  While these authors proceed unsurprisingly with 
Stoic or Platonic/Neoplatonic resonances, Thomas Aquinas ties the passage to his 
Aristotelian/scholastic theology, so to him the people described in 1:18-32 knew 
God as the stable, changeless cause of all good things, but put a limit to his power 
and knowledge, attributing blessings to their own talents, and so became vain in 
their thoughts.2  In his commentary as well as in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas 
ties his theory of natural law to Rom 1:19-20.3  Martin Luther reads the section as 
a demonstration ‘that all men live in sin and folly, in order that they may realize 
that their wisdom and righteousness are in vain and they need the righteousness of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gerald Bray, ed., Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture: Romans (Downers Grove, IL: 
IVP, 1998), 32-49. 
2 St Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans, trans. by Fabian R. 
Larcher (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012), 44. 
3 Eugene F. Rogers, Jr, ‘The Narrative of Natural Law in Aquinas’s Commentary on Romans 1,’ 
Theological Studies, 59 (1998), 254. 
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Christ,’ and as an illustration of ‘the moral condition of the heathen.’4  Until 
recently, the scathing tone and view of humanity as deeply depraved in this 
passage does not seem to have been a problem (indeed, for Calvin, the ‘total 
depravity’ of humanity is one of his central doctrines).  However, in modern times 
this passage has not been read so simply as a straightforward Pauline universal 
condemnation of humanity.  E. P. Sanders notes that as a universal condemnation 
of humanity, Rom 1:18-2:29 is both exaggerated and inconsistent.5  He then 
suggests that the mass inconsistencies between parts of Rom 2 and 1:18-32 are a 
result of Paul having lifted this whole section from sermons he had heard in 
synagogues, and dropped it into his letter without much qualification.6  To 
Sanders, ‘What is said about the law in Romans 2 cannot be fitted into a category 
otherwise known from Paul’s letters.’7  As Campbell points out, Richard Hays, N. 
T. Wright and Thomas Tobin have all suggested that the purpose of this section is 
to trap the reader into agreeing with it, before turning the tables in 2:1.8  However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Martin Luther, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, trans. by J. Theodore Mueller (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 1954 [1516]), 26. 
5 E. P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1983), 123-
125. 
6 Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 125-132. 
7 Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 132. 
8 Douglas Campbell, The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul 
(Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), 363, citing Richard Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament 
(London: T&T Clark, 1996), 289; N. T. Wright, ‘Romans,’ in The New Interpreter’s Bible, 10, ed. 
Leander E. Keck (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2002), 437-448 and Thomas Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric 
in its Contexts: The Argument of Romans (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2005), 112.  Neil Elliott’s reading 
is quite similar to this, with Paul using Rom 1:18-32 in order to trap his gentile Christian audience 
in a syllogism with 2:1-6 and 2:7-16: Elliott interprets Paul as diatribe (depending on Stowers), so 
that Paul is setting up several ‘characters,’ inviting the audience to identify first with the preacher 
who condemns gentile idolatry, then with the judge who thinks he is exempt but is a hypocrite, so 
that they then realise that if (A) God judges all gentile pagans and (B) God also judges the 
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many leading scholars still take it to be thoroughly Pauline in voice.9  So while 
the problem of voice has not been quite so pronounced as in Rom 7, it nonetheless 
presents difficulties. 
 The problem of voice in Rom 7 was introduced in Chapter 1, above, but 
needs to be sketched out again.  Origen read sections of Rom 7 as prosōpopoiia in 
the voice of someone Stoics (and others) would view as lacking in self-control, 
and thought that the Stoic resonances were obvious.10  Thus Origen’s view was 
that it represents someone pre-conversion, ‘under the law,’ and many have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
hypocritical judge of gentile pagans, then (C) God’s judgment can be universal, based in kindness, 
and just (because he is the judge of both the judged and the judge).  It is difficult to imagine Paul 
expecting his audience to follow this logic, which Elliott admits is ‘subtle;’ but he nonetheless 
provides an excellent illustration of the way Rom 1:18-2:16 can be read as varying in voice, as 
presenting a sort of ‘trap’ that might not be Paul’s opinion, and as containing logic that remains 
difficult to decipher and merits further study.  Neil Elliott, The Rhetoric of Romans: 
Argumentative Constraint and Strategy and Paul’s Dialogue with Judaism (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2007 [1990]), 108-126. 
9 James Dunn sees the passage as Pauline in voice, but nonetheless notes that he speaks ‘as a Jew,’ 
writing about ‘the degradation of Gentile ethics’ ‘from a Jewish perspective,’ also using ‘Stoic 
categories,’ with a vice list that is ‘particularly Stoic,’ in Romans 1-8, Word Biblical Commentary 
(Waco, TX: Word, 1988), 53.  His reading comes very close to the one suggested below, without 
going so far as to place the passage in non-Pauline voice.  Robert Jewett is perhaps surprisingly 
traditional, seeing the section as a universal condemnation of Jews and gentiles, in Romans, 
Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 150-152.  Richard Longenecker reads it as Pauline 
voice, but as an introduction to the series of diatribes Longenecker sees in the following chapters, 
The Epistle to the Romans, New International Greek Testament Commentary (Cambridge: 
Eerdmans, 2016), 361.  Even when reading the passage as Pauline in voice, there is usually some 
sort of concession made to its function within the argumentative flow as less-than-fully Pauline. 
10 Stanley Stowers, A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, & Gentiles (London: Yale University 
Press, 1994), 264-269.  Bryan Dyer, in the process of arguing against Stowers’ reading of Rom 7, 
admits that Stowers ‘convincingly shows that Origen understood Paul as presenting a character in 
this passage.’  Bryan R. Dyer, ‘“I Do Not Understand What I Do”: A Challenge to the 
Understanding of Romans 7 as Prosopopoeia,’ in Paul and Ancient Rhetoric: Theory and Practice 
in Hellenistic Context, eds. Stanley E. Porter and Bryan R. Dyer (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 195. 
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repeated this view.11  Then, ‘when Augustine retrospectively reinterpreted his 
[own] conversion in light of the Platonic myth of the soul’s falling, alienation 
from the Good, and return to it, he created a model of religious experience that 
would become characteristic of the West, especially in late medieval piety and the 
individualism of Protestantism.’12  This philosophical interpretation of his own 
conversion led to an interpretation of Rom 7:7-25 as Pauline autobiography, 
detailing his condition before his conversion; though eventually Augustine 
changed his mind and saw it as demonstrating the post-conversion Paul’s internal 
conflict.13  Martin Luther claims to be disagreeing with Augustine but must just 
be referring to Augustine’s earlier view, because he draws heavily from him and 
then essentially repeats Augustine’s position: that this passage details Paul’s 
continued condition after conversion, as simul justus et peccator, divided by two 
laws.14  This interpretation of Romans 7 as demonstrating the condition of the 
post-conversion Christian continued to dominate (having been defended by the 
greatest Catholic and Protestant heavyweights), until 1907 when William Wrede 
moved to a universal interpretation, with the passage describing the pre-Christian 
state of Paul and of each believer.15  In 1929 Werner Kümmel pointed out that the 
passage cannot be Pauline autobiography, because the line ‘I was once alive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Such as Richard Longenecker, Paul, Apostle of Liberty (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1964), 86-87.  
One should not, however, immediately assume that Origen’s view was one shared by all before 
him, back to the original audience.  Nonetheless, it is the oldest developed interpretation of 
Romans that remains extant. 
12 Stowers, Rereading of Romans, 259. 
13 Eugene TeSelle, ‘Exploring the Inner Conflict: Augustine’s Sermons on Romans 7 and 8,’ in 
Engaging Augustine on Romans: Self, Context, and Theology in Interpretation, eds. Daniel Patte 
and Eugene TeSelle (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2002), 111-112. 
14 Luther, Epistle to the Romans, 94-100. 
15 William Wrede, Paul (London: Green, 1907), 145-146. 
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without the law’ directly contradicts Phil 3:5; so, instead, the text contains a 
‘theory’ of man’s life under the law.16  Gerd Theissen offered a psychological 
interpretation that returned to a theory of Pauline pre-conversion autobiography, 
which will be discussed in comparison with my conclusion below.17  Stanley 
Stowers has suggested returning to Origen’s view, that this is a case of 
prosōpopoiia, impersonating a person whom Aristotle or the Stoics would label 
weak in self-control (an ἀκρατής/akratēs).18  Richard Longenecker, who long ago 
foreshadowed the New Perspectives with his Paul, Apostle of Liberty,19 is also the 
author of the most recent major commentary on Romans, in which he agrees with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Werner Kümmel, Römer 7 und die Bekehrung des Paulus (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs’sche 
Buchhandlung, 1929).  Gerd Theissen summarises this on 177-178 of Psychological Aspects of 
Pauline Theology, trans. by J. Galvin (London: T&T Clark, 1987), stating that up until the time he 
was writing no one had successfully refuted this. 
17 Theissen, Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology, 177-265. 
18 Stowers, A Rereading of Romans, 264-272.  Bryan Dyer recently attacked the use of ancient 
rhetorical strategies, specifically prosōpopoiia, to interpret Romans, in ‘“I Do Not Understand 
What I Do”.’  He provides an excellent summary of the three main proponents of this reading 
(Stowers, Thomas Tobin and Ben Witherington III, though only the former is discussed at length 
here), and then makes three brief counter-arguments: that Paul, unlike ancient rhetoricians, does 
not mark the opening of the prosōpopoiia; that they depend upon patristic readers as typical of the 
original audience; and that they presume Paul was educated in the formal rules of rhetoric.  The 
first and third of these can be met by the same point: as is argued throughout this chapter, since 
Paul so clearly was deeply aware of Stoic philosophy, he would have seen and heard rhetorical 
strategies being used by philosophers in the agora, and thus been aware of them – an often-made 
claim that Dyer wrongly dismisses on pp. 203-204.  It is precisely this casual awareness of the 
ways philosophers speak, rather than a deep knowledge of rhetorical manuals, that leads to Paul 
casually engaging in extended prosōpopoiia without realising that technically there should be 
introductory markers (just as he does with his letter quotations throughout 1 Cor and most of his 
quotations of Scripture).  Finally, his awareness of the way philosophers are heard speaking, and 
the way orators makes speeches in public, is something he could expect his Roman audience to 
share, thus putting them in line with later patristic writers who were also aware of rhetorical 
strategies. 
19 Longenecker wrote Paul, Apostle of Liberty in 1964. 
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Stowers that it is a case of prosōpopoiia, but sees its purpose as a description of 
‘people who attempt to live their lives by their own natural abilities and acquired 
resources, apart from God.’20  Robert Jewett, author of the 2007 Hermeneia 
commentary, also agrees with Stowers’ suggestion of prosōpopoiia, but thinks the 
caricature is one inspired by the pre-conversion Paul.21  Thus there are many 
options: the passage can be Pauline autobiography, or an impersonation of 
someone else, or a theoretical objective description of a psychological state.  It 
can describe the sincerely conflicted state of a Christian, or it can be a description 
of a ‘depraved’ state of a non-believer, or a Pauline attack on life under the Jewish 
law.22  From these options, there is now widespread acceptance of Stowers’ 
suggestion that the passage is written as prosōpopoiia, though certainly not 
widespread agreement on just whose voice is being adopted.23 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Longenecker, Epistle to the Romans, 673. 
21 Jewett, Romans, 443-445. 
22 In summary and simplification of the history of interpretations described above: 
Origen (3rd c.): a Jew who fails at Stoic self-mastery. 
Augustine (4th/5th c.): pre-conversion autobiography; then post-conversion autobiography. 
Luther (16th c.): post-conversion autobiography – the post-conversion Christian. 
Wrede (1907): pre-conversion autobiography – the pre-conversion Christian. 
Kümmel (1929): the ‘theory’ of man’s life under the law. 
Theissen (1983): this ‘theory’ is pre-conversion autobiography. 
Stowers (1994): prosōpopoiia of a gentile who uses Stoic self-mastery to try to follow the law. 
Since Stowers: general acceptance of a theory of prosōpopoiia, with its purpose interpreted 
variously. 
23 To Stowers it is a gentile of the sort Paul stereotypes in 1:18-32 trying to follow the Jewish law, 
which fails to enable self-mastery (Rereading of Romans, 264-272).  To Longenecker he is 
speaking in the voice of anyone who seeks to live by his own abilities (Epistle to the Romans, 
673).  To Jewett Paul is speaking in the voice of a character constructed in light of his own past 
experience as Saul (Romans, 443-445).  Jewett notes two other possible interpretations of the 
voice here, including the view that it is Paul impersonating his previous self (Saul, not just a figure 
influenced by Saul) or Paul impersonating himself understood as a slave of Christ. 
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 So there is a recent but important question of voice in Rom 1:18-32, and a 
constant widely debated question of voice in Rom 7:7-25.  However, there is also 
the question of the rhetorical style of Romans as a whole: was Paul writing to or 
regarding an individual, or is the addressee of verses like 2:1 (‘Therefore you are 
without excuse’) fictive?  To investigate this fully would require extended 
interaction with the very complex issue of the purpose of the letter, which will not 
be entered into with any depth here.24  The Lacanian reading of Paul that follows 
positions Paul against obsessional Stoicism, so in order to ground this reading of 
Paul in academic biblical studies, it will need to be the case that Romans, at the 
very least, could have been a diatribe written against either a fictive or real person. 
Suggestions that Romans is written in the style of a diatribe have also been 
frequent, and mostly draw upon comparisons with Epictetus’s (slightly later) 
diatribal style – though the parallels in style are so close that in this case the 
comparison is justified.  Rudolf Bultmann was the first modern scholar to argue 
extensively that Paul wrote Romans in a diatribe style similar to Epictetus,25 and 
read Rom 1:18-32 as Paul ‘[making] use of the Stoic theory of natural knowledge 
of God,’26 which, combined with his knowledge of other Stoic concepts like 
‘conscience,’ ‘freedom’ and ‘duty,’ as well as his use of diatribe, demonstrate an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The most recent commentary, The Epistle to the Romans by Richard Longenecker, settles on 
five different purposes for the writing of the letter (pp. 8-12).  The matter is far from resolved, as 
virtually every major interpretation offers, to some extent, a different suggestion for the primary 
purpose of the letter. 
25 Rudolf Bultmann, Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910). 
26 Rudolf Bultmann, ‘Paul,’ in Schubert M. Ogden (ed.), Shorter Writings by Rudolf Bultmann: 
Existence and Faith (London: Collins, 1960), 147. 
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acquaintance with Stoic philosophy.27  Bultmann was able to catalogue such a list 
of Stoic-influenced ideas in Paul that an awareness of Stoicism, at the very least, 
is fairly uncontested to this date.28  His paper remains one of the best-stated 
arguments for diatribe in Paul, but sadly also remains un-translated.29  Stowers 
has written two major works on diatribe in Romans: his PhD thesis that argues 
that Romans is a diatribe meant to be instructive to one of Paul’s students rather 
than in opposition to a real or fictional character,30 and a book in which he 
advances a complete rereading of Romans as diatribe.31  The book contains a 
chapter so influential that it was reprinted in 2007 as part of the Norton Critical 
Edition The Writings of St Paul, which is where he argues that Rom 7:7-25 is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Bultmann, ‘Paul,’ 131. 
28 Rudolf Bultmann, Kendrick Grobel (trans.), Theology of the New Testament vol. 1 (London: 
SCM, 1952 [1948]), 70-72. 
29 Abraham Malherbe said in 1980 that ‘Rudolf Bultmann’s dissertation is still the best general 
description of diatribal style and remains the authority on the subject for most NT scholars.’  
Abraham J. Malherbe, ‘ΜΗ ΓΕΝΟΙΤΟ in the Diatribe and Paul,’ The Harvard Theological 
Review, 23.1 (January – April 1980), 231. 
30 Stanley K. Stowers, The Diatribe and Paul’s Letter to the Romans (Williston, VT: Society of 
Biblical Literature, 1981).  The fact that it is directed towards students is important, because 
Stowers’ argument is actually that the diatribe’s normal function was not intended to be written 
against anyone, but to be instructive in a classroom setting.  Suggesting that the Teacher is entirely 
fictive does not damage the thesis that follows, but virtually every scholar in the last few decades 
would at least agree that Romans is written in response to real issues with which Paul wished to 
engage (Jewett states that this is now the consensus in Romans, 3), as indicated by 16:17-20; so, 
even if Romans is read as instructive diatribe rather than diatribe against a real figure, the Teacher 
should be taken as someone Paul consciously presents in a certain way in order to speak to certain 
issues. 
31 Stowers, Rereading of Romans. 
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case of prosōpopoiia.32  Changwon Song compares Romans and Epictetus’s 
diatribes extensively, noting that Paul’s frequent use of µὴ γένοιτο (‘may it never 
be!’), his use of the vocative ὦ ἄνθρωπε (oh, man!) and the structuring of his 
argument as a first person plural arguing against a second person singular are 
identical to the form of Epictetus’s diatribes.33  In Epictetus’s diatribes the second 
person singular to whom the argument is addressed is probably not a real person; 
but, as just stated, it is irrelevant to the present wider argument whether or not ‘the 
Teacher’ (as Campbell calls him) was real.34  Either Paul is stereotyping a real 
Stoic-Jewish teacher, or inventing one based upon his view of Stoic-Jewish 
teachers.  However, it is worth pointing out that in the section just cited, Song 
defends reading Romans as diatribe by comparing Paul’s style therein with both 
Galatians and 1 Corinthians, which were certainly written in response to specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Stanley K. Stowers, ‘Romans 7:7-25 as Speech-in-Character,’ in The Writings of St. Paul, eds. 
Wayne A. Meeks and John T. Fitzgerald (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007 [1972]), 525-
538. 
33 Changwon Song, Reading Romans as a Diatribe (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2004), 24-
40.  ὦ ἄνθρωπε could be translated simply as ‘person!’ since an ἄνθρωπος can just mean ‘person,’ 
and the particle ὦ merely denotes the vocative.  However, as a Hellenistic Jewish 
philosopher/teacher, the figure was probably male, and in Koine Greek the use of ὦ was not 
required as it was in earlier Greek dialects, adding further weight to the argument that Paul is 
specifically using it here as part of the diatribal style, in which it was normal to address one’s 
fictive opponent with ὦ ἄνθρωπε (as Song notes). 
34 Campbell was already using this term for Paul’s opponent(s) in Rome in ‘Natural Theology in 
Paul?  Reading Romans 1.19-20,’ International Journal of Systematic Theology, 1.3 (November 
1999), 244, and, as he also does throughout Deliverance of God, cites J. L. Martyn’s apocalyptic 
reading of Galatians as its source: Louis Martyn, Galatians, The Anchor Bible 33A (New York: 
Doubleday, 1997), especially 117-135, 236-240 447-466. 
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situations involving real people; and also that Romans concludes with the 
suggestion that real people be expelled from the church (16:17-20).35 
 Both Romans 1 and 7 have historically been read as examples of Paul 
stating positive foundational arguments to his theology, or as diatribe in Romans, 
or as straw-arguments meant to draw the reader into a view Paul opposes or even 
as prosōpopoiia, speech-in-character, not necessarily representing Paul’s opinion 
at all.  The Lacanian reading of Paul I suggest here reads Paul as opposed to the 
‘figure’ of the Stoic-Jewish obsessional, who for my purposes may be taken as 
either real or fictive. 
 
2.  Stanley Stowers and Douglas Campbell on Prosōpopoiia in 
Romans 
 
 Within Stanley Stowers’ reading of Romans as an instructive diatribe 
against an imaginary interlocutor, he posits Rom 7:7-25 as an example of 
prosōpopoiia.   He notes that prosōpopoiia, is described in rhetorical manuals and 
other texts by Cicero, Quintilian, Theon, Hermogenes and Aphthonius; and that 
Origen (the oldest extant major commentator on Romans) believed it to be the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 For these reasons, as well as the argument to be outlined below, I resist the claim made by Frank 
J. Matera, Romans (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010), 60, that ‘Because Paul is using the form of the 
diatribe, there is no need to speculate about the identity of the interlocutor.’  Diatribe means that 
there is not necessarily a real interlocutor to identify, but not that there is necessarily not a real 
interlocutor to identify. 
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strategy employed in Rom 7.36  Since Paul was clearly an educated person with 
knowledge of Stoic philosophy and letter-writing, and (according to Stowers) both 
Theon and Nicolaus claim that practicing writing in prosōpopoiia was standard in 
letter-writing and rhetoric instruction, Paul is likely to have been skilled at using 
it.37  Stowers objects to reading Romans with presuppositions that it concerns 
theological debates resulting from later Christian religious questions, and instead 
claims that the true theoretical context for the letter is the story of Christian 
salvation as a recovery of lost self-mastery.38  Thus he reads Rom 1:18-32 as a 
description of gentile pagans who have no self-mastery (i.e., he reads it in Pauline 
voice describing non-Jewish non-Christians), but then reads Rom 7:7-25 as a 
psychological reconfiguration describing the same group through prosōpopoiia.39  
This reading, similar to Dale Martin’s reading of 1 Corinthians described in 
Chapter 3, puts Paul on the same side as the Stoics, defending self-mastery 
through renunciation and control of the passions.40  Stowers attempts to reconcile 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Stowers, Rereading of Romans, 17.  As Campbell points out, the same rhetorical strategy is 
termed ἠθοποιία in some of these texts (Deliverance of God, 533). 
37 Stowers, Rereading of Romans, 17.  As Paul says in 2 Cor 11:6, ‘I may be an idiot when it 
comes to speech, but not when it comes to knowledge.’ 
38 Stowers, Rereading of Romans, 42. 
39 Ibid., 42-43.  As Stowers points out, Origen’s position is slightly more complex than this, 
describing instead various stages of un-self-control through which the impersonated figure passes, 
but his position as a whole can be described as an impersonation of an ἀκρατής. 
40 There have been countless other studies of Paul’s relation to Stoicism, in addition to the ones 
mentioned throughout this chapter.  Where this study differs from the bulk of them is that I am not 
examining how Paul was influenced by Stoicism (which he surely was, to some degree), or how 
his arguments employ Stoic argumentation, but how Paul specifically, intentionally relates to 
Stoicism in Romans through his presentation of the Teacher.  The fact that so many studies 
demonstrate his awareness and occasional dependence upon Stoic thought does not rule out the 
argument that in Romans he specifically positioned himself against it; it just rounds out the picture 
of Paul as someone aware of Stoicism, thinking positively of certain aspects of it, but ultimately 
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some of the many contradictions within Rom 1:18-3:20, such as described by 
Heikki Räisänen in Paul and the Law,41 by reading 2:1-5 as an admonition, 
involving brief prosōpopoiia in 2:2, against the potential judgmentalism of gentile 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
using his knowledge of it to strike against someone whose disagreement with him was defended 
with it.  Indeed, all of this demonstration that Paul used Stoic argumentative strategies (such as in 
Paul A. Halloway, ‘Paul as a Hellenistic Philosopher: The Evidence of Philippians,’ in eds. Ward 
Blanton and Hent de Vries, Paul and the Philosophers [New York: Fordham University Press, 
2013], 52-68), only strengthens the necessary prior argument to the one being made here: for Paul 
to argue against Stoicism, he must at least have been deeply aware of it.  Two important studies on 
Paul and Stoicism not otherwise mentioned below are Niko Huttunen, Paul and Epictetus on Law: 
A Comparison (T&T Clark, 2009) and Runar Thorsteinsson, Roman Christianity and Roman 
Stoicism: A Comparitive Study of Ancient Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 89-
104 (focusing on Stoic allusions in Rom 12-15, as Thorsteinsson also does in some of her other 
work).  These works both demonstrate parallels and claim dependences of Paul upon Stoicism, but 
do not suggest that Paul had a specific attitude towards or interaction with Stoicism other than 
thinking of it positively enough to depend upon it.  Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), is probably the most extensive work on Paul and Stoicism, 
suggesting a structural equivalence between them, in another reading of Paul as heavily influenced 
by Stoic thought.  Unlike many of the others, Engberg-Pedersen appeals broadly across all of 
Paul’s writings; but he is perhaps insufficiently cautious, alleging a large degree of dependence 
upon Stoicism where Stowers would more reasonably see Paul as situated within a wider discourse 
of self-mastery.  On the other hand Emma Wasserman, The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Sin, 
Death, and the Law in light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), is 
an excellent example of a trend true of many of these, including Stowers: the tendency to depend 
heavily upon Rom 1-2 and 7 for the densest proliferation of clearly Stoic/Hellenistic philosophical 
references.  She presents this argument (that in Rom 7 Paul’s prosōpopoiia presents the middle-
Stoic use of a passage from Euripides’ Medea to outline the ‘death of the soul,’ similar to Stowers’ 
reading) more briefly in ‘Paul Among the Ancient Philosophers: The Case of Romans 7,’ in eds. 
Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries, Paul and the Philosophers (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2013), 69-83.  The reading suggested here explains why Paul’s Stoic resonances are so 
heavily concentrated in certain sections of one of Paul’s letters, while studies focusing on passages 
outside of these tends to make more general claims about similarity of argumentative strategy 
rather than concepts (for example, the difference between the studies by Wasserman above, and 
those by Huttunen or Thorsteinsson above). 
41 Heikki Räisänen, Paul and the Law (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2010 [1983]), 201-209.  
Sanders, when writing about the internal contradictions of Rom 1:18-2:29 as cited above, says this 
in agreement with Räisänen. 
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Christians who were formerly the sort of people described in 1:18-32.42  So he 
reads 1:18-32 as a Pauline description of gentile ἀκρασία (akrasia, ‘un-self-
control,’ as in the translation of 1 Cor 7:1-9 in Appendix B, below), and Rom 2:1-
5 as condemning any pride one might have after advancing past such a condition.  
Thus in 1:18-32 Stowers’ Paul accuses gentile sinners of being so ignorant of the 
laws of nature that they commit every evil imaginable and deserve to die, and then 
follows it up by warning converts not to be judgmental; if there is any irony in 
this, it is lost on Stowers’ Paul.  However, this reading of Paul against akrasia 
then leads Stowers to agree with Origen that Rom 7:7-25 contains (either in part 
or in whole), prosōpopoiia of a person whom Stoic philosophy would deem to be 
without self-control (an akratēs).43  So Stowers makes use of prosōpopoiia in his 
reading of Paul, but in such a way that still reads Rom 1:18-32 as Pauline in 
voice, and reads the prosōpopoiia in Romans to be in the voices of different 
figures throughout the letter (in the voice of a judgmental gentile Christian in 2:2, 
and in the voice of a gentile who tries to live by the Jewish law in 7:7-25).44  
Stowers successfully defends the legitimacy of using the rhetorical strategy of 
prosōpopoiia to interpret Romans, but fails to employ it in such a way as actually 
to reconcile the contradictions between Rom 1:18-32 and 2:1-29 (by keeping the 
former as Pauline in voice, the accusation of judgmentalism contained in the latter 
rings hollow – as well as the other contradictions between the passages that will 
be discussed below). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Stowers, Rereading of Romans, 100-102.  It is worth noting that the NRSV confidently notes 
Rom 2:2 as prosōpopoiia (or simple quotation), putting it in quotation marks and adding the words 
‘You say’ before it. 
43 Ibid., 264-269. 
44 Ibid., 273-284. 
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 This is where Douglas Campbell picks up.  He writes that that when 
Stowers published his argument for prosōpopoiia in Romans, in 1994, he had 
already been presuming that some sort of strategy akin to this must be what is 
happening in Rom 1:18-32, but was not yet convinced it was prosōpopoiia.  He 
then found Stowers’ argument so convincing that he was persuaded it is also the 
strategy in 1:18-32.45  The full context of Campbell’s reading of this passage, as 
part of a complete rereading of Romans and Paul, is far too much to summarise 
here; but some of his observations about 1:18-32 justify his assertion that this is 
the opening statement of Paul’s impersonation of an opponent he labels ‘the 
Teacher.’  He lists nine ‘underdeterminations’ in the wider section of 1:18-3:20; 
that is, arguments one would expect Paul to have made if he was really saying 
what he has traditionally been interpreted to be arguing.46  Holding more weight, 
since they speak from presence rather than absence, are the overdeterminations he 
lists in 1:18-32 (aspects of this text that stand out as unnecessary, exceptional or 
inconsistent, if the text were to be taken as Paul’s own opinion): (1) it has a 
specific style distinct from the rest of Romans, with an excess of alpha-privatives, 
alliteration, third-person-plural verbs and word plays; (2) it describes in detail 
God’s judgment as revealed in the present, directly contradicting Paul’s specific 
claim that God’s judgment is a future event in Rom 2:5, and that it is God’s 
righteousness, kindness and patience that are revealed in the present, in 1:17 and 
2:4; (3) it posits the collective decline of all pagan civilisation, and all individuals 
therein, which negates the possibility of the individual correctly discerning God 
from nature in the way that the same passage (and the wider theological system 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Campbell, Deliverance of God, 532-533. 
46 Ibid., 339-353. 
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Campbell seeks to subvert) suggests they should have; and (4) the extensive and 
often-observed intertextual relation with the Wisdom of Solomon, a text that 
seeks to establish the necessity of Torah observance for all mankind.47  More 
reasons will be added to these in the discussion below, on top of the many other 
underdeterminations and overdeterminations Campbell lists on pages 338-411. 
 Campbell seeks to remedy these problems, not only with this passage but 
also the contradictions he sees in Romans and the whole of the Pauline corpus, by 
reading 1:18-32 (and other parts of Romans and Paul) as prosōpopoiia, and 
specifically as what Paul ‘takes to be the Teacher’s usual opening – his arresting 
προοίµοιν, or exordium.  Here Paul provides what we might call a cameo of this 
material.’48  Campbell reads this as a six-step argument: (1) universal culpability 
because of general revelation/natural theology; (2) humanity has turned away 
from natural theology; (3) this is described in terms of exchange, trading the glory 
of God for figures that were popularly recognised to refer to pagan idols; (4) this 
exchange also involved surrender to unnatural passions; (5) Paul formulates for 
the Teacher a precise list of sins of a ‘debased mind,’ including ‘attitudinal’ sins 
such as hatred, arrogance and schism, of which Paul can then accuse the Teacher 
of being guilty and (6) the list of sins concludes by condemning those who 
‘approve’ of such sins, again crafted so that Paul can condemn those who agree 
with the Teacher’s venomous sin list and are thus also its object, by being so 
hateful, arrogant and schismatic.  Campbell reads Rom 2 as Paul’s initial 
argument against the Teacher, and summarises Paul’s ‘main problem with the 
Teacher’ as holding that ‘the Teacher’s rather traditional Jewish instructions in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Ibid., 356-362. 
48 Ibid., 542. 
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terms of circumcision and law observance are ethically inadequate.’49  Campbell 
does not mention the apparent extent to which the Teacher’s arguments depend 
upon Stoic thought in either the section outlining the problems with seeing 1:18-
32 as Pauline, or the section proposing his solution;50 and he does not see a 
decision on prosōpopoiia in Rom 7 as necessary for his study.51 
 There have been positive and negative reviews of Campbell’s work, and a 
good representation of them now exists in a volume published following a 
conference in 2014.52  The argument below combats some of these criticisms, and 
circumvents others, but is not a full solution.  This is a step in a Lacanian reading 
that makes use of Campbell’s theory, not a thesis dedicated to defending 
Campbell’s reading of Romans.  I use some of the individual interpretative moves 
of Campbell and Stowers – primarily, reading parts of Rom 1 and 7 as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid., 570. 
50 Ibid., 355-376 and 542-571. 
51 Ibid., 532. 
52 Chris Tilling, ed., Beyond Old and New Perspectives on Paul: Reflections on the work of 
Douglas Campbell (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014).  Journal for the Study of the New 
Testament, 34.2 (Dec. 2011), contains many responses to Campbell, and a response by him.  
Michael Gorman read an advance copy and comments on it repeatedly, both positively and 
negatively, in Inhabiting the Cruciform God: Kenosis, Justification, and Theosis in Paul’s 
Narrative Soteriology (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), 7-8 (n. 20), 43 (n. 11), 45, 47, 48, 71, 75 (n. 
97), 82-83, 104 (n. 180) and 167-168.  Larry Hurtado responded on his blog, and engaged in 
conversation with Campbell in the comments. Larry Hurtado, ‘Douglas Campbell’s “Rereading” 
of Paul,’ Larry Hurtado’s Blog <https://larryhurtado.wordpress.com/2012/04/23/douglas-
campbells-rereading-of-paul/> [accessed 27.8.2016].  N. T. Wright responds with an article 
devoted to Campbell’s reading, in Paul and his Interpreters (London: SPCK, 2015), 187-218.  The 
present chapter is too long already to engage in prolonged response to Campbell’s critics, but the 
reader familiar with them will note that the reading I suggest meets some of the concerns raised. 
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prosōpopoiia – in order to position Paul clearly vis-à-vis Stoic philosophy and its 
psychoanalytic correlates.   
Some general methodological concerns should be addressed before 
continuing.  John Barclay has outlined the problems associated with ‘mirror 
reading,’ i.e., reading an argument in light of the presumed argument it is 
structured against, particularly in Paul’s more polemical letters.53  However, what 
Campbell is doing and what is continued below is not mirror reading because it 
does not involve reconstructing an absent argument based on inference, but 
reading an actual argument from within the text and discussing its voice.  
Nonetheless, even if one were to agree with Nijay Gupta’s categorisation of 
Campbell’s project as mirror reading, I am merely suggesting this ‘mirror 
reading’ as a possibility, rather than a fact.54  This is, in fact, all I am suggesting: 
that one possible Lacanian reading of Paul is as follows.  Another accusation that 
might be made is that, in light of the highly influential 1962 paper by Samuel 
Sandmel, my reading of the Teacher is some sort of ‘parallelomania,’ citing 
parallels between his speeches and Stoic philosophy.55  However this study 
specifically negates that accusation, as the claim being made regards not the 
specific content of the arguments made, but the form of the logic, the use of 
signifiers and above all the clinical structure of the arguments. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 John M. G. Barclay, ‘Mirror Reading a Polemical Letter: A Test Case,’ Journal for the Study of 
the New Testament, 31.1 (1987), 73-93. 
54 Nijay Gupta, ‘Mirror-Reading Moral Issues in Paul’s Letters,’ Journal for the Study of the New 
Testament 34.4 (2012), 377. 
55 Samuel Sandmel, ‘Parallelomania,’ Journal of Biblical Literature, 81-1 (March, 1962), 1-13. 
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3.  The Stoic Obsessional Teacher 
 
 Romans 1:18-32 is an ethical argument that bears no obvious relation to 
Christ:56 neither the revelation of God it espouses (1:19-20);57 nor the benediction 
in which Paul would usually include Christ (1:25); nor the ethical model it 
employs (1:26-27); nor the view of wisdom as good and foolishness as evil (1:22) 
and certainly not the ferocious and malicious judgmentalism (1:28-32).58  It is 
thus, from first reading, apparently at odds with Pauline theology; and the rest of 
the letter confirms this.  In Romans 8 there is an alternate story of the revelation 
of God, not through creation (κτίσις) but through his children in Christ.  In Rom 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Compare to the use of some similar signifiers in Eph 4:17-24.  This could be authentically 
Pauline, or could be a pseudepigraphal imitation of Rom 1:18-32.  Either way, the fact that the 
second half of it (vv. 20-24) is all about how the darkened way of the gentiles is ‘not the way you 
learned in Christ’ demonstrates how bizarre it is that we have fifteen verses of judgmental anger in 
Romans that fails to mention Christ at all.  
57 When Campbell first outlined his theory of Rom 1:18-32 as prosōpopoiia, in ‘Natural Theology 
in Paul?,’ 231-252, he made countering the natural revelation espoused in 1:19-20 his opening 
argument; it takes much more of a back seat in his eventual full argument in Deliverance of God, 
where Campbell’s main goal is unseating justification theory.  The reading presented here re-
integrates the relationship between Pauline theology and natural revelation, via Stoicism, as a core 
question of Romans, explaining its pride of place in the Teacher’s opening argument. 
58 Jewett notes that Paul ‘does not reiterate the Christological grounding of his theory here,’ in 
Romans, 150, and attributes this to Paul presuming the Roman Christians to know that the 
grounding of his moral theory is Christological; but it is difficult to see how 1:18-32 leaves any 
room for a ‘grounding’ other than nature itself as a revelation of God.  Paul makes a sweeping 
series of ethical statements, all founded on the self-revelation of nature to all humans, and neither 
mentions nor leaves room for Christ’s role in ethics and theology, since nature itself makes plain 
enough what can be known about God (1:19-21), that those who do not live by it (1:24-27) are 
justly condemned to death (1:28-32).  A more correct statement along the lines of Jewett’s logic 
would be that since Paul presumed the Roman Christians to know that his theory is 
Christologically grounded, this sustained development of a non-Christian ethical theory would not 
have sounded Pauline! 
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7:25 there is an alternate benediction, now referring to Christ.  The ethics based 
on living κατὰ φύσιν (aligned with nature) are subverted in Rom 11:21-24 when 
God himself acts παρὰ φύσιν (unaligned with/against nature).  The superiority of 
the wise over the foolish is contested in the verses immediately before and after it, 
as is the judgmentalism towards gentiles.  These arguments are added to and 
expanded upon below, towards the theory that in Rom 1:18-32 Paul stereotypes 
the Teacher as overly dependent upon Stoic logic, which Paul then contests.59  In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The reading suggested here is close to that of Diana Swancutt, ‘Sexy Stoics and the Rereading 
of Romans 1.18-2.16,’ in A Feminist Companion to Paul, ed. Amy-Jill Levine (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 2004), 42-73.  She argues that in Rom 1:18-2:16 Paul diatribes against a Stoic philosopher, 
using a familiar trope of accusing Stoic philosophers of hypocrisy on the basis of a common 
perception that their sexual behaviour is often in contravention of their own interpretation of 
natural law.  With this reading she suggests that Romans is actually placed in a triangular relation, 
with Paul excluding Stoicism in 1:18-2:16 before moving on to Judaism, and eventually positing 
the Christian gospel against both (71).  She demonstrates with comprehensive reference to Stoic 
literature the extent to which 1:18-2:16 should be read in context of Stoicism, with which I 
obviously agree; however, in making Paul’s direct object here Stoicism itself, she (with Stowers) 
presents a reading of Romans which, while fitting better with ancient pagan culture, fails to 
present a consistent purpose to the letter.  Her Paul strays into dialogue with pagan philosophy for 
no apparent reason other than because it was an available mode of thought to Christians in Rome.  
This weakness is most present when considering the strong resonances between 1:18-32 and the 
Wisdom of Solomon, which she acknowledges (44).  If the purpose of this section is to attack the 
vices hypocritically practiced by Stoic philosophers who claim to follow nature, and it is totally 
separate to Paul’s dialogue with Torah observance, why is Paul making frequent reference to the 
Wisdom of Solomon (or its discursive setting), which is a Jewish philosophical assault on gentile 
pagans?  My reading accounts for this.  Swancutt also fails to make the link between the Stoic in 
Rom 1:18-2:16 and the Stoic in 7:7-25; a link made much clearer by her translation of 2:14-15 as 
‘[the few wise gentiles] show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, although their 
inner conviction (συνείδησις) testifies and their conflicting thoughts bring accusations or even 
make defences among themselves on that day when according to my gospel, God judges the 
secrets of men by Christ Jesus’ (italics and parenthetical comments original).  If 1:18-2:16 is 
against a Stoic, and 2:17-29 against a Jew, then the former figure is clearly the sort of person Paul 
opposes in 7:7-25 (and here Swancutt follows Stowers, who also sees 2:1-16 as opposing a gentile 
and 2:17-29 as opposing a Jew).  If Swancutt’s triangulation of Romans is correct, why does Paul 
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this section I argue for this identification of the Teacher, in order to place Paul’s 
theology in relation to the Stoic obsessionalism described in Chapter 4, in addition 
to Paul’s relation to Corinthian perversion described in Chapter 3.  This sets up 
the rest of the chapter, drawing out the implications of Paul’s opposition to Stoic 
obsessionalism for a Lacanian reading of Paul. 
 This theory is not an overarching explanatory theory of Romans.  It is 
merely a theory about an aspect of the character posited in the diatribe, and the 
way Paul argues against him.  So, very much unlike Campbell’s reading, I am not 
arguing specifically against any other overall reading (neither am I arguing for 
one, other than that whatever Paul’s message in Romans is, it is posited against 
1:18-32).   Within 1:18-32 most interpreters see allusions to various types and 
sources of ‘fall’ narratives.60  This is also not being contested here.  Whatever the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
return to his caricature of a Stoic in 7:7-25, when the relation of Christianity to the Jewish law 
seems to be the predominant theme of the rest of the letter?  This is a major fault in both Swancutt 
and Stowers’ readings: in seeking to put Romans so predominantly in context of Hellenistic 
philosophy, they do go some way towards removing the possibility of anti-Semitic readings, but 
they perhaps go much further towards returning to the days of religionsgeschichtliche, reading 
Paul as moving from Judaism to Hellenism, and this might be even more problematic.  As 
Campbell notes (Deliverance of God, 1022), Swancutt is also wrong to deny the similarities 
between her alleged two figures opposed in Rom 2.  The reading suggested here, of Paul 
responding to Stoicism as part of his dialogue with a Hellenistic Jewish teacher who employs it, 
accounts for the extent of dialogue with Stoicism that Swancutt comprehensively reveals, without 
failing to account for the place of this dialogue within the argumentative structure of the rest of the 
letter. 
60 Dunn claims in Romans 1-8, 72, that ‘It is sufficiently clear that Paul had in mind the figure of 
Adam and the narrative of the fall (Gen 3), as of course is true also of the Wisdom of Solomon 
(2:23-24).’  Dunn notes, again on 72, that his reason for thinking the passage alludes to Genesis is 
that it is impossible that a Jew could be talking about the fall to sin and about looking at creation 
without Gen 1-3 in mind.  (Most commentators do not accept Dunn’s thesis that the Adamic fall is 
a strong subtext of Romans.)  Another potential ‘fall’ narrative being alluded to is retold in 
Wisdom of Solomon 10-11 and 16:5-6, where Israel’s time wandering in the wilderness is read as 
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inspiration of the narrative of the condemnation, what is being argued here is that 
the logical justification for this condemnation is built upon Stoic logic, much 
more than on biblical argument.  Since the two are not exclusive, and, as will be 
seen, it was perfectly normal to fuse them together (and this tendency is what Paul 
critiques), there is not a binary position to argue.  Nonetheless, it remains the case 
that the bulk of the argumentation Paul presents falls upon Stoic concepts, and 
that Paul opposes the figure he stereotypes for this very reason: though Torah 
observance is what he defends, the Stoic form of his argument is part of his flaw. 
One last clarification: ‘Stoicism’ is also not as clearly defined a category 
as one might like it to be.  Epictetus is the most often cited near-contemporary 
source for Stoicism when researching Paul, but he considered himself both Stoic 
and Cynic; and since Stoicism was the most popular of the philosophical schools, 
its language appears in authors who might not necessarily adhere to it entirely.61  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
full of rebelliousness and sinfulness (Wright, ‘Romans,’ 429). Wright also states as fact that Paul 
draws from the Wisdom of Solomon.   In the case of both of these proposed fall narratives, they 
come as side-effects of the importation of the Wisdom of Solomon, rather than as specific points 
Paul intended, and so do not affect the reading presented here.  Of course, as Stowers points out in 
Rereading of Romans 97-100, there is also a long history of fall narratives in Hellenistic literature, 
frequently employed by philosophers as examples of what life was like before humans ceased to 
live according to nature.  There are also other Jewish fall narratives (such as that contained in 1 
Enoch) that one could point to as subtexts for Rom 1:18-32, but none that can be argued so easily 
as the possibilities above, and also none that would actually undermine the proposed reading.  
Likewise, Alec Lucas finds the section 1:18-2:11 to be evoking the figure of the idol of the golden 
calf created by the Israelites while Moses was on Mt Sinai (as recounted in Psalm 106, or 105 
LXX).  Alec J. Lucas, Evocations of the Calf? Romans 1:18-32 and the Substructure of Psalm 106 
(105) (Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015).  This strikes against the majority view that 1:18-32 is 
directed against gentile idolatry, but requires Paul to be implying an allusion so subtly that it can 
hardly be regarded as a central theme of the section. 
61 As can be seen in the translated passage from Epictetus in Appendix B, Epictetus uses the term 
‘the Cynic’ for his concept of the ideal philosopher, and draws from Diogenes the Cynic alongside 
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Many of the patterns in Stoic thought, such as self-mastery and ethics grounded in 
a notion of physis, can also be seen as characteristics of wider Hellenistic thought.  
The usual approach of scholars attempting to define Stoicism is to clarify which 
ancient thinkers they group under this malleable designation.62  This is where the 
clarifications of the previous chapter are helpful: while Stoicism was the most 
prevalent philosophical school and the one with most influence on wider culture, 
one distinguishing mark of it is the obsessional form of its self-mastery and 
physis-based ethics.  Paul’s stereotyping of not just Stoicism but specifically the 
perceived obsessionalism of his opponent marks him out as the same sort of 
character as other Stoic obsessionals.  So, why should the fictive or real object of 
diatribe in Romans be characterised as Stoic? 
Much of what is extant of Paul’s writings is taken up with opposing those 
who fought against his inclusion of gentiles in the Church.  The basic connection 
between Paul’s argumentative context, in defence of gentile inclusion in the 
Church, and Stoicism, is that in Paul’s time it was common for academic Jews to 
defend the law (and Jewish proselytisation), by connecting it to the Stoic master 
signifier physis.63  For example, Philo claimed that he had ‘studied philosophy in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
his Stoic sources and Socrates; yet, despite this, his philosophical system is Stoic enough that A. 
A. Long insists that those who pay close attention to Epictetus will rightly identify him ‘solely and 
completely with the Socratic-Stoic tradition.’ A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to 
Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 98. 
62 For example, Thorsteinsson, Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism, 21. 
63 Some examples are sketched in this paragraph.  See the author’s wider study of the subject in 
the appendix.  Physis functioned in a similar way in Cynic and Epicurean philosophies, as is 
outlined in the complete version of the study in the appendix; and, as seen in the case of Epictetus, 
the lines between these philosophical schools were not clear-cut.  One of the benefits of the 
Lacanian approach being taken here is that while all of these schools treated physis as a master 
signifier, it was Stoicism whose relation to this signifier was particularly obsessional in structure, 
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a genuine spirit,’64 and effectively combines elements of Jewish and Stoic ethical 
systems: ‘The law corresponds to the world and the world to the law, and… a man 
who is obedient to the law, being by so doing, a citizen of the world, arranges his 
actions with reference to the intention of nature, in harmony with which the whole 
universe is regulated.’65  Likewise, the author of 4 Maccabees appropriates physis 
in a typically Stoic way: in 5:8-9 we are told that it is not wrong to eat meat that 
nature has provided for us, and which is not shameful to eat; we then find out in 
5:25 that ‘the law is divine’, and the Creator has shown us sympathy by ‘imposing 
a law that is in accordance with nature.’  The author of the Wisdom of Solomon 
spends most of chapters 12-15 mocking all who do not believe in God for not 
having seen evidence of him in nature, including the line ‘all beings who are 
ignorant of God are by nature [φύσει] foolish’ (13:1).  The Wisdom of Solomon, 
and in particular cps. 11-15, is so similar to Rom 1:18-32 (including in its Stoic 
tone) that most commentators see either it or the tradition from which it stems as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and it is this obsessional structure that will also be seen in the way Paul presents the Teacher.  
However, made without Lacan, the point that the Teacher was connected primarily to Stoicism 
rather than the other schools still stands, because the connections made between the theologians 
mentioned in this paragraph and philosophy are specifically to Stoicism.  The language that the 
Teacher employs, of mentally exhausting self-control based on reasoning from nature, sounds 
much more Stoic than Cynic or Epicurean, even considering the blurred lines between the schools. 
64 Philo, The Works of Philo: Complete and Unabridged, trans. by C. D. Yonge (Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson, 1993), 682 (from Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit 1.3).  More specifically, Philo is 
here describing the teachings of a Pythogorean sect with which he agrees, but the fact that he has 
studied philosophy closely is borne out across all of his works, and demonstrated by his agreement 
here with the belief common to most contemporary philosophies, that careful philosophical 
thought is the way towards a happy life. 
65 Philo, The Works of Philo, 3 (from De Opificio Mundi 1.3). 
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the primary source from which Paul adapts the section.66  Given all of this 
evidence, both of the following statements are fully plausible: either (1) the real 
figure whom Paul opposed in Rome was a Roman (Messianic?) Jewish theologian 
who used Stoic logic to defend the universal requirement of Torah observance or 
(2) in setting up a fictive opponent in the diatribe, Paul incorporated Stoic 
philosophical defence of law observance because it was a common motif in the 
discourse (perhaps particularly when he has in mind that he is writing to a church 
in Rome).67  However, at this point it is still possible to argue that Paul’s opponent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Brendan Byrne summarises the similarities concisely: ‘Both works (Romans and Wisdom) 
assume that human beings can attain to knowledge of God the Creator through the contemplation 
of the created world (Wis 13:1-5; Rom 1:20-21).  Both find human failure to do so inexcusable 
(Wis 13:6-9; Rom 1:21d)… Both see a link between lapse into idolatry and immoral behavior 
(Wis 14:12-14, 27; Rom 1:24-31); both refer to “unnatural” sexual behavior in this connection 
(Wis 14:26; Rom 1:26-27).  Both feature catalogues of vices (Wis 14:23-27; Rom 1:29-31), seen 
as liable to divine retribution (Wis 14:30 [cf.12:27]; Rom 1:32).  Both mention and condemn 
complacency in wrongdoing as well as the wrongdoing itself (Wis 14:22; Rom 1:32).  Both 
believe that sin has resulted in a “darkening” of the human mind (Wis 11:15; Rom 1:21).’  
Brendan Byrne, Romans, Sacra Pagina (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2007 [1996]), 64-65.  
Peter Stuhlmacher, though believing that the basis of Paul’s message in 1:18-32 is his missionary 
preaching, states that ‘in terms of content, Paul follows closely the way of thinking found in the 
(Hellenistic) Jewish wisdom tradition, as it is represented, for example, in the Wisdom of 
Solomon.’  Peter Stuhlmacher, Paul’s Letter to the Romans: A Commentary, trans. by Scott J. 
Hafemann (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 34.  As noted in footnote 60 above, James Dunn 
comments extensively on the similarities between Rom 1:18-32 and the Wisdom of Solomon, and 
N. T. Wright is confident that Paul actually used the latter as a source.  Campbell cites several 
more people who have outlined this intertextual link in Deliverance of God, 1027, n. 63, then 
gives eight of his own observations of similarities that are ‘too precise and/or numerous to be 
coincidental’ on 360-362.  The fact that in Romans Paul ‘seems to undermine the theological 
program of the Wisdom of Solomon far more than he leans on it,’ which Campbell calls 
‘orthopractic Judaism,’ is the fourth of the ‘textual overdeterminations’ in 1:18-3:20 that Campbell 
lists (360-362, also see above). 
67 Note that for my specific purposes in this particular Lacanian reading of Paul it is only 
necessary to argue that the above is ‘plausible.’  For Campbell’s argument it is not just plausible 
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is characterised as Jewish and philosophical in his arguments, but not necessarily 
Stoic (for, as stated, all Hellenistic philosophical schools gave physis a central 
place in their systems, in one way or another). So, having established that it is 
plausible that Paul knew or presumed a real or fictive opponent in Rome to argue 
using Stoic philosophical concepts, what evidence is there in the text that this 
actually was the case, and that Paul characterises his opponent specifically as 
Stoic? 
Firstly, Stoic writers frequently referred to Stoic philosophers in a special, 
elevated way, usually as σοφοί (sophoi, ‘wise men’ or sages), and to those who 
are not sages in some other way, usually as fools.68  In 1 Corinthians Paul 
intentionally posits Christians within the latter category, professing them not to be 
wise but foolish, constantly referring to Christians, including himself, as fools 
(µωροί).69  In Romans Paul continues this, acknowledging in Rom 1:14 that he is 
a debtor both to the wise and to the foolish.70  However, in the voice of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
but crucial that Paul faces a Jewish Christian opponent.  This is what allows him to go beyond the 
New Perspective and see Paul’s argument in Romans as a particular argument in which Paul was 
engaged in a contingent situation – rather than as a foundational juxtaposition of Christianity 
against Judaism.  But for this study I am not really dealing with the question of Paul’s relation to 
Judaism, be it foundational or contingent to his thought.   
68 John Sellars, Stoicism (London: Routledge, 2006), 36-41.  Sellars mentions that Cicero, in 
Paradoxa Stoicorum, has a section devoted to the claim that ‘every non-sage is mad.’  He also 
provides the helpful clarification that there was a third category employed, those who are ‘making 
progress:’ philosophers who love wisdom but are not themselves yet wise. 
69 1 Cor 1:17-4:21, specifically 1:18-25, 27, 3:18-19 and 4:10.  1 Cor 2 is a speech against wisdom 
and rhetoric, which sounds as though it was written against a Stoic sage.  Paul’s thoughts on the 
matter are perhaps summed up best in 3:18-19, where he says ‘If anyone among you thinks 
himself to be a sage, let him become a fool, so that he may become wise.  For the wisdom of this 
world is foolishness with God.’ 
70 This point is complex, due to both the wide semantic range of ὀφειλέτης (in what sense does 
Paul owe something to both Greeks and Barbarians, both the wise and foolish?), and the argument 
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Teacher he claims that all those who fail to learn about the things of God from 
nature (1:20) have had their logic confused and their ‘stupid hearts darkened,’ 
claiming to be sages but made fools (1:22).  The Teacher again calls them foolish 
with the word ἀσύνετος, in 1:31.  This is all quite opposed to Paul’s proud claim 
to have a debt to fools in 1:14.  Afterwards, Paul, true to his habitual refusal to 
side with those who see themselves as greater than a fool, attacks the Teacher’s 
hypocrisy in 2:20-21, saying ‘An instructor of fools and teacher of babes… will 
you not teach yourself?’71  This use of language is a strong defence of Campbell’s 
reading: Paul first proudly claims to owe something both to the wise and the 
foolish, then has the Teacher lambast his opponents for their foolishness, and then 
retorts that the Teacher teaches fools but does not teach himself.  This is not only 
additional evidence that 1:18-32 only makes sense when read in opposition to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
by Runar Thorsteinsson, in ‘Paul’s Missionary Duty Towards Gentiles in Rome: A Note on the 
Punctuation and Syntax of Rom 1.13-15,’ New Testament Studies, 48 (2002), 531-547, that a full 
stop should be placed before the noun, making the last two words of 1:14 the beginning of the 
sentence of 1:15.  However, in any possible reading the point stands.  If one takes ὀφειλέτης in the 
sense of Paul owing a debt to the wise and foolish, then this can be read as Paul acknowledging 
that he borrows ideas and rhetorical style from both those who consider themselves wise, and 
those they might consider foolish.  If it means Paul has an obligation to preach to them (the most 
common reading), then Paul is reinforcing that his obligation is not just to wise philosophers but to 
all, and no less to the foolish.  If Thorsteinsson’s reading is upheld, then Paul is prefacing his 
repost to the Teacher with the claim that he has had success both with Greeks and barbarians (this 
opposes the Teacher’s defence of his gospel with specifically Greek logic), and both the wise and 
the foolish (this opposes the Teacher’s insistence, in 1:18-32, that salvation is for the wise; a 
notion Paul consistently opposes). 
71 Stowers, Rereading of Romans, 101, notes that typifying one’s opponent as foolish was usual for 
the diatribal style; but Paul goes further, introducing the theme of the wise against the foolish as 
early as 1:14, and not only caricaturing his opponent as foolish, but specifically caricaturing him 
as one who presents himself as wise, lampoons those who claim to be wise but are foolish, and is 
foolish. 
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what precedes and follows it, but is also an example of Paul positing and opposing 
the Teacher as one who sounds like a Stoic. 
Secondly, the clearest argument for reading 1:18-32 as intentionally Stoic 
is the form of its logic.  As outlined in the previous chapter, Stoicism treats physis 
as its central explanatory mechanism, as a master signifier that determines the 
meaning of other signifiers in a signifying chain.  Its relation to this master 
signifier is obsessional in form, transubstantiating desire as demand by placing 
upon physis the expectation that it will regulate all of life, and submitting entirely 
to whatever it is determined to be dictating.  This level of psychoanalytic demand 
is parallel to an extreme level of argumentative demand placed upon it, with 
physis as the ultimate object of all ethical appeals.  As stated, due to the influence 
of Hellenistic philosophy on Jewish thought, physis was also being used in Paul’s 
time to defend Torah observance, which could be read not as a specific allusion to 
Stoicism but merely as the way such arguments generally went.  However, though 
this is the argument Paul caricatures in his opening prosōpopoiia, he caricatures it 
to such an extent that the Teacher’s argument is almost exclusively Stoic in form, 
mimicking the extreme demand placed on physis and the obsessional structure it 
elicits, and only minimally Jewish in form, perhaps containing allusions to Gen 1-
3 but not necessarily.72  So this passage is not saying that gentile pagans should 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 The extent to which Rom 1:18-32 contains an exclusively Stoic argument is one of the main 
things that separates it out from the only other place where Paul definitely uses physis positively, 
and indeed in a Stoic way, in 1 Cor 11:14.  While the Teacher advances an extended argument for 
why physis, and not Christ, is the foundation of ethics, Paul in 1 Cor 11:14 only gets around to 
physis eventually, as an additional minor argument in a section that begins by stating that Christ is 
the head of the Church.  However, in order to further allay any concerns that 1 Cor 11:14 is the 
spanner in the works of my argument, I should perhaps say a bit more.  Firstly, within the wider 
reading of Paul in this study, I have already outlined 1 Corinthians as bearer of a knee-jerk 
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have known God’s law from the Torah, which happens to be aligned with physis 
(the more common Jewish academic argument described above), but, rather, that 
‘the invisible things of God have been understood and clearly known through the 
created things from the creation of the world’ (v. 20).  Indeed, the Teacher has just 
said that what can be known about God has been made clear to them, and he 
explains that it is clear in creation/nature, without linking this to the Torah.   
Upon nature the Teacher places an extreme burden of thought and 
rationalisation, which he sees as universally required of the subject: ‘the 
knowledge of God is known among them.  For God revealed it to them.  For the 
invisible things of God have been understood and clearly known from the creation 
of the world… Despite knowing God [they] became perverted in their reasoning 
and their stupid heart was darkened.’73  It is as a result of failing in the attempt to 
master the real through thought (one of the definitions of the obsessional), which 
Stoics do through striving for correct knowledge of physis, that the people 
described by the Teacher are given over to the passions, exactly as the Stoics say 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
neurotic reaction, so it would be perfectly consistent to read 1 Cor 11:2-16 as part of this.  
Secondly, my argument is that in Romans Paul caricatures his opponent as overly Stoic; not that 
Paul was consistently anti-Stoic.  There is far too much evidence to overlook that Paul was often 
positively influenced by Stoic ideas.  Thirdly, it has been suggested both before Campbell and then 
again in a way influenced by Campbell that this section of 1 Corinthians does not represent Paul’s 
own opinion; though, for the reasons just stated, it is not at all necessary that one agree with that 
judgment for the present reading to succeed.  See Jerome Murphy O’Connor, ‘The Non-Pauline 
Character of 1 Corinthians 11:2-16?,’ Journal of Biblical Literature, 95.4 (Dec., 1976), 615-621 
and Lucy Peppiatt, Women and Worship at Corinth: Paul’s Rhetorical Argument in 1 Corinthians 
(Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015). 
73 The italicised words and phrases here are γνωστὸν, φανερόν, νοούµενα, καθορᾶται γνόντες, 
ἐµαταιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισµοῖς and ἀσύνετος.  
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happens when one fails to learn from nature.74  So, not only is the cause of the 
failure insufficient intellectual oblativity to physis (failure to be an obsessional 
Stoic), but the result of the failure is Stoic as well: one is punished by being given 
over to the passions, which is punishment in itself, because the sage learns from 
nature to avoid the passions.  Stoicism from its earliest times taught that to live 
according to nature, and to discern right action from nature, is human nature.75  It 
is this view of human nature, of all humans as rational beings programmed to 
learn about God and ethics from nature, which lies at the core of the Teacher’s 
condemnations in 1:18-32; the expectation that we should learn from Christ is not 
present in the section, and any implied references to narratives or commands in 
the Torah are secondary to this clear core logic.  So all of the core arguments in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Jewett traces this formulation in Rom 1:24 to Wis Sol 11:16, ‘by what things a man sins, by 
these is he punished,’ in Romans, 167.  He then builds a case that this verse is not mirroring Stoic 
logic because Paul uses the plural of ἐπιθυµία, which I have translated throughout as ‘excessive 
desire,’ whereas a Stoic would see desire itself (in the singular) as the root of evil.  As I argued in 
Chapter 3, both the Stoics and Paul, particularly when talking about sex, did make room for a good 
desire that becomes evil when in excess, and this excessive desire is what Paul means by ἐπιθυµία 
– whether in the single, or here, in the plural, as ‘desires of the heart.’  It is thus perfectly 
consistent with the Pauline caricature of Stoicism I am here suggesting that he portrays the 
Teacher, based on Wis Sol, as overly Stoic in his thought because he sees ἐπιθυµία (or the plural, 
ἐπιθυµίαις) as punishment.  (In 1 Corinthians, where Paul borrows slightly from Stoicism and 
notions of self-mastery for his knee-jerk neurotic defence of law, and is not in a diatribe against 
Stoicism, sees ἐπιθυµία as to be avoided; but he certainly does not go into the more specifically 
Stoic territory of the Teacher here and Wis Sol, where ἐπιθυµία is presented as evil and unnatural 
in itself. 
75 Malcolm Schofield, ‘Stoic Ethics,’ in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 239-246.  Schofield gives examples from many 
different Stoics, including both early and late Stoics, to show that they believed humans to be 
programmed to follow nature, so that all those who do not seek harmony with nature are denying 
their own rational instinct.  This is essentially what the Teacher is posited as suggesting pagans are 
guilty of. 
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this section operate together in a specifically Stoic fashion: extreme demand is 
placed upon physis, to which one should submit intellectually with great mental 
effort, which is presumed as the natural route for a human, or risk being given 
over to unnatural passions. 
Thirdly, as noted above, Campbell points out a temporal problem with 
1:18-32: it announces God’s wrath as something being revealed in the present, in 
direct contradiction to Paul’s response to it in 2:1-5, where judgment is located in 
a future event.  This is indeed a clear marker that this section is prosōpopoiia; not 
just because of the temporal issues, but also because if Paul presumes that the 
Christians in Rome will recognise the God he posits, a God whose kindness rather 
than wrath leads to repentance (2:5), then it is totally legitimate to see the 
beginning of 1:18 (‘God’s wrath is being revealed’) as something that would have 
been heard as a change in voice, particularly since it immediately follows the 
claim that God’s righteousness is what is being revealed in the present, through 
faithfulness (1:17).76  However, something Campbell does not mention is just why 
it might be that the Teacher sees judgment as a thing of the present.  Although 
there are certainly streams in first century Jewish thought that see divine judgment 
in present actions,77 the structure of the argument here comes from Stoicism, and 
what identifies this as primarily Stoic rather than Jewish is temporality: there is no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 As C. K. Barrett notes, there is no other place in the authentic Pauline corpus in which the word 
‘wrath’ takes the genitive ‘of God’, nor is there anywhere where God is the subject of a verb for 
wrath (though he does note that the wrath of God appears in Col 3:6 and Eph 5:6, but these are 
both probably pseudepigraphal).  C. K. Barrett, The Epistle to the Romans, Black’s New 
Testament Commentaries (London: A&C Black, 1971 [1957]), 33.  
77 Jewett, Romans, 167-168.  Since Jewett uses the Wisdom of Solomon as his primary evidence 
for this, it does not oppose the present argument, that it is precisely this stream, influenced by 
Stoicism, that Paul presents the Teacher as representing in an exaggeratedly Stoic way. 
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mention at all of future judgment, and only mention of passion and its 
consequences in the present.  Paul may be stereotyping Stoic-Jewish theologians, 
but it is the Stoic side of the thought that is here emphasised.  Robert Jewett’s 
well-argued translation of 1:27 lends further weight to this argument, and also 
gives the section additional coherence: ‘the males… were inflamed with their lust 
for one another, males who work up their shameful [member] in other males, and 
receive back for their deception the recompense that is tightness in themselves.’78  
Though it is difficult to see such a translation making it into church lectionaries, it 
fits ancient understandings of desire, gender and sexuality much better than 
traditional renderings, and also fits with the theme of punishment being in the 
present.  Paul’s stereotype of the Teacher’s use of Stoic logic depicts him as one 
who posits divine judgment in a temporally and causally Stoic way: present, not 
eschatological, and as an inherent result of unnatural passion, not as a result of 
disobeying divine ordinance as known through Scripture.79  The extent to which 
the Teacher’s logic is no longer even distinctively Jewish assists my suggestion 
that the Teacher, as Paul is portraying him, is exaggeratedly dependent upon Stoic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Jewett, Romans, 163. 
79 Emma Wasserman seeks to add to this case, paralleling the use of the passions as a present 
punishment with Philo, On Rewards and Punishments 71-72, where he invokes the Stoic passions 
of pleasure, desire, sorrow and fear, notifies us that he is using them in specifically Stoic sense by 
describing them in terms of their temporality (defining desire as good in the future, as do the 
Stoics, noted in the previous chapter above), claiming that God punished Cain by removing even 
pleasure and desire.  Wasserman compares this to how Paul has God punish humans by giving 
them over to their passions.  However, Paul is using Stoicism much more than Philo here, since 
Philo clearly denotes Stoic concepts and then has God punish by removing desire.  So Philo does 
not provide, as Wasserman argues, a parallel that reveals Paul to be a Stoic, but, rather, provides 
an example of the sort of figure Paul lampoons (a Stoic Jewish philosopher) being even less Stoic 
than Paul’s exaggerated caricature.  Wasserman, Death of the Soul in Romans 7, 126-128, citing 
Philo, Works of Philo, 670-671.   
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logic.  If there was a teacher using Stoic-Jewish logic to try to convince the 
members of the church at Rome to follow the Torah, Paul is portraying him as 
being so Stoic that he fails even to arrive at biblical arguments.  
Fourthly, Paul’s arguments against the Teacher agree with the picture I 
have suggested: his counterarguments continue to imply that the Teacher’s logic 
has gotten ‘too Stoic.’  As just stated, Stoic philosophy taught that to seek right 
action in physis is human nature.  Since 1:18-32 seems to be mostly or entirely 
constructed on Stoic logic, it is fair to see this concept as the root of the 
assumption in 1:19-20 that everyone should see God in nature.  This, then, also 
explains the sudden appearance on the stage of the so-called ‘righteous gentile’ in 
2:14: the Stoic Jewish teacher has already suggested that all gentiles possess the 
ability to gain knowledge of God from nature, so Paul posits that this subverts 
what Stoic Jewish theologians are also claiming, that thus all should obey the 
Torah.  He explains this, using Stoic terminology to subvert the Teacher’s 
argument: ‘When gentiles who do not have the law by nature [φύσει] do the 
things of the law, those without the law are a law to themselves.  They 
demonstrate that the work of the law is written on their hearts, bearing witness to 
their conscience [συνειδήσις]’ (Rom 2:14-15a).80  In the closing section of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 There is debate over whether φύσει is to be read with the phrase preceding it (‘have the law by 
nature’) or the phrase following it (‘by nature do the things of the law’).  While the former reading 
makes more sense with the similar phrase in 2:27, referring to circumcision as how the law is 
written onto the body in its nature, the latter reading makes more sense with the argument Paul is 
making in 2:12-16, particularly in response to 1:19-21; so the immediate context should probably 
be given more weight, giving us ‘who by nature do the things of the law.’  In either reading Paul is 
using the Teacher’s Stoicism against him: either showing that Jewish privilege as marked in physis 
itself can be undone when one whose physis is uncircumcised does the law, or, with the latter 
reading, showing that since Stoic philosophy believes that all have the ability and inclination to 
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argument (2:26-29) Paul draws on the concepts of the ‘inwardly’ and ‘outwardly,’ 
one of the central themes of most of what Epictetus would write, using, like him, 
words from the root φαν-, to do with appearance.  Jewett notes this parallel with 
Epictetus.81 Käsemann, though trying to advance the theory that Paul’s thought 
here is primarily eschatological, is forced to concede that ‘Paul can use the 
Hellenistic tradition in which Epictetus, for example, asks concerning the true 
Stoic.  Here the appearance, which depends on the evaluation of spectators, is set 
over against the inward and essential existence.  According to the Stoics the latter 
rests in itself… and pays attention to harmony with God and the all.’82 
In summary, it can be seen that Paul not only presents the Teacher as one 
who, like many other academic Jewish theologians, defends law-observance with 
Stoic logic; but further, Paul caricatures this aspect of his thought in order to use it 
against him.  The Teacher’s argument can be seen as Stoic because of the 
repetition of the theme of the wise versus the foolish (which Paul opposes here 
and elsewhere); argumentation based on an obsessional relation to the master 
signifier physis; a repeated emphasis on thought and reason as opposed to passion 
and the present consequences of passion, rather than divine judgment in the 
future.  Paul then argues against the Teacher by pointing out that his Stoic logic 
should allow for righteousness through inborn natural rationality aside from the 
Torah, and that his Stoic logic should emphasise the inward, which Paul connects 
to spirituality, rather than external physicality (2:26-29).  One more argument 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
follow physis written into their own instinct, ‘those who by [their] nature do the things of the law’ 
are a law unto themselves. 
81 Jewett, Romans, 235. 
82 Ernst Käsemann, Commentary on Romans, trans. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1980), 74-75. 
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related to these can be added, from Stanley Stowers.  He judges the theme of 
1:18-32 to be that ‘Those peoples who refuse to honor God and instead worship 
idols have lost the capacity for self-mastery.’83  In 1:18-32, ‘God punished the 
gentiles by allowing their passions and desires to become dominant, a loss of self-
mastery.’84  Though Stowers believes 1:18-32 to be in the voice of Paul, he also 
sees in it a theme of self-mastery, another theme of Stoic ethics (though one that 
was certainly known in Roman culture beyond Stoicism).  This will return in 
Stowers’ interpretation of 7:7-25, to which I now turn.  
In Rom 7:7-25 the Teacher gives his dramatic concession speech, in a 
prosōpopoiia that sounds so much like an obsessional on the couch that it could 
easily be mistaken for a Woody Allen monologue.  I have already discussed 
Stowers’ reading of it, but reading 1:18-32 as an opening speech by a Stoic 
obsessional sheds new light on the Teacher’s second, and final, sustained 
prosōpopoiia.  In Stowers’ view Origen is correct and it is a speech in the voice of 
a person whom Stoic philosophy would deem to be without self-control, an 
akratēs.85  Paul’s final assault on the Teacher is to present him conceding the 
argument, comically, acknowledging that his attempt to ground Torah observance 
in Stoic naturalism, and consciously exercise self-control in line with it, has 
failed.  There are several points that link this passage to the figure debated with in 
1:18-2:29 (and much of the rest of the letter, but the current study is limited to 
these two texts).  There is an emphasis on the failure of both reason and 
knowledge to bring about right action, particularly in 7:14-23, where, despite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Stowers, Rereading Romans, 42-43. 
84 Ibid., 92. 
85 Ibid., 264-269. 
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knowing that the law is spiritual, the Teacher does not understand his own actions.  
He now knows that ‘the good,’ the object of his philosophical ethics, is not what 
dwells within him, but, rather, contrary to the post-conversion Christian 
anthropology espoused by Paul in Gal 2:19-20, what dwells within him is sin.  He 
finds his will, so important in Stoic ethics, to be powerless.  He speaks of the ‘law 
of the mind,’ but finds himself captive to a different law ‘in his members.’  This 
discordance between his actions and his intentions has led some commentators to 
link him to the character in Rom 2.86  So here the Stoic judgmental figure admits 
his hypocrisy and resigns from the Stoic attempt at self-mastery through 
rationalisation.  Having stated in 1:20 that gentile pagans who do not reason from 
physis are without excuse (ἀναπολογήτος), because he believes them to have been 
born with a natural instinct to reason the good from nature, and then ranted about 
their evil actions until he condemned them to death, and then been condemned by 
Paul as a judge who is without excuse (ἀναπολογήτος) because he is doing the 
same things (2:1-5), the Teacher now confesses ‘that which I hate, I do’ (7:15).  
The Teacher offers a benediction near the end of his speech (7:25), just as he did 
in 1:25, but this time it is addressed to Christ, whom he proclaims as Lord.  
Having confessed and proclaimed Jesus Christ as Lord, Paul then responds that 
there is now no condemnation for him (8:1).  So Paul responds to the first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Theissen, in Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology, 240-243, argues that the figure Paul 
argues against in Rom 2 is Saul the Pharisee, with Paul revealing that as Saul he had a 
demonstrative pride in the law combined with an inability to recognise his own violations of the 
law, repressing memory of them.  This links the figure of Rom 2 with the figure of Rom 7:7-25, 
whom Theissen also reads as Saul.  Stowers reads 2:1-16 as a diatribe against a gentile confident 
of self-mastery without the Jewish law, containing prosōpopoiia (Rereading of Romans, 126-142), 
and 7:7-25 as a prosōpopoiia of a gentile attempting self-mastery through the Jewish law (273-
284), thus linking them in the voice of a gentile attempting self-mastery. 
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prosōpopoiia by telling him that he has condemned himself in his hypocrisy (2:1), 
and the second prosōpopoiia by telling him that there is now no condemnation 
because he has confessed to his hypocrisy (and sworn Jesus as Lord, which will 
be to his benefit in 10:9). 
In Paul’s comic portrayal of the Teacher here, he highlights several 
obsessional symptoms, as outlined in Chapter 4.  It is easy to detect high levels of 
anxiety, ambivalence, internal conflict, doubt, feelings of diminished freedom (he 
feels as though his ego is powerless), fear (sin has wrought death in him) and 
guilt.  These can be added to the obsessional symptoms already discernable from 
his opening speech, of oblativity, preoccupation with thoughts, attempting to 
dominate experience through thought and making of his desire a prohibited desire.  
Lacan’s last obsessional maxim on the table in Chapter 4 is that the obsessional 
suffers with ‘a thought that burdens the soul.’  This seems apt to describe the ‘law 
of the mind,’ at war with the greater law of sin, as the Teacher struggles under the 
obsessional’s experience of ‘the too-much-ness of jouissance.’ 
The theory of Stoic philosophy as structurally obsessional thus helps to 
unify the readings of Stowers and Campbell, which aids both of their 
interpretations.  Stowers wants to read Paul as advocating Christ in the gentile’s 
quest for self-mastery, but reads Rom 1:18-32 in the voice of Paul, despite it 
making absolutely no mention of Christ.  If Romans is about self-mastery, and it 
opens with Paul declaring that self-mastery should be learned from nature, then 
there is a contradiction at the heart of the letter.  Reading 1:18-32 in the voice of 
the Teacher allows Paul to be disagreeing with the Stoic route to self-mastery, but 
instead suggesting his own, should one read the rest of Romans that way.  As for 
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Campbell, he opts out of taking a stance on prosōpopoiia in Rom 7 in his own 
work, presumably because it seems irrelevant to his central argument, about the 
presence of justification-theology in Paul’s soteriology.87  This would seem to 
leave Campbell with a problem he otherwise deplores: a passage in Paul whose 
presence his construal fails to justify (an ‘overdetermination’).  My reading solves 
this problem: Rom 7:7-25 is indeed another instance of prosōpopoiia, as Stowers 
claims, because once it is recognised that Paul is stereotyping the degree of Stoic 
logic involved in his opponent’s argument, Rom 7 is easily read as the Teacher 
conceding the failure of his own Stoic arguments; and Paul stereotypes the 
Teacher in such a way as to mock the features of Stoic thought that are here 
deemed ‘obsessional.’88  So combining Campbell’s and Stowers’ readings posits a 
consistent opponent to Paul, with an opening argument and a closing concession 
speech; it explains Paul’s many references to physis in Romans, much more than 
any of his other letters;89 it explains why there are so many references to Stoicism 
in the commentaries on these passages and it neatly places Paul as one opposed to 
the place of physis as a master signifier. This then also places Paul as opposed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Campbell, Deliverance of God, 532-533. 
88 To be clear, the claim made here is not that the historical figure Paul opposed is someone Paul 
thought was obsessional.  That would be anachronistic, and would presume, probably falsely, that 
Paul had actually personally met the person rather than just heard about him.  Instead, the claim 
here is that, building on the thesis of the previous chapter that Stoicism as a popular philosophical 
movement was obsessional in its theoretical structure, the Teacher is thus presented as having an 
obsessional neurotic way of thinking, which, conveniently for my  thesis, results in him also being 
presented with obsessional neurotic symptoms (perhaps, if psychoanalysis is correct, this is 
because the two are linked!). 
89 According to Alfred Schmoller, Handkonkordanz zum griechischen Neuen Testament (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1989), of the eighteen occurrences of φύσις and its cognate adjective 
and adverb, thirteen are in Pauline epistles (including one in Ephesians), and nine of those are in 
Romans. 
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the sublimation of das Ding through both a perverse relation to the law and an 
obsessional one. 
Thus I disagree with Slavoj Žižek’s reading of Romans 7 as a positive 
suggestion of hysteria as opposed to perversion, outlined at length in the 
introduction, above.  I also disagree with Concetta Principe’s suggestion that 
Paul’s ‘unplugging’ from the law represents a psychotic structure.90  However, 
Žižek is absolutely correct in his framing of part of the question of Romans: 
Romans, like 1 Corinthians, is addressed to perversion (which could be because of 
Paul’s experiences with the Corinthians, but either way it is certainly the case in 
Romans).91  While combating the Teacher’s obsessional neurotic relation to the 
law, Paul frequently, and possibly in the form of interjections in the Teacher’s 
voice, objects to his own arguments with various forms of the question ‘Won’t 
that lead to perversion?’  In 3:8 Paul complains that some report him to say ‘Let 
us do evil so that good may come.’  In 6:1, Paul responds to his own argument (in 
the voice of the Teacher?), with the question ‘What then shall we say?  Should we 
continue in sin so that grace may increase?’  Again, in 6:15: ‘What then?  Shall 
we sin, since we are not under the law?’  Thus, in response to the perverse side of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Concetta V. Principe, Secular Messiahs and the Return of Paul’s “Real”: A Lacanian Approach 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, 2015), 83-111.  It is remarkable how many interpretations of 
Rom 7:7-25 are possible, with theologians having cited it both as examples of what we are saved 
from and what we are saved to, and psychoanalytic interpretations having seen it as positive 
examples of hysteria (Žižek) or psychosis (Principe), or as a negative example of obsessionalism 
enslaved by a perverse law (the reading proposed here).  Nineteen verses of one of Paul’s letters 
somehow simultaneously contain both the plight and goal of human existence, and all four of the 
Lacanian clinical structures of the subject.  
91 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Paul and the Truth Event,’ in Paul’s New Moment: Continental Philosophy and 
the Future of Christian Theology, eds. John Milbank, Slavoj Žižek and Creston Davis (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 2010), 94-97. 
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the paradox, Žižek puts the Pauline question as: ‘How can I break out of this 
vicious cycle of the law and desire, of the prohibition and its transgression, within 
which I can assert my living passions only in the guise of their opposite, as a 
morbid death drive?’92  But Paul is also writing against the obsessional side of the 
paradox as it was known in the first century: ‘How can I break out of the vicious 
cycle of desire and law, of transgression and the need for more prohibition, so that 
I can feel alive without thinking about the law constantly?’  How can the subject 
relate to das Ding in such a way that does not feel stuck in a perverse, obsessional 
or any other paradox?  The Teacher is not only seeking freedom from the power 
of the law to generate the enjoyment of transgression (perversion), but also from 
the enjoyment of law itself (obsessionalism). 
I will look at the solution Paul poses, his interpretation of the Christian 
subject, in the next chapter.  Putting that to the side for now, I am now also 
positioned to ask: how does Paul respond to the paradox of jouissance in 
Romans?  He is positioning his argument in response to both sides of the paradox, 
but what are his attitudes towards these sides of the paradox in Romans, and what 
can be learned from them? 
 
4.  Reading Romans 1-2 and 7: St Paul as Anti-Obsessional 
 
Throughout Romans Paul is engaged in a response to the suggestion of an 
obsessional approach to the law, while attempting to combat the alternative he is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Žižek, ‘Paul and the Truth Event,’ 97. 
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now accustomed to facing, a perverse approach to the law.  This does not detract 
from Paul’s main purpose (whatever that is); he caricatures Stoic obsessionalism, 
and in doing so expresses an attitude towards it, while making other points.  It is 
worth noting, though, that Paul is not arguing against obsessionalism itself.  That 
is not his point in Romans, and it would be senseless to argue ‘against’ a clinical 
structure.  Instead, Paul is arguing against one who defends law observance with 
Stoic thought by demonstrating that the life aimed at law-abidance-perfected-
through-thought is one that leads to spirals of obsessional symptoms.  He 
caricatures Stoic obsessionalism as a way of demonstrating a failure in the 
Teacher’s approach.  
I sketched some of how Paul caricatures the Teacher above, but this 
deserves more attention.  It is not just the case that the Teacher is obsessional and 
so has certain symptoms, but, rather, Paul is opposing the Teacher’s advocacy of 
law-observance, and in so doing presents the Teacher as one exaggeratedly 
plagued by the symptoms of his (obsessional) Stoic approach to the law.  (So Paul 
is not opposing law-observance as something ‘Jewish and thus obsessional,’ 
which is the very anti-Semitic theory to which the New Perspectives object, but is 
opposing law-observance, for reasons not discussed in the present chapter, and 
doing so by caricaturing Stoic obsessionalism.)  Of course, we know nothing 
about the historical ‘Teacher,’ if there was one, so it is entirely possible that he 
was known as an extremely neurotic individual and Paul presents him as such.  
This would not work against my point (it would just mean that Paul is accurately 
presenting the obsessional character of the Stoic system he opposes); but the 
character presented in Rom 7:7-25 is so exaggerated in his obsessive and 
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emotional deliberation that it appears as caricature.  Some of the affects listed in 
the previous chapter that appear here are feelings of internal conflict, feelings of 
diminished freedom, anxiety, fear and guilt.  The language used to express all of 
these feelings is extreme: the Teacher talks about how even the good becomes a 
vessel of sin and death (13), not understanding his own actions (14), and, again 
and again throughout the section, describes not being able to do what he wants to 
do or stop himself from doing what he does not want to do.  He repeats this 
obsessively, until he refers to a law at work in his members (23), and refers to 
himself as miserable (24).  He ends his obsessive monologue with ‘Who will 
rescue me from this body of death!’ (25), which is itself an obsessional symptom 
(in Lacan’s earlier work he linked obsessionalism more with one’s unconscious 
relation to death, as can be seen in the table of maxims in the previous chapter).93  
All of this obsessional affectivity proceeds out of his argument with Paul, 
beginning in verse 7 with the initial realisation that he would not have known 
what sin was without the law prohibiting it.  As explained from the beginning of 
my look at the paradox of jouissance in Chapter 2, above, the very core of the 
obsessional side of the paradox is the conundrum that attempting to follow the law 
somehow breeds the desire to transgress it.  In other words, through the Teacher 
Paul demonstrates that, while his freedom from the law is something that comes 
from an unexpected encounter with Christ, he now sees that the law has a 
relationship to jouissance that, when approached through a method of attempting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Also, in S3, 179-180, he briefly discusses how the subject’s existence is something that the 
signifier will never be able to explain, and the question of death is how the obsessional formulates 
a question that helps cope with this form of alienation. 
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to think one’s way into obedience, results in a spiral of the emotions symptomatic 
to obsessionalism. 
In the Teacher’s closing prosōpopoiia Paul connects these affective 
symptoms to those aspects of obsessionalism that have to do with thought: in 
summary, the attempt to dominate and master one’s experiences through thought.  
Just as 1:18-32 demonstrates the centrality of this approach to the Teacher’s Stoic 
argument for law-observance, Paul makes this a feature of the Teacher’s downfall, 
which means that part of Paul’s critique of the Teacher is a critique of Stoic 
obsessionalism itself, not just law-observance.  From the start of the Teacher’s 
closing speech he connects the failure of his approach to the law with a failure of 
its intellectualism, when he says that he would not have known sin without the 
law, and would not have known excessive desire without the law’s prohibition of 
it (7:7).  This means his complaint is that the law itself acts to introduce sin to the 
rational process he seeks to employ in defence of the law against sin.  In 7:14-23 
the dense proliferation of words to do with knowing mirrors the same 
phenomenon in the Teacher’s opening speech: he knows the law is spiritual; he 
does not understand his own actions; he agrees that the law is good; he knows that 
nothing good dwells in him and the law of his mind is not strong enough to win 
against the law of his members. Added to this is the problem of feelings of 
diminished freedom.  The bulk of 7:13-23 is an obsessive repetition of the 
complaint that he does not feel that his ego has freedom over the strength of his 
passions.  He expresses this as a conflict between what he wills (θέλειν) and what 
he does (ποιεῖν and πράσσειν), using the same verbs that take the object ‘these-
sorts-of-things’ in the argument about the Teacher condemning but practicing 
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those who do the actions described in 1:28-32.  Thus, another part of Paul’s 
critique of attempting to defend law-observance through Stoic obsessionalism is 
that attempting to solve one’s problems and master one’s passions through 
thought is tied into the conflict and feelings of impotency that this very approach 
creates, since this whole section begins with the problem that the law itself 
introduces sin into knowledge.  So Paul sees the obsessional symptoms of 
ambivalence and powerlessness as the law’s effect on the subject who approaches 
it obsessionally, through belief in the power of thought.  To put it in terms more 
connected with Alain Badiou’s philosophy, Paul characterises the Stoic Teacher 
as one who believes that the Event is thought itself, rather than as one for whom 
the Event has changed thought itself. 
There is another way that Paul opposes the Teacher’s obsessionalism, 
though he puts it more clearly in 1 Corinthians.  As I argued above, part of Paul’s 
caricature of the Teacher is as one who thinks of himself as a sage and those who 
do not intellectually choose to learn from and obey physis (and the law) as fools.  
Connected to this, it has also been noted that Romans 1:18-32 is curiously 
elaborate in style: it employs much more rhyming and alliteration than one 
generally finds in Paul’s letters,94 using rhetorical speech to try to argue sinners 
into employing their minds against these vices (which are grouped into fours, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Virtually every commentator makes this simple observation, usually focusing on 1:29-32; see 
Jewett, Romans, 189.  Dunn, Romans 1-8, 54, notes the ‘neat wordplays,’ rhyming and alliteration.  
He also quotes Matthew Black, Romans, New Century Bible (London: Oliphants, 1973), 50, who 
notes that 1:28-32 reads like the spoken part of a diatribe, and resembles ‘the section in Attic 
comedy known to the ancient rhetoricians as the pnigos, a long passage to be spoken in a single 
breath.’  This all aids the claim that Paul is specifically mimicking the known style of a Stoic 
preacher. 
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keeping with Stoic vice lists).95  Paul accuses the Teacher of seeing himself as an 
instructor of children and a teacher of babes, having the embodiment of 
knowledge and truth in the law (2:20).  However, in Romans Paul does not 
specifically launch an attack on the Teacher’s use of rhetoric for persuasion, other 
than in what he implies in the way he presents him. 
So one perhaps senses this attack in the way he caricatures the Teacher, 
but the substance of this position of Paul’s is found in 1 Corinthians.  Here there is 
an extended discourse against Greek wisdom and wise speech (cps. 1-3).  Paul 
says that using wise speech (σοφία λόγου) would ‘empty’ the cross of Christ 
(1:17), then quotes Isaiah 29:14 where God says he will ‘destroy the wisdom of 
the wise,’ and adds that God has made foolish the wisdom of the world – using 
the same words here, to condemn those who think themselves wise, as the 
Teacher uses in 1:22 to condemn gentile pagans.  The argument goes on to the 
end of 3:23 and has too many components to be summarised here – Paul does 
even get to a positive statement about speaking the right sort of wisdom to the 
right people (2:6).  Two sentences in particular make an interesting point about 
what Paul opposes to ‘wise speech:’ ‘Jews ask for signs and Greeks seek wisdom 
but we proclaim Christ crucified, a scandal to Jews and foolishness to Greeks’ 
(1:22-23) and ‘I decided not to know anything among you except Jesus Christ and 
him crucified’ (2:2).  Alain Badiou makes much of the former, as testament to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Jewett, Romans, 183-184.  ‘The literary model for Paul’s catalogue is from Greco-Roman ethics, 
particularly in its Stoic form… Emulating the Greek tradition of four cardinal vices that stand as 
the opposites of the cardinal virtues, paralleled by the four passions in Stoicism…’ 
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resurrection of Christ as ‘non-being,’96 but a Lacanian reading perhaps reveals 
more.  Paul here, and in this section, refers to the foolishness, the scandal of 
worshipping someone who was crucified – even though he was resurrected.  The 
foolishness here is the thought that someone who was crucified could possibly be 
someone worth worshipping; but the reason for why this person is worth 
worshipping is something that cannot be communicated through signs or wisdom, 
and would be ‘emptied’ (of its power?) if one attempted to prove it with 
persuasive rhetoric.  In Lacanian terms, Paul preaches, but the core of his message 
is not found in the signifier – it cannot be proven through appeal to the symbolic 
alone.  Badiou is also empirically wrong in his reading of the text, since what 
confounds logic and language here is not the claim of resurrection, but the 
crucifixion of Christ.  I will return in the next chapter to the nature of the thing 
Paul defends.  The point here is that part of the folly of the Teacher is that his 
entire approach takes place in the domain of the symbolic: he is presented as one 
who wants to use the intentional control of speech itself, through the wise speech 
of his rhetorical argument, in order to convince people of his rational approach to 
the mastery of desire.  The Teacher’s defence of the Torah through physis is 
carried out via rhetoric; but just as one cannot reach the end of psychoanalysis 
through thinking about one’s speech, so here Paul portrays the attempt to master 
the real through thinking about the symbolic as part of a doomed approach. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. by Ray Brassier (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003 [1997]), 45-54. 
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5.  Reading Romans 1-2 and 7: St Paul as Anti-Physis 
 
This brings me from Paul’s arguments against obsessional approaches to 
the law to Paul and Lacan’s arguments against physis, for when Lacan refers to 
the subject of psychoanalysis as antiphysis, it is this very attempt to master the 
real through thinking about the symbolic against which he speaks. 
At the beginning Seminar XVI, written on the board behind him were the 
words ‘The essence of psychoanalysis is a discourse without words.’97  Following 
the events of the students’ revolt of 1968 (in which Parisian students reacted 
against the perceived intellectualism of structuralism with the declaration that 
‘structures do not march in the streets,’ and Lacan responded with ‘you are 
looking for a new master, and you will find one’),98 Lacan was now responding to 
the event formally, by examining the relationship between psychoanalysis and 
knowledge, the Other.99  Naturally, the discussion begins with mustard pots.100  
Mustard pots had been, in Seminar VII, his illustration of the way language is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Jean-Michel Rabaté, ‘Lacan’s Turn to Freud,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Lacan, ed. Jean-
Michel Rabaté (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1.  Rabaté was at the lecture and 
records that this was on the board.  Lacan also refers to having done this at the beginning of his 
next seminar, in S17, 12. 
98 See Élisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, trans. Barbara Bray (Chichester: Columbia 
University Press, 1997 [1993]), 332-348, specifically 341-342. 
99 The seminar is summarised in Marcelle Marini, Jacques Lacan: The French Context, trans. by 
Anne Tomiche (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992 [1986]), 215-217.  Note from 
the previous chapter, above, that ‘knowledge’ is another name for the Other, the place where there 
is pure knowledge without yet a signifier to structure it. 
100 S16, 13.11.1968, 5-6.  According to Henry Krutzen’s index to Lacan’s seminar, the mustard pot 
makes its way into at least six of Lacan’s seminars (7, 10, 12, 13, 16 and 21).  Henry Krutzen, 
Jacques Lacan Séminaire 1952-1980 : Index referential (unofficial 1995 manuscript, later 
published by Paris: Economica, 2009), 419. 
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wrapped around a void, das Ding.101  Does the truth speak through language, 
through knowledge?  If the truth of human existence is das Ding, and our 
fantasies about reality are sublimations of it, then knowledge and language are the 
mustard pot around das Ding, gaining form once the signifier relates them to the 
former contents, which may once have been inside, but are now void.  The 
mustard pot is called a mustard pot from the moment it is created, whether or not 
there is any mustard contained within – its form is matter, but its signifier is the 
effect of the void it creates.  Likewise, the essence of psychoanalysis is a 
discourse without words, because, while the human being is speech and so is 
psychoanalysis, its goal is to bring about realisation of the pure structure of 
human existence, as it exists without the signifier.  The form of psychoanalysis is 
entirely verbal, but its essence is to bring about realisation of that which is not 
verbal; and, for Lacanian psychoanalysis, one of its primary tools is anti-verbal, 
the sudden end of the session.  Another of its tools is the slip of the tongue, in 
which truth makes a sudden appearance in language; the truth, hiding in plain 
sight in what is spoken, speaks.  Thus in the next lecture of Seminar XVI, Lacan 
refers to the staged ‘speaking out’ (prise de parole) of May ’68 as an occasion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 S7, 148-150.  Lacan acknowledges that he adopts this image from Martin Heidegger’s use of 
the vase/jug in his essay ‘The Thing,’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by Albert Hofstadter 
(New York: HarperCollins, 2001 [1971]), 161-184.  Mustard pots also signify Lacan’s own place 
as a signifier absented from the historical family business of vinegar and mustard sales 
(Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, 3-7).  Lacan and his two siblings were the first generation not to 
work for the family firm, Dessaux Fils, which sold vinegars and mustards, etc.  Their grandfather, 
Emile Lacan, had married the sister of the manager Ludovic Dessaux (grandson of the founder, 
Charles-Prosper Dessaux), so it was the Dessaux line that ran the firm and the Lacan line that 
worked for it; until Jacques Lacan and his brother and sister excepted themselves from it, the void 
in the mustard-pot tradition. 
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where the truth was written on the walls without actually ‘taking’ anything,102 
which Jean-Michel Rabaté rightly connects to Lacan’s frequent uses of 
prosōpopoiia, in which he usually describes psychoanalysis as an event in which 
‘The Truth has said: I speak.’103  How does the Truth speak?  Lacan has the truth, 
in prosōpopoiia, tell us: ‘I slip in not only via falsehood, but through a crack too 
narrow to be found at feigning’s weakest point and through the dream’s 
inaccessible cloud, through the groundless fascination with mediocrity and the 
seductive impasse of absurdity.’104 
It is for this reason that psychoanalysis aims to be a discourse without 
words: not based on formulating a knowledge of chemical deterministic factors, 
but speaking that which will never fully exist in words, only occasionally 
appearing as prosōpopoiia, mirror-reading itself into speech; even allowing the 
unconscious to speak through a prosōpopoiia into the voice of the Other through 
the analyst.105  In his article ‘The Direction of the Treatment and the Principle of 
its Power,’ where Lacan frequently elaborates on obsessional neurosis in his main 
discussion of transference, he thus condemns behaviourism, because ‘they had no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 S16, 20.11.1968, 12-13. 
103 Rabaté, ‘Lacan’s Turn to Freud,’ 3.  Écrits, 340-342 (in ‘The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning 
of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis’), Lacan’s longest prosōpopoiia, where he has ‘the 
Truth’ speak in the mouth of Freud to Heidegger,  
104 Écrits, 342.  
105 My attempt at reading prosōpopoiia faces the danger of mirror-reading, but mirror-reading is 
exactly what psychoanalysis is: the analysand figures out what she want by discovering what her 
speech is saying the unconscious wants (analogous to discovering what Paul is saying in 1 
Corinthians by mirror-reading what his speech says the contents of the letter he received was 
saying), and, even more directly analogously, the transferential relationship in psychoanalysis is a 
mirror-reading of the unconscious through the analyst, transference making him the Other through 
prosōpopoiia. 
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other thoughts concerning our particular subject matter, which is antiphusis.’106  
Lacan parallels this psychology-by-physis, the investigation of the subject as 
produce of nature, with the obsessional’s oblativity, seeking his truth in the belief 
of the absoluteness of the Other without realising that it is the lack in the Other 
that is creating his anxiety.  This is what Lacan means by ‘Thought is an action 
that undoes itself,’107 a sentiment mirrored in Paul’s attitude towards the Stoic 
obsessional in 7:7-25, as described above.  Since the subject as antiphysis (lack in 
language), presents itself in the world of physis (speech and language), for the 
analyst to try to understand the subject through thought would be unproductive 
(and thus the analysis progresses not through the analyst’s own knowledge or 
thought, but through transference and the analysand’s presumption of the 
analyst’s knowledge).  For Lacan physis involves not just the world of physical 
nature, but also the attempt to discover solutions to one’s psychological ills 
through the symbolic, through words, through the logical investigation of the 
Other, rather than through the study of the subject’s true nature as a lack alienated 
in physis; that is, as antiphysis. 
This leads back to Paul.  The Teacher is portrayed as one engaged in the 
attempt to persuade others of his particular thinking of salvation, through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Écrits, 514.  The Greek letter upsilon (Υ/υ) can be transliterated with the Roman letters Y or U.  
It is more common for it to be transliterated via Latin as Y/y, but occasionally it is transliterated 
more directly as U/u, resulting in the transcription of the above Lacanian neologism as antiphusis. 
107 Écrits, 514.  This also brings us to the link that makes sense of the quote with which this 
chapter opened.  On Écrits, 515, Lacan states that ‘Nothing is to be feared more than saying 
something that might be true, for it would become entirely true if it were said.’  This is because if 
one tries to force progress in the analysis by thinking one’s way towards saying ‘the right thing,’ 
one runs the risk of causing that thing to be true whether it was or not.  Thus the goal of analysis is 
not self mastery but speaking at the right time. 
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elaborate rhetoric.  Paul stereotypes this, presenting him in prosōpopoiia as one 
who mocks fools who pretend to be wise, and then accuses him of claiming to 
teach fools without teaching himself.  Paul’s position here, stated in 1:14, is to 
consider fools no less worthy of his time than the wise, aligning himself 
consistently with his anti-rhetoric stance in 1 Cor 1-3.  Though Paul is opposed to 
the obsessional Stoic’s relation to physis in other ways, in this way he is opposed 
to what Lacan means by the obsessional’s relation to physis: looking for salvation 
through the study of and logical manipulation of speech itself, rather than through 
Truth’s prosōpopoiia in speech. 
For both Lacan and Paul, then, physis is a word used for the Other, an S1 
for S2, an s(A) for A; and both oppose the obsessional approach of oblating 
oneself towards the Other (behaviourism’s attitude to Science and Stoicism’s 
attitude to physis), in search of answers for the subject.  In the way described 
above, a particular aspect of Paul’s opposition to Stoic thought, which forms a 
part of his caricature of the Teacher in prosōpopoiia, turns out to be a similar 
critique to Lacan’s critique of behaviourism, which Lacan coincidentally happens 
to phrase as a failure to realise that the subject is an antiphysis deceptively 
presenting itself as physis.  So among the ways Paul opposes obsessional attitudes 
to physis is a way only Lacan would later recognise as an obsessional attitude to 
physis. 
Paul himself adds even more ways he is opposed to the obsessional Stoic’s 
use of physis.  In Rom 8:18-30 Paul identifies a problem with Stoicism in a way 
remarkably similar to Slavoj Žižek’s criticism of some aspects of modern 
environmentalism: ‘nature’ itself is not ‘harmonious,’ as the Stoics would have it, 
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but chaotic.108  Lacan, commenting on Sade, would go so far as to say that nature 
itself (including human nature) is evil, a system of evil repelling evil.109  If Origen 
and Stowers are correct that the original audience of Romans would have heard in 
it the language of Stoicism (or at least the language of self-mastery, which is then 
presented in a form so obsessional that it would have been identified with the sort 
of Stoicism described in Chapter 4, above),110 then Rom 8:20-21 would have also 
been heard against the Stoic view of creation as something imbued with a natural 
harmony in light of which we must live: ‘For Creation was subjected to futility, 
not willingly, but because of the one who subjected it, in the hope that even 
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108 Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2010), 80-84, points out that some 
express a fantasy that if we simply return to a non-technologised relation to nature, removing all 
industrialisation, the environment will fix itself; but it is more likely that, since nature has already 
adapted to us, the sudden absence of part of this system would cause catastrophe.  Žižek discusses 
the same subject from 23-25 minutes in the video lecture that accompanied this book, ‘Living in 
the End Times,’ online video recording, YouTube, 11.3.2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=Gw8LPn4irao&t=1346s> [accessed 4.12.2016].  Here he goes even further, and says that we 
should not accept the view that ‘nature is a balanced harmonised circulation which is then 
destroyed through excessive human agency.  That nature does not exist.  Nature is in itself a series 
of mega catastrophes.  Nature is crazy.  Things go wrong all the time in nature.’  The opposing 
view sometimes taken up by modern environmentalists, that one’s goal should be to live in 
harmony with nature, is closely paralleled in the ancient Stoic attitude towards nature (detailed in 
Sellars, Stoicism, 125-129), though perhaps even more closely paralleled in the Cynic view of 
nature.  If I am correct that Paul posits the Teacher as exaggeratedly Stoic then Romans 8 should 
be read even more as being against this deification of ‘nature’ as the solution to its own problems, 
pushing us towards a discourse in which it is not presumed that the fantasy of the removal of 
human impact from nature is, by virtue of nature itself, the best solution.  That is to say, here Paul 
sides with Žižek, and the Paulinist’s first port of call in regards to environmental issues should not 
be to assume the omnipotence of the signifier ‘nature’ (though it is still possible that one might 
reach environmentalist solutions regardless of any assumptions about ‘nature’). 
109 S7, 259-264. 
110 Stowers, Rereading of Romans, 42-82. 
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glory of the children of God.’  In opposition to the notion in Stoicism and Rom 
1:18-32 that nature is how we know God because God is seen in nature, Paul 
posits that God himself caused Creation to be in a non-harmonious state, 
describing it here as decaying, and in 8:22 as ‘groaning and in labour pains.’ 
This opposition is repeated again in the incongruity between Rom 1:26-27 
and 11:21-24, which becomes even more striking when Romans is read as a 
diatribe against a Stoic.  In 1:26 the fault of those described is that they exchange 
the natural for τὴν παρὰ φύσιν, that which is against/unaligned with nature.  In 
opposition to the ethical approach this implies, in 11:24 God himself acts in a way 
described as παρὰ φύσιν, against nature.  This can be added to 2:27 where those 
who are in physis uncircumcised will judge those who keep the letter of the law, 
and 2:14, which refers either to gentiles not having the law in physis 
(circumcision) but nonetheless keeping it, or to gentiles who by physis are able to 
keep the law.111  In all of these cases, aside from the latter translation possibility 
of the final example, Paul opposes the value of action according to physis.  Thus, 
Paul opposes the use of physis as a master signifier.112  One implication, then, of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 This is discussed briefly in footnote 80, above.  As stated there, either Paul is once again using 
physis negatively, with one’s status in nature made irrelevant, or Paul is subverting the Teacher’s 
argument by showing that with a Stoic understanding of physis it negates the necessity of Torah 
observance for ethics. 
112 One might object here with the role physis plays in the argument of 1 Cor 11:2-16, specifically 
v. 14.  However, as argued in Chapter 3, above, Paul’s relation to Stoic thought in this earlier letter 
is complex.  He seems to be offering a knee-jerk neurotic reaction to perversion, which he then 
corrects in Romans.  His discordant use of physis in 1 Corinthians aids this theory: it adds another 
dimension to Paul’s realisation that he needed to think through his response to perversion in order 
to offer a consistent Christian theological ethic, not a knee-jerk adoption of available neurotic, 
non-Christian, positions.   
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Christian conversion, is that it sets one at odds with the master signifiers of others.  
This will be discussed more in the two following chapters.   
Similarly, for Lacan psychoanalysis is not the study of nature.  He means 
this both in the sense described above (with psychoanalysis not being about 
appeals to nature as a signifier for ‘knowledge’ and language, but rather about the 
study of the subject as antiphysis), as well as in the sense of nature as the physical 
universe.  He says that many presume psychoanalysis to be a search for natural 
ethics, based in the subject as a natural instinctual entity, but it actually belongs to 
the realm of the pastoral (and not instinct).113  In fact, he sees treating 
psychoanalysis as a new natural law of instincts as dangerous.114  Both Paul and 
Lacan firmly oppose ethics based on nature, and both Paul and Lacan expand 
upon this thought, meaning various things by it, some of which have been seen 
here; so while Paul’s opposition to physis as a master signifier is best understood 
in Lacanian terms, so also when one understands Lacan’s opposition to the study 
of the subject ‘as physis,’ it turns out to be a position Paul had already taken up 
much earlier. 
 
6.  Is Romans 7 Lacanian? 
 
Rom 7:7-25 is a key passage in historical theology for grounding the 
history or present of the Pauline subject in guilt and internal conflict, and is an 
even more central passage in the history of philosophical and psychological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 S7, 108-110. 
114 Ibid., 383. 
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readings of Paul.  If this section is also prosōpopoiia, is it then useless for 
understanding Paul’s own opinion?  Have philosophical and psychological 
readings of Paul now been rendered impotent? 
No, because Rom 7:7-25 is more complex in its voice than 1:18-32.  1:18-
32 is a straightforward statement of the foundation of the view Paul opposes.  7:7-
25, on the other hand, contains more argument between the two, with interjections 
of ‘May it never be!’ and potential interruptions of Pauline voice (see the 
translation in Appendix B).  It is also not a statement of the Teacher’s original 
contrary position, but, in the reading suggested, is the Teacher’s concession 
speech, finally working his way toward Paul’s opinion, and ending with his 
dramatic proclamation of Christ’s lordship.  This means the passage is a positive 
example of Paul’s interpretation of the problems with the Teacher’s position, but 
from the Teacher’s voice.  This reading is most aligned with Stowers and Origen, 
except that instead of this passage bearing witness to a Stoic’s view of those 
without self-mastery, it is bearing witness to a Stoic’s view of his own failed 
philosophy of life (it is an example of the result of the correctly lived Stoic life, 
not failed self-mastery).  Emma Wasserman builds upon Stowers’ reading, and 
argues that the figure Paul describes here is a gentile attempting self-mastery 
through Jewish law; and thus that this passage is not presenting any universal 
view of subjectivity, but only presenting the plight of historically contingent 
gentile subjectivity.115 I suggest that she is correct to see the figure of Rom 7:7-25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Wasserman, ‘Paul Among the Ancient Philosophers,’ 82-83.  Stanley Stowers himself 
expresses a similar sentiment, arguing that Paul should be read in a more materialist way, and less 
as a philosopher of Cartesian subjectivity, in ‘Paul as a Hero of Subjectivity,’ in eds. Ward 
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as one attempting self-mastery through ‘gentile’ (including Stoic philosophical) 
reason, but incorrect that this removes the passage from any construction of a 
Pauline view of human subjectivity.  Paul is indeed not suggesting his own view 
here, but is nonetheless addressing the symptoms of the obsessional neurotic 
approach to law, and treats these symptoms as the modus operandi of obsessional 
neurosis: it is not just the gentile who finds that the law brings ‘excessive desire’ 
and death, but any who use the pursuit of law as a way of life (obsessional 
neurosis), because Paul sees this as a property of law itself.116  Rather than being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Blanton and Hent de Vries, Paul and the Philosophers (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2013), 159-174, particularly 172-174. 
116 This is important to point out because, as Ward Blanton states, if Paul is only describing a 
contingent temporally-bound situation in which he opposes a certain modality of gentile 
subjectivity, and not discussing the law and the human subject in general, then this both removes 
him from the philosophical/theological/anthropological theories that were later built upon this 
passage, and means that he was ‘not fascinated with interior spaces of the psyche or experiences of 
self-consciousness in the same way as were influential interpreters of this passage from Augustine 
to… Bultmann [or] Lacan.’  Ward Blanton, ‘Paul and the Philosophers: Return to a New Archive,’ 
in eds. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries, Paul and the Philosophers (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2013), 14.  As I stated in the Introduction above, it is true that Paul was not 
intentionally setting out to do philosophy; but he was nonetheless lured by necessity into debating 
and employing philosophical concepts, and, as I argue here, putting his argument into a 
psychoanalytic framework does throw light onto what he was arguing, as well as what he was 
arguing against.  He may not have been fascinated with psychology like Lacan, but he discusses 
‘law’ in general and arrives at similar positions anyway.  Of course, Blanton rightly points to 
Foucault, on the same page as above, in connection with Wasserman’s argument about the 
historical contingency of Paul’s understandings of sexuality and subjectivity.  From a Foucauldian 
perspective, the aims of this study, linking the past to the present through psychoanalysis, might 
not be viewed positively, because it involves claiming that desire and law have real structures in 
human consciousness, transcending time.  The debate between Foucauldian historicism and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis is an old one, and will not be settled here.  For a defence of the Lacanian 
side, see Joan Copjec, Read My Desire: Lacan against the Historicists (London: Verso, 2015 
[1994]), specifically pp. 1-14 where she summarises the issues of the debate and gives her opening 
argument.   
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Pauline pre- or post-conversion autobiography, Rom 7:7-25 is Stoic conversion 
autobiography in prosōpopoiia, revealing Paul’s understanding of and arguments 
against the attempted imposition of obsessional neurotic approaches to the law on 
others. 
Since this section is a statement of Pauline opinion in non-Pauline voice, 
increasingly accepting Paul’s theology up to the moment of conversion in 7:25, 
elements that equate to Lacanian concepts can be read as such (though one should 
resist the temptation to presume that since it seems to line up with Lacan it is thus 
entirely identical in argument).  There is a perverse function of the law itself, 
which Paul recognises, and Lacan later elaborates upon it in terms of a 
psychoanalytic topography.  This ‘perverse function of the law,’ as Žižek calls it, 
refers to the way the law’s relation to humans is perverse, not a perverse structure 
akin to the one Paul opposes in 1 Corinthians and Romans.117  This is because the 
law itself sits in a perverse position relative to humankind, creating the conditions 
for its own transgression, and then enjoying our suffering under it.  As described 
in the Introduction, in Lacan’s view humans do not merely exist in language, but 
suffer under it, tormented by its demands and plagued by the irreparable 
alienation it institutes.  As Alenka Zupančič describes, it even acts as a 
justification for our own evil acts to each other.118  In both of these senses the law 
might be said to ‘enjoy’ our suffering.  So while it would be false to claim that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 See discussion in Introduction, 4.1. 
118 Zupančič shows that it is not the exceptions to Kant’s hypothetical situations that demonstrate 
the flaw in his ethics, but the fact that the Moral Law itself opens up a situation in which we may 
use it to our own ends, justifying things we know to be unethical by interpreting the Moral Law to 
our own perverse ends.  In this way the law becomes Sadean.  Alenka Zupančič, Ethics of the 
Real: Kant and Lacan (London: Verso, 2011 [2000]), 56-61.  
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Paul recognises the depth of this perverse function of the law to the extent that 
Lacan develops it, there is certainly here, in lines such as ‘Sin, taking its 
opportunity through the commandment, deceived me, and through [the 
commandment] killed me’ (7:11), an awareness of the law’s perverse and 
paradoxical function as cause of that which it prohibits.  All of this follows from 
the Teacher’s opening question of whether Paul’s theology leads to a perverse 
understanding of law in 7:7, ‘Is the law then sin?’  In Rom 7, it is the obsessional 
who uses this perverse question as a line of defence, as a sort of defence against 
Paul, which could be reformulated as: ‘If this argument of yours, that I’m coming 
to adopt, is true, and the law creates the conditions of its own transgression, is the 
pervert then correct, who says that the law is sin?’ 
So in Rom 7 Paul is quite consciously setting both sides of the paradox of 
jouissance against each other.  He has the Teacher repeatedly restate the argument 
that Paul’s view leads to perversion, until he realises that even his obsessional 
behaviour does not stop the law from being perverse in its treatment of humans, 
no matter how well aligned it is with ‘the good.’  Thus the Teacher is presented as 
one fully trapped in the paradox, defending one side with the reality of the other.  
He then comes to understand the neurotic side of the paradox, in the realisation 
that the letter lacks the power completely to sublimate, or to obliterate, das Ding.  
This is not a sublation of the law/sin dialectic as a mind/flesh or law/love 
dialectic.  It is simply a clear restatement of the very realisation that this speech 
began with: he begins by saying ‘Is the law sin?’ and ends by realising that, more 
precisely, the problem is that the law is always perverse because obsessional 
thinking is a sublimation of das Ding, not its end.  The reason this should not be 
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read as Hegelian synthesis resulting in a new dialectic is because Romans does 
not end with verse 23, 24 or 25.  When the Teacher claims that there are two laws 
at war within him (the law of his own inescapably obsessional behaviour and the 
law of the inescapability of das Ding), he then cries out to be rescued, thanks his 
Lord Jesus Christ and proclaims that he is still a slave to the law of God and the 
law of sin; and then Paul continues.  When Paul continues, he proclaims that 
there is now (as opposed to his previous response in 2:1) no condemnation for 
him, and then lays out how Christian salvation affects the man’s paradoxical 
existence.  So this passage is not hysteria triumphing over perversion or hysteria 
triumphing over obsessionalism, but is an obsessional realising that the law he 
serves is perverse in its relation to him, rendering his existence eternally 
structured by das Ding, leaving him in a position to hope that Christ really is the 
way out of this paradox.  Whether or not this is the case will be examined in the 
next chapter. 
Thus Paul’s main idea here is that obsessional neurosis is indeed one 
possible relation to the law, but it does not lead anywhere except to more 
obsessional neurosis.  He does this in terms that discuss the law as such, and a 
certain relation to the law (the obsessional one) as such, so his claims can be taken 
to speak to the present through their relations to the clinical structures.  Having 
seen the perverse side of the paradox of jouissance in his relationship with the 
Corinthians, Paul now sees its neurotic side (through obsessionalism), and 
caricatures his opponent as one deeply trapped by the reality of both, positing one 
as a defence against the other. 
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I mentioned another idea that Paul is here aware of: the perverse nature of 
the law as the cause of sin.  This is where things get tricky, because interpreting 
Paul in Lacanian terms could easily go too far and become reading Lacan into 
Paul.  The simplest way to interpret Paul would be to say that he has realised that 
the things labelled ‘sin’ are only called sin because the law has said they are; 
therefore, logically, there cannot be sin without the law.  But, firstly, if scholars 
are correct that the purpose of the law is to define the boundaries and markers of 
Israel’s covenant relationship with God, why is Paul’s argument against it that it 
is a list of sins?  Secondly, Paul’s argument here seems to be much more than the 
law simply ‘labelling’ sin, bringing it into existence by giving it a name.  The 
Teacher claims that his struggle is that the more he tries to do good, the more sin 
lies at hand, and the commandment seems to be, for him, why he wants to sin so 
much.  Paul’s argument is not that the law is a list of sins that creates them, but 
that, whatever the nature and purpose of the law, the problem with the law for the 
obsessional is that the conditions of the commandment generate a will to 
transgress from the very inner material of the subject.  The Teacher begins by 
talking about knowledge of sin being the problem, but moves from knowledge to 
the interior, with the cause of his sin eventually being that knowledge of law 
arouses something within him, the law of the flesh.  (Keep in mind that from 1:18-
32 the Teacher has posited ‘knowledge’ as his solution, and that which those who 
fail at self-mastery are lacking.) 
Gerd Theissen prefaces his extended psychodynamic interpretation of 
Rom 7 by saying that uses of psychoanalysis for the interpretation of this passage 
seem appealing because of the topographical language of both, but ultimately fail 
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because Freud espoused a theory of instincts, and what Paul expresses here is 
clearly not a ‘psychodynamic doctrine of drives,’ but a conflict between ‘the law 
as life-giving Spirit and as death-bringing Letter.’119  Thus he turns to 
behaviourist thought before psychodynamic.120  Lacan is not very influential in 
Germany (at least not in the 1970’s), so Theissen can be excused for being 
unaware of a psychoanalytical school that argues precisely that the drives are a 
result of the Letter.  The question, though, is to what extent Paul’s idea really 
foreshadows this; and this is difficult to say.  Theissen is quite helpful in 
demonstrating that Paul and the traditions from which he drew did have a concept 
of the ‘inner self’ similar to modern psychodynamic theories of the 
unconscious.121  It is thus reasonable to say that his ‘law of the flesh’ is somehow 
related to the rules that govern the ‘inner self,’ that which is unknown to the 
conscious self.  Seeing the two as linked is something Theissen could not posit, 
because he was unaware of a psychoanalytic tradition in which the unconscious 
exists in relation to the signifier, not to biological instincts.  Speaking of sin as 
something somehow caused by the law that operates in the unconscious and 
determines behaviour against the will comes close to Lacan, and is perhaps as 
close as the text permits. 
Lacan’s theory of das Ding has many influences and alludes to many 
different thinkers’ ideas, and while Paul here comes close to some of them (evil as 
something unconscious and interior, awakened by the presence of ‘law,’ and only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Theissen, Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology, 223. 
120 Ibid., 223-228. 
121 Ibid., 57-114.  He uses the term ‘psychodynamic’ because psychoanalysis is not alone in 
theorising about the unconscious; but this includes psychoanalysis. 
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strengthened when opposed by conscious effort), Paul is not here suggesting that 
the drives are the effect of language hitting the body.122  Indeed, he cannot be 
suggesting that sin is entirely the effect of law, because he states in Rom 5:13 that 
sin was in the world before the law.  Nonetheless, it is fair to state that Paul’s idea 
here represents a proto-Lacanian anthropology, positing in some way unconscious 
desire to do evil as the effect of law (and ‘law’ in general, because he here talks in 
philosophical terms not about Torah, but ‘transgression’ and ‘commandment,’ and 
unconscious desire).  This understanding is Lacanian enough that it opens him up 
to a much deeper understanding of the intricacies of humanity’s imprisonment in 
the paradox of jouissance, and the effects of both perverse and obsessional 
responses to it. 
One last question is crying out to be addressed here: is it fair to equate so 
simply Pauline and Lacanian concepts of ‘law’?  So far I have been using the term 
‘law’ as though they are identical, which is not the case.  By ‘law’ Lacan means 
paternal prohibition, which, in his interpretation, is the prohibition that causes 
desire, instituted not by the real father but by the existence of language, which 
binds human existence in a state in which that which we get is never that which 
we asked for (because the signified never equals the signifier, because the real of 
our desire is something leftover from the world of language and because das Ding 
is the point where the real suffers from the signifier, not the point where the real is 
named by the signifier).  For Paul the most common signified of ‘the law’ is the 
Torah, and its status as definer of Israel’s covenant relationship with God.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 This precise formulation of the drives as ‘the effect of language hitting the body’ is in keeping 
with the view described in Chapter 2, above, but comes from Phil Dravers, ‘Desire, Drive and the 
Object a,’ public lecture with the New Lacanian School at Conway Hall, London, on 3.6.2015. 
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Nonetheless there are strong cases to be made that this is not its exclusive 
meaning in Paul.123  In Rom 13 Paul discusses how Christians should act 
regarding the state, and, perhaps deeply subversively, states that ‘the one who 
loves the other has fulfilled the law’ (13:8).  The context of this verse in 13:8-10, 
and the implied reference to Lev 19:18, establish that Paul is here talking about 
the Torah; but, in the context of the wider argument of Rom 13, he is also 
implying that fulfilling the Jewish law satisfies or supersedes one’s obligations to 
Roman law.124  Understanding what Paul means by ‘law’ and its ‘just 
requirements’ in Rom 2:12-29 is quite difficult,125 especially with the difficulties 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 For example, Brigitte Kahl argues that in Galatians Paul is specifically writing to encourage the 
Galatian Christians that both Jewish and gentile Galatian Christians can stay strong despite the 
attempts of the imperial Roman law to ‘Other’ them as it divides and conquers, setting Galatians in 
context of the dying Gaul.  (Note: her frequent use of ‘Other’ throughout bears little relation to the 
meaning of the term in Lacan’s thought.)  At the very least, what she shows it that νόµος (law) in 
Paul should not be taken exclusively to refer to the Jewish law, but can also refer to imperial law, 
and perhaps to law in general.  Brigitte Kahl, Galatians Re-imagined: Reading with the Eyes of the 
Vanquished (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010). 
124 One could thus comment that in this sense Paul really is a supersessionist: he posits that the 
Jewish law supersedes state law!  Jewett argues forcefully that Paul is here suggesting that love 
fulfils both Jewish and Roman law (Romans, 805-809), showing that most of the closely parallel 
statements in contemporary literature are from Roman and Hellenistic sources.  Since Paul then 
goes on to quote the Torah in 13:9-10, defining the love that fulfils the law as the love first 
commanded by the law, the Torah fulfils Roman law.  As one can work out, such a perspective 
would hardly have been acceptable to the Roman authorities, thus the attitude towards the law in 
Rom 13 is much more complex than Pasolini realised.  Pasolini uses Rom 13 as his moment when 
Paul turns from revolutionary to establisher of the Church, and supplements this with Rom 7:7-12 
as evidence that Paul’s stance was, in the end, pro-law.  Pier Paolo Pasolini, St Paul: A 
Screenplay, trans. by Elizabeth A. Castelli (London: Verso, 2014 [1977]), 92-96.  This might 
partially explain why the complex way in which biblical scholars grapple with Paul’s stance 
towards the Roman law has not made it into the world of continental philosophical interpretations. 
125 According to Jewett, Romans, 233, this is the only place where Paul uses the plural of 
δικαίωµα, for his phrase ‘the righteous requirements of the law.’  As Jewett here also notes, its 
meaning is dependent upon what Paul is saying in 2:14-16.  For a fairly recent discussion of what 
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in translating 2:14 mentioned above; however, the idea that the law’s 
requirements are ‘written onto the hearts’ of some or all gentiles in 2:15 clearly 
demonstrates a concept of law separated from conscious knowledge of the letter 
of the Torah.  Most importantly, in Rom 7:7-25, whatever Paul or the Teacher 
mean by ‘law,’ it is the prohibitive force of the law that is generating the 
unconscious mechanism described.  Since Paul is here discussing the power of the 
law to generate a will of transgression from the inner material of the subject, he 
must, to some extent, be taking the effect of ‘law’ in general as his object, since 
he is describing the effect of prohibition, not the Torah in specific. So while Paul 
and Lacan have concepts of law that would mostly be graphed in differing circles 
in a Venn diagram, the law as source of prohibition would certainly be in the 
overlap, and since this is the aspect chiefly discussed in 7:7-25 a cautious degree 
of equation with Lacan (as outlined in the preceding paragraph) is justified.126 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Paul means by ‘law,’ see Hans Hübner, Law in Paul’s Thought (London: A&C Black, 2004), 
which touches upon many of the issues discussed in this chapter (such as, for example, that the law 
does not just make sin recognisable but actually provokes it, on p. 26, against Luther and Calvin).  
Ultimately there is not room here to discuss the full dynamics of the overlap between Pauline and 
Lacanian ‘law,’ but only to sketch out some of them as in the note below.  I believe that a fuller 
study of the relationship between Pauline and Lacanian understandings of the law/the Other’s 
‘enslavement’ of humanity would be highly productive.  This study makes some way towards that 
by reading Paul against Lacanian alienation in the paradox of jouissance. 
126 Should one attempt to create such a Venn diagram, it might look something like this (though 
doing this properly would require much more argument and qualification, so this is only an 
exploratory sketch): 
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7.  Obsessionalism in the History of Pauline Interpretation 
 
The question of the meaning of ‘the law’ is important, because it is a 
central issue in theological and philosophical interpretations of Romans.  Looking 
at how philosophical interpretations have handled it, regarding the place of the 
superego in Paul’s view of the law, leads into a discussion of how issues of the 
superego and guilt have also lurked behind the history of the interpretation of Paul 
by theologians. 
Within Slavoj Žižek’s many readings of Paul, Adam Kotsko notes the 
presence of two different interpretations of Paul’s understanding of the law in 
Rom 7: firstly, the ‘normal’ or ‘pagan’ law that generates its own transgression 
through an obscene superego supplement (the perverse law discussed above that 
creates the situation for its own transgression, and enjoys our suffering under it), 
and secondly, the Jewish law, which he says already does not require any obscene 
superego support.127  Kotsko then points out the contradiction here, because Paul, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    ‘Law’ in Paul                                  ‘Law’ in Lacan
 
 
Note that the words in the centre of the diagram are not intended to correlate to the words directly 
to their left and right, but are in random order. 
127 Adam Kotsko, ‘Politics and Perversion: Situating Žižek’s Paul,’ Journal of Cultural and 
Religious Theory, 9.2 (Summer 2008), 51, citing Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The 
Perverse Core of Christianity (London: The MIT Press, 2003), 113. 
Stoic physis 
Torah 
the law of Christ 
the law of the mind 
the paternal metaphor 
the symbolic 
language 
nom/non-du-père 
God/the Other 
prohibition/law in general 
the law of the flesh/unconscious 
state law 
‘the letter’ 
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even Žižek’s Paul, is opposed to the Jewish law in Rom 7.  The obscene superego 
supplement spoken of is part of what makes the obsessional’s law so perverse: 
when one attempts to think one’s way to an absolute and all-encompassing 
conception of the law, and devise a way one can use the will and the intellect to 
follow it, not only will one find oneself breaking the law, but breaking the law 
also brings with it a certain jouissance, in the act of breaking the law or in the 
guilt that accompanies it, so that the obsessional winds up with far more guilt than 
the pervert whose enjoyment is from breaking the law itself (so less from the guilt 
accompanying it).  In Žižek’s view the role of Christ is to move the superego 
supplement from the law, allowing the law/sin dialectic to be sublated as 
law/love, for the difference between sin and love is whether it is accompanied by 
superego.  This would be a coherent psychoanalytic interpretation of Rom 7 if it 
were not for the problem Kotsko points out, which also places Žižek on the wrong 
side of the New Perspectives: his view necessarily places Paul as opposed to the 
obscene superego present within Judaism itself, despite the fact that he wishes not 
to fall into this problem.  This is not dissimilar to the problem Badiou faces when 
he sees law/grace as a Pauline dualism.128  That may have been true of the 
Lutheran Paul Badiou read, but scholars now usually read Paul’s concept of grace 
as a continuation of Judaism, in which God also claims to save by grace, and not 
as the antithesis of what Badiou calls the ‘Jewish discourse of the rite and the 
law.’129 
With this reading of Rom 7:7-25 as Paul opposing the Teacher’s defence 
of the universal requirement of Jewish law obedience by opposing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Badiou, Saint Paul, 63-64. 
129 Ibid., 64. 
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obsessionalism of the Stoicism he employs in order to make his argument, Žižek is 
granted the missing piece for his picture of Paul: in Rom 7 Paul is indeed 
opposing the superego supplement to the law, but he locates this supplement in 
the ‘normal’ ‘pagan’ law, as Kotsko puts it.  Here Paul avowedly claims, as he 
does throughout Romans, that the law is not sin.  Paul is simultaneously defending 
the Jewish law while he argues that the gentile Christian does not need to follow 
it: the law that is sin is the superego supplement that comes with pagan 
obsessional approaches to the law; and by demonstrating this he counters the way 
that the Teacher, specifically, advocates universal law observance, without ceding 
ground on his belief that the Jewish law is good and sufficient in the function in 
which it is intended: as an indication of Israel’s covenant relationship with God.  
He just thinks that this grace of God is also available to gentiles through Christ. 
Also, with this position of Paul against the guilt induced by the paradox of 
the obsessional’s relation to law, a brief metacritique of the historical 
interpretation of Paul is now possible.  This is a short diversion from the main 
goal of simply using Lacan to read Paul, but is too important a point to gloss over, 
now that its foundation has been built.  Despite the negative approach taken by 
Paul in Romans, obsessional neurosis, objectively, is not a more ‘negative’ way of 
life than any of the other three clinical structures available to human subjectivity.  
The paradox of jouissance is not actually an eternal game between perverse and 
obsessional structures; it is a paradox that exists without them, but, as argued in 
the previous chapters, is a paradox that can be seen in the first century Roman 
world as related to on a popular level as a conflict between perverse and 
obsessional approaches to life.  Within this world, Paul can be seen to understand 
	  296	  
the pitfalls of both, and to believe that Christ has provided another alternative 
(which will be addressed in the following chapter).  The clinical structures are not 
prisons to be escaped, but structures to be understood.  Thus, what follows from 
my current position is not a claim that Paul thinks obsessional neurotics are 
‘wrong’ (though he does think that obsessional neurosis is not a solution to the 
paradox of jouissance that one should prescribe to others).  Instead, what follows 
now is not a theological claim about the merits of a structure, but a historical 
question about the role that clinical structures have had to play in the history of 
Pauline studies. 
This particular study has in fact already been done, only without Lacanian 
terminology.  Krister Stendahl’s 1963 paper ‘The Apostle Paul and the 
Introspective Conscience of the West,’ mentioned briefly in the Introduction, is 
one of the most important forebears of the New Perspectives.130  In it he argues 
that Augustine is, broadly speaking but with a fair degree of precision, the 
foundation of an introspective tradition in the West, set in stone by Martin 
Luther.131  He demonstrates that the combination of deep introspection with a 
constant sense of guilt is something found in both Augustine and Luther, and 
something absolutely not attested in Paul, outside of the possibility of Rom 7.  
Instead, he shows that Paul demonstrated a remarkably clean conscience (citing 
Rom 9:1; 2 Cor 1:12 and 5:10f),132 and saw himself as one who was successfully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Krister Stendahl, ‘The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West (1963),’ The 
Writings of St. Paul, eds. Wayne A. Meeks and John T. Fitzgerald (London: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2007 [1972]), 501-510. 
131 Ibid., 503-505. 
132 Ibid., 507. 
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blameless in his life under the law (Phil 3:6)133 – a far cry from the notion that 
Paul thought righteousness under the law impossible.  Perhaps the only place in 
his paper where his argument feels somewhat contrived is when he gets to Rom 
7:7-25, the main text into which a Pauline introspective conscience has been read, 
and he argues that rather than bear witness to a guilty introspection, it is an 
acquittal of the ego, which is ultimately seen not to be the cause of blame.134  
However, this potential weakness in Stendahl’s argument highlights a strength in 
the argument here: in the same way that Rom 1:18-32 is out of place with many 
aspects of the rest of Paul’s theology (most of all by containing no reference to 
Christ), so also is the figure caricatured in 7:7-25 directly opposed to the 
personality of Paul known from elsewhere in his letters: the Teacher is presented 
as deeply introspective and suffering from a guilty conscience, whereas ‘When 
[Paul] speaks about his conscience, he witnesses to his good conscience before 
men and God,’135 and ‘He would be suspicious of a teaching and a preaching 
which pretended that the only door into the church was that of evermore 
introspective awareness of sin and guilt.’136 
To put this into Lacanian terms, Stendahl posits Augustine and Luther as 
pillars of obsessional thinking (endless introspection and near-constant guilt) in 
the West.  He demonstrates that this obsessional thinking is not found in Paul, 
though the part of Paul that takes the most effort for him to say this about is Rom 
7:7-25.  In my summaries of the interpretation of Rom 7 above it is Augustine and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Ibid., 502. 
134 Ibid., 508. 
135 Ibid., 507. 
136 Ibid., 510. 
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Luther who embed in theological history the reading of this section as describing 
Paul’s post-conversion inner conflict, as typical of universal post-conversion 
Christian inner conflict.   Augustine and Luther also both make use of Rom 1:18-
32 as a foundational text for a notion of Original Sin.  The picture with which we 
are left, then, is composed of four important steps: (A) Paul wrote a diatribe in 
which he caricatured an obsessional character, then (B) in time Christian theology 
was hijacked by two exceptionally skilled theologians who happened also to be 
obsessionals (in either clinical structure or at least the form of their theological 
thought), so (C) they quite naturally identified with the texts intended to be read in 
the voice of the obsessional Paul opposed, largely basing their theologies on these 
texts, leading to (D) the course of the history of Pauline theology in the Church 
being commandeered by the texts in which he intended to parody his opponent.  
Paul, on the other hand, is not even largely concerned with the issues on which 
their theologies are based.  Obsessionalism is a side issue for Paul; just a part of 
his argument against the Teacher, demonstrating a flaw in the Stoic logic he 
employs in his argument. 
This opens up an important wider question, for if obsessionalism has been 
worked so deeply into Paul by Augustine and Luther, simply pointing out 
introspection and guilt will not be enough to remedy the problem.  By attacking 
Augustine and Luther’s ‘introspective conscience’ without making a wider 
psychoanalytic attack on an obsessional relation to law and guilt, their 
introspective conscience will be sublimated in another way, returning.  As 
Stendahl notes, Augustine is in many ways ‘the first modern man,’137 so we 	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cannot overwrite the negative parts of his influence simply by observing a 
symptom or two.  This is why a reading of Paul that focuses on the problem of 
law in the widest way possible, law as language itself causing superego guilt 
when it institutes the subject, is so essential.  Stendahl noted some of the 
obsessional symptoms that have biased our reading of Paul, and then the New 
Perspectives moved the question of the interpretation of Paul from being about the 
universal subject’s relation to law, to being about the law as covenant identity 
marker; but the human relation to law in general still forms some part of Paul’s 
theology (and some part of Christian theology), so without discussing this 
specifically, in the philosophical and psychological terminology it demands, 
‘Pauline’ obsessionalism will inevitably return. 
This is perhaps the most impressive aspect of Campbell’s work.  The 
Deliverance of God makes a long controversial plan for the rereading of the 
entirety of Pauline theology, replete with extensively researched summaries and 
critiques of the scholarly works that influence and oppose his theory;138 but it 
opens with an almost completely un-sourced theoretical sketch of the theological 
system he seeks to displace, as he sees it.139  Methodologically, Campbell’s work 
represents a step forward because he is willing, from the start, to consider how 
Pauline theology relates, both causally and responsively, to Christian theology in 
the abstract form of a logical structure he subjectively perceives (despite the near 
impossibility of ‘citing’ the subjective perception of a structure).  This move is 
what allows him to place the foundational role of guilt in a contractually 
prospective schema as a key issue that needs to be addressed in Pauline studies.  It 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Campbell, Deliverance of God, 1-309. 
139 Ibid., 15-35. 
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is on this subjective, abstract and utterly non-empirical level that Lacan could 
have the most relevance for biblical studies, because it is at this level, if any, that 
the impacts of Augustine’s and Luther’s (and others’) obsessional readings of 
Paul’s obsessional opponent must be weeded out, lest we run the risk of simply 
displacing obsessional symptoms elsewhere in theology.  If the current structure 
of Christian proselytisation, worship, mission, and, to be frank, power, is 
dependent upon an obsessional reading of Paul, is it really realistic to think that 
the conscious efforts of biblical scholars to re-read Paul will filter ‘down’ to the 
way Christian religion functions, unless it is linked directly to the present and 
historical structure of that functioning? 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, I will look at some potential modern Lacanian applications 
from the interpretation just sketched.  Rom 7:7-25 is a caricature in prosōpopoiia 
of the Teacher’s concession speech, in which the Teacher is presented as one who 
feels constantly guilty for his inability to put his own law into practice.  Paul then 
responds to his eventual acceptance of Christ by telling him that ‘Therefore there 
is now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus,’ a reversal of his 
position in response to the first prosōpopoiia in 2:1 by telling him that in his 
hypocrisy he condemns himself.  If it is correct that 7:7-25 is prosōpopoiia, as is 
now a common view, then the presentation of the Teacher is not just caricature, 
but can also be read as comedy.  The repetition of the sorry state in which he finds 
himself, if acted out by Phoebe in the way prosōpopoiia was meant to be 
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performed, would have been sure to elicit a laugh.  Paul thus establishes a 
situation in which a man’s guilt under the weight of prohibition leads to 
obsessional symptoms, and laughs at him, before telling him that his guilt is 
unnecessary because there is now no condemnation.  If one were to accept this 
reading, just what is Paul laughing at the Teacher for? 
 In a Lacanian view, the only thing of which one can be guilty is giving 
way on one’s desire.  While the law perversely makes demands of us in order to 
enjoy the guilt it elicits in our failure to meet its demands, this guilt is an 
expression of our own regret at being caught in the paradox of jouissance, caught 
in the trap of language itself without even knowing how to express what we want.  
This is why the object of psychoanalysis is not to enable self-mastery (that is the 
Stoic/obsessional approach), but to learn how to speak; and not to learn how to 
speak with fine rhetoric (that is what Lacan and Paul opposed and Lacan called 
physis), but to learn how to speak our desires; to learn when to speak.140  Thus 
when Ward Blanton reads Rom 7 with Lacan, he reads it as a description of 
humanity’s struggle under the perverse demands of the law, which, in the modern 
western world, equates to the struggle under the perverse demands of the market, 
which demands that we enjoy.141 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 S1, 3.  Learning when to speak is an important lesson of psychoanalysis, tied to learning what 
one really desires: desire can be deceptive, and there is no point in saying something that only 
sounds like what you want, when you know it is not really what you want, and the analyst might 
end the session if she believes you. 
141 Ward Blanton, ‘Afterword: Appropriation’s Excess, Paul of Tarsus for an Age of the 
Capitalization of Mastery,’ in Pier Paolo Pasolini, St Paul: A Screenplay, trans. by Elizabeth A. 
Castelli (London: Verso, 2014 [1977]), 122-137. 
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 The perverse structure of the modern western world is something many 
Lacanians have written about: the market disavows castration, demanding we 
enjoy, setting us in an endless pattern of failing to live up to this perverse law, for 
we can never enjoy enough.142  This comes from Lacan’s own thoughts on the 
Capitalist Discourse.143  However, for Lacan this modern condition is a reversal of 
what was previously the case: Paul was indeed theorising about the perverse core 
of the law, which is its mode particularly when tormenting an obsessional subject; 
but he was doing this in a world that does not equate directly to the perverse 
world of modern consumerism.  The modern world is the one in which now that 
God is dead144 everything is prohibited, since the complete enjoyment of das Ding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Samo Tomšič, The Capitalist Unconscious: Marx and Lacan (London: Verso, 2015), 149-153.   
Žižek, in Puppet and the Dwarf, 56 (and elsewhere), says more briefly exactly what Blanton 
argues: that capitalism gives us the superego injunction ‘Enjoy!’, and that in demanding we enjoy, 
the modern ‘late capitalist’ law is just as perverse as the one Paul sets up in Rom 7, demanding 
transgression. 
143 S17, 31-32.  In Je Parle aux Murs (Paris: Seuil, 2011 [1972]), 96, Lacan ties the capitalist 
discourse to a rejection of castration, which, though he uses a term he usually reserves for 
psychosis (verwerfung, foreclosure), is the perverse structure.  As opposed to the philosophical 
Lacanians who see capitalism as perverse, the psychoanalyst Mario Goldenberg ties the capitalist 
discourse to hysteria, in ‘Capitalist Discourse (The),’ in A Real for the 21st Century (Paris: École 
de la Cause freudienne, 2014), 55-57, noting that the structure Lacan gives to the capitalist 
discourse is actually a hysterical structure.  Matthew Sharpe and Geoff Boucher note that before 
1997 Žižek treated capitalism as hysterical, analysing the symptoms within it, but after reading 
Schelling changed his diagnosis to that of perversion, because ‘the superego imperatives of 
capitalist consumerism and fundamentalist reaction are just the flipside to how global capitalism is 
the new world Symbolic Order.’  Matthew Sharpe and Geoff Boucher, Žižek and Politics: A 
Critical Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 159-162. 
144 This of course should be read in terms of what Nietzsche meant; that is, not that God was once 
a real conscious being and has now expired, but that the impact of God/religion/theology on 
human consciousness in the West is not what it used to be.  The phrase has a long history in 
continental philosophy, through Heidegger (reading it as a reference to the end of metaphysics) to 
philosopher theologians like John Caputo and Gianni Vattimo, in After the Death of God, ed. 
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is found to be prohibited at the end of every attempted hedonistic avenue.  In 
connecting the modern perverse law of enjoyment to the death of God, Lacan 
situates the modern condition after the rise of atheism.145 
This creates a different setting in which to read Paul’s response to the 
Teacher.  If Paul was laughing at the Teacher for feeling guilty for the form of his 
jouissance, for the guilt that the law of the flesh, provoked by the law of his mind, 
was giving him, then perhaps Paul today would laugh at the person who feels 
guilty for not having jouissance.  In today’s world it is not the obsessional’s law 
of perfect mental obedience to physis that one feels guilty for breaking, but the 
perverse law of perfect enjoyment after the ‘end of prohibition’ that one feels 
guilty for failing.  If Paul laughed at the Teacher for feeling guilty for enjoying, 
perhaps he is laughing at us for feeling guilty for not enjoying?  In this way, what 
does ‘There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus’ 
mean today?  Perhaps it means that, if the psychoanalytic event of Christ that Paul 
interpreted were to be replicated today, Christians would find themselves 
naturally exempt from the law of consumerist enjoyment, and from the social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Jeffrey Robbins (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2007), as well as a long history in 
theology in the form of the death of God movement, involving theologians like Jürgen Moltmann, 
Paul Tillich, Thomas Altizer, etc. 
145 In S2, 128, Lacan reverses the quote from Dostoyevsky that ‘If God doesn’t exist, then 
everything is permitted,’ to ‘If God doesn’t exist, then nothing at all is permitted any longer,’ and 
states that it is neurotics in analysis who reveal this to be the case.  In S7, 226-227, he states that 
God is dead, but God will never know he is dead because jouissance remains forbidden.  In other 
words, now that the general cultural consensus is God’s nonexistence, we feel an imperative to 
enjoy, but also even stronger the impossibility of jouissance (prohibition) that lies at the end of 
any attempt to enjoy.  Thus, tied in with a Lacanian view of modern capitalism as a perverse law is 
the fact that when Lacan discusses this he posits in relation to the change in mindset that results 
from a move to a society in which the signifier ‘God’ has lost its literal force. 
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causes of mid-life crises, and from the unconscious demand we face with the 
deep-rooted feeling that we must ‘do life right,’ in the sense of enjoying life 
enough.  A sermon by the Lacanian Paul, then, might be titled ‘You are Not 
Condemned for Not Having a Corvette.’  The question this all opens up might be 
titled ‘Paul in modern jouissance,’ and it would be an interesting question to 
investigate further. 
 Another question opened up by the discussion opened above is the 
question of master signifiers.  How has the Christian gotten to the place of having 
different master signifiers?  And how does the Pauline Christian subject relate not 
just to the Stoic master signifier that the Teacher uses in defence of the law 
(physis), but to Jewish and state master signifiers?  Is such a displacement of 
master signifiers possible today?  Is the Pauline Christian subject, on this level, a 
replicable psychical event?  Or is normativity not a possible goal of 
psychoanalytic readings of Scripture? 
 In Seminar VII, Lacan’s actual interpretation of Rom 7, as more than just a 
predecessor to his own thought, comes a few pages after he first quotes it.  He 
eventually says that ‘Freud is telling us the same thing as Saint Paul, namely, that 
what governs us on the path of our pleasure is no Sovereign Good, and that 
moreover, beyond a certain limit, we are in a thoroughly enigmatic position to that 
which lies within Das Ding, because there is no ethical rule which acts as a 
mediator between our pleasure and its real rule.’146  Since Lacan appears to read 
classical texts in the original languages, the use of the word ‘enigmatic’ 
(énigmatique) could perhaps be a reference to the other chapter of Paul’s letters 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 S7, 118 (114-115 in the French). 
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that philosophers and psychoanalysts like to use, 1 Cor 13, where in verse 12 Paul 
says that ‘We see through a mirror enigmatically [ἐν αἰνίγµατι], but then we will 
see face to face.’  However the main referent of this interpretation is Rom 7, 
where Lacan sees Paul as describing the relationship we have to das Ding, in 
which the law of the mind is not what governs our actions, and neither is any 
Sovereign Good that any law posits as the goal of ethics, but instead it is the law 
of the flesh, of sin as a result of the prohibition, to which we relate enigmatically, 
the contours of desire dictated by something we do not understand.  This Lacanian 
elaboration of Paul is not unfaithful; however, it is also not the full picture. 
Paul makes use of a notion that is legitimately proto-Lacanian, but he 
makes use of it as something that the Teacher recognises as the fault to 
obsessional arguments for law-observance.  This is a Pauline idea, but it is far 
from being the Pauline idea, and it does a great disservice to Paul when 
philosophers and psychoanalysts treat him as though this minor detour in the flow 
of his diatribal logic is his key contribution to history.  Paul is neither describing 
his soteriology nor his complete anthropology, but merely using a part of his 
anthropology against a counterargument against his soteriology.  This leaves us 
asking the question of what, then, is Paul’s soteriology, in Lacanian terms?  And 
does it line up with Lacan’s ideas as nicely as Rom 7 does?  
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Chapter Six 
 
Antigone Resurrected 
 
 
 
 
 If the obsessional is one who wants to master the real through language 
and intense concentrated thought (i.e., the Stoic Teacher), and the pervert is one 
who seeks to occupy the very position of the law, disavowing symbolic castration, 
and grasp enjoyment through the weakened law’s alleged absence (i.e., the 
Corinthian Christian), then Lacan paints Antigone as one whose approach to the 
law, and to the Thing it both evokes and masks, stands in defiance of the logic of 
this yet inescapable paradox.  Lacan’s Antigone is not an example of a clinical 
structure opposed to the others, but is an example of a sublimation of das Ding 
that has the potential to affect its viewers.  In this chapter I propose that it is 
Antigone that provides the best Lacanian model for interpreting Paul’s 
understanding of Christ, and not the Lacanian clinical structures.1  Antigone’s 
faithfulness causes her to ignore the power of the law, with absolute fidelity to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Throughout this chapter ‘Antigone’ refers to the heroine of the play Antigone, with this 
distinction always denoted by the presence or absence of italics.  Greek and English references to 
the play not otherwise cited are from Sophocles, ‘Antigone,’ in Sophocles II, trans. by Hugh 
Lloyd-Jones, Loeb Classical Library, 21 (London: Harvard University Press, 1994), 1-127. 
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signifier she has chosen, running headlong towards das Ding.  Embracing the 
law’s power to kill, emptied of all but pistis (faithfulness/fidelity), she somehow 
radiates an unsurpassable beauty; unsurpassable, but perhaps not unparalleled.  
For, some time after Antigone was written, another play was penned; it sets out 
from the start to declare its hero the son of God, but is devoid of full human 
recognition of this until the very end, when Christ cries out in pain and expires, 
and then, when a gentile Roman guard ‘saw how he died, he said “Surely this man 
was the Son of God!”’2 
 In this chapter I advance my reading of Paul past two interpretative 
deadlocks, by using a Lacanian framework to understand the psychical 
transformation that Paul’s theology describes and demands.  In continental 
philosophical terms, this chapter is a Lacanian interpretation of what Louis 
Althusser calls ‘interpellation.’  In theological terms, this investigation will be 
into the psychological impact upon the believer described by Pauline soteriology 
(the study of salvation).  The first deadlock is the question of what Paul poses in 
response to the Teacher’s obsessional neurosis, as well as in response to 
Corinthian perversion – the deadlock being that Lacanian readings of Paul tend to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It was undoubtedly the case that most early Christians’ contact with the Gospels, and any of the 
rest of the emerging Christian scriptures they encountered, would have been through hearing and 
not reading; particularly since the traditions eventually inscribed into the Gospels were probably 
mostly transmitted in oral form before that point, and most people were illiterate.  Further, there is 
a strong case to be made that Mark’s Gospel, quoted at the very beginning of this chapter, was 
actually written to be an oral performance, akin to the many ‘passion plays’ that were in 
circulation at the time.  Whitney Shiner argues for this in Proclaiming the Gospel: First-Century 
Performance of Mark (London: Continuum, 2003), and provides a helpful bibliography of other 
works that have made this or similar claims on pp. 197-200.  The reading of Paul in this chapter 
should be read in light of the proliferation of passion plays in the Early Church, though it is not 
central to the argument. 
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descend into simple placements of Paul’s ideas within clinical structures, which 
runs the risk of severe reductionism; but what else does Lacan offer by way of 
psychoanalytic interpretation?  In the Introduction I summarised Žižek’s reading 
of Rom 7 as a positive suggestion of hysteria in response to the perverse demands 
of the law.  Throughout Chapter 5 other approaches were discussed, with many 
Lacanian readings seeing it as bearing witness to some sort of change in clinical 
structure.  Since I am not reading Rom 7 as a hysterical response to perversion, 
but as an obsessional’s final attempt to raise the spectre of perversion in defence 
of his own symptom, and Paul is not suggesting hysteria as a solution, just what is 
Paul suggesting in response to the Teacher’s internment under the paradox of 
jouissance?   
The second interpretative deadlock is witnessed in the already existent 
question of the ontology of Pauline soteriology; specifically, the problem 
represented by the insufficiently qualified use of ontological language by some 
recent Pauline scholarship.  Within participationist interpretations of Pauline 
soteriology it has become normal to describe the transformation of the Christian 
subject as ‘ontological.’3  This quick way out, anachronistically positing Paul’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In The Quest for Paul’s Gospel (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 41, Douglas Campbell suggests that 
Paul’s participatory language is a ‘metaphor for being or ontology,’ which is the core claim he 
defends and applies in the two chapters that outline his core vision for Pauline soteriology, pp. 95-
131.  Michael Gorman then cites this argument for Paul’s ontological soteriology at the beginning 
of his Inhabiting the Cruciform God: Kenosis, Justification and Theosis in Paul’s Narrative 
Soteriology (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), 7, which reads the patristic concept of ‘theosis’ 
(ontological participation in the divine) into Pauline participatory soteriology.  Benjamin 
Blackwell makes much more use of the language of ontology throughout his Christosis: Engaging 
Paul’s Soteriology with His Patristic Interpreters (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2016), though he is very 
careful and precise, using ontological language because it was so common in patristic 
interpretations of Paul, and systematically clarifying the different ways it was used.  However we 
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view as ontological without clarifying exactly how Paul might have understood 
salvation ontologically in his own terms, is a mistake that is also replicated by 
Paul Axton, in such a way as to confound an otherwise successfully Lacanian 
reading (as described in the Introduction, section 4.1, above).4  This deadlock is 
the symptom of analytical biblical studies lacking a philosophical framework to 
describe its own concepts. By understanding in Lacanian psychoanalytic terms the 
psychical transformation that Paul witnessed and described in his own terms 
(‘justification,’ being ‘in Christ,’ and occasionally ‘salvation’), I will be making 
an actual claim about the content of the event to which Paul was witness, 
circumnavigating the need for the language of ontology. 
In addition to these two aims of my interpretation of Pauline soteriology, I 
defend Žižek’s wider programme by embedding Paul in the debate over the role 
of Antigone in modern politics.  Žižek posits Lacan’s Antigone as a paradigm for 
the successful political act.  As argued in the Introduction, Žižek’s conception of 
Pauline soteriology usually defaults into his reading of the Gospels, or into a 
theory of clinical structures, or into a use of Hegelian sublation (thus not being a 
Lacanian reading, so not being within the aims of the present study); I posit 
instead that Žižek’s reading of Antigone (and of Lacan’s reading of Antigone) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
are perhaps still left, like the medieval Catholic who knows the doctrine of transubstantiation but 
wonders what ‘really happens’ inside the elements, wondering what exactly Paul (and the Church 
Fathers) meant with their language of ontological transformation.  Since Lacanian ontology is that 
the subject really does not exist outside of language (but the subject’s existence in language is its 
ontology, as the unconscious is the discourse of the Other), a Lacanian view of subjectivity allows 
one to read Pauline soteriology as ontological without any further possible question of how it is 
ontological.  It is ontological because it is indeed possible for the subject’s total existence in and as 
language to be altered. 
4 Paul Axton, ‘The Psychotheology of Sin and Salvation,’ (doctoral thesis, University of 
Nottingham, 2013), 237. 
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maps seamlessly onto Paul, and would give him a more consistent and critically 
sound reading of Paul to use in his own wider political/philosophical programme.  
This does not at all affect Žižek’s reading of Christianity in general, i.e., his 
reading of the cross and the cry of dereliction. 
The purpose of this chapter, and indeed this entire study, is not to argue 
for any one of the many Pauls that scholars have put forward, from within or 
outside of the New Perspectives.  Instead, the main interpretative goal is to 
demonstrate the usefulness of Lacanian concepts for the interpretation of Paul, 
regardless of the Paul one reads.  In latter half of this chapter I make extensive use 
of the Paul that Douglas Campbell calls ‘PPME,’ as discussed in chapters 1 and 5.  
Specifically, I use the readings that have emphasised participation in the narrative 
of Christ discernable from the substructure of Paul’s letters – the succession of 
readings that trace back from Campbell to E. P. Sanders through Michael Gorman 
and Richard Hays, among others.  Sanders helped move the notion of 
participation to the centre of Pauline soteriology, then Hays argued that the 
Pauline Christian participates in ‘the faith of Christ,’ which acts as a term for the 
narrative of Christ’s death and resurrection as attested by the substructure of 
Paul’s letters, then Michael Gorman expanded extensively on the centrality of 
participation/‘co-crucifixion’ with Christ, all leading to the soteriological model 
Campbell argues lies exclusively at the core of Pauline soteriology.  This is 
recounted in more detail below.  Of the many possible interpretations of Paul, this 
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is the one that happens to be read here with Lacan, in order to use it rather than 
defend it.5 
 
1.  Lacan’s Antigone 
 
 For the last quarter of Seminar VII Lacan engages in a deep discussion of 
Sophocles’ play Antigone, the third part of his Oedipus trilogy.6  Having 
described das Ding and the paradox of jouissance, and then set out how the work 
of the Marquis de Sade brings us close to a vision of das Ding (but is ultimately 
the work of a man who remained bound to the perverse side of the paradox), 
Lacan reads Antigone as something that is, unlike any of Sade’s works, ‘a treatise 
that is truly on desire.’7  Of the six final sessions of the seminar, he argues for his 
reading of Antigone over three, and then spends three more discussing its 
implications and concluding.  Antigone is not only naturally situated within 
psychoanalytic discourse as part of the Oedipus trilogy, but was also already 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 As it happens, this approach is exactly the approach Lacan recommends taking to Freud, on S7, 
255; and I am sure he would not mind me changing its referent to Paul, as Lacan himself casually 
changes Paul’s ‘sin’ to das Ding: ‘[One does not] attempt to measure [Paul’s] contribution 
quantitatively, draw up a balance sheet – what’s the point of that?  One uses him.  One moves 
around within him.  One takes one’s bearings from the direction he points in.  What I am offering 
you here is an attempt to articulate the essence of an experience that has been guided by [Paul].  It 
is in no way an effort to measure the volume of his contribution or summarize him.’ 
6 It was the first play of the trilogy to be written, but in the chronology of the story takes place last, 
after Oedipus Rex and Oedipus at Colonus. 
7 He does not explicitly use these words in S7.  Rather, this is precisely what he succinctly accuses 
Sade of not giving us in ‘Kant with Sade’ (Écrits, 667).  In S7 Lacan offers reading of Sade 
followed by a reading of Antigone that presents several theses on desire in conclusion, implying 
that Lacan finds in Antigone that which he did not find in Sade. 
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embedded in continental philosophy, as the subject of discussions by both Hegel 
and Heidegger.  Lacan makes no explicit reference to Heidegger’s reading, but 
specifically counters Hegel, who reads Antigone as caught between a law of the 
state and a law of the family.8 
 
1.1.  Summary of Antigone 
 Antigone begins immediately after a civil war fought between her two 
brothers, Eteocles and Polyneices, which ended with the brothers killing each 
other and Antigone’s uncle Creon becoming king.  Creon has declared that 
Eteocles is to be regarded as the hero and Polyneices the enemy of the state, thus 
Polyneices is to be denied ceremonial burial (safe passage to the afterlife), and 
instead be humiliated by having his corpse left to carrion and decay.  Anyone who 
defies this order is to be put to death.  Antigone and her sister Ismene argue over 
what to do, with Antigone insisting that Polyneices must be buried, and eventually 
disowning Ismene who wants to leave Polyneices and spare her own life.  
Antigone performs the burial rite, and then is caught when she performs it a 
second time.  Ismene attempts to take the blame, but Antigone confesses, and they 
are both thrown into prison.  Eventually Creon decides to release Ismene, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Lacan’s explicit positioning of his reading against Hegel’s can be found on S7, 307, and Hegel’s 
reading in G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), 261-289, sections 437-476.  It might be significant that Lacan does not 
mention Heidegger, if the reason is because his positive reading of Antigone might realistically be 
compared with Heidegger’s use of her as an example of resolute authenticity, of which he was 
probably aware.  Heidegger’s reading of Antigone is originally from lectures in 1935, but had 
recently regained prevalence with the 1953 English translation of these lectures, now re-translated 
as Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt 
(London: Yale University Press, 2000), 156-176. 
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sentences Antigone to be sealed in a cave indefinitely.  Antigone continues to 
defend her actions, and once in the cave begins to lament, reflecting on what her 
life might have looked like.  Much of the play is taken up with Antigone 
defending her insistence upon burying her brother, no matter the consequences, to 
various people (Ismene, Creon, the chorus and others).  There is also drama less 
central to Lacan’s reading, regarding Antigone’s fiancé (Creon’s son Haemon), 
and Creon’s wife Eurydice.  The play is quite short, and in addition to the Loeb 
edition and the wonderful translation by David Grene (both cited here), it has also 
been translated by Hölderlin (which influenced Heidegger’s reading), Seamus 
Heaney and many others, recently including Slavoj Žižek.9 
 
1.2.  What is Lacan Doing with Antigone? 
 Lacan opens his discussion of Antigone by noting that it is often discussed 
in terms of the inner conflict that can result from even a just law, which confirms 
that we are still reading something pertinent to the struggles faced by the 
Teacher.10  He then introduces Antigone by way of Aristotle: it was one of 
Aristotle’s primary examples of ‘catharsis,’ the cleansing of the subject through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Hölderlin’s translation has been translated into English as Hölderlin’s Sophocles: Oedipus & 
Antigone, trans. by David Constantine (Hexham: Bloodaxe Books, 2001).  Sophocles, The Burial 
at Thebes: Sophocles’ Antigone, trans. by Seamus Heaney (London: Faber and Faber, 2004).  
Slavoj Žižek, Antigone (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016).  Žižek’s translation is more of a 
paraphrase for the purposes of his own agenda with the text (which is why he is listed as author), 
much like Alain Badiou’s translation of Plato’s Republic (Plato’s Republic: A Dialogue in 16 
Chapters, trans. by Susan Spitzer [Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2012]).   
10 S7, 299. 
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pity and fear, in the participatory experience of watching tragic drama.11  In 
Lacan’s reading, Antigone purges the viewer of pity and fear in the imaginary 
order, through the image of Antigone.12  Through inducing a state of excitation, 
the subject loses its power-relations, and then Lacan says something happens, 
which, contra Hegel, is not a moral lesson arising from a sublation.13 
 Instead of a moral lesson, learned from watching a hero with a tragic flaw 
(ἁµαρτία, hamartia) fall, the subject (viewer, reader, audience) is on the side of a 
hero who is against the character with the tragic flaw (Creon); and that character’s 
tragic flaw is not a disobedience to the law, but the attempt at perfect obedience to 
the law (a neurotic position).14  Thus what is revealed in the anti-hero, the 
character with the hamartia, is not that the law must be followed, but rather that 
‘the Good cannot reign over all without a [fatal] excess emerging,’ an excess 
Lacan would later write about at length as the objet petit a.15  So while Creon 
occupies both the obsessional and perverse positions,16 Antigone occupies the 
place of the law’s objet petit a: she is what remains leftover, unaccounted for by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid., 300-304.  Aristotle develops this in Poetics, 1449-1459, which can be found in the Loeb 
edition, or ‘Aristotle: Poetics,’ trans. by M. E. Hubbard, in Classical Literary Criticism, eds. D. A. 
Russell and Michael Winterbottom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 57-80. 
12 S7, 305. 
13 Ibid., 306-307. 
14 Ibid., 317-319. 
15 Ibid., 319.  
16 Creon’s unique position in the place of the law’s voice and tormented by it experienced as Other 
allows this contradiction: he is a neurotic object of a perverse law, forced to subject himself to it 
and prosecute his own family; but he also occupies the position of the perverse law himself, 
enacting it upon others.  Creon can thus be seen as occupying the full force of both sides of the 
paradox of jouissance as I have argued it was experienced in the first century CE. 
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the law/transgression dialectic, as both a member of the family and that which is 
cast out by the law of the family. 
 Antigone’s voluntary decision within this position establishes her as a 
figure of particular Lacanian interest.  Antigone is handed, by decree of a perverse 
law, the forced choice of either letting her brother’s corpse remain un-buried, or 
dying herself.  This is a position in which tragic heroes often find themselves: 
tragically forced into a decision that will inevitably lead to their doom.  In this 
sense, they run up against some sort of ‘barrier,’ a situation in which the good of 
their desire lies beyond an impossible limit.  Lacan implies an equivalence 
between the function of the Greek word ἄτη (atē) and das Ding, when pointing 
out that according to the play’s chorus this placed Creon ἐκτὸς ἄτας, beyond the 
limit of das Ding – meaning, according to Lacan, that Creon’s position caught in 
the paradox of jouissance also places him on the other side of the barrier from das 
Ding, incapable of ‘getting there,’ as are we all.17  So Antigone and Creon both 
come up against a barrier before das Ding, but Antigone takes the astounding 
position of choosing to go πρὸς ἄταν, towards das Ding.18  Of course, this is 
exactly what the Marquis de Sade also attempted; so the question is, will 
Antigone succeed where Sade failed? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 S7, 332-335.  The reference to Creon as ἐκτὸς ἄτας comes from Antigone, 614.  Lacan here 
argues that all of Sophocles’ heroes ‘begin at a limit,’ not accounted for by their relationships to 
others, placed at a limit between life and death in which they are trapped.  It should also be pointed 
out that ἄτη does not equate exactly to Ding, but is also a word for the fate and doom Antigone 
inherits from her family, which is closer to its meaning in the play; but Lacan certainly ties it to 
the exposition of das Ding in which he has been engaged throughout the seminar. 
18 S7, 333. 
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 If das Ding is ‘the point at which the real suffers from the signifier,’ then 
that signifier, in this instance, is ‘brother,’ as it relates to the symbolic domain of 
funeral rites.  Antigone states directly that the reason her brother is so special to 
her is precisely because of his status as signifier ‘brother;’ for if her husband died 
she could remarry, and if her son died she could have another, but with father and 
mother dead she will not have another brother.19  So, simply because her brother 
is her brother, he must be buried.  Evoking a Lacanian understanding of the 
subject’s alienation in language and the symbolic, the chorus has told Antigone 
that she does not understand the law at work in her, her αὐτόνοµος (autonomos, 
line 821); but she responds that she has heard the story of Tantalus’ daughter, and 
knows death, and proceeds nonetheless.20  Thus, ‘Antigone appears as αὐτόνοµος, 
as a pure and simple relationship of the human being to that of which he 
miraculously happens to be the bearer, namely, the signifying cut that confers on 
him the indomitable power of being what he is in the face of everything that may 
oppose him.’21  By being aware that in order to retain the signifier ‘brother’ she 
must head towards what is now its signified, das Ding, she is fully autonomous, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Lines 909-912. 
20 Lacan does not mention Antigone’s reference to the death of Tantalus’ daughter here (S7, 344); 
but one cannot help but elaborate the very precise link alluded to here.  Antigone defends her 
decision for das Ding by stating that she has heard of Tantalus’ daughter, who was murdered by 
being turned into stone, yet wept eternally.  Antigone, likewise, will be locked away in stone, 
while still alive, weeping; so she is stating that she already knows the horror of her end, yet 
proceeds towards it.  Tantalus, on the other hand, is Lacan’s most vivid illustration of the 
predicament of the obsessional neurotic (S5, 21.5.1958, 8), placed in an eternal paradox wherein 
the object of his desire is just out of reach, and yet he does not die (life somehow sustained by 
constantly relating to and recalling death, but never actually grasping the enjoyment linked to it).  
Antigone thus, in Lacan’s reading, positions herself as an alternative to obsessionalism – not 
Tantalus, but his daughter. 
21 S7, 348. 
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knowing that the object of her desire is das Ding, and being faithful to her desire 
nonetheless.  Since all desire results from the signifier, and all signifiers are 
predicated upon the repression of das Ding, Antigone incarnates this dynamic 
intentionally when she makes the rare decision to pursue something that she 
knows is just a signifier, while also knowing that it is a signifier for das Ding.  
She ‘pushes to the limit’ and incarnates the ‘desire of death as such;’ she 
‘incarnates that desire,’ and, in doing so, ‘perpetuates, eternalizes, immortalizes 
that Atè.’22 
 Incarnating desire and immortalising das Ding, Antigone finds herself 
locked in a cave, her social death in the past and her imminent carnal death 
ensured.  In this way, Lacan claims that Sophocles presents humanity not in terms 
of physical decay or historical generational progress, but ‘along the paths of his 
solitude,’ in a sphere ‘where death encroaches on life’ in his relationship to ‘the 
second death.’23  In this function, when Lacan comments frequently throughout 
these chapters/lectures on Sophocles’ description of the radiant beauty of 
Antigone,24 it is a beauty that appears as she commits to her desire for das Ding, 
and eventually finds herself looking back on life from her position trapped 
between the first and second death; and it is this beauty that causes catharsis.25  
Lacan imagines the beauty Sophocles attributes to Antigone to be the beauty that 
the analysand often mentions when approaching the barrier to das Ding; so part of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid., 348. 
23 Ibid., 351. 
24 Ibid., 345-348, citing Antigone, 944-987. 
25 S7, 351-352.   
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the beauty Sophocles describes is a consequence of Antigone’s voluntary sacrifice 
of her life for her desire.26 
 Another part of why Antigone’s immortal desire is perceived as beautiful 
is that ‘the question of the realization of desire is necessarily formulated from the 
point of view of a last judgment,’ and this is a position she uniquely reaches.27  As 
discussed in chapters 1 and 4, the subject always pierces the signifying chain 
backwards, being presented with phonemes and signifiers but not giving them 
signification until it punctuates back through the sentence or text.  The biblical 
scholar who doubts this point needs only to attempt to translate Rom 5:16 from 
the Greek, in isolation from its surroundings.28  Is the first part a negative 
statement, or a rhetorical question expecting the answer yes?29  In the second part, 
does judgment come from one man or one trespass?30  An implication of Lacan’s 
insistence that desire plays out along metonymical lines is that desire never 
‘comes to rest’ before we do;31 desire is connected to words, and words never 
fully convey that which we desire; which is, ultimately, das Ding (that which 
words exclude).  This all means that one is never really able to look back and say 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Lacan has already mentioned that beauty can act to shield the subject from das Ding in S7, 268. 
27 S7, 361, and again on 386. 
28 The Greek text reads: καὶ οὐχ ὡς δι᾽ἑνὸς ἁµαρτήσαντος τὸ δώρηµα· τὸ µὲν γὰρ κρίµα ἐξ ἑνὸς 
εἰς κατάκριµα, τὸ δὲ χάρισµα ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωµάτων εἰς δικαίωµα. 
29 Robert Jewett strikes against the norm and reads it as the latter, so that the sentence compares 
Adam and Christ instead of contrasting them, which is quite a major theological difference.  
Robert Jewett, Romans, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 381-383. 
30 This one is a much less crucial difference, but still demonstrates the indiscernibility of the text 
without punctuation and context – of course this itself is hardly a controversial hermeneutical 
point! 
31 On S7, 361, and again on 395-396, Lacan uses Rev 10:10 as an illustration of the true nature of 
desire: the Other’s response to our needs is the gift of a book to eat, as language is the infinite 
plane of our desire. 
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‘that is what I wanted’ and ‘that is what I did not want’ (one is never able fully to 
un-confuse the Teacher’s rant in Rom 7:7-25), until one has arrived at the end of 
the sentence – or, in the case of Antigone, one has been sentenced.  When 
Antigone is in the cave her social world has ended: most of her family is dead, the 
law has judged her, the signifier ‘brother’ has been given its symbolic burial, and 
she will not talk to another human again.  So, having committed to the signifier in 
the purest sense, and with it das Ding, she has found herself in the position of a 
final judgment, having articulated her desire, having achieved what she desired, 
and being able to look back and see her desire laid bare before her; and she knows 
(and the audience with her) that the real object of that desire truly was das Ding, 
death itself. 
 Antigone’s potential impact upon the subject is similar to that of 
psychoanalysis.  Antigone’s commitment to her own desire, and the depiction of 
her as someone who gets exactly what she wants, able to look back from the 
perspective of a final judgment and know it, know herself,32 means that the 
catharsis the subject experiences is one of witnessing humanity’s true relation to 
the law: the law comes with atē, das Ding, and understanding one’s own 
autonomos, one’s desire and law, requires the acceptance of das Ding with it.  The 
point Lacan makes that ties the effects of psychoanalysis and Antigone together is 
that analysis involves realising one’s dependence upon and inheritance of das 
Ding as it structures the world in which one has existed as long as one has 
spoken.33  In this sense, the goal of psychoanalysis is not to end alienation, but to 
help the subject to realise her alienation and indebtedness to the lack in language, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid., 336. 
33 Ibid., 368-369. 
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in order thusly to adopt a position of intentional desire, after the realisation of 
lack.  Antigone is able to have this effect upon the subject because she is one who 
has passed through death on our behalf, having passed through social/symbolic 
death before carnal death, revealing the truth of desire in a way that might affect 
the viewing subject.     
 Much more could be said of Lacan’s interpretation of Antigone, upon 
which the entire thrust of the argument of Seminar VII turns;34 particularly since 
the above sketch includes only the points Lacan makes that work towards the 
picture sketched here.35  For now I turn to the question: what is Lacan’s main 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 This is true not just in the sense of the aspects of his interpretation I have not discussed, but also 
in the wealth of opportunity to discuss and critique Lacan’s Greek translation and interpretation, 
which, particularly in Chapter 21, is not nearly as solid as he claims.  For example, on page 339 he 
seems to be completely unaware of the range of possible translations of the Greek genitive when 
he offers a particularly obscure reading of νόσων δ᾽ ἀµηχάνων φυγὰς (Antigone, 363) as ‘an 
escape into impossible sickness’ (italics original), and then claims that ‘There is no way of 
ascribing another meaning to that phrase than the one I ascribe.’  While his reading is somewhat 
plausible, it is considerably less likely than the more obvious reading of an escape from impossible 
sickness, which is attested in both the Loeb edition and in Sophocles, ‘Antigone,’ in Sophocles I, 
trans. by David Grene, eds. David Grene and Richmond Lattimore (London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991), 174.  Having followed Lacan’s reading of Antigone in the Greek in 
preparation for writing this chapter, it is apparent that he falters frequently in translation, but these 
errors do not affect his overall argument, and (as in the case cited here) usually concern his 
comments on Creon more than his understanding of Antigone. 
35 Important themes I have glossed over here include the relationship between atē and Antigone’s 
family history (discussed more below); the voluntary nature of Creon’s submission to his own 
hamartia (which is where a lot of Lacan’s Greek translation and interpretation errors occur); the 
importance of anamorphosis in how Antigone affects the subject and the role of the chorus in 
acting on behalf of the audience to cause catharsis.  Some of these will be discussed a bit more in 
what follows.  Further, I have not yet paid any attention to the last two lectures of the seminar, in 
which Lacan summarises much of what he has said and offers some brief concluding thoughts.  
These will be referred to more in the discussion of some interpretations of Lacan’s reading of 
Antigone that follow. 
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point in his use of Antigone?  I have attempted initially to sketch Lacan’s reading 
of Antigone above without much reference to secondary literature, because there 
is so much disagreement over what exactly Lacan is doing with it.  So let me now 
examine a few of the possible interpretations, towards answering the question, 
‘What exactly is Lacan doing with Antigone?’   
 The only book-length English language commentary specifically on 
Seminar VII provides the clearest picture, without embedding the text in a larger 
philosophical or political project.36  Marc DeKesel makes several observations 
that will help me to untangle what Lacan was actually doing with Antigone.  
Firstly, DeKesel observes that when Lacan sets out to discuss Antigone, he states 
that he does so specifically ‘with a view to finding something other than a lesson 
in morality.’37  Indeed, Lacan has spent much of the seminar arguing that all 
notions of ‘the good’ are a sublimation of das Ding acting as a barrier to stop us 
from accessing it, which precludes any interpretation of Antigone via Lacan as a 
moral example.38  But is Lacan using Antigone as any other sort of example, not 
necessarily a moral one?  Is Antigone an example for how to act in relation to 
one’s own desire, regardless of ethics?  Or is she a political example?  Again, 
DeKesel thinks otherwise, correctly noting that Lacan uses Antigone not as an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Perhaps surprisingly, the two non-English commentaries on S7 of which I am aware are not 
French, but German and Dutch.  Tim Caspar Boehme, Ethik und Geniessen. Kant und 
Lacan (Vienna: Turia & Kant, 2005) and Paul Moyaert, Ethiek en sublimatie: Over De ethiek van 
de psychoanalyse van Jacques Lacan (Nijmegen: SUN, 1994).  The former is an examination of 
the viability of Lacan’s concept of jouissance for ethics, and the latter is an attempt to bring Lacan 
into the Dutch philosophical world by closely examining his ethics. 
37 Marc DeKesel, Eros and Ethics: Read Jacques Lacan’s Seminar VII, trans. by Sigi Jöttkandt 
(Albany: State of New York University Press, 2009 [2001]), 212, 318.  S7, 307.  Miller 249. 
38 And thus also precludes the interpretation of Paul that follows from being one that places him in 
the school of moral influence theories of the atonement. 
	  322	  
example, but as an image that comes into view slowly (anamorphosis), in a 
different way for each viewing subject, and has some sort of influence upon the 
subject, which Aristotle called catharsis.39 
 Eventually, after outlining everything that Lacan does in his interpretation 
of Antigone, DeKesel states that it is ‘not a moral example but a sublimation.’40  
Das Ding is what lies beyond the second death (symbolic death: the death of 
symbolic, social, linguistic existence, the end of one’s existence/memory as 
signifier).  Antigone intentionally heads towards das Ding, aware that it means 
symbolic death; and when she gets there she is described as beautiful, because 
beauty is what lies at the barrier of the second death: ‘the good’ is what stops us 
from going towards the first death (somatic death), but the final barrier before the 
second death cannot be a signifier, because the second death is the end of the 
signifier.  Lacan’s opinion, based on clinical experience, is that what turns the 
subject away from seeking the second death is beauty; but Antigone radiates this 
very beauty, while nonetheless heading towards das Ding.  This is what creates 
the ethical dimension in the play, which is not something one could transcribe or 
prescribe, but is simply this event of Antigone, and what it has the power to do to 
the subject.  ‘For Lacan, Antigone’s ethical dimension is to be found in the 
viewer’s aesthetic moment of catharsis.’41  In Lacanian terms, this moment of 
catharsis is brought on because Antigone herself becomes a sublimation of das 
Ding, showing us what it really looks like when a human is able to symbolise 
desire, and this beauty shines through in the imaginary. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 DeKesel, Eros and Ethics, 211-212. 
40 Ibid., 241. 
41 Ibid., 247.  Italics original. 
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 In summary, there are several elements that work together to make 
Lacan’s Antigone into an object capable of instigating psychical change.  Firstly, 
when Antigone commits to bury her brother despite the consequence of death, and 
even more so when she is permanently sealed in the cave, she becomes someone 
who, though living, is already dead – and she states that she already regards 
herself as dead.42  In this way she sublimates das Ding by becoming a symbol for 
the way all humans, according to Lacan, already exist, since ‘the idea that a 
human being, as a real being, is always already “dead” lies at the heart of the 
Lacanian theory of the subject.  Being the subject/bearer of signifiers, human 
beings have left behind their real being and only live by grace of the signifiers that 
represent them.’43  Secondly, in her decision to bury her brother Antigone is not 
only edging towards das Ding by committing to her somatic death, but also by 
instigating her own symbolic death – a Lacanian term for experiencing symbolic 
death being passage à l’acte.44  Normally one reaches the second death long after 
the first, when one is no longer spoken of as signifier; but Antigone consciously 
makes a decision that she knows will result in her symbolic death, as she is 
excluded from the world of speaking beings, punished by the law and assured that 
she herself will not get the symbolic ritual burial she secured for her brother.  
Thirdly, her conscious decision for the first and second deaths is done for the sake 
of a signifier, and a signifier alone: her brother is already dead, and it is only his 
unique status as ‘brother’ that she states as her motive.  She insists that this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Line 559, ἡ δ᾽ ἐµὴ ψυχὴ πάλαι τέθνηκεν. 
43 DeKesel, Eros and Ethics, 214.  As DeKesel also notes, the idea of the human subject as ‘dead 
already’ is a theme that stretches back to Lacan’s previous seminar, on Hamlet. 
44 The distinction between the two will be clarified below. 
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signifier remain in the Other through the symbolic rite of burial.  Fourthly, when 
she is in the cave, she is actually able to look back on her desire from the 
perspective of a final judgment.  In this moment her story represents for the 
audience the fact that das Ding is the object one desires once one understands 
one’s own desire.  So, lastly, she sublimates for the audience the realisation of das 
Ding.  This is not meant to inspire the audience actively to seek the first and 
second deaths, but to realise that this is already the obverse of their desire, causing 
for each subject, in a different way, an increased awareness of the law already at 
work in them. 
 One last comment must be made here, and it is perhaps the most useful 
observation made by DeKesel: the great Lacanian maxim ‘Do not give ground 
relative to your desire’ is not a Lacanian maxim.45  The purpose of Antigone in 
Lacan’s reading is not to inspire one to pursue all that one desires, or even, in a 
deeper reading, to commit to the discovery of what one truly desires.  Lacan’s 
actual argument in this passage is that giving up on one’s desire is the ultimate 
source of guilt: ‘the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given 
ground relative to one’s desire.’46  The contribution from Antigone here is a 
narrative of what it would look like actually not to give up on one’s desire.  
Antigone, like psychoanalysis, does not help the subject to get what they really 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 DeKesel, Eros and Ethics, 262.  He refers directly to Simon Critchley treating this phrase as a 
Lacanian maxim, but it is also frequently treated as a maxim by Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou.  
Alenka Zupančič treats it as a maxim throughout Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan (London: 
Verso, 2011 [2000]), particularly 256-259.  Badiou, in Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of 
Evil, trans. by Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 2012 [1993]), 47, says that with this phrase Lacan 
‘proposed his ethical maxim.’ 
46 S7, 392.  Miller 319. 
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want, but rather helps the subject to have a more accurate view of desire as 
something eternally dependant upon lack, eternally castrated by the lack of das 
Ding. 
 
1.3.  What is Žižek Doing with Antigone? 
 Slavoj Žižek and Alenka Zupančič use Antigone as a model for ‘the act,’ 
in similar ways.47  This is not a connection that is overt in the three chapters in 
which Lacan reads Antigone, but it does appear in the final chapter of the seminar.  
Here, leading up to the statement that the only thing of which one can be guilty is 
having given ground relative to one’s desire,48 he says that tragedy (meaning 
Antigone in specific) poses a question ‘with the force of a Last Judgment’ that 
otherwise can only be asked in the context of psychoanalysis: ‘Have you acted in 
conformity with the desire that is in you?’49  It is quite clear from these final 
pages of Seminar VII that Lacan sees Antigone as one who has successfully 
‘acted,’ because her act is the one that poses this question to the audience.  This 
use of the term ‘act’ is consistent with Lacan’s subsequent development of it, in 
which an act is something that actually sends a message to the Other.50 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Zupančič does not discuss Paul or add enough to Žižek’s reading of Antigone to merit a full 
discussion here, beyond mention.  She uses Antigone as one example among many, places a strong 
emphasis on the importance of the passage à l’acte in leading to the act, and is reading Lacan 
synthetically with Kant (as Žižek does with Hegel) in order to ground and elaborate her 
ethical/political theory.  Nonetheless, her book Ethics of the Real has helped greatly in informing 
this chapter. 
48 S7, 392, and again on 395. 
49 Ibid., 386. 
50 His understanding of the act largely develops between seminars 14 and 20, with S15 devoted to 
it specifically.  Marcelle Marini articulates Lacan’s definition of the act as something that ‘entails 
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Lacan specifically (but briefly) contrasts the effects of Antigone’s act with 
the demands of what modern theologians might call ‘Empire:’ Antigone knows 
her desire and acts upon it, whereas when Alexander or Hitler conquer new places 
they essentially tell the people ‘We have liberated you from such and such, and so 
you need not act upon your desire for rebellion now.’51  In an act one acts upon 
desire to send a message to the Other, but Lacan’s view here of Empire is similar 
to his view of tyranny in ‘Kant with Sade:’ a tyrant is one who attempts to enslave 
the desire of the Other.52  Antigone poses the question of desire from the 
perspective of a Last Judgment (from the perspective of the Other), but Empire 
tells you that your desire can wait. 
It is also important to note that in this section Lacan is specifically 
discussing ethics.  He begins it by pointing out that ethics is the question of one’s 
actions, and then proceeds to discuss Antigone and the act.53  However, DeKesel’s 
prescient reminder remains correct: ‘For Lacan, Antigone’s ethical dimension is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a signifying doubling that allows for an insertion of the subject in a chain where he inscribes 
himself—or else it entails the institution of a signifier.’  Marcelle Marini, Jacques Lacan: The 
French Context, trans. by Anne Tomiche (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992 
[1986]), 206-207. 
51 S7, 387.  The word ‘Empire’ is often used by theologians to denote state powers of domination 
in general.  For example, Richard Horsley’s book Religion and Empire: People, Power, and the 
Life of the Spirit (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003) is about various times in history when 
religion has risen up in opposition to ‘Empire.’  He bluntly argues for a parallel between Rome as 
Empire and America as Empire in conclusion to his Jesus and Empire: The Kingdom of God and 
the New World Disorder (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 137-150.  N. T. Wright uses it 
throughout his chapter on Paul’s relation to the Roman Empire, referring to the ‘question of “Paul 
and Empire”’ on page 1277 of the chapter ‘The Lion and the Eagle: Paul in Caesar’s Empire,’ in 
Paul and the Faithfulness of God (London: SPCK, 2013), 1271-1319. 
52 Écrits, 661-663. 
53 S7, 383-387. 
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to be found in the viewer’s aesthetic moment of catharsis.’54  Antigone has an 
ethical dimension, in its presentation of an act; but this ethical dimension is not in 
Antigone’s act as a model, but in Antigone’s act as the source of a question for the 
subject.  It is even proper to distance this question from Antigone herself: it is not 
that Antigone presents a question which, when separated from Antigone and asked 
in a separate conversation retains its meaning; but, rather, the question as Lacan 
words it is one way of putting the question that is Antigone.  This is what he 
means by suggesting reading Antigone more as the subject of anamorphosis than 
catharsis: what Antigone’s act means for the subject is something that comes into 
view slowly, and differently, for each subject.  In summary, Antigone’s act, 
through the cathartic/anamorphotic power of tragic drama, poses for the subject 
the questions of their own action and desire, opened up by presenting Antigone’s 
act directly in relation to das Ding.  In this way Antigone’s act affects the subject 
with a demand opposite to the demand of Empire: Antigone poses the 
psychoanalytic question of your own desire, and ‘Empire’ demands that you not 
ask the question.55 
Žižek first outlines his reading of Antigone and the act in 1992’s Enjoy 
Your Symptom!56  This begins with a description of the same clinical paradox 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 DeKesel, Eros and Ethics, 247. 
55 Note again that this use of the signifier ‘Empire’ is not Lacanian or Žižekian, but serves to tie 
both of them to theological discourse. 
56 Slavoj Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom! (London: Routledge, 2008 [1992]), 34-76.  He also writes 
about Antigone in the short introduction to his recent translation, Slavoj Žižek (trans.), Antigone 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2016), xi-xxv.  Here he responds to the other main philosophical readings 
of Antigone (those of Hegel, Lacan, Kierkegaard and Judith Butler), and concludes by suggesting 
how he would rewrite Antigone for a modern audience, before accomplishing some of this in his 
own translation.  His argument in Enjoy Your Symptom!, though dated, provides a much more in-
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described at the very beginning of the first chapter above: that in psychoanalysis 
the subject speaks, ‘remembering’ trauma, but at the same time these utterances 
‘make the subject what it asserts to be;’ the remembrance of the past ‘transforms 
the very place from which the subject speaks.’57  Žižek quite rightly compares this 
with speech-act theory, so popular at the time of Lacan’s earlier writings,58 but 
clarifies that from a psychoanalytic perspective speech-acts gain their power from 
the expression of a real trauma being brought out of repression through its 
symbolic enunciation (thus sending a message to the Other).  Since Lacan’s view 
of the subject is one of Saussurean synchronic structure, a relation of repressed 
and conscious signifiers in the present, the Lacanian psychoanalytic (speech-)act 
is not so much a matter of remembering and declaring the historical truth of an 
event, but of speaking the signifiers presently repressed in the unconscious.  Žižek 
emphasises his Lacanian/Hegelian view of the subject, in which the ‘true subject’ 
is not the essence one believes oneself to be, but is found instead in exactly the 
imaginary-symbolic discursive form in which one presents oneself: ‘wearing a 
mask actually makes us what we feign to be.’59  This widens the extent to which 
for Žižek an act is not just a posture or pretence, but consists exactly of taking the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
depth use of what Antigone actually says, and does so in a way that follows Lacan more closely, 
thus being more useful here. 
57 Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom!, 37. 
58 Ibid., 36-37., discussing J. L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1962).  For a collection of articles outlining and explifying the use of speech-act theory in biblical 
studies, by the leading proponent of this approach, see Anthony Thiselton, Thiselton on 
Hermeneutics: Collected Works with New Essays (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2006), 51-150.  
Thiselton also supervised an original and precise formulation of the use of speech act theory in 
biblical interpretation, in the doctoral thesis of Richard S. Briggs, Words in Action: Speech Act 
Theory and Biblical Interpretation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001). 
59 Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom!, 39. 
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very pretence seriously as the true location of action.  That is to say, an act does 
not consist of trying to escape the symbolic through doing something, but instead 
consists precisely of realising how the symbolic was always the only domain in 
which we can do anything at all.  Here Žižek is quite faithful to a core Lacanian 
idea: that the real is not hiding in some magical deep interior that exists in a 
concrete form to be revealed (as one could read Jung), but rather the real already 
exists in plain sight, in what we had been saying but not taking seriously – saying 
without realising we were saying it.   
 So Žižek looks at three Rossellini films that in his view treat the subject 
this way – as subjects whose existence is located in the very domain from which 
their problems arrive, the Other – the last of which, Stromboli, he uses as an 
example of someone who reaches ‘the proper dimension of the act.’60  Like with 
Zupančič, this begins by tying the act to the passage à l’acte and Antigone: the 
protagonist (called Karin) commits social/symbolic suicide, cutting off all real 
links with her social world.61  Whereas in French psychiatry contemporary to 
Lacan the phrase passage à l’acte referred to a sudden negative reaction, usually 
suicide or another violent act,62 Lacan developed it into a notion of symbolic 
death (the second death), in which one suddenly does something to extricate 
oneself from the Other.63  For Lacan this is something specifically passive, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ibid., 49.  Žižek discusses Stromboli on pages 48-53. 
61 Alenka Zupančič opens the argument of Ethics of the Real, 7-20, by finding a parallel for the 
Lacanian passage à l’acte in Kant’s ethics.  As can be seen on p. 20, she depends upon Žižek for 
her understanding of the passage à l’acte. 
62 J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. by Donald Nicholson-
Smith (London: Karnac Books, 1988 [1973]), 5. 
63 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 
1996), 136-137; S10, 113-130. 
	  330	  
which one is caused to pass through symbolic death – thus it is not a ‘proper act,’ 
in which one chooses to send a message to the Other.64  This posits Lacan’s 
understanding of the passage à l’acte as opposed to the traditional psychiatric 
one, because suicide is specifically a successful act: it is ‘the only successful 
act,’65 because it sets out to send the message to the Other ‘you no longer exist,’ 
and the message is received and obeyed by the Other.  Conversely, in the passage 
à l’acte, one is put through symbolic death, in ‘an exit from the symbolic network, 
a dissolution of the social bond.’66  It is a last resort, prompted by anxiety, in 
which one ‘rushes and topples off the stage, out of the scene’67 through a ‘flight 
from the Other into the dimension of the real.’68 
In Žižek’s interpretation, Karin’s act of symbolic suicide should be 
opposed to real suicide: real suicide sends a message to the Other, but symbolic 
suicide cuts one off from the Other.69  Since it is an act cutting oneself off from 
the Other, a passage à l’acte, whatever emerges afterwards is not a result of 
planning, but is simply the result of the act itself: there is a simple ‘No!’ said to 
the symbolic, and a new state that emerges from a new perspective is ‘essentially 
a by-product.’70  Žižek combines the act and the passage à l’acte in his 
understanding of Karin, and of Antigone, in suggesting that their acts were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Evans, Introductory Dictionary, 1-2, states that Lacan saw the passage à l’acte as ‘not a proper 
act.’     
65 Jacques Lacan, Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, ed. Jacques-Alain 
Miller (London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1990 [1974]), 43.  ‘Suicide is the only act that can succeed 
without misfiring.’   
66 Evans, Introductory Dictionary, 137. 
67 S10, 115. 
68 Evans, Introductory Dictionary, 137. 
69 Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom!, 50. 
70 Ibid., 51-53. 
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examples of the passage à l’acte.  This means reading the passage à l’acte as 
something that can be consciously chosen, in the same way that suicide can be, 
despite Lacan having sought specifically to distinguish the two: suicide, which is 
a successful consciously chosen act, and the passage à l’acte, which is an 
unsuccessful passive action.71  However, while the former is what Lacan directly 
attributes to Antigone, the latter is a concept Lacan had not yet developed when 
he delivered Seminar VII.  It might not be defensible to go as far as Žižek and tie 
the passage à l’acte and the act together; but it is reasonable to claim that 
Antigone’s actively chosen symbolic death, though not a passage à l’acte 
(because it was active), had the effects of the death of the Other and the 
reconstitution of her symbolic field in line with her own desire that Lacan would 
later describe as the effects of the passage à l’acte.  Thus, when Žižek and 
Zupančič describe the effects of the passage à l’acte they are quite legitimately 
expanding upon the implications of an ethics that mimics Antigone; and perhaps 
even doing so in a way that Lacan himself would have done, had he considered 
Antigone to be an example of recommendable action rather than the source of a 
psychoanalytic question, and had he been writing about Antigone after developing 
his understandings of the passage à l’acte (Seminar X) and the act (Seminar XV). 
I will proceed by using the term ‘symbolic death’ to include the 
implications of the passage à l’acte described by the later Lacan, but will not 
employ the term passage à l’acte as though it can refer to a chosen and successful 
act, because this is clearly not what Lacan ever meant by it, despite describing in 
better detail some of the effects that Antigone’s act had.  So, to be more precise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 This criticism is made by Yannis Stavrakakis, ‘The Lure of Antigone: Aporias of an Ethics of 
the Political,’ in Umbr(a): Ignorance of the Law, 1 (2003), 122-125. 
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with Žižek’s reading of Antigone, Antigone is an example of a successful act in 
which she chooses to undergo symbolic death, because she knows that her chosen 
fidelity to the signifier ‘brother’ and to its signified of das Ding means being cut 
off from the Other (the state, what remains of her family, and all social relations).  
In this faithfulness to the signifier and death she also encounters the real, evident 
in the text from her ‘radiance,’ and from her ability to know her desire from the 
perspective of a last judgment.  She is a ‘figure of fidelity,’72 whose act Lacan 
reads to have a psychoanalytically transformative effect upon the subject. 
 When reading Žižek describing the act we find something very Pauline 
that is not present in his reading of Paul.  Whereas his reading of Paul inevitably 
slides into his reading of the Gospels as soon as he gets close to soteriology, 
seeing Pauline salvation as effected by Christ’s cry of dereliction (the symbolic 
realisation of the lack in the other through the enunciation of this lack coming 
from the incarnate voice of the Other itself), when Žižek describes the act he is 
describing exactly the Pauline Christian’s experience of Christ, so this would be a 
much more natural vehicle for Žižek’s reading of the Pauline Christian subject, 
and would not require a post-Pauline jump to Gospel tradition not necessarily 
known by Paul.  Take for example this extended quote from the text I am 
currently discussing: 
 
What lies ahead of Karin is undoubtedly what, in a vulgarly pathetic 
way, we call “a new life”: sooner or later, she will return to the village, 
make peace with her husband or return to the mainland and assume 
new symbolic mandates, a new place in the community, in one way or 
another, she will begin again to be active—but the film ends before 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Zupančič, Ethics of the Real, 205. 
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Karin finds her place in a new symbolic identity (or reassumes the old 
one), before the new performative, the new “founding word.”  There is 
of course something exceptional, excessive even, in such an encounter 
with the Real, with the abyss of the “abstract freedom”: it takes place 
only in the utmost intimacy of what some call the “mystic experience.”  
The emphasis of Lacan is, however, that such a passage through the 
“zero point” of symbolic suicide is at work in every act worthy of this 
name.  What is namely an act?  Why is suicide the act par excellence?  
The act differs from an active intervention (action) in that it radically 
transforms its bearer (agent): the act is not simply something I 
“accomplish”—after an act, I’m literally “not the same as before.”  In 
this sense, we could say that the subject “undergoes” the act (“passes 
through” it), rather than “accomplishes” it: in it, the subject is 
annihilated and subsequently reborn (or not)… I put at stake 
everything, including myself, my symbolic identity; the act is therefore 
always a “crime,” a “transgression,” namely of the limit of the 
symbolic community to which I belong.73 
 
Žižek also describes Karin’s act in Hegelian terms, as a negation of negation when 
she cries out to God in frustration before fainting, then exclaims God’s name 
while staring at nature in the morning, thus realising the lack in the Other but 
negating that negation by reaffirming the master signifier nonetheless.74  This 
parallels Žižek’s interpretation of Christ on the cross; but this Hegelian 
interpretation of the Lacanian act is not necessary for Paul.  The act as Žižek 
describes it in the above quote is already sufficient to account for the Pauline 
subject, without Hegel or the Gospels.  The Pauline Christian subject faithfully 
participates in Christ’s faithful suffering death, which Paul states happened in 
such a way as to place Christ (and the Christian ‘in Christ,’ crucified with him) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom!, 50-51, italics original. 
74 Ibid., 50. 
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under the curse of the Law at the moment of crucifixion.75  The Christian subject 
has also been affected to commit to this symbolic death through an encounter with 
the traumatic real, which will be discussed below.  The subject passes through this 
act not entirely as a result of planned action (agency), but as something the subject 
undergoes, in a mystical experience, preceding a new founding act (the 
affirmation of a new master signifier, in the proclamation kyrios Iēsous, ‘Jesus is 
lord’).  This	  all	  will	  be	  argued	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	  ‘St	  Paul’s	  Christ,’	  with	  reference	  to	  modern	  Pauline	  scholarship. 
 Part of this possible oversight can be explained by asking the question of 
the identity of the Other in Paul’s theology.  The simplest historical reading is that 
the Other is discussed in theology under the signifier ‘God,’ with the Lacanian 
provision that in addressing the Other directly as God we actually address the 
unconscious, which is where the discourse of the Other takes place (where there is 
still prohibition even though ‘God is dead’); thus, ‘God is unconscious.’76  
However, it should be evident that in Paul the Other, as always, goes under many 
names (there is not just one master signifier for any subject).  ‘Rome,’ ‘Caesar,’ 
‘Torah,’ ‘honour,’ ‘family’ and ‘nature’ are all also historical master signifiers, as 
cultural concepts that occupied the place of the Other in Paul’s world.  So while 
one might need to look from Paul to the Synoptic Christ to find the cry of 
dereliction, and with it a handy theological instance of the symbolic inscription of 
the lack in the Other, it is actually quite simple to find symbolic death, 
precipitating the act, within Paul’s theology itself – when taken in historical 
context. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Gal 3:13. 
76 S11, 59. 
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 In order to situate this argument properly, there are some problems that 
have arisen with the interpretation of the Lacanian Act by Žižek (primarily) and 
Zupančič, which should be discussed.  Firstly, there is the common accusation of 
infidelity made against Žižek, Zupančič, Badiou and all radical leftist Lacanians: 
Lacan specifically did not advocate radical politics, and is even sometimes 
described as politically conservative.77  There is an irrelevant point here, but also 
a legitimate one.  There is certainly no reason why Lacanian theory should not be 
used in ways Lacan did not intend; but this criticism does lead to the more 
pressing concern, that a political reading of Lacan on Antigone is actually 
irreconcilable with Lacan’s intent.  As Matthew Sharpe points out, Lacan in 
Seminar VII not only takes an explicitly neutral stance towards the political 
discourse, but within this context Creon should be read as a representative of this 
discourse, which Antigone opposes.78  Antigone’s act is one that Lacan reads in 
line with his ambivalence to politics, as something happening beyond that realm, 
not opposed to it or in order to alter it.  Antigone’s act does not change the 
symbolic/political order Creon represents, it only attains for her some autonomy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 For example, Tomšič is forced to begin his book on Lacan and Marx by stating that any attempt 
to ‘turn Lacan into a leftist thinker’ is ‘immediately countered by a wealth of biographical trivia 
and more or less trustworthy anecdotes regarding Lacan’s political preferences, which, it is said, 
inclined towards Charles de Gaulle’s conservatism.’  Samo Tomšič, The Capitalist Unconscious 
(London: Verso, 2015), 1.  Alain Badiou and Élisabeth Roudinesco debate the legitimacy of the 
use of Lacan for far-left or radical leftist politics in Alain Badiou and Élisabeth Roudinesco, 
Jacques Lacan Past and Present: A Dialogue, trans. by Jason E. Smith (Chichester: Columbia 
University Press, 2014 [2012]), 19-30. 
78 Matthew Sharpe, ‘Lacan’s Antigone, Žižek’s Antigone, Psychoanalysis and Politics,’ paper 
presented at the 13th International Conference of the International Society for the Study of 
European Ideas at the University of Cyprus, <https://lekythos.library.ucy.ac.cy/bitstream/handle/ 
10797/6176/ISSEIproceedings-Matthew%20Sharpe.pdf?sequence=1> [accessed 22.11.2016], 7-8. 
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from it, in a way that affects the viewer.79  Of course, even this does not demolish 
Žižek’s reading: there is no reason why one should not read Antigone via 
Lacanian psychoanalysis in a more political way than Lacan, and, further, no 
reason one should not even use Antigone as a model of the structure of an act that 
Lacan did not specifically link to her.  The implication that Lacanian readings of 
Antigone should follow Lacan’s ‘original intention’ treats Lacan himself as an 
omniscient master, an Other who knows – and this is a position Lacan explicitly 
rejected both when he dissolved his school before his death, and when he accused 
the radical political students Badiou praises of only ‘looking for a new master.’ 
 Another criticism reveals how much closer to Paul Žižek should be.  As 
summarised in the Introduction, in The Ticklish Subject Žižek criticises Badiou’s 
reading of Paul for failing to account for the Lacanian death drive, instead 
focusing entirely on life and resurrection.80  I then discussed Badiou’s reading of 
Paul in more detail, and noted that he does indeed focus on the resurrection of 
Christ to the exclusion of the death of Christ, rejecting the idea that death 
(‘morbidity’) is a major theme of Paul’s theology, (earning Badiou much criticism 
from a host of biblical scholars).81  However, almost immediately following his 
criticism of Badiou’s reading of the Pauline event for ignoring the domain of the 
death drive, Žižek goes on to criticise Badiou’s view of the subject in general for 
being insufficiently Lacanian by omitting the death drive, and does not go on to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Stavrakakis, ‘The Lure of Antigone,’ 118-120. 
80 Chapter 1, section 4.1, above.  Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject (London: Verso, 2008 [1999]), 
176-180. 
81 Discussed at length in Chapter 1, section 4.1, mostly in response to Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: 
The Foundation of Universalism, trans. by Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2003), 61-74. 
	   337	  
discuss how this should affect his own reading of Paul.82  Instead, having found 
the death drive in Paul only in the role of death in Rom 7, he counters Badiou’s 
vision of the event with his Antigone/act/passage-à-l’acte trope, rightly 
concluding that, against Badiou, for Lacan ‘a Truth-Event can operate only 
against the background of the traumatic encounter with the undead/monstrous 
Thing,’83 and that Badiou is ultimately led to ‘oppose the full revolutionary 
passage à l’acte.’84  This is something that Žižek’s Paul never really does, 
because he either takes the subject through a Hegelian sublation of law/death and 
law/sin as law/love, or he is dependent upon Žižek’s reading of the Gospels for a 
salvific effect of Jesus on the cross, symbolically declaring God destitute of God.  
The first of these options depends upon a weak reading of Rom 7, as argued in the 
previous chapter, and the second depends on the error of reading Paul through the 
Gospels, thus failing to account for what Paul might actually imagine the 
Christian subject in his own time to be.85  In order to solve these problems, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Žižek, Ticklish Subject, 184-191. 
83 Ibid., 191. 
84 Ibid., 195. 
85 On 2.11.2016, at Birkbeck, University of London, I asked Žižek exactly the above question: are 
your readings of Paul and Christ completely separate, or does your reading of Paul depend upon 
him being aware of the cry of dereliction as it eventually made its way into the Gospels?  He 
restated his reading of Christ’s death, but said that he understands that Paul wrote first.  I asked 
him whether this then meant that there was something in Christ’s death itself that carried with it 
the effects of the cry of dereliction, and he answered that indeed this is contained within the notion 
of God being crucified.  Earlier in his lecture he had stated that the cry of dereliction is his ‘one 
piece of evidence’ for his reading of Christ.  Thus it is the aim of this chapter to expand upon the 
notion of the psychoanalytic effects of the cry of dereliction being contained within Paul’s earlier 
understanding of Christ’s death, and to show that it is not just the effect of the idea of ‘God 
crucified,’ but the effect of the power of the narrative of Christ’s pistis to traumatic death.  This is 
in aid of Žižek’s programme, not opposed to it, showing how the cry of dereliction need not be his 
one piece of evidence for his reading of Christ, because its implications are already contained in 
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retain the place of Paul in Žižek’s programme, I formalise the structure of 
Antigone’s act (without misappropriating the passage à l’acte), and then look at 
how this helps us to understand Paul’s vision of the Christian subject. 
1.4.  The Structure of Antigone’s Act 
 Instead of arguing that Antigone herself is a model for the political act, I 
suggest that the cathartic/transformative event Lacan describes in his discussion 
of Antigone is the same event Paul witnesses in his discussion of the nature of 
Christian subjectivity.  Aiming to do no more than describe the Pauline Christian 
event, without suggesting any normative imperative for Christian life, this should 
be regarded as pure psychoanalytic history.  If early Christians were transformed 
by symbolically participating in a symbolic death like Antigone’s (but this time 
followed by symbolic resurrection, the immutability of the signifier as such 
shining through even more clearly), what does this mean for modern Christian 
life?  That is a secondary question, which is not my concern here, because it 
requires a wider theory of Scripture and inspiration, and here I merely offer a 
psychoanalytic interpretation of a historical text/event. 
 So I join with Žižek and Zupančič, and read Lacan’s Antigone in light of 
the act, aided by Lacan’s further thoughts on symbolic death that emerged through 
his separate notion of the passage à l’acte.  However, rather than use Antigone for 
an example of how one should choose to act, she is an example of how a narrative 
of an act, specifically of faithfulness to a signifier and to symbolic then physical 
death, can result in the transformation of others.  Thus, if Christ’s act based in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Paul’s letters; particularly when read alongside Žižek’s understanding of Antigone and the act.  
The lecture was titled ‘Between Philosophy and Psychoanalysis,’ and a recording is available 
online at <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/bih/podcasts> [accessed 5.12.2016]. 
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symbolic death led others to experience symbolic death and be able to act, then 
this process fits snugly with Lacan’s reading of Antigone.  Whether or not her act 
is fully paradigmatic of ‘the act’ in Žižek’s politics, her faithfulness to her own 
desire and symbolic death, and the effect it potentially has on the subject, is 
paradigmatic of the phenomenon witnessed in Paul’s letters. 
What is the structure of Antigone’s act, that so impacts the subject?  
Conveniently for this study, Antigone’s act is characterised, on several levels, by 
pistis, fidelity.86  She is a figure of fidelity to the signifier ‘brother,’ insisting upon 
preserving the place of this signifier in the symbolic through ritual.  She is also, 
quite uniquely, a figure who (unlike Sade and unlike the Teacher) manages not to 
give way on her own desire, being faithful to both her symbolic and physical 
deaths, since both are implicit in her fidelity to the signifier ‘brother,’ acting as 
the signified of her fidelity to him.  This relation of fidelity can be formulated 
with the symbol (↔), since Antigone is faithful to these things, but also through 
this fidelity comes to assume the position of a final judgment, knowing what is 
truly signified by her faithfulness to the signifier; thus the arrow points in both 
directions, since the relationship is reciprocal.  What she is faithful to, in ‘brother’ 
and the first and second deaths that this faithfulness implies, is the Signifier itself, 
qua signifier.  In Lacanian theory, the entirety of the symbolic is a world of 
signifying chains masking the horror of das Ding – a world the subject enters as 
soon as a baby cries out, trying to use language to acquire or hide the lack of a 
jouissance that will never be, the fullness of the world before language/desire.  
Antigone manages to be faithful to a signifier that is no more than a signifier itself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 The translation of pistis will be discussed briefly below. 
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(‘my brother is my brother’), but at the same time faithful to a signifier whose 
signified is the death that she now walks towards voluntarily, out of fidelity, 
knowing that she will wind up sealed in a cave, symbolically dead but still 
breathing.  ‘She pushes to the limit the realization of something that might be 
called the pure and simple desire of death as such.  She incarnates that desire.’87  
Thus Antigone is ‘a pure agent of death drive [in] her unconditional demand for 
the symbolic ritual to be performed.’88  This can justly be called an encounter with 
the real.  By so incarnating the drive, she is confronted with the objet a, a signifier 
for das Ding that she would never otherwise encounter directly.  A representation 
of Antigone’s Act begins to look like this: 
 
S1                      S2 
$                        a 
 
Antigone is represented by the signifier S1.  She is in a reciprocal relation of 
fidelity and effect with S2, ‘brother qua signifier,’ whose signified is the implied 
death at which her fidelity aims, the Ding that is normally excluded within the 
symbolic (in what Lacan would call an ‘extimate’ relationship).89  Since a result 
of the reciprocity of this relationship is that Antigone is incarnating the desire of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 S7, 348.  
88 Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London: 
Verso, 2012), 84. 
89 Note that the objet petit a is not a later term for das Ding, but they are closely related concepts.  
The former can be regarded as a signifier for an instance of the latter, but is tied even closer to 
language itself (it is that which remains excluded by every signifying unit), rather than being 
primarily concerned with maternal jouissance and the second death.  Since I am here constructing 
a formulation I use a, as does Lacan in his mathemes, and also because I am discussing a particular 
instance of the death drive as what is implied by but not specifically contained within the signifier 
‘brother.’ 
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death as such, and she is actually consciously aware of death as the implied object 
of her desire, there is an arrow up from a to S2, to represent that here the signified 
is affecting the meaning of the signifier, and becoming known through the 
signifier. 
 Lacanians will recognise the developing schematic.  The signifier 
‘Antigone’ is the signifier that ‘represents the subject for another signifier.’90  Its 
signified is Antigone as barred subject, that which is represented by Antigone’s 
‘I,’ but only exists as alienated within language.  Thus below the bar one can put $ 
for the subject Antigone, with a downward arrow demonstrating that Antigone as 
subject is contingent upon her alienated linguistic understanding of herself, which 
is here in relation to the signifier ‘brother’ and its signified of her own death 
drive, excluded as a from the signifier ‘brother’ as set in the signifying chains of 
Creon’s state law and religious rites.  Of course, the alienated subject of Antigone, 
the lack that is contained within Antigone’s own understanding of herself, is not 
what comes to desire death.  Desire is the desire of the Other, existing on the part 
of Antigone’s self-understanding, her ego-ideal; so it is not $ that desires a, but S1 
that is in relation to S2.  There is a double bar (//) between $ and a to show that it 
is not Antigone’s ‘pure self’ coming to desire death, but the signifier that 
represents the subject for another signifier which has as its signified an instance of 
das Ding.  So, here is the complete schematic: 
 
S1                      S2 
$           //           a 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 This is Lacan’s definition of the signifier, as given, for instance, in S11, 207.  ‘A signifier is that 
which represents a subject for another signifier.’ 
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This is a representation of the discourse in which Antigone’s act occurs.  It 
is a discourse Antigone enters through her symbolic death, in which her 
faithfulness to S2, due to its new position with respect to Creon’s law (and not due 
to any action of her own), substitutes that which was the signified of ‘brother’ 
with Antigone’s own symbolic (and then physical) death.  It is also the ‘discourse 
of the master’ as Lacan formulates it in Seminar XVII;91 the only difference is that 
instead of the subject being in a subservient/receptive relation to the Other, S2, 
Antigone’s pistis creates a reciprocal relation, made possible by her incarnation of 
the death drive.  This is an appropriate appropriation of the discourse of the 
master, because it is the very discourse in which Lacan believes the 
psychoanalytic treatment to transpire, with the unconscious of the analysand 
putting the analyst into the position of the Other-supposed-to-know, through 
transference; and Lacan believed the effect of Antigone to be analogous to the 
clinic. 
 This is the structure not only of the discursive position of Antigone’s act, 
but also of the subject who views the play Antigone, and through catharsis 
identifies with her, coming to know something of his/her own relation to das Ding 
through identifying with Antigone in the cave, the place of ‘final judgment.’  Thus 
the audience member is also represented by $, because in both cases (the fictional 
Antigone and the real audience member) they are represented by S1, ‘Antigone.’  
So the discourse of the master, with the central term in the top half adjusted to 
(↔) to represent pistis, is my model of the subject’s participation in Antigone’s 
act, and also in her passage to it, through the real. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 S17, 29-32. 
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2.  St Paul’s Christ 
 
 In his Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, one of Marcus Pound’s 
claims is that psychoanalysis can be read as analogous to faith.92  Although his 
argument is ultimately concerned with using Lacan and Kierkegaard to show that 
‘the Sacred Mass may be seen in terms of a social form of analysis,’93 on the way 
to this he provides an excellent summary of Lacan’s reading of Antigone, 
describing it in much the same way as above, and then comparing Antigone’s act 
(and the psychoanalytic effect it elicits) with Christ’s: ‘Christ assumes the status 
of the sublime object, short-circuiting the real and the symbolic, and in bringing 
the real into the symbolic he traumatizes us… In reading the Gospels one is 
purged through the confrontation with the real.’94  Thus he understands the 
Christian subject’s relationship to Christ to be one wherein the subject is affected 
in a way similar to the viewer of Antigone, via the reading of the Gospels (or, in 
the case of early Christians, via the viewing of the Gospels).95  My thesis here is 
that this effect was so strong for the earliest Christians, with whom Paul 
interacted, that it formed the basis of Paul’s understanding of Christian existence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Marcus Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma (London: SCM, 2007) and Žižek: a 
(very) critical introduction (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2008), 125-126. 
93 Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 142. 
94 Ibid., 114.  To be more specific, the point of the discussion of Antigone in this chapter of 
Pound’s work is to show that Lacanian psychoanalysis, not ego-psychology, is the proper 
framework through which to understand Kierkegaard’s reading of Abraham, and then to claim that 
the subjective change (assumption of desire, religious subjectivity) that they find in Abraham and 
Antigone is also the interpretative action that founds the Church – which Pound finds replicated in 
the sacrament of the Sacred Mass. 
95 See n. 2, above. 
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In his summary of Lacan’s reading of Antigone Pound points out 
something not yet emphasised here: the fact that Antigone’s atē is a fate 
specifically received from her family.  The doom that awaits Antigone is one that 
results from her location not just as sister to her brother, but as member of the 
family of Oedipus.  In this sense atē means more than das Ding, as it is not just 
death in the abstract, but the death that was already sealed by one’s history before 
one was even born.  So when Pound addresses her situation, he says that ‘this is 
precisely the predicament Antigone faces, compelled to act by the collective guilt 
of the family, the crimes of Oedipus.’96  In this dimension of Antigone’s embrace 
of the situation into which she was born, her fidelity to the Other that is her 
symbolic position within her own family, there is a parallel not just with Christian 
incarnational and atonement theology (wherein Christ takes the form and guilt of 
humanity), but also with Paul’s specific presentations of Christ.97  Paul refers to 
Christ as being ‘born of a woman, born under the law’ (Gal 4:4), meaning in 
Lacanian terms that in Christ’s very birth he enters the world in a symbolic 
construction not his own – Christ is born into the alienation in language and in 
one’s family history that constitutes human subjectivity.  Thus placed in human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 107. 
97Antigone, born into the atē of her family, might make a fine parallel for Christian understandings 
of the incarnation (Christ born into the atē of humanity), but one should nonetheless be careful to 
be more specific when drawing comparisons with Pauline Christology, since Paul did not mention 
the virgin birth and there is debate over what the incarnation meant to Paul.  See James D. G. 
Dunn, Christology in the Marking: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of 
the Incarnation (London: SCM, 1989 [1980]), 98-128 and 163-212, or Gordon D. Fee, Pauline 
Christology: An Exegetical-Theological Study (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2007), especially 
500-512 for the question of Christ’s pre-existence in Paul.  Further, one should also not presume 
that any of one’s assumptions about the nature of Christian atonement theology are necessarily 
also Pauline. 
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symbolic/linguistic networks, receiving the law, it is also possible for Paul to say 
that ‘on our behalf [God] made the one who did not know sin to be sin’ (2 Cor 
5:21).98  Like Antigone, Paul’s Christ is born into the symbolic world, the law, the 
sin and guilt of his forebears; and, put even stronger, like Antigone he chooses to 
incarnate this doom and ‘become sin’ (Paul), to ‘incarnate the desire of death as 
such’ (Lacan).99  I follow this line of thought more below. 
For Pound the purpose of this is to show how Christian religion and 
sacramental practice can affect the subject in ways analogous to Antigone and 
psychoanalysis.  Here our aims are quite similar, except that this study is not 
primarily concerned with the present.  Instead of using Lacan’s Antigone to argue 
that religious experience can be positively psychoanalytically transformative, I 
instead argue that the experience of Christ that Paul described was 
psychoanalytically transformative.  This assumes as a starting point the reading of 
Christ via Antigone that Pound provides.  The story of Christ received by the early 
Church was one in which he assumes the death drive, a desire for the real itself, 
demonstrating a faithfulness clearly paralleling Antigone.  However, it is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 For Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 113-115, Christ is born into a pre-existent 
atē of a ‘family drama,’ which presumably means his relationship to the Father, and he also 
receives the atē of human mortality as a consequence of ‘the fall (Gen 2:17).’  This certainly fits in 
with a Radical Orthodox or Catholic Lacanian reading of Christ, but is not the exact approach 
taken here, where I am instead seeking to show that Antigone maps onto Paul’s understanding of 
Christ (for whom Christ clearly partakes in the the atē of his human family, and for whom Genesis 
is not necessarily witness to a fall narrative as Augustine later understood it).  In 2 Cor 5:21 we 
also see Paul most clearly verbalising how Christ sublimates das Ding: he literally has him 
‘become sin.’ 
99 Note that saying Christ ‘incarnates the desire of death as such’ is quite different from claiming 
that Christ desired death – the former is merely saying that, like Antigone, in wilfully embracing 
das Ding Christ incarnates the desire that is specifically human: the drive towards and around das 
Ding that results from existence in language. 
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Pauline formulation of this specifically, even more than that contained in the 
Gospels, which justifies this comparison; because it is in Paul’s letters that these 
very ‘Antigonine’ elements constantly reappear when Paul discusses the 
transformation that he believes has happened to the post-conversion Christian 
subject. 
 The parallels between Christ and Antigone that Pound points out are 
specifically clear in Paul’s letters: Christ is born into human atē and commits to it, 
embodying the death drive, thus bringing the real into the symbolic.  However, 
Paul goes even further, providing a direct link to the very aspect of Antigone’s 
character that causes catharsis (her fidelity), in the way he summarises the 
narrative of Christ with the signifier pistis.  Pound points out that like Antigone, 
Christ incarnates the death drive in his relentless push to Jerusalem, the ‘city that 
kills prophets’ (Matt 23:37).100  This persistent indefatigability of Christ’s 
faithfulness to God’s plan is something typically associated with the Gospels, 
where Christ repeats the maxim ‘not my will but yours’ on the way to the cross.101  
While this is perhaps most overt in Mark, it has recently been seen by some 
apocalyptic Paul scholars as an essential core to Paul’s gospel as well; and, not 
only a core to it, but so key that it is even present in Paul’s writing where it is not 
overtly stated.  
 In Chapter 1 I briefly mentioned the work of Richard Hays, as an early 
example of a scholar building upon the findings of E. P. Sanders at the beginning 
of the ‘New Perspectives on Paul.’  Hays is now best known for what is often 
regarded as the main idea contained within his doctoral thesis: that the phrase 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 113. 
101 Matt 26:39, Mark 14:36 and Luke 22:42.  See also John 6:38. 
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pistis Christou does not mean ‘faith in Christ,’ but ‘the faith of Christ.’  However, 
this was not actually the main point of his thesis.  In his introduction to the second 
edition Hays clarifies this, stating that the discussion of pistis Christou plays a 
‘subsidiary role’ to the central thesis that ‘a story about Jesus Christ is 
presupposed by Paul’s argument in Galatians, and his theological reflection 
attempts to articulate the meaning of that story.’102  In other more Lacanian terms, 
Hays’ point is that lurking beneath the overt meanings of Gal 3:1-4:11 is the 
constant presence of the unconsciously remembered trauma of the narrative of 
Christ’s death – and to Hays pistis Christou is one instance of something that was 
originally written as a result of the shock of the crucifixion.  I will discuss pistis 
Christou more below; but its foundation is here, in Hays’ wider claim that Paul’s 
theology should be read as the result of trauma that can be found beneath the text 
(in its ‘substructure’).  Hays’ reading of the trauma of the crucifixion is neatly 
analogous to the Lacanian unconscious: it is not a positively charged location of 
easily symbolised ‘meaning,’ but is that real gap that exists within and between 
the words themselves, resisting interpretation; the unconscious trauma that affects 
the words spoken without being fully represented by them. 
 Michael Gorman is one example of a scholar who builds upon the 
implications of Hays’ study, and helps to complete several of the parts of the 
analogy between Antigone and Christ.103  He again makes clear that Paul should 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Richard B. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002 [1983]), xxiv, italics removed. 
103 Gorman has written substantial amounts on Paul and ‘cruciformity,’ some of which have been 
discussed briefly already.  Here I will be drawing from his most major work on the subject, 
Michael J. Gorman, Cruciformity: Paul’s Narrative Spirituality of the Cross (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2001). 
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not be regarded as a theological thinker as opposed to the narrative of the 
Gospels, since Paul’s thoughts do not depend upon an ‘idea’ of Christ, but upon a 
narrative of Christ, regardless of whether he ever feels the need to expound this 
narrative specifically in detail (though Phil 2:6-11 is certainly an example of 
where he does!).104  In investigating Paul’s references to his own ‘conversion,’ 
Gorman rightly notes that Paul’s initial ‘mystical’ experience was an experience 
of the narrative identity of Jesus, forming a basic framework for his ‘master 
story.’105  It is this story of Christ, like the story of Antigone, that lies at the heart 
of the experience that founded the subject Paul, and that he expected to see 
replicated in the lives of those who made up the ‘body of Christ.’106  The crux of 
Paul’s argument is not the advocacy of the ‘fact’ of Christ’s divine sonship, but, 
rather, what Paul preaches is ‘Christ crucified’ (1 Cor 1:22); and the entire 
narrative of Christ’s faithfulness, crucifixion and resurrection is implied by the 
signifier ‘Christ.’107  This is metonymy in its most basic sense: the signifier Christ 
comes to mean the entirety of the narrative of Christ. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Scholars will be quick to point out here that Phil 2:6-11 is in fact Paul quoting an early 
Christian hymn, not Paul spontaneously deciding to recount the narrative of Christ.  However, this 
is only the most overt and extended instance of Paul summarising the narrative of the pistis 
Christou.  Gorman lists thirty-nine other such texts from Paul’s authentic letters in Cruciformity, 
77-81. 
105 Gorman, Cruciformity, 23.  Gorman draws upon a number of citations (such as Gal 2:15-21 and 
1 Cor 15:3-6) to build the point that Paul’s understanding of his encounter with Christ was as an 
encounter with one inextricably bound to a narrative. 
106 Gorman, Cruciformity, 75-94. 
107 There is now a major trend in Pauline studies of emphasising the narrative of Christ that lies 
behind Paul’s theology, often using Algirdas Greimas’s structural model of narrative to detail the 
specific events of this narrative, such as Hays does in The Faith of Jesus Christ, 73-117.  Several 
different scholars’ approaches to narrative dynamics in Paul, as well as responses to these claims, 
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 Gorman also makes a point that provides the true Pauline form of the idea 
that Žižek locates in Christ’s cry of dereliction.  For Žižek it is the cry of 
dereliction that allows the Christian subject to be able to identify with God when 
feeling abandoned by God (thus, as he often says, ‘Christianity is the only true 
way to atheism,’ because only in the cross is atheism actually located in the place 
of the Other).  This leaves Žižek with a basic problem: I have discussed at length 
his many interpretations of Paul’s theology; but the key event that Žižek believes 
founded the Christian subject (the cry of dereliction) is something only recorded 
decades after Paul, to which Paul makes no overt reference.  If Paul did know 
about it, it was not important enough to mention.  But is there something of that 
which is revealed in the cry of dereliction that is also contained in the very notion 
of God incarnating and being crucified?  Gorman shows that this is indeed the 
case, and in such a way as to carry my reading of Christ and Antigone another 
step forward.  Gorman argues that ‘Paul’s experience of God was transformed by 
his encounter with the crucified – and exalted – Christ… If the Christ of Paul’s 
experience was the faithful, obedient Son of God, then he acted in life and 
especially in death according to the will and character of God.’108  Eventually he 
quotes N. T. Wright: ‘For [Paul], the meaning of the word “God” includes not 
only Jesus, but, specifically, the crucified Jesus.’  This is not a suggestion of 
patripassionism,109 but instead is the belief that if Christ is to be regarded as 
faithful to God’s plan, then the whole narrative of Christ’s crucifixion is inscribed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
are collected in Bruce Longenecker, ed., Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment 
(London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002).  
108 Gorman, Cruciformity, 15-16. 
109 An ancient Christian heresy stating that God the Father suffered on the cross. 
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into the Christian understanding of God himself: the Christ subject comes to know 
das Ding as part of what ‘God’ means.  Thus the inscription of ‘lack’ into the 
Other is something that happens just as much for Paul’s Christ as for the Christ of 
the Gospels; and it is specifically this Christ, who incarnates the real and inscribes 
it into the signifier ‘God,’ in whom the Pauline subject ‘participates,’ as the centre 
of Gorman and Campbell’s Pauline theologies.  The rest of Gorman’s book is 
indeed an argument that this suffering-Christ-who-represents-the-character-of-
God-himself is the object of Paul’s participatory soteriology. 
 Curiously, Roy Harrisville’s work Fracture: The Cross as Irreconcilable 
in the Language and Thought of the Biblical Writers makes no reference to 
Richard Hays, as it carries on the project of examining the unconscious impact of 
the crucifixion narrative.110  He opens by summarising the debate over whether 
what Paul experienced was ‘conversion,’ from one religion to another, or a calling 
– of course citing Sanders, who found that Paul’s concept of ‘grace’ was 
continuous with Judaism, not a break from it.111  Later he argues that in fact what 
Paul experienced was a revelation that ‘fractured’ his identity; the sort of 
retrospective event Campbell’s work advocates.112  Paul’s ‘experience was so 
overwhelming that he was impelled to use figurative language to do it justice.’113  
‘The death of Jesus… heralded as Son of God, was an event that thwarted every 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Roy A. Harrisville, Fracture: The Cross as Irreconcilable in the Language and Thought of the 
Biblical Writers (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006). 
111 Harrisville, Fracture, 2, citing E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1977), 197, 422 and 543. 
112 Harrisville, Fracture, 39-47. 
113 Harrisville, Fracture, 3. 
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attempt to assimilate or absorb it in a scheme,’114 which Hans Küng, as quoted by 
Harrisville, labelled ‘fracture’ because ‘the conceptual material of that period does 
not suffice, but must be continually broken through, if the meaning of the Christ 
event is to be explained… The concepts, metaphors, analogies and comparisons 
which the New Testament uses… prove to be insufficient for grasping the reality 
created by Christ.’115  The fact that the cross ‘continually’ ruptures any attempts 
to signify it is what causes Küng and Harrisville to use the word ‘fracture.’ 
The specific language with which Paul attempts to signify Christ’s death is 
interesting, beginning with the repeated use of the verb σταυρόω (‘I crucify’) – 
which seems obvious, since Christ was indeed crucified, but one does not 
normally constantly refer to the means of death as a term for the death itself.116  
As Harrisville points out, this is the very word used in the Septuagint for Haman, 
the villain Jews remember at Purim by repeatedly wishing ‘Let his name be 
blotted out.’117  This verb also leads to Paul’s declaration in Gal 3:13 that Christ is 
cursed by the Torah, which says ‘cursed is the man who hangs on a tree,’ and 
which Harrisville notes may be a core early interpretation of Christ’s death that 
Paul references, not invents.118  In both of these ways, the language that Paul uses 
to interpret his experience of Christ is language that commemorates him as one 
who went willingly towards the second death (symbolic death).  Harrisville’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Harrisville, Fracture, 39. 
115 Hans Küng, ‘Die Religionen als Frage an die Theologie des Kreuzes,’ Evangelische Theologie 
33 (1975), 420, quoted in Harrisville, Fracture, 39. 
116 This is another example of metonymy in Paul, and, like the metonymy of ‘Christ’ as a signifier 
for an entire narrative in which he features, the choice of ‘to crucify’ as the signifier for the 
narrative of his death reveals much of the unconscious structure behind Paul’s theology. 
117 Harrisville, Fracture, 20. 
118 Ibid., 21.  Deut 21:22-23. 
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extended reading of Paul thus begins with the argument that the death of Christ 
forced Paul to break with Judaism; but his ultimate argument is that Christ’s death 
fractures all symbolic constructions, not just the Torah, so that even Paul’s 
attempts to communicate Christ with wisdom theology, apocalyptic and Stoic 
concepts fail.119  While Paul does constantly apply theoretical mechanisms to his 
understanding of Christ, the crucifixion ‘continually puts all systems into 
question,’ as no reflection can give ultimate coherence to the event at the core, 
which spells the death of all systems;120 so in the end Harrisville labels the cross 
as a ‘minus sign’ drawn over everything everyone else says, but also over 
whatever Paul himself tries to say.121  In Harrisville’s view, this fracturing effect 
of Christ’s death causes Paul to move from theological explanation to 
‘identification,’ stating that Paul ‘replaced the idea of substitution or 
representation with that of identification.’122  Pursuing this further would open up 
a much larger conversation of Pauline soteriology, but here Harrisville is in 
agreement with Campbell and Gorman: Pauline soteriology is primarily about 
what shifts in the subject’s identification, not about a theological mechanism of 
punitive substitution.  Without mentioning Gorman’s work of five years prior, 
Harrisville reads Christian participation in Christ as one of cruciform 
identification through the psychical experience of the cross; an indicative that is 
inseparable from imperatives, resulting from the revelation contained in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Harrisville, Fracture, 65-109. 
120 Ulrich Luz, ‘Theologie crucis als Mitte der Theologie im Neuen Testament,’ Evangelische 
Theologie, 34 (1974), 130, quoted in Harrisville, Fracture, 108. 
121 Harrisville, Fracture, 108.  Harrisville again uses the language of the cross being something 
that refuses all expression, assimilation and reflection in his final concluding paragraph on p. 279. 
122 Ibid., 101. 
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crucifixion narrative itself, and not from mystical experiences during baptism or 
an altered theoretical understanding of oneself.123 
Harrisville’s work is relevant to the current study in several ways.  Firstly, 
he argues persuasively throughout that for Paul and early Christians the event that 
we now label ‘conversion’ was a passive experience of the fracturing effects of 
the narrative of Christ.  Their experience of Christ was one that shifted the 
significance of the signifiers already forming their consciousness, retrospectively 
re-signifying them.  Secondly, he shows that this ‘fracturing’ is a form of eternal 
negation, of a ‘real lack’ that resists symbolisation.  This is the real in its purest, 
that which Gorman argued the narrative of Christ inscribes into God, the Other.  
So between Gorman and Harrisville the narrative referred to by pistis Christou is 
that which inscribes lack into the Other, and that which arrests and transfixes the 
subject in such a way as to cause a passive psychically transformative experience 
(or at least this is what New Testament authors record as having been the case 
historically, whether or not it is precisely reproducible millennia later).  Thirdly, 
this experience caused the subject to make new ego identifications; specifically 
identifying with Christ in cruciformity.  Just as the viewer of Antigone, in Lacan’s 
interpretation, is asked psychically transformative questions through identificatory 
participation in Antigone’s narrative, the Pauline Christian subject is caused by 
the trauma of the narrative to identify with Christ, in a transformative experience.  
Putting this all together brings Paul to a place of profound parallel with both 
Lacan’s Antigone and Žižek’s Christ: the narrative that transforms is one in which 
a narrative subject (Antigone or Christ) demonstrates the eternal presence of the 
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  354	  
real in the symbolic; of the lack in the Other; of das Ding hidden by law, God, 
family/human history, one’s own desire; of the objet petit a leftover in every 
symbolic construction and present in every identification. 
 All of this fits neatly with Campbell’s understanding of Pauline 
soteriology, describing the mechanism he places at the centre of Paul’s gospel to 
the exclusion of all other soteriologies.  At the core of both Campbell’s reading of 
Paul and Lacan’s reading of Antigone is the English signifier ‘fidelity.’  
Throughout several pieces of Campbell’s work he argues with sweeping 
comprehension that pistis in Paul should almost always be translated as ‘fidelity’ 
or ‘faithfulness.’124  Having done this, he cements the parallel suggested here 
between Lacan’s Antigone and Paul’s Christ by reading the phrase ek pisteōs125 as 
a reference to this pistis Christou, positing Christ’s fidelity (the narrative it refers 
to) as the primary operator and central term of Christian salvation.  A test case of 
this can be found in his reading of the thesis paragraphs of Romans, 1:16-17 and 
3:21-31, where Campbell makes the following assertion: ‘Christ’s fidelity, that 
Paul explicates elsewhere in particular relation to the story of his crucifixion, is 
functioning in 1:17 and 3:22 to reveal or disclose some righteous characteristic of, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 He makes this argument throughout The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of 
Justification in Paul (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), such as on 610-613 and 867-870, but devotes 
an astoundingly comprehensive and well-argued chapter to it in The Quest for Paul’s Gospel, 178-
207.  He was already arguing for this translation of pistis and pistis Christou in his doctoral thesis, 
The Rhetoric of Righteousness in Romans 3.21-26, Journal for the Study of the New Testament 
Supplement Series 65 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 58-69.  He also makes a 
compelling argument for the subject translation of pistis Christou based on 2 Corinthians 4:13, in 
‘2 Cor 4:13: Evidence in Paul that Christ Believes,’ Journal of Biblical Literature, 128.2 (Summer 
2009), 337-356.  
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or action by, God.’126  In both of these he reads the phrase ek pisteōs to mean ‘by 
[Christ’s] faithfulness,’ making Paul’s gospel boil down to the effects of the 
narrative of Christ’s fidelity, not just in narrative substructure, but also in Paul’s 
overt theological claim.127  In Campbell’s reading, the evidence permits me not 
only to posit that Paul’s theology is in response to a psychically transformative 
narrative similar to Antigone, but also that Paul’s theological claim is overtly that 
this is the case; that the narrative of Christ’s faithfulness is the revelation of God’s 
character that causes some to become ‘in Christ.’ 
Returning to the discourse of the subject’s participation in Antigone’s act, 
every element now aligns with the discourse of the subject’s participation in 
Christ’s act: 
 
S1                      S2 
$          //            a 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Campbell, Deliverance of God, 613.  Italics original. 
127 In my dialogue with Pauline scholarship I interpret the phrase pistis Christou as ‘faithfulness of 
Christ,’ with Campbell, Hays and others, and not ‘faith in Christ,’ with James Dunn, Barry 
Matlock and others.  However, this is far from set in stone; there are hundreds of published papers 
on either side of the debate, including many arguing that the phrase expresses both senses, 
different senses, or varying senses at different points.  Matlock has himself published many 
articles arguing for the ‘objective’ (‘faith in Christ’) reading, such as R. Barry Matlock, ‘ΠΙΣΤΙΣ 
in Galatians 3.26: Neglected Evidence for “Faith in Christ”?,’ New Testament Studies, 49 (2003), 
433-439.  Against his many papers are many more by Bruce Longenecker, Douglas Campbell, etc.  
Richard Hays’ book The Faith of Jesus Christ is the originator of the modern debate, and the 2002 
edition cited here contains a response by Dunn at the end, which is a good entry point for the 
debate.  More recently, many different views and arguments have been collected in Michael Bird 
and Preston Sprinkle, eds., The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Pistis Christou Debate (Carlisle: 
Paternoster, 2009). 
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S1 is the signifier that represents the subject Jesus (by Paul’s time this signifier 
was Christos, even though the word still also meant ‘messiah’), and also the same 
signifier as it represents the Pauline Christian subject, analogous to how the 
signifier ‘Antigone’ represents both the character in the play and the viewing 
subject’s identification with that character.  As argued by the four Paul scholars 
discussed above, S1, Christos, is also in a metonymic relationship with the whole 
traumatic narrative of Jesus’s fidelity (so that S1 also refers to a narrative 
structured like the discourse of which it is a part).  Within that narrative, S1 is in a 
relationship of fidelity with S2, ‘God.’  Like with Antigone, that which is signified 
by S2 is actually the real as such: Christ’s symbolic and physical death, the trauma 
emitted from that death, and, in the case of Christ and not Antigone, the 
impossible real of resurrection.128  All of these ways in which Christ’s fidelity to 
God has the real as its signified are stated overtly by Paul.  Faithfulness to God 
meant symbolic death, as being ‘hung on a tree’ meant being cursed by the law 
(Gal 3:13), and being crucified was the greatest form of symbolic death in Roman 
culture and law.  Faithfulness to God meant being ‘obedient unto death, even 
death on a cross’ (Phil 2:8).  Paul’s first thesis in Romans (Rom 1:16-17) is that 
Christ’s faithfulness also leads to life (resurrection), and he does the same thing 
he does in Galatians, quoting Hab 2:4 as evidence that pistis leads to 
resurrection/life (Gal 3:11).  Christ’s faithfulness to God, knowing that this 
faithfulness amounts to a desire for das Ding, is a narrative that changes the very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Though this is not relevant to the current study, it should be noted that the inclusion of the 
resurrection in this structure of Christ’s act, as the real qua impossible signified by his fidelity to 
God, connects this reading of Christ with Badiou’s, for whom the resurrection as real qua 
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meaning of ‘God,’ and transforms the subjects who view or hear this narrative and 
are transfixed by its power. 
 At this point one might raise two objections: firstly, that the cathartic 
effect of a text/play could not possibly bear the full weight of an explanation for 
the mass phenomenon of early Christianity, which commanded so much authority 
that many even became devoted martyrs; and secondly, that the above schema 
gives little to no attention to the resurrection of Christ – the very charge levelled 
earlier at Žižek and Nietzsche’s readings.  The same response can be given to both 
charges: it is exactly the resurrection of Christ that differentiates Paul’s Christ 
from Lacan’s Antigone.  Without entering any discussion of the historicity of 
Christ’s resurrection, it certainly seems to be the case that Paul believed Jesus had 
actually risen from the dead into a new physical/spiritual body, and believed that 
this resurrected Christ appeared to him and to at least five hundred other people, 
most of whom were still alive.129  The effect that the narrative of Christ had on 
early Christians was an effect of the same kind that Lacan argues Antigone can 
have on its viewers; but the scale of this effect, both for the individual subject and 
in respect to the size of the early Christian movement, is amplified by the fact that 
this narrative is one about a real person whom Christians believed actually 
resurrected.  The resurrection of Christ served to eternalise the psychoanalytic 
realisation of the inscription of lack into the Other; and this too is consistent with 
a Lacanian view of the subject, because lack is an eternal part of the Other.  As 
long as a human lives, and as many times as one passes through an experience of 
symbolic death, the signifier remains, and it remains lacking.  Christ demonstrates 
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not just the reality of what it is like truly to incarnate the real and know one’s 
desire (by voluntarily going towards symbolic death), but also the inescapability 
of life under the signifier even after ‘symbolic death.’ 
 Another reason the narrative of Christ gave rise to a phenomenon so much 
larger than the effects of Antigone is because the effects of this narrative 
underwent institutionalisation, which affected the rest of history.  Part of this 
institutionalisation, this attempt at preserving some form of ritual symbolisation of 
the event, is baptism.  Conveniently, a fairly well researched Lacanian reading of 
Pauline baptism has already been done, albeit wedged into a work otherwise laden 
with empirical errors.  It will take a bit of unpicking before I can affirm the central 
point.  Itzhak Benyamini’s book Narcissist Universalism: Psychoanalytic Reading 
of Paul’s Epistles concludes with two chapters on baptism and the Lord’s 
Supper,130 and in the former of these posits that in baptism Pauline Christians 
traversed a liminal state in which they passed from the symbolic (law), through 
the real, to an imaginary identification with Christ.131  In reading baptism as an 
experience of the real, he first claims that early Christians spoke in tongues, 
Lacan’s lalangue, during or immediately following baptism.  However, this claim 
is dependent upon reading Acts into Paul, and is directly contradicted by Paul’s 
own words in 1 Cor 12, where tongues is clearly not a universal experience 
among Pauline Christians. 
More persuasively, Benyamini points to Wayne Meeks’ study, which 
connects the Pauline Christian calling out abba ho Pater upon baptism to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Itzhak Benyamini, Narcissist Universalism: A Psychoanalytic Reading of Paul’s Epistles 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 58-88.  See discussion of Benyamini’s work in Chapter 1, part 4.1. 
131 Ibid., 66-67. 
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work of the Spirit, similar to speaking in tongues.132  One could add to this 
experience of the real the fact that early Christian baptisms were conducted with 
the subject completely naked, being clothed in white afterwards, as a symbol of 
dying and resurrecting with Christ; in this way the subject not only symbolically 
participates in Christ’s death, but also undergoes a touch of symbolic death as 
he/she stands naked in front of others.133  Baptism also amounted to a public re-
enactment of Christ’s symbolic death in the declaration kyrios Iesous, ‘Jesus is 
Lord,’ which Paul’s political interpreters have pointed out posits the Christian as 
opposed to the Roman state from the very start, regardless of how one then 
interprets Rom 13.134  Benyamini also reads baptism as a moment where the 
non/nom-du-père is temporarily foreclosed upon, producing the experience of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Ibid., 71.  Wayne A. Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul 
(London: Yale University Press, 1983), 152, 156. 
133 Wayne Meeks states as a fact (and briefly argues) that early Christian baptisms were conducted 
naked, which explains the prevalence of ‘clothing’ metaphors whenever Paul discusses baptism, in 
The First Urban Christians, 150-157.  He also closely connects the experience of public nudity in 
baptism with symbolic death.  Of course, one should not presume that ancient attitudes to 
nakedness were identical to modern ones, which they were not (and not even identical between 
ancient Greece and Rome).  Nonetheless, public nakedness was associated with shame to some 
degree, particularly in the biblical tradition (from Gen 2:25 to Rev 3:18), and was part of the 
metaphor of symbolic death. 
134 N. T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God (London: SPCK, 2013), 1284-1305.  Wright’s 
position is somewhat more complex than this, as he tries not to take sides with those who want 
Paul to be anti-Empire ‘in the way they want to be anti-empire’ (1298), or with those who read 
Rom 13 as a sign that he is explicitly in support of the ruling powers.  Instead, Wright reads Paul 
as one who lives in a present already impacted by the future world in which the power of Empire 
has been abolished, leading to a paradoxical political situation in which Paul advocates not 
rebelling against the powers, precisely because they do not really have power (or, not for long).  
Nonetheless Wright is a good example of someone who, even though he attempts to be as 
balanced as possible, argues quite forcefully that the claim ‘Jesus is lord’ was inextricably 
political, one way or another.  It was a political anti-Imperial claim, but not necessarily one that 
led to real political revolutionary sentiment. 
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real that he associates with speaking in tongues, and then re-emerges as the cry of 
abba ho Pater.135  However, this argument largely depends upon his idea that 
speaking in tongues was closely associated with baptism in Pauline Christianity, 
and also probably misuses a Lacanian concept in the implication that the 
foreclosure of the non/nom-du-père would consistently lead to its re-emergence in 
the form of a signifier for one actually viewed as Father, whereas for Lacan the 
paternal metaphor is not about the real father. 
Nonetheless, Benyamini’s final description of Pauline baptism accurately 
describes it as a chosen act of participation in Christ, in such a way that would act 
to confirm the view of the Christian subject posited above: ‘The experience of 
baptism in Jesus, which does indeed unify the community under one signifier… at 
the same time forces an encounter between the baptized and the Real.  Baptism 
represents a liminal/real stage which poses a menace to the baptized subject.’136  
Based on his theory of a connection between the gifts of the Spirit and baptism he 
also calls it a ‘break-through of the Real into symbolic reality.’137  That Paul sees 
baptism as a symbolic confirmation of the subject’s participation in Christ’s 
passage through death and resurrection is confirmed in Rom 6:3-8, beginning with 
the sentences ‘Or are you unaware that as many of us as were baptised into Christ 
Jesus were baptised into his death?  Therefore we were buried with him into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Benyamini, Narcissist Universalism, 72. 
136 Ibid., 78. 
137 Ibid.  Note that he also offers a lot of criticisms of Paul in this same concluding paragraph, 
which have been omitted above because they do not affect the content of his understanding of 
baptism.  As with most of his criticisms of Paul, they do not mesh well with the actual text – for 
example his claim here that ‘Paul does not want to establish a community based on the 
dismantling of absolute hierarchies,’ in defiance of Gal 3:28, and of Paul’s insistence that 
economic class has no place in church life in 1 Cor 11:17-22. 
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death, through baptism, so that just as Christ was raised from among the dead 
through the glory of the Father, in this way we also will walk in newness of life.’ 
 
3. Implications 
  
 In the previous chapter I argued that Paul’s interpretation of the Christian 
subject is posited against the paradox of jouissance as it was popularly 
experienced in his world, and that his response to it was not to posit one clinical 
structure over the others.  In this chapter I argued that the event of Christian 
subjectivity that he posits against the paradox of jouissance is one identical in 
structure to the effect Lacan describes Antigone’s act having on the subject.  The 
way this works out, with Antigone and Christ’s acts inscribing lack into the Other, 
means that Pauline theology fits just as well with Žižek’s politics even without the 
cry of dereliction, and also, conveniently, fits with Žižek’s politics of the act, 
otherwise not directly related to his readings of Christ or Paul.  However, with 
respect to the previous chapter, we are still left with a very important question: 
how does the structure of the Pauline subject described above relate to the 
paradox of jouissance as described in the previous chapters? 
 In short, it does not relate to the paradox of jouissance as described in the 
previous structures; or, at least, it does not have the effect of altering the basic 
structure of the paradox, or allowing one somehow to escape it.  Like the 
psychoanalytic analysand, the Christian subject Paul describes is not one who is 
brought to some idealised pseudo-perverse position in which the law no longer 
	  362	  
has any effect – for this is not a symptomless relation to the law, but is either 
psychosis or death.  The Pauline subject has a law: it is the nomos Christou, the 
‘law of Christ,’ which in my interpretation refers to the effects of transformation 
by the pistis Christou, though this is certainly up for debate.138  Rather, what is 
relieved for the Pauline and psychoanalytic subject is some of the symptoms of the 
subject’s clinical structure.  This is expressed quite explicitly in Paul’s response to 
the Teacher’s final speech: ‘Therefore there is now no condemnation for those 
who are in Christ Jesus.  For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set 
you free from the law of sin and death.’139  In response to the Teacher’s complaint 
of his obsessional symptoms, that there is a law of death at work in his body that 
is only provoked by the law of his mind, Paul responds with the belief that those 
who have been affected by their participation in the pistis Christou are not 
plagued by superego self-persecution (‘there is now no condemnation’), as Žižek 
puts it correctly, removing the ‘superego supplement’ of the law’s ‘obscene un-
written underside.’140 
However, despite being psychoanalytically affected, the subject is not now 
without clinical structure, because she still exists in language.  Instead, there is a 
new law at work, ‘of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,’ which, again, clearly refers 
to the effects of a life transformed by Christ.  The obsessional neurotic is still 
obsessional neurotic, but the effects of Christ’s impact include the relieving of the 
force of one’s symptomatic relation to the law.  This is exactly what allows Paul’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 1 Cor 9:21 and Gal 6:2. 
139 Rom 8:1-2.  See Appendix B for the Greek and brief defence of translation, though there is 
little contentious translation work to be done in these two verses. 
140  Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity (London: The 
MIT Press, 2003), 113. 
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non-symptomatic relation to the law: in both Romans 14-15 and 1 Corinthians 10 
Paul is able to take a removed stance from the debate over Christian Torah 
observance, despite having his own opinion, and advise that Christians simply 
take whatever stance best holds the community together, because to follow or not 
to follow the law is not a question to which Paul attaches an obsessional or 
perverse superego (he does not feel impelled to guarantee subservience to it, or 
thrilled at the thought of breaking it).  The main point of Rom 6, which is 
followed by the Teacher’s last speech, is that one who has been baptised into the 
death and resurrection of Christ is no longer a slave to ‘the old self,’ the ‘body of 
sin,’ the ‘body of death.’  For the Christian subject as Paul imagines him there is 
still a law (the law of Christ), and there is even still the paradox of jouissance; but 
the law is simply the effects of a psychoanalytic transformation, and whatever 
signifier follows it – there is a new law, but it has such a small weight of guilt that 
Paul is able to laugh at the Teacher’s guilty conscience, and instead write 
extensively about how Christ breaks down the entire honour/shame system.   
 In summary, the Teacher’s argument, especially in Rom 7 where he posits 
the problem of perversion in defence of his neurosis, is simply the paradox of 
jouissance itself.  This is why Paul’s argument in Romans should be read in 
context of the paradox.  Paul’s solution then, participation in the pistis Christou 
which can be structured in the form of the formula above, is not something that 
replaces the central term $ (for the subject) in the matheme for the paradox of 
jouissance.  The subject is still bound by the paradox of jouissance – the subject is 
still alienated in language.  But the structure given above for the subject’s 
participation in the pistis Christou narrative is the argument Paul posits against 
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the Teacher’s.  The Teacher says ‘My situation is ($ ! a " $ ! A ! φ [a, a’, 
a”, a”’,…]), and its weight is unbearable!’  Paul says, ‘Me too, but 
(…………………..) happened, and I think you will find it lessens the burden.’  
Martin Luther’s problem is that by reading Rom 7:7-25 the way he does, and also 
proclaiming himself simul justus et peccator, he stops at ‘me too.’ 
 Another question that might arise at this point is, what does this mean for 
Christian soteriology?  Again, the initial answer is ‘absolutely nothing.’  The 
psychoanalytic transformation of the subject is not a theory posited against 
traditional literal interpretations of Pauline soteriology, or a theory meant to 
replace them.  The current study is a psychoanalytic reading of Paul, specifically 
interacting with theological readings, but not intended to subvert them.  As Lacan 
says, specifically in defence of his reading of grace in Paul: ‘We analysts… do not 
have to believe in these religious truths in any way, given that such belief may 
extend as far as what is called faith, in order to be interested in what is articulated 
in its own terms in religious experience – in the terms of the conflict between 
freedom and grace, for example.’141  Lacan then goes on to defend ‘grace’ from 
attack by Freud, saying that ‘religious experience… was literally a dead letter for 
him,’ and the reason he defends grace is exactly in line with the thesis of this 
chapter: ‘A notion as precise and articulate as grace is irreplaceable where the 
psychology of the act is concerned, and we don’t find anything equivalent in 
classic academic psychology.’  Psychoanalysis is analogous to Pauline religion in 
that the analyst must give a piece of himself when he takes the place of the Other, 
putting his own desire on hold, occupying a place from which, at the right time, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 S7, 210. 
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he might intervene on the analysand’s behalf.  When Lacan here argues that grace 
should not be left to the believers, this is what he means.  When the analysand 
intervenes from the place of the Other, Lacan compares the way the analyst in that 
moment enables the subject to ‘act,’ with Paul’s understanding of grace.   This is 
exactly the comparison I am making from the opposite starting point: Paul’s 
understanding of the formation of the Christian subject is analogous to a 
psychoanalytic act.142  It is a psychoanalytic act that, from Paul’s perspective, 
resulted in the lessening of superego guilt without the increase in an imperative to 
transgress. 
 Another loose end from the previous chapter that needs to be cleared up is 
the matter of master signifiers.  I first discussed master signifiers in Chapter 4, 
where I argued that physis acted as a master signifier, in an obsessional relation, 
for the Stoics.  In Chapter 5 I argued that Paul believed the Christian subject to be 
set at odds with the master signifiers of others, in particular with physis.    In this 
chapter I have argued that Paul’s interpretation of the formation of the Christian 
subject is analogous to Lacan’s description of Antigone’s effects, i.e., analogous at 
least in part to the effects of psychoanalytic treatment.  This is what explains why 
Pauline Christians were at odds with the master signifiers of others.  One of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 I have also suggested that the effect of this event of the pistis Christou, which ultimately 
reforms the signification of the Other (working das Ding into the signified of ‘God,’ revealing the 
lack in the Other, changing Paul’s understanding of God), then also affects the subject’s superego, 
reducing the weight of the paradox of jouissance and the perverse demands of the law.  This 
demonstrates how religion is uniquely in the position for revelations that affect the Other and the 
superego, which is the argument of Eric L. Santner in his reading of Freud and Franz Rosenzweig, 
On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life: Reflections on Freud and Rosenzweig (London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001), especially pp. 97-104. 
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effects of psychoanalytic treatment is the production of new signifiers.  Mark 
Bracher summarises: 
 
What must be done, essentially, is to reveal to subjects that what they 
are asking for (and perhaps think they are getting) in their values, 
ideals, conscious wishes, and identifications is not the only expression 
or even the most truthful embodiment of what they really desire or find 
gratification in.  By exposing the Real, which the system of signifiers, 
and particularly master signifiers, fail to grasp, the discourse of the 
Analyst interpellates those subjects who have responded in the 
particular way that one is examining to an activation of their alienated 
condition, their non-identity with their master signifiers, and thus 
creates an impetus for them to produce new master signifiers.143 
 
Paul’s interpretation of the Christian subject fits this description.  Participation in 
Christ’s act, particularly identification and conscious faithfulness to crucifixion 
qua social death/religious exclusion, exposes the real.  This reveals their non-
identity with philosophical, religious, social and imperial master signifiers.  Thus 
wisdom ceases to be the goal of their thought; the Torah cannot any longer 
occupy the position of religious law (because it cursed the man who resurrected as 
divine); the entire honour/shame system loses control over their lives because they 
consciously identify with a crucified man; and the signifiers kyrios (Lord) and 
huios tou Theou (son of God) now refer to the new master signifier Christos, and 
not to Caesar.144  Not only has the new master signifier displaced these former 
master signifiers, but it has also, as master signifiers do, disrupted previous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Mark Bracher, Lacan, Discourse and Social Change: A Psychoanalytic Cultural Criticism 
(London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 77-78. 
144 This is put fairly explicitly in 1 Cor 15:24-25, Phil 2:9-11 and Eph 2:20-21.  In these passages 
the subjection of all rulers to Christ is made explicit, as he is placed as ruler over them, and the 
day when earthly rulers are destroyed is hoped for. 
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signifying chains so that the wider field of signification for the subject changes.  
A perfect example is the signifier ‘grace’ (hesed/charis), which is not a new 
signifier but an old one with altered meaning – it is still a chief attribute of God, 
but now signifies God’s gift of the pistis Christou, rather than God’s gift of the 
law.145  This displacement of master signifiers naturally affected Pauline 
Christians’ relation to the Roman state, because their passage through the real in 
Christ displaced the very signifiers through which imperial power was 
psychologically established.146 
 Another study could perhaps be more systematic and thorough, looking at 
all of the different language Paul uses for the transformation he presumes all 
Christians to have undergone, and the Lacanian implications of the underlying 
psychological anthropologies.  I have not fully explored the precise formulations 
Paul uses in Rom 6-8, or exactly what he means by the notoriously difficult to 
translate Gal 2:19-21.147  What do Paul’s statements about Christ, and not sin or 
the flesh, living inside the Christian, mean for the affect of the pistis Christou on 
the individual unconscious of the Pauline Christian subject?  I have only scratched 
the surface here.  And another potential direction of this sort of study would be 
into the question of what it is about Pauline theology that causes the 
Calvinist/Arminian split in Reformation theology.  Could it be that the 
psychoanalytically transformative experience that Paul described created subjects 
who, like the Lacanian analysand, were able to feel both the weight of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 This is of course one of E. P. Sanders’ points, which has been mentioned several times already. 
146 Again, see 1 Cor 15:24-25, Phil 2:9-11 and Eph 2:20-21, as well as Eph 6:12 and Col 1:15-20; 
2:13-15.	  
147 Offering a Lacanian translation of this passage was going to be a chapter of this study, and 
would make an excellent project for furthering a Lacanian reading of Paul.   
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determinism and the freedom to act, simultaneously?148  Applying a Lacanian 
schema to the Pauline Christian subject does not solve every problem in the 
interpretation of Paul, and perhaps creates more than it solves; but it does open a 
way for new approaches to Pauline theology, and, with the Lacanian approach to 
political thought being taken by many continental philosophers today, perhaps 
also opens the way to more Pauline approaches in fields of thought beyond 
theology. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Badiou has opined that Lacan is the only philosopher who, in his view, avoids both complete 
determinism and a neoreligious or superstitious obscurantism, in positing a subject who is capable 
of accepting her complete impotency and then acting, only made possible once unconscious desire 
has been spoken into the symbolic.  The act happens entirely within the deterministic plane of 
unconscious structures, but, in taking account of them, is finally able to transcend them.  If the 
Pauline Christian subject has experienced a transformation like the realisations that occur in 
psychoanalysis, is this why Paul remains oblivious to the tension that caused later conflicts in his 
theological interpretation – because the Christian subject is both determined and free?  Did early 
Christians feel that they were both ‘called’ in a deterministic way, but also as though they had 
achieved a true radical freedom?  Badiou and Roudinesco, Lacan: Past and Present, 16-18. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Findings 
 
 
 
ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπέθανον καὶ εὑρέθη µοι ἡ ἐντολὴ ἡ εἰς ζωήν, αὕτη εἰς θάνατον· 
 
I died; and the law ‘that leads to life’ was found in me, leading to death.1 
 
 
1.  What did St Paul Found? 
 
The main goal set out at the end of the very first section of the Introduction 
was to demonstrate the fecundity of the ground in the overlap between Lacan and 
Paul, specifically arising from the commitment found in both of them to develop 
an ethics that finds a way to move beyond ‘law.’  In Seminar VII, Lacan presents 
the difficulty of transcending the power of law as the ‘paradox of jouissance,’ in 
which one is caught between the enjoyment that results from failing at trying to 
follow the law, and the fact that trying to enjoy breaking the law requires and 
supports the law’s continued dominance.  In Lacan’s system of thought, this is 
one aspect of humanity’s alienation in language.  In Paul’s world, the two 
approaches that make up this inescapable paradox were represented by a perverse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Rom 7:10, from the translation offered in Appendix B, below. 
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libertinism and an obsessional Stoicism (though this is not to suggest that these 
were the only incarnations of those clinical structures, or that perversion and 
obsessionalism are the only ways one can attempt to cope with the paradox).  
Alongside advancing a reading of Romans against a Stoic Teacher (dependent 
upon the readings of Douglas Campbell, Stanley Stowers and others), in Chapter 
5 I presented Paul as positioning his theology squarely in context of the paradox 
of jouissance.  This amounts to a clear and precise definition of the ‘ground of 
overlap’ described above: Paul and Lacan overlap in that their ideas force them 
both to encounter the paradox of jouissance, and to try to overcome some of the 
difficulties related to it.  In the final move of equivocation above, I argued that 
Lacan’s response to the paradox of jouissance is similar to Paul’s: they describe a 
narrative of fidelity to both the law and its ‘ex-timate core’ of das Ding, which 
they believe has the power to fixate and transform the subject in such a way as to 
reduce the weight of the paradox.2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Though published near the end of the writing of this study, and read in the final stages of editing, 
this reading of Paul is broadly in line with the hopes for a new ‘critical theology’ set out by Carl 
Raschke in Critical Theology: Introducing an Agenda for an Age of Global Crisis (Downers 
Grove, IL: IVP, 2016), 111-129.  By looking to Paul not for an example of the ‘essence’ of 
Christianity as a religion, but as an example of the way an event has disrupted a signifying field, a 
Paul is found who is positioned for the discourse of critical theory, examining the religious as the 
eruption of a singular event into semiotic domains, past and present.  In the book’s final chapter 
(131-151), Raschke borrows John Milbank’s interpretation of Christ in the prologue of the Fourth 
Gospel as ‘the Word made strange’ (in The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture 
[Oxford: Blackwell, 1997]), in order to argue that Christ should not be read as orthos logos or as 
Stoic logos (reason), but as a singular event enabling critical theological engagement with politics 
and culture.  My reading of Paul compliments this, with Paul also seeing Christ not as an instance 
of Stoic logos, but as its foil; an event disrupting the (individual or collective) subject’s symbolic 
existence. 
	   371	  
Here we find Lacan and Paul positing similar ideas, but by no means 
identical ones.   Neither of them actually have the definition of a new ethics as 
their primary goal.  Despite making use of a broad selection of philosophical 
ethics’ greatest thinkers (Aristotle, Kant, Bentham, etc.), Lacan’s goal in Seminar 
VII is not to contribute to ethics, but to contribute to the ethics of psychoanalysis; 
specifically, the question of how the analyst is to handle the power given to 
intervene in the mind of the analysand, and to direct the treatment towards the 
‘good’ of the subject.  This forces Lacan to discuss how it could possibly be that 
the analyst can decide what is ‘good’ for the analysand, when the analysand exists 
like all of us within the trap of the paradox of jouissance, gaining enjoyment from 
acts that are not overtly for their own good.  Likewise Paul, constantly embroiled 
in ethical debates, did not write any of his extant letters with the development of 
an ethical idea as his primary goal.  He mostly wrote in response to situations, and 
in Romans he is forced to discuss ethics in light of the paradox of jouissance 
because his insistence that those in Christ do not live according to law has landed 
him there.  So Lacan and Paul both discuss the paradox of jouissance and ethics, 
and do so with a commitment to transcend the impossible demands made upon 
humanity by the law; but they are brought there by very different motives. 
They do however wind up in somewhat similar territory in one sense: 
neither of their solutions is complete.  Lacan does not cure alienation or free us 
from the paradox, but helps the subject to realise his/her own castration (the 
impossibility of existing without the problems of language), and Paul does not 
actually give the subject a way of immediately and completely existing without 
the power of sin, but instead posits the Christian subject as caught between two 
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worlds, with Christ being the first fruit of a new creation that has not yet fully 
come.  Lacan and Paul both, in a way, fix the human condition by not fixing it; 
but they do this through discussing the impact of a psychoanalytic event upon the 
subject, not through positing a Hegelian sublation. 
Lacan’s ‘solution’ is, ultimately, psychoanalysis itself, with Antigone as an 
illustration of some of the aims of psychoanalysis; but Paul’s solution is not an 
idea that he posits, but something he believes really to have happened, which is 
both the source of his awareness of the problems he discusses, and their solution.  
Paul presents his solution prescriptively, which is far from Lacan: even though the 
Lacanian solution is psychoanalysis itself, he did not believe that everyone should 
go through psychoanalysis.  This is a crucial distinction I discuss more below.  
Paul’s solution is one he preaches as universally available and recommendable, 
and Lacan’s solution is not, because Paul believes that ‘Antigone’ is real and 
exists now in resurrected form, as part of a divine plan to redeem the world.  This 
is not a difference we should try somehow to overcome; it is a real difference 
between the systems they describe. 
So the overlap between them produces enough common ground that the 
structures Lacan develops for the problems Paul faces, as well as for the parts of 
their response to this problem that are similar (Antigone and Christ’s fidelity), are 
helpful in elaborating upon why the narrative of Christ’s suffering had the effect it 
did; but this is not a full explanatory mechanism for the origins of Christianity.  I 
have not suggested a new or total interpretation of Pauline Christian conversion, 
since I have not discussed eschatology, Judaism and the prophetic pre-history of 
Christianity, or the actual history that might be ‘behind’ the pistis Christou.  
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Perhaps there will be further studies using Lacanian psychoanalysis to investigate 
some of the other details in Pauline theology.  This is only a layer of explanatory 
commentary regarding the world Paul inhabited and the structure of his position 
within it, which provides useful insights for the present use of Pauline theology, 
perhaps more than a ‘pure’ analytic historical approach.   
Despite their differences, the primary goal here has been achieved: to 
demonstrate that Lacanian psychoanalysis provides helpful tools for 
understanding the context and structure of Paul’s theology, aiding in the 
construction of bridges from past to present.  Clinical structures still exist in 
society and ideologies (and individual subjects) today as they did then, and Paul’s 
politics of das Ding and the signifier complement modern continental 
philosophical approaches to political intervention in a way that further embeds the 
philosophical return to Paul, and perhaps provides a stronger ground for a 
relationship between the Church and the continental philosophical Academy. 
 
2.  Criticisms 
 
 Creating a new Lacanian reading of Paul using academic biblical research 
is an approach that has not previously been widely explored; but in another sense 
it presents yet another philosophical reading of Paul to the world of continental 
philosophy, which, as described in the Introduction, is not suffering a shortage of 
them.  More specifically, it posits a reading in dialogue with the Pauline 
theologies put forward by two prominent Lacanian philosophers in specific, Alain 
Badiou and Slavoj Žižek.  In light of this, I can now draw some conclusions in 
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criticism of both of these, as well as make some Lacanian comments about 
Pauline theology itself. 
Lacan climaxes Seminar VII by arriving at the question that Antigone was 
uniquely able to ask from the perspective of a ‘last judgment:’ ‘Have you acted in 
conformity with the desire that is in you?’3  Due to the intervention of a narrative 
structured like Antigone’s, Paul found himself with an experience at hand that 
enabled that very question to be asked, since a vision of the sublimation of das 
Ding had been forced upon the subject in such a way as to induce a collective of 
subjects who have participated in an act, revealing in the narrative itself 
something of the desire common to all.  It is here that I am now situated to make a 
fundamental Lacanian critique of Paul’s theology: he reaches a point that enables 
him to formulate what Lacan would call ‘a thesis that is truly about desire,’ but he 
stops just before this boundary. 
I argued in Chapter 3 that, against those who read Paul on the side of the 
Stoics, Paul is not against desire but afraid that excessive (or ‘surplus’) jouissance 
might lead to porneia.  In attempting to escape the law without advocating the 
pursuit of jouissance, in 1 Corinthians Paul defends his gospel with a knee-jerk 
retreat to neurosis; but in Romans he realises that his gospel is stuck between 
perversion and neurosis, and this time posits nothing other than the event of the 
transformation caused by participation in the Christ narrative as his response to 
the paradox of jouissance.  For both Lacan and Paul there is not actually a maxim 
that lies beyond the pistis narrative as a higher virtue; but for Lacan there is still 
the question of one’s desire, which psychoanalysis is intended to help one to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 S7, 386. 
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formulate, live and assume.  For Paul instead there is, if anything, another form of 
the message Lacan phrases as ‘as far as your desires are concerned… make them 
wait.’4  ‘Desire’ for Lacan does not mean sexual want, but refers instead to the 
very linguistic existence in which one is ever driven forward by the lack in the 
Other, and psychoanalysis acts to bring one to a better knowledge of one’s place 
in this schematic.  Paul discusses an event that also does this, but does not open 
the question of what this means for the individual subject, and instead gives his 
own opinion of what the new master signifier means.  He tries to keep this 
somewhat open, allowing ethics to differ from person to person and community to 
community, but he does not directly impel the Christian onward to a deeper 
discovery of oneself, because he believed Christ’s return was imminent and the 
New Creation was coming.5  So when discussing what a modern Lacanian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid., 387.  This is the message Lacan attributes to that which theologians call ‘Empire,’ 
discussed briefly in Chapter 5, above.  Should one wish to join the throngs of cynical Nietzschean 
readings of Paul, but from a Lacanian perspective, expanding upon Paul’s failure to link the Christ 
event to the subject’s desire might be the way to do this.  However, I would like to suggest that 
there are more interesting things to study Paul for than the ways in which he failed.  Should one 
wish to pursue that route, a more balanced approach might be to look for the ways in which Paul’s 
understanding of the Christ event did affect his relation to Pauline Christians’ individual desires.  
Perhaps it has something to do with love, or joy, or the freedom Paul first posited, which led to 
libertinism? 
5 Sadly there has not been occasion in this study to enter deeply into Pauline eschatology, and I am 
not convinced that Lacanian psychoanalysis offers the best tool for doing so (Alain Badiou’s 
philosophy of fidelity to the event might provide more a productive ground for comparison).  A 
study that aimed to do complete justice to Paul would have to account for the place of eschatology 
in his thought, but this study has instead been concerned with forcing a particular Lacanian point 
of entry into Pauline studies.  However, were one to stick doggedly to a Lacanian approach, the 
above question would indeed be the most essential: what is the effect of the future upon the 
subject’s desire in the present?  And how does Pauline eschatology, construed in either a literal or 
perhaps a Badiouan philosophical sense, affect one’s relation to political enjoyment, or to political 
action? 
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Paulinism might look like, this question is a problem.  It does not appear that 
Christ is coming back soon; so what is the state of the subject’s desire, freed from 
the full weight of the paradox of jouissance, but still alive?  I do not believe that 
Paul answers this satisfactorily, and if Paul is to mean something today, and 
Christ is still to be preached in response to the paradox of jouissance, there must 
be more Christian thought on the actual place of the human subject as desire. 
The main Lacanian reading of Paul that has been interacted with 
throughout this study has been Slavoj Žižek’s, especially in chapters 1, 5 and 6.  
This is not just because he has written so frequently about Paul, but also because 
of the primacy of importance he gives to Paul in his wider political programme.  
The fact that he gives so much weight to Paul, but at the same time fails to 
provide a truly Pauline reading of Paul (similar to criticisms often made of his 
readings of both Lacan and Hegel), begs for dialogue; particularly since he has 
spent so much time working to build up a dialogue with academic theological 
circles.  His politics actively make space for the Church to be involved in his 
revolution, and it is my conclusion that if his reading of Paul were truer to Paul, 
more informed by the academic study of Paul, and indeed more Lacanian, then 
Žižek might have more success in bringing Christians on board with his wider 
theo-political programme.  One could even add to this that I have demonstrated 
the possibility of a Žižekian Paul who is not an atheist – or, at least not any more 
of an atheist than the Lacanian clinic aims to create; and Lacan was very clear 
that, as opposed to many Freudian analysts, the creation of atheists was not his 
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goal.6  I hope that this study opens the way to more Lacanian Christian reflections 
on politics: what should the Christian relation to the state be, and does a 
psychoanalytic perspective on the Christ event help the Church to get there, and to 
understand where it is currently at? 
The ‘Žižekian Paul who is not an atheist’ follows from reading Paul’s term 
pistis Christou as a central reference to Christ’s fidelity to das Ding, rather than 
making the Pauline Christian subject somehow dependent upon the alleged 
atheism implicit in the cry of dereliction.  If the lack in the Other is primarily 
present in the trauma of the crucifixion narrative rather than in the non-existence 
of God, then the Christian psychoanalytic event can be structured upon an act 
precipitated by the lack in the Other without implying atheism.  This indeed 
seems to be where Lacan is going in Seminar VII when he states that ‘Only 
Christianity, through the drama of the passion, gives full content to the 
naturalness of the truth we have called the death of God.’7  This leads to him 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The aim of the Lacanian clinic is not to cause the subject to cease believing in God, particularly 
inasmuch as ‘God’ is a name for the Other.  Rather, regardless of Lacan’s personal atheism, 
Lacanian psychoanalysis insists upon the impossibility of complete atheism, since one cannot 
escape the fact that jouissance remains forbidden (by the Other).  In this sense, the paradox of 
jouissance itself is another name for the inescapability of God.  This does not mean that Lacan 
affirms the existence of a conscious divine figure, but only that, since once cannot escape the 
Other without becoming a psychotic, and God is just a word some use for the Other, the analyst 
has no cause to desire to change the subject’s name for the Other, unless the subject’s own desire 
to do that leads in that direction.  At any rate, Lacan’s non-participation in the militant atheism that 
sometimes arises in psychoanalytic circles is noted by Élisabeth Roudinesco, who states that 
unlike most French analysts at the time, Lacan would not only actively engage with religious 
thinkers, but would even, when analysing Jesuit priests (whom Roudinesco claims were strangely 
drawn to his teachings), recommend that they remain as priests if that was their desire.  Alain 
Badiou and Élisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan Past and Present: A Dialogue, trans. by Jason 
E. Smith (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2014 [2012]), 14-16. 
7 S7, 238. 
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describing how its horror makes the violence of the Coliseum pale in comparison, 
and does not lead to the cry of dereliction.  Expanding upon the parallel between 
the fidelities of Antigone and Christ cements this link, and, by finding the ‘drama 
of the passion’ so deeply wedged at the centre of Pauline theology, shows that it 
was exactly this that was at the heart of Christianity (with the resurrection), and 
not any implicit atheism.  Indeed, Lacan’s only reference to the cry of dereliction 
in Seminar VII is not in any of his discourses on Paul or Christ, but when he 
describes Antigone as one who was ‘moved to a kind of “Father why hast thou 
forsaken me?”’ this is not a statement of atheism, but an effect of her fidelity to 
das Ding.8 
Eventually Lacan does mention briefly how the death of God sublated the 
law as love9 – a main theme Žižek and Badiou develop in their interpretations of 
Paul.  This is probably correct, but it should be noted that it is the pistis Christou, 
not the ethics of love, that is at or near the centre of Paul’s theology, regardless of 
whether that means ‘faith in Christ’ or ‘faith of Christ.’  This is not a major 
criticism of either Žižek or Badiou, but a brief comment on the tendency of 
philosophical and psychoanalytic interpretations of Paul to presume that the ideas 
most closely tied to philosophy or psychoanalysis must therefore be Paul’s core 
ideas, rather than offering philosophical/psychoanalytic interpretations of the 
actual core ideas (as has been done here in Chapter 6). 
The main criticism that needs to be made of Badiou’s reading of Paul, 
which was already made in the Introduction, is that he sacrifices the sacrifice of 
Christ for the sake of the resurrection; but the death of Christ is the event of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid., 313. 
9 Ibid., 238-239. 
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fidelity to which Paul refers.  When Badiou speaks in Being and Event of ‘fidelity 
to the event,’ this event for Paul is the fidelity of Christ, as it affects the Christian 
subject.10  Badiou’s resurrection-only theology (where the only function of death 
is as something negated in the resurrection) is consistent with his thought: the 
resurrection is the exception that grounds Christ in the impossible; but inasmuch 
as Badiou is a reader of Lacan, and some of his language has been Lacanian, this 
schema is not.  He connects pneuma (spirit) to life and sarx (flesh) to death, as 
does Paul; but Paul also connects hamartia (sin) to death, tying it again with sarx 
– and for Paul these are not merely things negated in the resurrection, but things 
participated in in the pistis Christou.11  Lacan then provides the psychoanalytic 
commentary to this latter equation, translating hamartia as das Ding, which is 
(among other things) death.  So Badiou’s construal of Pauline anthropology 
misses the connection with death, using death only as something that is negated in 
the impossible resurrection.  But the real is not only present in Paul as the 
impossible resurrection, but also in the pistis Christou, faithfulness to das Ding, 
which is the point where the signifier suffers in the real.12  Lacan goes a little bit 
of the way towards a reading of Paul in Seminar VII; if he had gotten further, it is 
my thesis here that his Paul would be placed in relation to the full paradox, the 
letter that brings both the eternal life of the signifier and its obverse, the death of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I made this point at length in an article that I presented at the conference ‘St Paul in Continental 
Philosophy’ at Staffordshire University, Stoke-on-Trent, UK, 28.6.2013.  A summary of the paper 
is included in the conference report: Matthew Edward Harris, ‘Conference Report: “St. Paul in 
Continental Philosophy” Staffordshire University, 6 June 2014,’ International Journal of Badiou 
Studies, 4.1 (Dec. 2015), 145-149. 
11 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. by, Ray Brassier (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), 55-85. 
12 S7, 154. 
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das Ding.  Lacan opens the way to a more genuine Pauline philosophy than 
Badiou, because his system makes room for the death and resurrection of Christ 
to be equal in significance, as the resurrection links us to the real in its 
impossibility (agreement with Badiou) and the eternality of this impossibility (the 
Signifier), but the death links us to the real in its inevitable omnipresence as long 
as we are under the signifier (the Lacanian death drive, which Žižek notes is the 
missing element in Badiou’s Paul).13 
 Are there any criticisms to be made of Lacan’s work based on this study?  
Several have been made throughout, which mostly amount to no more than the 
comment that Lacan could have done much more with Paul than he did.  As 
argued at the end of Chapter 2, Lacan could not have advanced a theory of 
psychoanalytic transformation in Paul’s theology because he did not believe that 
Paul came from a place that needed transformation.14  As argued just above, he 
could not have suggested that Paul’s theology is based on the sublimation of das 
Ding contained in the passion narrative, because the extent of the narrative 
substructure to Paul’s theology had not yet been written about when Lacan 
delivered Seminar VII; likewise, he had no option in 1959-60 but to read Rom 7 
as Paul’s own opinion.  Nonetheless, the little that Lacan does do with Paul arises 
from initial cursory readings, and so there is not much to criticise except that fact 
itself.  More positively, this also leaves us with a much blanker slate for where the 
Lacanian reading of Paul could go in the future.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject (London: Verso, 2008 [1999]), 168-184. 
14 The very criticism that Ward Blanton levels at a whole host of continental philosophers 
throughout A Materialism for the Masses: Saint Paul and the Philosophy of Undying Life 
(Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2014).   
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3.  The Future 
 
 Throughout this study I have occasionally returned to Lacan’s response to 
the student riots in 1968: ‘You are looking for a new master, and you will find 
one.’15  This statement fits with Lacan’s well-known political pessimism: all 
political movements involve the search for a master, which can be anything from 
‘God’ to ‘the market’ to ‘the will of the people’ to ‘the common good’ or ‘social 
justice,’ etc.  To him the students only believed they were expressing a general 
discontent, but what they were really doing was looking for a new master.  Since 
all subjects enter language by affirming it as master, and by placing certain 
signifiers in positions of mastery with respect to other signifiers, political 
movements are just rearrangements of the positions of power within the symbolic.  
Against this backdrop, there now exist many leftist and far-left Lacanian political 
philosophers: spearheaded by Žižek and Badiou, but also including Alenka 
Zupančič, Samo Tomšič and others.  These philosophers all get accused of 
overlooking the fact that Lacan was most certainly not a communist, and possibly 
not even a political ‘progressive,’ as apparently evidenced by his statements in 
1968.  However, these criticisms can be naïve, implying that philosophers who 
have spent decades studying Lacan are simply ignorant of his politics.  Yes, they 
are using Lacan’s theories in a way that is not Lacan’s; but they do so from a 
position that does not actually disagree with Lacan’s political pessimism.  When 
Zupančič suggests an ethics of the real that is predicated upon a realisation of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Élisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, trans. by Barbara Bray (Chichester: Columbia University 
Press, 1997 [1993]), 341-342. 
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role that the death drive already plays in ethics, and when Žižek suggests that an 
act (including Christ on the cross) accomplishes a sublation in which the present 
state of things re-emerges as viewed from a different perspective, they are taking 
Lacan’s political pessimism fully on board, and then asking what Lacan means for 
politics nonetheless. 
Many books have been written on the ‘revolutionary’ or ‘radical’ nature of 
early Christianity, and Pauline theology.16  Further, there has been much work that 
criticises the Church in the centuries that followed, tracking the emergence of 
‘Christendom,’ the end of Christian non-violence, etc.17  Whether or not earliest 
Christianity itself can be characterised as merely ‘looking for a new master,’ new 
masters are what they found; and, quite predictably, the new masters arguably 
bore few dissimilarities to the old.  But just because Christianity predictably 
turned into the search for a new master, does that mean it was always reducible to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Neil Elliot, The Arrogance of Nations: Reading Romans in the Shadow of Empire (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2008) is an example of exactly such a piece, forcefully arguing for an anti-Imperial 
reading of Romans, and collecting together references to many of the other arguments for a 
politically radical Paul, particularly with reference to the difficulties posed by Rom 13.  Andrew 
Bradstock and Christopher Rowland have edited a collection of radical Christian texts from the 
whole of Church history, Radical Christian Writings: A Reader (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002).  
17 The critique of Christendom is hardly a recent phenomenon, and in one way or another is as old 
as Christendom itself.  Stuart Murray-Williams surveys the emergence of the (often violent) 
dominance of Christian religion in the West in Post-Christendom: Church and Mission in a 
Strange New World (London: Paternoster, 2004), 23-144, one of many books along these lines that 
characterise Christianity as originally non-violent but eventually violent and imperial.  It is the 
first in a series of books called After Christendom.  J. Denny Weaver tracks the development of 
atonement theory from its non-violent origins to its later Anselmian (and violent) form in The 
Nonviolent Atonement (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2011 [2001]), even persuasively arguing that 
probably the last book of the New Testament to be written, Revelation, is adamantly non-violent 
(pp. 20-34).  Wes Howard-Brook has recently brought this all together, including the theological 
‘empire’ language, in the extended argument so poignantly summarised in the book’s title: Empire 
Baptized: How the Church Embraced what Jesus Rejected (New York: Orbis, 2016). 
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it?  Lacan was not a political revolutionary, but that merely serves to amplify the 
extent to which his theories can aid those who are in understanding a framework 
in which change is possible – it is only once one understands that all of one’s life 
has been the search for a master that one is able to begin to think seriously about 
whether any alternative is possible; or, perhaps, more seriously about which 
master one would like to have. 
By placing Paul in this context, of the pessimism of a certain irreducibility 
of humanity’s political situation, his struggle is illuminated as an attempt, like 
every historical advocate of major ideological change, to gain some degree of 
freedom from the paradoxes in which we find ourselves trapped.  Specifically, he 
is demonstrably bearing witness to a shift in the significance of signifiers, and in 
the positions of master signifiers, which he thinks ruptures previously assumed 
modes of political and ethical existence.  To him the event of Christ is a narrative 
of an act of symbolic death capable of inducing symbolic participation in a 
traumatic encounter with the real, reframing the political situation and dislodging 
master signifiers, replacing them with new ones, thus altering the meanings of 
other signifiers.  To him this event is so impacting that it should bring some 
degree of freedom from the weight of the paradox of jouissance, inducing the 
subject to act in a way that is neither a quest for more law nor a presumption of 
the enjoyment of transgression. 
In Paul’s world his participation in the pistis Christou, and the resulting 
ability to ‘act’ in the Lacanian sense, involved a symbolic death that nullified the 
mastery of master signifiers, replacing them with the pure real of ‘not signs, not 
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wisdom, but Christ (i.e., Christ crucified).’18  Then, of course, following the act, 
our alienation in the symbolic immediately resumes, with the symbol of the 
resurrected/crucified Christ coming to occupy a permanent position as master 
signifier.  The end of psychoanalysis includes the emergence of new signifiers, 
and Paul happily prescribes them.  Perhaps, here, to mimic the cynicism one 
might detect in Elizabeth Castelli’s Foucauldian reading of Paul, one could accuse 
him of the Lacanian definition of tyranny: attempting to enslave the desire of the 
Other, in not simply preaching the real trauma of Christ crucified, but also 
preaching that Caesar is not really ‘lord’ because Christ is (Rom 13).19  Indeed, 
this is the form of Christianity that Paul inherited, as evidenced by the fact that the 
‘Christ Hymn’ he quotes in Phil 2:6-11 begins by trumpeting the traumatic 
narrative of the pistis Christou, but carries on to boast that Christ was then 
exalted, and at his name every knee shall bow.  It is the inescapable essence of the 
Christian narrative that it makes this step, for it is only the resurrection of Christ 
that makes the trauma of the real into a fact of the divine. 
In Mark’s Gospel one gets the impression that Christ’s fidelity is so 
absolute that it would remain unchanged even if there was to be no resurrection 
and Christ knew it, and this unwavering aspect of Christ’s fidelity is central to the 
‘Antigonine’ effect of the narrative; but equally important to Paul is the fact that 
the consequence of (Christ’s) pistis is life, and this is why he places so much 
emphasis on Habakkuk 2:4: the righteous one will live by pistis.  If this is a 
tyranny, it is a tyranny inseparable from the ecclesiastical use of Pauline theology, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This is of course a close paraphrase of 1 Cor 1:22. 
19 Elizabeth A. Castelli, Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power (Louisville: Westminster-John 
Knox, 1991).   
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and I suggest it should simply be read as the Christian iteration of the fact of our 
alienation in language.  Christian pistis is participation in the pistis Christou, 
transformation by Christ’s symbolic death, and the affirmation of a prescribed 
master signifier.  For Pauline Christians at least, this was a legitimate act because 
they committed to the pure death drive of symbolic death, and then chose a new 
master signifier – the tyranny is Paul’s attempted prescription of that choice.  
Pauline Christian politics in its purest, in the Lacanian reading that has been 
initially sketched out in this study, is this very formula. 
It is my hope that this opens the way to a new discourse between Pauline 
and Christian theology on the one hand, and the Lacanian politics so popular in 
the modern continental philosophical scene on the other.  Of all the New 
Testament writers, Paul is the only one who makes any direct comment on the 
place of the signifier physis, despite it being such an important master signifier for 
nearly every contemporary Mediterranean philosopher.  This should not be too 
surprising, given that the New Testament is not primarily a book written as a 
philosophical tract (and neither indeed are Paul’s letters); but seeing how the 
impact of Christ thrust Paul and other Christians into a situation of 
irreconcilability with other master signifiers should provoke modern Christians to 
question where the master signifiers are in their own theological and culturally 
Christian systems of thought.  In Lacan’s later works he discussed the role of ‘the 
market’ as a master signifier today, so that, for example, a politician can win an 
election by claiming that if she does not then ‘the market’ will lose confidence.20  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Bert Olivier details specifically Lacan’s evolving ideas on capitalism and the role of ‘the 
market’ in the capitalist discourse in ‘Lacan on the discourse of capitalism; Critical prospects,’ 
Phronimon, 10.2 (2009), 25-42. 
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What effect should the pistis Christou have on the place of ‘the market’ as master 
signifier?   
What about the use of the word ‘nature’ today?  We live in a very different 
world and language to the first century, and the meanings of this word have 
definitely shifted – it perhaps today has fewer connotations of ‘natural harmony’ 
and more connotations of ‘the natural world’ and ecology when used in defence of 
environmentalism.  Should the Church fully endorse the notion that attempting to 
subordinate human desire to ‘nature’ will solve our problems?  In what other ways 
do we use ‘nature’ and other master signifiers, like ‘science’ and ‘gender’ and 
‘freedom’ in today’s world?  As Mark Fisher notes, en route to explaining why 
one should not mistake ‘reality’ for the real, ‘Emancipatory politics must always 
destroy the appearance of a “natural order”, must reveal what is presented as 
necessary and inevitable to be a mere contingency, just as it must make what was 
previously deemed to be impossible seem attainable.’21  There are endless 
possibilities for Lacanian/Pauline theological studies examining the structure of 
modern society and politics in a way similar to Lacanian philosophers, but asking 
Pauline questions of the meaning of Christ in response. 
All of this should lead to another perhaps more important question: to 
what extent is the impact of the pistis Christou actually replicable in today’s 
world, where ‘crucifixion’ is no longer a location of universally recognised 
imaginary trauma, and ‘resurrection’ is not something that we can feel in a way 
identical to Paul, who said that Christ appeared to five hundred people at once, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Winchester: O Books, 2009), 17. 
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most of whom were still alive in his time?22  Does the form of the formation of the 
Christian subject need to change?  Has it changed already? 
Paul seeks to remove the superego supplement to the law.23   In what ways 
do modern forms of law (social, religious, state, etc.) enact themselves through 
superego?  Can modern Christians relate to these laws in ways not determined by 
the enjoyments of transgression or submission, and does Christ still affect this?  If 
this is the case, should the Church have a function as a community that reveals the 
lack in the laws of the Other, demonstrating what politics less plagued by the 
enjoyment of superego might look like? 
One can see that the purpose of this study was not to outline a definitive 
model of ‘the Lacanian Paul,’ but to open the possibility of the emergence of 
Lacanian Pauls by working Lacanian problems and structures deep into Paul’s 
texts, and hoping to find some of them already there.  I have found the perverse 
and obsessional formulas, the paradox of jouissance, the structure of Antigone’s 
act, the presence of das Ding in the narrative, and a general psychoanalytic effect 
at work in the Pauline Christian community.  This reveals a Paul who is better 
positioned for dialogue between Lacanian philosophy and theology, and leads to 
many more questions. 	   The	   paradox	   of	   jouissance	   is	   not	   one	   of	   Lacan’s	   major	   concepts;	   it	  appears	  only	  in	  Seminar	  VII,	  and	  only	  as	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  Lacan’s	  other	  points.	  	  Instead,	   the	   paradox	   is	   just	   another	   articulation	   of	   the	   problem	   of	   the	  subject’s	   alienation	   in	   language.	   	   As	   soon	   as	   language	   exists,	   along	  with	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 1 Cor 15:6. 
23 That is, the role that the law plays in the subject’s avoidance of das Ding by turning aggression 
inward at itself.  The law’s role here is that it helps us to enjoy superego, through the paradox of 
jouissance. 
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prohibitions,	  the	  subject	  is	  caught	  in	  relation	  to	  those	  prohibitions,	  incapable	  of	   making	   any	   decisions	   that	   do	   not	   depend	   upon	   a	   law	   that	   comes	   from	  beyond	  the	  subject,	  and	  yet	  is	  the	  subject.	  	  	  It	  is	  this	  particular	  incarnation	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  alienation	  that	  Paul’s	  theology	  specifically	  came	  up	  against:	  as	  soon	  as	  he	  preached	  freedom	  from	  the	  law	  he	  was	  faced	  with	  the	  paradox	  of	  
jouissance.	  	  Thus	  Paul	  was	  faced	  with	  the	  very	  problem	  of	  our	  imprisonment	  in	  the	  games	  of	  the	  signifier	  that	  Lacanian	  philosophers	  also	  face	  when	  they	  attempt	  to	  articulate	  a	  progressive	  politics	  that	  is	  not	  a	  just	  search	  for	  a	  new	  master.	  	  How	  do	  we	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  not	  just	  a	  game	  of	  enjoyment?	  	  Lacan	  and	  Paul	  both	  answer	  with	   the	  psychical	   impact	  of	  a	  narrative	  of	   fidelity	   to	  
das	  Ding;	  and	  not	  with	  a	  model.24	  	   This	   is	   not	   an	   easy	   answer.	   	   Ultimately,	   included	   in	   both	   of	   their	  answers	  is	  that	  annoying	  thing	  Lacan	  said	  as	  soon	  as	  he	  started	  getting	  close	  to	   talking	   about	   politics:	   ‘Don’t	   expect	   anything	   more	   subversive	   in	   my	  discourse	  than	  that	  I	  do	  not	  claim	  to	  have	  a	  solution.’25	  	  Both	  Paul	  and	  Lacan	  leave	   alienation	   as	   it	   is.	   	   Master	   signifiers	   continue	   to	   exist,	   as	   the	   subject	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 To clarify, I am not denying that there is a sense in which Christ is an ethical model for Paul.  It 
would be ridiculous to suggest otherwise.  However, there is a distinct difference between ethics 
based upon a model, and Paul’s theology based upon the transformative effects of a narrative, 
which also implies a sense of Christ as model.  In Cor 6:9-11 Paul lists ten behaviours of which he 
clearly does not approve; but his message is not ‘you should imitate Christ and so not do these 
things,’ but rather ‘Christ has already transformed you, which is why you are not doing these 
things.’  The psychical effects of the event of Christ are primary, and the imperative of Christ as 
model is a method Paul used in his attempt to preserve faithfulness to this event.  Paul does not 
evangelise by trying to convince people that a new ethical model has arrived, but claims only to 
preach Christ crucified, and since for him that means a resultant ethics, those ethics sometimes 
take the form of Christ as model. 
25 S17, 70. 
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remains	   trapped	   in	   language.	   	   But	   they	   posit	   an	   event	  with	   psychoanalytic	  effects,	   in	  which	  a	  realisation	  of	  alienation	  brought	  on	  by	  close	  contact	  with	  
das	  Ding	  results	  in	  participation	  with	  symbolic	  death,	  and	  the	  assumption	  of	  one’s	  place	  with	  respect	  to	  alienated	  desire.	  The	  early	  Pauline	  Christian	  subject	  picked	  a	  new	  master	  signifier;	  one	  that	   included	   suffering	   and	  death,	   and	   a	   resilient	   joy	   that	   came	   from	  being	  caused	  to	  abandon	  the	  quest	  to	  get	  what	  the	  old	  order	  suggested	  one	  wanted.	  	  The	  effect	  of	   this	  new	  signifier,	  Christos,	  metonymically	   including	  the	  whole	  narrative	  of	  the	  pistis	  Christou,	  was	  such	  that	  Paul	  was	  constantly	  faced	  with	  the	   impossible	   task	  of	   using	  words	   to	  defend	  his	   own	   interpretation	  of	   the	  event	  that	  transformed	  him.	  	  I	  am	  not	  convinced	  that	  he	  succeeded,	  or	  that	  it	  was	  even	  possible	   for	  him	   to	  succeed.	   	  The	  pistis	  Christou	   still	   sublimates	  a	  Thing	   that	   cannot	   be	   fully	   assimilated	   to	   any	   given	   linguistic	   or	   political	  order,	   and	   communicating	   or	   defending	   that	   thing	   with	   words	   is	   still	  impossible.	  	  We	  are	  left	  with	  the	  question	  of	  how	  one’s	  desire	  relates	  to	  ‘the	  law’	  in	  its	  widest	  sense,	  including	  all	  religion,	  politics,	  prohibition,	  language,	  culture,	  gender,	  family,	  consumerism,	  etc.	  	  This	  is	  the	  question	  that	  the	  pistis	  
Christou	   still	   asks,	   and	   a	   question	   that	   the	  Church	  needs	   to	   ask	  once	  more.	  	  This	  is	  the	  question	  Paul	  repeatedly	  struggled	  to	  answer,	  and	  could	  only	  posit	  the	   pistis	   Christou	   itself	   in	   response.	   	   There	   is	   not	   a	   neutral,	   objective,	  academic	   answer.	   	   What	   found	   Paul	   was	   the	   assumption	   of	   a	   dizzying	  question,	   core	   to	   human	   existence,	   which	   deserves	   to	   be	   the	   centre	   of	  theological	  inquiry	  once	  more.	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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Glossary 
 
This glossary includes only a small fraction of the hundreds of terms 
Lacan either invented or used in a way particular to his own work.  It only 
includes terms that are necessary to comprehend this study, and only the ones that 
Lacan used in a sufficiently unique way to merit explanation.  Most definitions 
include reference to where in the thesis they are first introduced or explained, and 
some of them depend upon the sources cited in the thesis.  Definitions are also 
given for non-Lacanian and Greek words used or translated in a specific way here.  
Finally, there are also definitions for words particular to academic biblical studies 
and theology. 
Several dictionaries were consulted in the process of writing this glossary, 
all of which are invaluable sources for further definitions of the terms used in this 
thesis: 
 
• Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis 
(London: Routledge, 1996). 
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• J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. by 
Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: Karnac Books, 1988 [1973]). 
• Barclay M. Newman, Greek-English Dictionary of the New Testament: 
Revised Edition (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2013). 
• Arthur G. Patzia and Anthony J. Petrotta, Pocket Dictionary of Biblical 
Studies (Leicester: InterVarsity Press, 2002). 
 
Other sources cited below include Joël Dor, Introduction to the Reading of 
Lacan (New York: Other Press, 1998 [1985]); Richard B. Hays, The Faith of 
Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11 (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2002 [1983]); Sean Homer, Jacques Lacan (London: Routledge, 
2005); Bogdan Wolf, ‘The Mysterious Ways of the Obsessional,’ The 
Psychoanalytical Notebooks Issue 18: Obsessional Neurosis, ed. Philip Dravers 
(London: London Society of the New Lacanian School, 2009), 143-161 and 
Alenka Zupančič, Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan (London: Verso, 2011 
[2000]). 
Many of the Lacanian terms below are introduced more fully in Chapter 1, 
sections 2.1-3, and in the first section of Chapter 2, above. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Act:  A moment in which the subject finds a way to express her desire, putting 
into speech something previously unconscious, and thus sending a message to the 
Other.  The analyst can also act, when using his own desire to intervene on behalf 
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of the subject.  (The analyst’s transferential position in the place of the Other is 
what enables him to act on the subject’s behalf – the difficult ethics of the 
analyst’s action being the reason Lacan devotes seminars to both the ethics of 
psychoanalysis, Seminar VII, and the psychoanalytic act, Seminar XV.)  A true act 
is something that actually sends a message to the Other, though the only act than 
can fully accomplish this is suicide.  Some philosophers link this to Antigone, and 
to the passage à l’acte, so that symbolic death is a factor that can lead to an act 
(though in Lacan’s understanding of the passage à l’acte it is something the 
subject does passively/involuntarily, whereas the act is specifically voluntary).  
The act is discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Alienation:  An ‘essential constitutive feature of the subject’ (Evans, Introductory 
Dictionary, 9), in which the subject is alienated in the imaginary (the ego-ideal is 
formed through identification with one’s mirror image) and in the symbolic (one’s 
existence is bound to language), so that in both orders one cannot speak of a ‘true’ 
subject without alienation, despite the fact that neither one’s symbolic nor 
imaginary forms ever absolutely or concretely describe the subject.  Lacan 
borrows the term from Hegel and Marx, but his meaning is different, and 
Lacanian alienation is not something that can be transcended.  It is introduced in 
section 2.3 of Chapter 1. 
 
Analysand:  Lacan coined the word ‘analysand’ for the patient in the 
psychoanalytic clinic, as opposed to the analyst. 
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Apocalyptic:  Theology or literature focused on a theme of the revelation and in-
breaking of a divine/eternal age into the present.  Since the late nineteenth 
century, many books of the New Testament, including Paul’s letters, have been 
characterised as apocalyptic literature.  Literature of the apocalyptic genre tends 
also to discuss the faithfulness of a community to its principles, or to God, 
through suffering.  God’s plan for history is seen as justifying action, rather than 
passivity.  Note that in theological terms, ‘apocalyptic’ does not specifically refer 
to a chaotic scene of destruction (though this is often an aspect of apocalyptic 
literature).  This understanding of the word ‘apocalyptic’ probably comes from 
the book of Revelation, often translated as the Apocalypse (from its Greek name, 
Apokalypsis, meaning ‘revelation’), which is only one example from the genre of 
apocalyptic literature. 
 
Atè/atē: This is the Greek word in Antigone designating Antigone’s inherited 
doom from her situation and from her family history, and from Lacan’s 
perspective also implicitly also designating das Ding, the second death towards 
which she voluntarily heads.  It is transliterated as atè in the English translation of 
Seminar VII used here (and so in quotations from it), but outside of quotations is 
transliterated as atē, consistent with other Greek transliteration throughout.  It is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, sections 1-2. 
 
Clinical structure:  Lacanian psychoanalysis recognises three ‘clinical 
structures,’ which Lacan referred to as ‘Freudian structures.’  Every subject is a 
clinical structure, though might also demonstrate symptoms typical of other 
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structures.  The three structures are psychosis, perversion and neurosis, with the 
latter divided into hysteria and obsessionalism (thus there are really four clinical 
structures).  The origins of one’s clinical structure have to do with the way the 
child responds to castration (the inability to get what one really wants caused by 
language itself), and to the nom/non-du-père (see below), during the stages in 
infancy when one enters into language, first experiences alienation, and struggles 
to place oneself with respect to the desire of the Other.  Since everyone is a 
clinical structure and most people are neurotics, there is no such thing as the 
‘normal condition;’ the structures cannot be ‘cured,’ and it is not ‘bad’ to be a 
clinical structure.  Modern Lacanian philosophers and cultural theorists often 
apply these structures to cultures or ideologies, etc.  The current study uses them 
to discuss the relations to jouissance present in Paul’s world, and the structure of 
some of those against whom Paul argued, and who have interpreted him since. 
 
Cry of dereliction:  The theological term for the moment Jesus cries from the 
cross, ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’  It is a central element of 
Slavoj Žižek’s theology, in which the Christian subject has a place to identify 
with God’s own disbelief in himself (the lack in the Other).  It can be found in 
Mark 15:34 and Matt 27:46, and is a quotation of Psalm 22:1. 
 
Das Ding:  Discussed at length in the beginning of Chapter 2, above, das Ding is 
a concept Lacan employs almost exclusively in Seminar VII, after which he 
included most of its meanings in either the real or the objet petit a.  It represents 
maternal jouissance, the trace memory of enjoyment before language, the void 
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excluded from the world of language, that which remains beyond signifier and 
signified, death, the Kantian Ding an sich and the true object sublimated in our 
desire for other objects.  According to Lacan Freud also thought of das Ding in 
this way, but the veracity of this interpretation is certainly up for debate. 
 
Demand:  For Lacan, ‘demand’ is a very specific term, which exists in a triangle 
with ‘need’ and ‘desire.’  ‘Need’ is perhaps the most simple, as instinctual 
biological need.  When the infant is in need, but does not understand this need, it 
is communicated in a cry, which is pure demand.  Demand is always a demand for 
something in return, such as love, pity, respect, etc.  It is not a demand in the 
sense of a forceful imperative, but in the sense of insisting upon a response.  In 
psychoanalysis, the analyst does not give in to demand, specifically frustrating it, 
in order to make the object of the demand clearer.  The obsessional prefers 
demand to desire, because demanding something of the Other involves playing a 
game in which the Other’s presence is constantly assured (thus the obsessional’s 
demand is a form of regression, to the same game played during infancy).  The 
concept is chiefly used in this study in the discussion of the structure of 
obsessional neurosis, in Chapter 4.  Demand is the insistence upon a certain 
response from the Other, whereas desire is the lack in the Other (see below). 
 
Desire:  Desire is the lack in the Other of language, and is the most central term of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, especially at the time of Seminar VII.  Since our 
conscious and unconscious existence is entirely in the medium of language, and 
language itself is something always in movement, as soon as we enter language 
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our existence can never reach a terminal ‘complete’ point, other than death.  Thus 
we are impelled within language, moved by its own incapability of ever settling 
down, as we circle around and sublimate any awareness of the pure lack (das 
Ding) at the heart of language, and of our own existence.  This movement of 
desire within/as language is what remains of demand after need is met.  Need 
evokes demand, and demand is met with specific objects taught to the infant as 
words; thereafter the child can communicate its demands as specific signifiers, 
and also theorise about which signifiers are getting in the way of desire.  Since 
desire is the word Lacan uses for human being itself, it is not possible to speak of 
a Lacanian philosophy as being ‘against desire,’ unless one is advocating for 
suicide.  Thus, in the face of interpretations of Paul that align him with Stoic 
philosophy ‘against desire,’ a Lacanian articulation of Pauline philosophy requires 
some clarification – and neither can Stoic philosophy be understood to be 
‘against’ what Lacan means by ‘desire.’  An attempt is made at untangling this 
mess in Chapter 3. 
 
Drive:  Drive is not an element of the triangle of need, demand and desire.  
Neither is drive a word for instinct, which is only represented in Lacanian 
terminology by ‘need.’  Drive is the effect language has on the body, the force of 
movement within our linguistic existence.  Thus it is the pulsive force behind 
desire (the French is pulsion).  Since language acts as a mask of das Ding, which 
is death, the drive ultimately has death as its object; though the aim of the drive is 
not to die, but to circle around death, keeping our desire in movement while 
avoiding ‘getting there.’  In 1964 Lacan first stated that all drives are virtually 
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death drives, as he explained the drive with a quote from Paul: ‘The signifier as 
such, whose first purpose is to bar the subject, has brought into him the meaning 
of death.  (The letter kills [2 Cor 3:6], but we learn this from the letter itself [2 
Corinthians, a letter].)  This is why every drive is virtually a death drive’ (Écrits, 
719).  The drive is introduced near the end of the first section of Chapter 2, above.  
It is mostly used in the singular in Seminar VII, but in the plural in Lacan’s later 
works. 
 
Empire:  A word used by some theologians in order to build a bridge between 
New Testament political relations to the Roman Empire, and modern forms of 
political domination.  This is used in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Epithymia:  As argued near the end of Chapter 3, Paul uses the word epithymia 
(ἐπιθυµία) to mean excessive desire.  Both Stoicism and Paul understood there to 
be varying degrees of desire, and to Paul epithymia was desire of such an intensity 
that he worried it would bring too much jouissance (and might lead to porneia).  
In Rom 7, discussed in Chapter 5, above, Paul translates the commandment 
commonly remembered today as ‘Thou shalt not covet’ as the prohibition of 
epithymia – that is to say, not the prohibition of the wanting of any object, but the 
excessive wanting of another’s object (the desire of the Other, but to a degree Paul 
found undesirable).  Using the word epithymia also connected this commandment 
to sexual desire, an allusion that remains present throughout Rom 7. 
 
Eschatology:  The study of the end times. 
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First and second deaths:  The first and second deaths are bodily death and 
symbolic death.  After one dies, one is still remembered by the Other as signifier 
(funerals ensure this, and while living many fantasise about their own funerals, or 
about how they will be remembered after death).  The two deaths are introduced 
near the end of the second section of Chapter 2, in the discussion of Lacan’s 
reading of the Marquis de Sade as one who claimed to desire death itself, but 
eventually betrayed his desire not to suffer the second death.  In Chapter 6, 
Antigone’s fidelity to the signifier is one that she knows is a desire for the first 
and second deaths, and heads towards them voluntarily, resulting in her being 
trapped between the second and first deaths (physically alive, but already 
symbolically dead). 
 
Hysteria:  A form of neurosis in which repressed trauma is not consciously 
remembered, and instead presents itself in the form of neurotic symptoms.  The 
complete repression of the trauma leaves the subject plagued by questions of sex, 
gender and love.  The hysteric desires the desire of the Other by unconsciously 
seeking to preserve this desire by ensuring that he is never its object, thus 
engaging in patterns of behaviour that either negate the possibility of really being 
loved, or presume that the other’s love is always directed elsewhere.  The hysteric 
also avoids being the object of love by fantasising about being the instrument or 
subject of love (and thus not its object).  All of these symptoms allow the subject 
to go on believing that absolute love exists (Wolf, ‘The Mysterious Ways of the 
Obsessional,’ 146) – if one avoids the situation of being its object, its absolute 
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existence is always still theoretically possible.  The main reference to hysteria in 
this study is in discussions of Žižek’s reading of Romans 7, throughout.  
 
Imaginary:  One of Lacan’s three ‘orders’ or ‘registers,’ to do with the image.  
Like with the symbolic, the subject is alienated in the imaginary, which begins 
with Lacan’s famous ‘mirror stage’ when the subject first identifies with its own 
image and begins to form the ego.  The imaginary is the world of the image, and 
of what can be imagined, but it is structured by the symbolic.  Lacan accuses ego-
psychologists of attempting to work only in the imaginary, since their goal is to 
cause the subject to identify with the analyst’s ego.  The imaginary is also the 
order of both the signifier and the signified, but not the relationships between 
signifiers and signifieds.  To steal an analogy sometimes used by Žižek: in a game 
of chess the pieces and the board are imaginary, the rules are symbolic, and the 
real is what emerges when an angry players suddenly sweeps the board, 
interrupting the entire game with the human emotions not otherwise formally 
present for the rules or the pieces. 
 
Jouissance:  Jouissance is enjoyment that does not exist, the perfect enjoyment of 
das Ding.  As such, jouissance is precisely the enjoyment that one gets shades of 
from not getting what one wants.  The paradox of jouissance is that whether one 
attempts to get one’s jouissance by pursuing it directly, against the laws that 
forbid it, or one attempts to follow the law perfectly and sacrifice one’s 
jouissance, both paths are impossible, and result in shades of the jouissance that 
come from not getting what one wants. 
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Kerygma:  The Greek word kērygma is used in biblical studies to refer to the 
general content of one’s preached message.  Thus, Mark’s Gospel is often 
theorised to be heavily influenced by ‘Petrine kerygma,’ the content of St Peter’s 
sermons, and Pauline kerygma is Paul’s evangelistic message. 
 
Lack:  The incapability of the Other ever to produce enough signifiers, or the 
‘right’ signifiers, for the subject to feel complete; this is the impossibility of the 
subject ever finding the signifier or object that satisfies his desire.  Desire is an 
effect of the lack in language.  Since language is composed of signifiers that slide 
in their relations to each other, desire always plays out along these metonymical 
lines, infinitely sliding to different signifiers.  Since language will never arrive at 
a fully ‘complete’ set of stable relations between signifier and signified, this lack 
ensures the continuation of desire, as an effect of the lack in the Other – and thus, 
Lacan says, ‘desire is the desire of the Other.’  Further, it is this lack in the Other 
that allows the subject to exist, and which is the subject’s existence. 
 
Liberalism:  In Chapter 3, ‘liberalism’ refers to Paul’s message of freedom from 
the law.  The specifics of what Paul meant by this are debated, but in 1 
Corinthians it is clear that it was a liberalism he intended not to lead to 
libertinism. 
 
Libertinism:  Libertinism was a favourite topic of Lacan’s, specifically the work 
of the Marquis de Sade.  Libertinism is the relentless pursuit of jouissance 
through the transgression of the law.  This makes libertinism a perverse pursuit. 
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Master signifier:  A signifier that determines the meaning of other signifiers, thus 
functioning as a name for the Other.  Master signifiers function as a points du 
capiton, quilting points through which the subject passes retrospectively, in order 
to interpret knowledge (for example, a sentence, which cannot be understood until 
its completion).  In Pauline theology Christos functions as a master signifier, 
retroactively re-determining the meanings of other signifiers, like nomos, agapē 
or pistis.  The concept is described in more detail in Chapter 5, section 5, and is 
particularly important in the final three chapters. 
 
Neurosis:  In psychoanalysis a neurosis is a particular curable symptom in which 
a repressed memory comes to be expressed through an unwanted action or 
association.  Freud and Breuer’s discovery that a neurosis is not a nervous 
disorder but an effect of repressed trauma, in 1895, marks the beginning of 
psychoanalytic inquiry.  For Lacanian psychoanalysis, neurosis is one of the three 
clinical structures (with perversion and psychosis), and is itself divisible into 
hysteria and obsessional neurosis.  Every subject is a clinical structure, and they 
are not curable; instead, Lacanian psychoanalysis aims to affect one’s relation to a 
clinical structure, curing particular symptoms of one’s neurosis, not neurosis 
itself.  This means that ‘neurosis’ is not a negative term in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, but is just the most common clinical structure, which throws up 
more problems for some than for others.  The origins of the theory of neurosis are 
discussed in Chapter 4, section 1. 
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New Perspectives:  Interpretations of Paul since 1977 that have sought to move 
away from Martin Luther’s interpretation, which had posited Paul against a notion 
of ‘Jewish legalism,’ interpreting Paul’s phrase ‘works of the law’ as a reference 
to Jews trying to earn their way into heaven.  Though this has been done in 
several ways, they all depend upon a new understanding of the problem Paul was 
up against, which is not Jewish legalistic soteriology, but the question of the role 
of the law in the definition of God’s people.  This reframes much of Paul’s 
theology as a conversation about identification, and about the appropriate 
response to God’s grace, rather than as primarily concerned with soteriology.  The 
New Perspectives on Paul are elaborated upon at length in Chapter 1, section 3.2. 
 
Non/nom-du-père:  This is a core term for Lacan, especially in Seminar V 
(discussed in Chapter 2, above), though it is not as prevalent in Seminar VII.  The 
nom-du-père (‘name of the father’), pronounced in French in a way that could be 
heard as the non-du-père (‘no of the father’), is part of the ‘paternal metaphor’ 
through which the child achieves mastery over the lost object by affirming a 
signifier that represses the non/nom-du-père, the prohibition of enjoyment.  In a 
more orthodox Freudian construal this might mean repressing the memory of the 
real father’s prohibition of the mother; but for Lacan this is an early metaphor that 
helps the child to cope with the fact that language forbids them from ever getting 
what they want.  For example, the signifier that the child uses in the paternal 
metaphor (the acceptance of the non/nom-du-père by repressing it) could be a 
signifier for an object that the child imagines is what the primary caregiver really 
wants, that which keeps him/her away when the child cries.  In Lacanian theory, 
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the use of a signifier to deal with the loss of the object marks the entrance into 
language as such, in which signifiers in signifying chains forever swap signifieds 
with each other through metaphor and metonymy.  The repression of a primal 
signifier through a metaphorical substitution with another signifier opens the 
possibility of the ‘sliding’ structure of language as a whole.  See Joël Dor, 
Introduction to the Reading of Lacan, 111-119. 
 
Objet petit a:  This term originates in Seminar II, but develops throughout Lacan’s 
work, being used most frequently from Seminar XI.  The objet petit a, with the 
little ‘a’ for little other, autre, is the object-cause of desire.  Thus the formula for 
the fantasy is the subject in relation to a, $!a.  However, the objet petit a is that 
which is leftover in every object – that which is still not there even after one gets 
what one wants.  So it is the part of the signifier that causes one’s desire, but also 
the very part that will never be found to be there.  To use the language of Seminar 
VII, the objet petit a is that which stops a sublimation of das Ding from ever 
actually being das Ding, because neither of them can actually be represented by 
language.  The objet petit a is not actually contained in language, but is a 
projection of the ego, because it is the object-cause of desire that the subject hopes 
to be contained in the object, something the subject has placed there in an attempt 
to find an imaginary object for the ego-ideal. 
 
Obsessionalism:  A form of neurosis in which repressed trauma is dis-affected, 
remembered without the actual emotions that accompanied it.  The obsessional 
copes with life through various forms of the question of one’s existence.  For 
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example, he/she has a specific relation to the Other in which the Other’s desire is 
transubstantiated as demand, which succeeds at ensuring continued belief in the 
Other’s absolute existence (see Chapter 4, section 3).  Thus the obsessional can be 
said to ‘believe in absolute being’ (Wolf, ‘The Mysterious Ways of the 
Obsessional,’ 146), as the obsessional’s symptoms express, question and preserve 
this belief.  The obsessional is plagued by various more specific symptoms, such 
as guilt, fear and anxiety.  Obsessionalism is a major theme of this study, 
particularly in chapters 4 and 5.  It is elaborated upon at great length, including 
lists of symptoms, in Chapter 4, sections 1-3. 
 
Other:  Represented by A, or by a barred A (A) because the Other is always 
lacking. The Other is radical alterity (otherness) itself.  This has many meanings 
for Lacan, though the biggest is the subject’s alienation in language.  The Other is 
also the other subject, in the Levinasian sense of every other human being 
radically unknowable, and the other sex, in the sense of gender itself being 
another linguistic construct in which the subject is alienated.  
 
Paradox of jouissance:  The paradox Lacan discovers in Seminar VII, in which 
the subject is caught between two different ways of failing to get jouissance: 
either one seeks to obey the law perfectly, but the law generates a desire to 
transgress that one enjoys, and then one frequently secretly enjoys this 
transgression (a neurotic position), or one seeks to get one’s enjoyment apart from 
the law, but is nonetheless always bound by it, enjoying transgressing it but 
always needing the law in order to continue transgressing (a perverse position).  
	   405	  
The paradox of jouissance is an effect of alienation in the symbolic: one’s 
existence in language prevents one both from ever fully getting jouissance, and 
from ever being able to try to get jouissance in a way that is unrelated to the 
Other.  Lacan does not specifically posit the paradox of jouissance as between 
neurosis and perversion, but the argument of this thesis is that the reality of the 
paradox of jouissance for the subject was experienced in the first century 
Mediterranean world as a conflict between the lifestyle choices of perverts and 
obsessional neurotics. 
 
Passage à l’acte:  A term Lacan inherited from French psychiatry, he modified it 
from referring to any sudden self-destructive behaviour, and instead uses it from 
Seminar X on to refer to a passive experience in which one is suddenly caused to 
extricate oneself from symbolic identification.  The term is defined more fully in 
Chapter 6, section 1.3. 
 
Perversion:  The attempted disavowal of castration (which for Lacan is symbolic 
castration, the inability to get what we want that is an effect of the impotency of 
language itself).  While for Freud ‘perversion’ had strong connotations of sexual 
impropriety, for Lacan it is one of the ‘Freudian structures,’ which Lacanians 
today call ‘clinical structures.’  Bogdan Wolf defines perversion as belief in 
absolute jouissance (‘The Mysterious Ways of the Obsessional,’ 146).  The 
pervert disavows castration, and so relentlessly pursues enjoyment.  As such, the 
formula for the perverse structure is (a!$), in which the subject attempts to 
occupy the place of the Other (compare to the structure of the fantasy, given in the 
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section on the objet petit a, above).  The Lacanian understanding of perversion is 
first introduced in Chapter 2, section 3. 
 
Phallus:  Lacan’s use of this term changed over time, though it never refers to the 
male genitalia, except on the rare occasion when this is what he means by the term 
‘real phallus.’  In his earlier work it is the signifier for the desire of the mother (or 
other primary caregiver), denoted by φ.  The Oedipal drama plays out as a result 
of the infant’s desire to be the phallus, the object of the mother’s desire.  
Eventually he or she has to move from desiring to be the phallus to desiring to 
have the phallus (accepting that he or she is not the phallus, and then that he or 
she has or does not have the phallus).  This is related to gender, in ways that 
Lacan discussed in great detail long after the works chiefly discussed in this study 
(Seminar XX); but the phallus is a signifier that has no signified, so it is not 
directly connected to one’s genitalia.  The phallus is not discussed at length in this 
study (because it is not mentioned often in Seminar VII), but it does come into 
play in Chapter 2. 
 
Physis:  The signifier used as a foundation for ethics in most ancient Greek and 
Roman philosophies (natura in Latin), usually translated as ‘nature.’  It referred to 
the natural world, as in the modern English phrase ‘the environment,’ but also to 
nature as an abstract concept of natural harmony, and to the natures of individuals, 
to the concept of human nature, and to the whole of existence.  Chapter 5 builds 
upon the thesis set out in Chapter 4, section 5, that physis functioned as a master 
signifier in an obsessional neurotic structure for Stoic philosophy.  For both Stoic 
	   407	  
philosophy and Paul (in Rom 1:26-27 and 11:21-24), para physin means ‘against 
nature’ (or ‘unaligned with nature’), and kata physin means ‘according to nature’ 
(or ‘aligned with nature’). 
 
Pistis Christou:  These two words of Paul’s occupy a central position in Paul’s 
theology according to most interpreters, whether they are translated as a reference 
to the believer’s ‘faith in Christ’ or Jesus’s ‘faithfulness of Christ.’  The history 
and importance of this are discussed in Chapter 1, section 3.2, and Chapter 6, 
section 2.  In line with many of Paul’s ‘apocalyptic’ interpreters, it is used in this 
study as a reference to the entire narrative of Christ’s obedience to God unto 
crucifixion and resurrection (see discussion in Chapter 6).  The ‘pistis Christou 
debate’ is the debate that has raged since Richard Hays’ 1981 doctoral thesis on 
the question of whether the phrase should be translated ‘subjectively’ as ‘the 
faithfulness of Christ,’ or ‘objectively’ as ‘faith in Christ’ (as a subjective or 
objective genitive). 
 
Porneia:  A New Testament Greek word often translated as ‘fornication,’ but 
actually referring more generally to whatever the author considers sexually 
immoral.  Thus, the best English word for it might actually be ‘perversion,’ but in 
a Lacanian study ‘perversion’ has a more precise definition (see above).  It is 
easiest and clearest to leave it un-translated.  Instead, the word ‘perverts’ is used 
to translate the closely related word πόρνοι (pornoi) in 1 Cor 6:9, near the end of 
Chapter 2. 
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Prosōpopoiia:  An ancient rhetorical strategy in which one performs a speech in 
the character of someone else, which occasionally appears in English in the 
Latinised form ‘prosopopoeia.’  Lacan uses the term to discuss how in 
psychoanalysis the Truth speaks through the subject’s speech.  Douglas Campbell 
argues that Rom 1:18-32 was originally intended to be performed as 
prosōpopoiia.  Stanley Stowers argues that Rom 7:7-23 was originally intended to 
be performed as prosōpopoiia.  All of this is discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Psychosis:  A clinical structure in which the subject has foreclosed upon the 
non/nom-du-père, and thus never fully enters language.  There is little discussion 
of psychosis in this study. 
 
Real:  One of Lacan’s three ‘orders’ or ‘registers,’ to do with reality in its purest; 
that is, nothing.  The real is ‘that which resist symbolisation absolutely’ (S1, 66), 
and the ‘domain of that which subsists outside of symbolisation’ (Écrits, 324).  
Thus the real is the limit of both the symbolic and the imaginary, similar to the 
Kantian noumenon.  As Lacan lays out in the tenth and eleventh seminars, it is the 
object of anxiety, when a missed encounter with a ‘real object’ presents itself in 
the form of trauma.  Towards his later seminars, Lacan increasingly connects it 
with the idea of ‘the impossible,’ though from the start it was that which it is 
impossible for a signifier to represent.  In exactly this sense it is also connected 
with das Ding in Seminar VII, where he refers to das Ding as ‘that which in the 
real suffers from the signifier’ (S7, 154).  The real itself does not contain gaps or 
negatives, because it is rationality in its purest (Hegel: ‘the real is rational, the 
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rational is real’); thus, das Ding is the effect that the signifier (always containing 
lack) has upon the real. 
 
Signifier and signified:  A signifier is a sign, symbol or word that forms a unit 
with its ideational content, the signified.  These terms come from the work of 
Ferdinand de Saussure, the father of modern linguistics and one of the most 
influential thinkers on Lacan’s earlier work.  Though translation of Saussure is not 
consistent, in English Lacanian scholarship the terms are always ‘signifier’ for the 
word and ‘signified’ for that which it represents.  The Lacanian subject is 
represented by a signifier for another signifier, meaning that we identify with and 
understand ourselves with signifiers, which we use in order to represent ourselves 
for others, and for the Other. 
 
Soteriology:  The study of salvation, sōtēria.  In the above study, the term is used 
more widely to refer to the study of the entire mechanism of conversion in Pauline 
theology, though Paul himself perhaps uses terminology explicitly connected to 
‘salvation’ less often than the casual reader might expect.  
 
Subject:  The subject of the unconscious, in the same way as someone might call 
a lab-rat subject to experimentation.  It refers to the human subject, but, 
specifically, as it is placed in the symbolic, not as it identifies in the imaginary 
(that is the ego, with the ego-ideal being the subject’s imaginary identification 
itself).  The subject is always ‘barred,’ in that it only exists as alienated in the 
Other, despite being a gap in the symbolic; the subject is that which is ‘under the 
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signifier,’ under the bar in Lacan’s modified Saussurean symbolisation.  Since the 
subject exists within language, and this is both the language that is spoken and the 
language of the unconscious, one can agree with Alenka Zupančič that ‘The 
subject is at once subject to and subject of the unconscious’ (Ethics of the Real, 
35). 
 
Sublimation:  For Freud, sublimation is a sexual instinct enjoyed as something 
else.  For Lacan in Seminar VII, sublimation is the raising of an object to the 
dignity of das Ding (S7, 138).  Sublimation is how we enjoy das Ding without 
getting too close to it; thus sublimation accounts for most human enjoyment, 
explains why jouissance can sometimes be both painful and enjoyable (since das 
Ding is suffering and death), and is a tool aiding the drives in circling around das 
Ding without getting there.  Antigone is a sublimation of das Ding that 
simultaneously poses a question to the subject of the nature of his/her desire – as 
is the pistis Christou (as argued in Chapter 6).  Sublimation is introduced in the 
second section of Chapter 2, and discussed throughout. 
 
Symbolic:  One of Lacan’s three ‘orders’ or ‘registers,’ to do with the symbol.  
Lacan’s understanding of the symbolic emerges from his psychoanalytic reading 
of Claude Lévi-Strauss: symbolic rules unconsciously structure the social world.  
The symbolic is the world of the signifying play of language.  Signifiers 
themselves are imaginary (and that which they exclude is real), but the way they 
relate to each other, the rules according to which they operate, and their power to 
represent the subject and cause desire, are all what Lacan calls ‘the symbolic;’ 
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thus language has imaginary and real dimensions to it, but the symbolic 
dimension of language is the play of the signifier.  Since the subject experiences 
the signifying play of language as something foreign to it, but also as the very 
fabric of its existence, symbolic alienation is the key sense in which the subject is 
always alienated in ‘the Other.’  The unconscious is the discourse of the Other 
because its symbolic structure transpires according to the rules of language, not 
consciously generated by the subject. 
 
Torah:  The first five books of both the Hebrew and Christian Bibles, containing 
the laws/instruction kept by Jews in Paul’s time (and today) as a sign of continued 
participation in covenant with God, identifying the nation of Israel, God’s chosen 
people.  Paul’s debates about the function of the law occurred as a result of the 
question of whether converts to Christianity should follow the requirements the 
Torah – though he often argues about ‘law’ in general, discussing the requirement 
of Torah observance by way of a conversation about prohibition, or state law, etc.  
The question of what Paul means by ‘the works of the law,’ and what this phrase 
meant to others in Paul’s time, is central to the debates that led to the New 
Perspectives on Paul. 
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Appendix B: Translations 
 
Included here are the Greek texts and translations of the core passages discussed 
above.  Defences of any potentially controversial translation, or of instances 
where translation has been done in a certain way for the sake of this study, are 
given afterwards. 
1 Corinthians 7:1-9 
Greek English 
[1] Περὶ δὲ ὦν ἐγράψατε, καλὸν ἀνθρώπῳ 
γυναικὸς µὴ ἅπτεσθαι· 
Now concerning what you wrote, ‘It is good for 
a man not to touch [a woman/his wife];’ 
[2] διὰ δὲ τὰς πορνείας ἕκαστος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ 
γυναῖκα ἐχέτω καὶ ἕκάστη τὸν ἴδιον ἄνδρα 
ἐχέτω. 
but because of the porneias let each husband 
have his wife and let each wife have her 
husband. 
[3] τῇ γυναικὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ τὴν ὀφειλὴν ἀποδιδότω, 
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ γυνὴ τῷ ἀνδρί. 
The husband should give marital rights to the 
wife, and likewise also the wife to the husband. 
[4] ἡ γυνὴ τοῦ ἰδίου σώµατος οὐκ ἐξουσιάζει 
ἀλλὰ ὁ ἀνήρ, ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ τοῦ ἰδίου 
σώµατος οὐκ ἐξουσιάζει ἀλλὰ ἡ γυνή. 
The wife does not have authority over her own 
body but her husband does, and similarly the 
husband does not have authority over his own 
body but the wife does. 
[5] µὴ ἀποστερεῖτε ἀλλήλους, εἰ µήτι ἂν ἐκ 
συµφώνου πρὸς καιρόν, ἵνα σχολάσητε τῇ 
προσευχῇ καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἦτε, ἵνα µὴ 
πειράζῃ ὑµᾶς ὁ σατανᾶς διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν 
ὑµῶν. 
Do not deprive each other, unless out of 
agreement for a time, so that you may devote 
yourselves in prayer, and you will be together 
again, so that Satan may not tempt you through 
your un-self-control. 
[6] τοῦτο δὲ λέγω κατὰ συγγνώµην οὐ κατ᾽ 
ἐπιταγήν. 
I say this as a concession, not as a command. 
[7] θέλω δὲ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἶναι ὡς καὶ 
ἐµαυτόν· ἀλλὰ ἕκαστος ἴδιον ἔχει χάρισµα ἐκ 
θεοῦ, ὁ µὲν οὕτως, ὁ δὲ οὕτως. 
And I wish that all people were as even myself; 
but each has his/her own gift from God, some 
this gift, some that gift. 
[8] Λέγω δὲ τοῖς ἀγάµοις καὶ ταῖς χήραις, 
καλὸν αὐτοῖς ἐὰν µείνωσιν ὡς κἀγώ· 
To the unmarried and widows I say, it is good for 
them that they should remain as I am. 
[9] εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐγκρατεύονται, γαµησάτωσαν, 
κρεῖττον γάρ ἐστιν γαµῆσαι ἢ πυροῦσθαι. 
But if they are not self-controlled, they should 
marry, for it is better to marry than to desire 
[passionately?]. 
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[1]  The word γυνὴ means both ‘woman’ and ‘wife.’  The phrase is likely a 
general maxim that it is good not to ‘touch’ (sexually) a woman, but the 
immediate context shows that it was being used to discourage marital relations.  It 
may be the case that it is best to leave both meanings in the translation, since the 
phrase was probably being used both ways.  At any rate, I have left both 
possibilities in the above translation, in an attempt at offering a relatively neutral 
translation, where it does not distract from the goals of this study, for the reader 
who is not proficient in New Testament Greek. 
[2]  Porneia is the Greek word used in the New Testament for all sexual acts 
deemed immoral.  It is usually translated as ‘immorality’ or ‘fornication.’  
Perhaps in a psychoanalytic study the best word would be ‘perversion,’ but that 
would pervert the clarity of an essay that already has a different technical 
definition for perversion (running towards the intentionally transgressive side of 
the paradox of jouissance).  This bears on the fact that Lacan did not see 
‘perversion’ in the same way as other psychoanalysts: to him perversion was just 
a clinical structure, not a moral judgment.  Even outside of psychoanalysis, 
translating this word into modern English is difficult because there is no general 
consensus in the world as to what denotes sexual immorality, and whatever our 
modern society might view as sexually immoral is certainly not congruent with 
ancient Jewish/Christian views of immorality.  One could argue that this is the 
reason ‘fornication’ seems out of place in modern English: we do not now always 
apply a negative connotation to the idea of sex outside of marriage, and it is 
arguable that neither did the majority of ancient Romans or Jews.  So, due to there 
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being no equivalent concept to porneia in Lacanian psychoanalysis or modern 
English, it is left un-translated. 
There is some room for debate here over whether it should be translated 
‘let each man have a wife’ (be married), or ‘let each man have his wife’ (continue 
to consummate the marriage).  However, the object of the verb is a woman/wife 
who is already qualified as ‘his’ with a genitive reflexive pronoun in the 
attributive position (a ‘sandwiched genitive,’ as many grammarians call it).  The 
simplest and most likely way to read this is that the definite article is there for its 
most common reason: it qualifies the woman as the woman of the man.  Also, the 
rest of this section (7:1-7) is talking about married couples.  For these reasons it 
makes the most sense to translate this verse as given above, with the 
jussive/imperative being for the man to have his wife (and then vice versa).  Thus 
the first italics contained in the translation above are to reflect the emphasis 
contained in Paul saying ‘the of-himself wife’ (an articular sandwiched genitive) 
rather than the much simpler ‘his wife’ (γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ).  The second italics are 
added for emphasis, to reflect the unnecessary insertion of the adjective ἴδιον 
(literally, ‘her own husband’).  Since, as far as we know, there was not a culture of 
polyandrous polygamy present, Paul is not stating that a woman should have only 
one husband, and is thus either implying that women are sleeping with men who 
are not their husbands, or he is finding a near synonymous way of expressing the 
same thought as the first half of the sentence, varying vocabulary for euphony.  
The strange emphasis on the wife being ‘the wife of himself’ and the husband 
being ‘her own husband’ might suggest that part of the porneia Paul is responding 
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to is a sharing of spouses; or it might be in reference to the use of prostitutes 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
[3]  This is the clear meaning of τὴν ὀφειλὴν (most commonly ‘the debt,’ but with 
a fairly wide semantic range) in the context of the two verses preceding and 
following it. 
[5]  ‘Un-self-control’ is used here in order to preserve the consistency of potential 
references to the Stoic understanding of self-control in the Greek. 
[7]  The masculine gender in the Greek could here be taken either as referring 
only to men, or as inclusive of other genders as well. 
[9]  The heated debate over the meaning of πυροῦσθαι is addressed in Chapter 3. 
 
Epictetus, Discourses 3.22.76 
 
Greek English 
–Ναί· ἀλλὰ Κράτης ἔγηµεν.– ‘Yes, but Crates married!’ 
Περίστασίν µοι λέγεις ἐξ ἔρωτος γενοµένην καὶ 
γυναῖκα τιθεῖς ἄλλον Κράτητα. 
You mention a situation that arose out of 
passionate love, and a woman who is another 
Crates. 
ἡµεῖς δὲ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν γάµων καὶ 
ἀπεριστάτων ζητοῦµεν καὶ οὕτως ζητοῦντες 
οὐχ εὑρίσκοµεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ καταστάσει 
προηγούµενον τῷ Κυνικῷ τό πρᾶγµα. 
But we are concerned with common marriages, 
and are seeking without extenuating 
circumstances; seeking thusly we are not 
finding in this position a primary action1 for the 
Cynic. 
 
This translation attempts to mirror the Greek as closely as English syntax can 
permit, in order to preserve the logical flow and specific meaning of the argument. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Foucault makes much of Epictetus’ phrase τό πρᾶγµα, here τό πρᾶγµα προηγούµενον, which 
refers not just to an action, but to ‘the true proposition inasmuch as it can be transformed into a 
precept of action.’  The Hermeneutics of the Subject, trans. by Graham Burchell (New York: 
Picador, 2005), 349-351. 
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Romans 1:16-2:6, 26-29 
The words in italics are intended to be read in the voice of ‘the Teacher.’  
 
 
 
Greek English 
[16] Οὐ γὰρ ἐπαισχύνοµαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, 
δύναµις γὰρ θεοῦ ᾽στιν εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ 
πιστεύοντι, Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνι. 
I am not ashamed of the gospel, for it is God’s 
power of salvation for all of the faithful, both the 
Jew first and also the Greek. 
[17] δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ 
ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, καθὼς 
γέγραπται, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται. 
For in it God’s righteousness is being revealed, 
out of faithfulness and for faithfulness, just as it 
stands written: The righteous one will live as a 
result of faithfulness. 
[18] Ἀποκαλύπτεται γὰρ ὀργὴ θεοῦ ἀπ᾽ 
οὐρανοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν 
ἀνθρώπων τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ 
κατεχόντων, 
For God’s wrath is being revealed from heaven, 
upon all impiety and unrighteousness of men 
who repress the truth in unrighteousness. 
[19] διότι τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν 
ἐν αὐτοῖς· ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφανέρωσεν. 
Because the knowledge of God is known among 
them.  For God revealed it to them.  
[20] τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως 
κόσµου τοῖς ποιήµασιν νοούµενα καθορᾶται, 
ἥ τε ἀΐδιος αὐτοῦ δύναµις καὶ θειότης, εἰς τὸ 
εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους· 
For the invisible things of God have been 
understood and clearly known through the 
created things from the creation of the world, 
and [this means] both his everlasting power and 
divinity, so that they are without excuse. 
[21] διότι γνόντες τὸν θεὸν οὐχ ὡς θεὸν 
ἐδόξασαν ἢ ηὐχαρίστησαν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ἐµαταιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισµοῖς αὐτῶν καὶ 
ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία. 
Because, despite knowing God, they did not 
honour or thank him as God, but became 
perverted in their reasoning and their stupid 
heart was darkened. 
[22] φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ ἐµωράνθησαν, Professing to be sages they were made fools, 
[23] καὶ ἤλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου 
θεοῦ ἐν ὁµοιώµατι εἰκόνος φθαρτοῦ 
ἀνθρώπου καὶ πετεινῶν καὶ τετραπόδων καὶ 
ἑρπετῶν. 
and they traded the glory of the undying God for 
the likeness of a statue of a dying man and birds 
and quadrupeds and reptiles. 
[24] Διὸ παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς ἐν ταῖς 
ἐπιθυµίαις τῶν καρδιῶν αὐτῶν εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν 
τοῦ ἀτιµάζεσθαι τὰ σώµατα αὐτῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς, 
Therefore God gave them over, in the desires of 
their hearts, to uncleanness, so that their bodies 
would be shamed among them. 
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[25] οἵτινες µετήλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ 
θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει, καὶ ἐσεβάσθησαν καὶ 
ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, ὅς 
ἐστιν εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας· ἀµήν. 
They traded the truth of God in for a lie, and 
they worshipped and served the creature 
alongside he who created, who is blessed into the 
ages, amen. 
[26] Διὰ τοῦτο παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς εἰς 
πάθη ἀτιµίας· αἵ τε γὰρ θήλειαι αὐτῶν 
µετήλλαξαν τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν εἰς τὴν παρὰ 
φύσιν, 
Because of this, God gave them over to 
dishonourable passions, for even their women 
exchanged the natural function for the unnatural,  
[27] ὁµοίως τε καὶ οἱ ἄρσενες ἀφέντες τὴν 
φυσικὴν χρῆσιν τῆς θηλείας ἐξεκαύθησαν ἐν 
τῇ ὀρέξει αὐτῶν εἰς ἀλλήλους, ἄρσενες ἐν 
ἄρσεσιν τὴν ἀσχηµοσύνην κατεργαζόµενοι 
καὶ τὴν ἀντιµισθίαν ἣν ἔδει τῆς πλάνης αὐτῶν 
ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀπολαµβάνοντες. 
and also in the same way the men, having 
abandoned the natural function of the woman, 
became enflamed in their lusts for one another, 
men working up their shameful [members] in 
men, and receiving back in themselves the 
punishment that was a result of their error. 
[28] Καὶ καθὼς οὐκ ἐδοκίµασαν τὸν θεὸν 
ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει, παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς 
εἰς ἀδόκιµον νοῦν, ποιεῖν τὰ µὴ καθήκοντα, 
And just as they did not see fit to hold God in 
knowledge, God gave them over to an unfit mind, 
to do improper things, 
[29] πεπληρωµένους πάσῃ ἀδικίᾳ πονηρίᾳ 
πλεονεξίᾳ κακίᾳ, µεστοὺς φθόνου φόνου 
ἔριδος δόλου κακοηθείας, ψιθυριστὰς 
having been filled with every kind of 
unrighteousness, evil, greediness, badness, full of 
envy, murder, strife, treachery, whisperers, 
[30] καταλάλους, θεοστυγεῖς, ὑβριστὰς 
ὑπερηφάνους ἀλαζόνας, ἐφευρετὰς κακῶν, 
γονεῦσιν ἀπειθεῖς, 
slanderers, God-haters, insolent, arrogant, 
egotists, inventors of bad things, disobeyers of 
parents, 
[31] ἀσυνέτους, ἀσυνθέτους, ἀστόργους, 
ἀνελεήµονας· 
unthinking, unfaithful, unaffectionate and 
unmerciful. 
[32] οἵτινες τὸ δικαίωµα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιγνόντες, 
ὅτι οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντες ἄξιοι θανάτου 
εἰσίν, οὐ µόνον αὐτὰ ποιοῦσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ 
συνευδοκοῦσιν τοῖς πράσσουσιν. 
They know the just requirement of God, that 
those who practice such things are deserving of 
death, but they not only do them but also 
approve of those who practice them. 
[2:1] Διὸ ἀναπολόγητος εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε πᾶς ὁ 
κρίνων· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίνεις τὸν ἕτερον, σεαυτὸν 
κατακρίνεις, τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ πράσσεις ὁ κρίνων. 
Therefore you are without excuse, oh all judging 
man; for in this judging of the other you 
condemn yourself, for you do the same things, 
judge. 
[2] οἴδαµεν δὲ ὅτι τὸ κρίµα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστιν 
κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐπὶ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα 
πράσσοντας. 
But we know that God’s judgment upon those 
who do these-sorts-of-things is in truth! 
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[1:16-2:29]  I retain much of Paul’s repetition of the enclitic particle γὰρ  (‘for’), 
despite it not being totally necessary in English, in order to preserve the potential 
emphasis on logical flow and philosophical tone.  Translation of important 
Pauline words and phrases is in line with trends in recent apocalyptic 
interpretation of Paul, such as translating words from the πίστ- stem along lines of 
fidelity/faithfulness.  It is tempting to translate Ἰουδαίος as ‘Judean,’ as do Bruce 
J. Malina and John J. Pilch in Social-Science Commentary on the Letters of Paul 
[3] λογίζῃ δὲ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνθρωπε ὁ κρίνων τοὺς 
τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντας καὶ ποιῶν αὐτά, ὅτι σὺ 
ἐκφεύξῃ τὸ κρίµα τοῦ θεοῦ; 
But do you reckon, oh man who judges those 
who do these-sorts-of-things while doing the 
same things, that you are going to escape the 
judgment of God? 
[4] ἢ τοῦ πλούτου τῆς χρηστότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ 
τῆς ἀνοχῆς καὶ τῆς µακροθυµίας καταφρονεῖς, 
ἀγνοῶν ὅτι τὸ χρηστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰς µετάνοιάν 
σε ἄγει; 
Or do you despise the richness of his kindness 
and tolerance and patience, not knowing that it is 
‘the kind[ness]’ of God that leads you into 
repentance? 
[5] κατὰ δὲ τὴν σκληρότητά σου καὶ 
ἀµετανόητον καρδίαν θησαυρίζεις σεαυτῷ 
ὀργὴν ἐν ἡµέρᾳ ὀργῆς καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως 
δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ θεοῦ 
But with your stubbornness and unrepentant 
heart you store up wrath for yourself on the day 
of wrath and the revelation of God’s just 
judgment, 
[6] ὃς ἀποδώσει ἑκαστῷ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ· who will repay each according to his works; 
[26] ἐὰν οὗν ἡ ἀκροβυστία τὰ δικαιώµατα τοῦ 
νόµου φυλάσσῃ, οὐχ ἡ ἀκροβυστία αὐτοῦ εἰς 
περιτοµὴν λογισθήσεται; 
Therefore, if ‘the uncircumcision’ observes the 
law’s just requirements, won’t then his 
uncircumcision be counted as circumcision? 
[27] καὶ κρινεῖ ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία τὸν 
νόµον τελοῦσα σὲ τὸν διὰ γράµµατος καὶ 
περιτοµῆς παραβάτην νόµου. 
And ‘the law-fulfilling circumcision’ will judge 
you, who lives through the letter and 
circumcision, to be a transgressor of the law. 
[28] οὐ γὰρ ὁ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ Ἰουδαῖός ἐστιν 
οὐδὲ ἡ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἐν σαρκὶ περιτοµή, 
For there is no ‘Jew in externality’ and no 
‘circumcision in the externality of the flesh,’ 
[29] ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαῖος, καὶ 
περιτοµὴ καρδίας ἐν πνεύµατι οὐ γράµµατι, 
οὖ ὁ ἔπαινος οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ 
θεοῦ. 
but rather there is the secret Jew, and there is a 
circumcision of the heart, in the spirit, not by the 
letter, whose praise is not from humans but from 
God. 
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(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), in order to communicate the lack of clear 
distinction between these concepts at the time of writing; but it would be 
misleading to imply that the discussion in Romans is strictly about national 
identity to the exclusion of racial and religious identity.  Possible allusions to 
Stoic thought have been translated as such.  ἀσύνετος is translated differently in 
1:21 and 31, in order to preserve the alliteration in 31, which is part of Paul’s 
caricature of the Teacher. 
[2:1-29]  Some phrases are translated in quotation marks in order to communicate 
that they function as terms in themselves, such as ‘the Jew in externality’ or ‘the 
uncircumcision.’  See Robert Jewett, Romans, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2007), 233-234, where he muses that perhaps it should be translated as 
‘foreskin,’ as a derogatory term for gentiles, citing Joel Marcus, ‘The 
Circumcision and the Uncircumcision in Rome,’ New Testament Studies, 35 
[1989], 67-81).  Similarly, τὰ τοιαῦτα seems best rendered in a hyphenated 
fashion as ‘these-sorts-of-things,’ to highlight its function as a short-hand 
reminder of the whole sin list of 1:28-32. 
[2:1, 3]  As discussed in Chapter 5, above, the vocative ὦ, required in Attic Greek 
but not widely used in New Testament Greek, was a marker of the diatribal style, 
and has been translated to convey this. 
[2:1]  πᾶς is difficult to translate, as it can be read with either the preceding 
vocative or following nominative, and its meaning hinges upon the presumed 
object of the diatribe.  Douglas Campbell never comments on it directly in The 
Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul 
(Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), but does acknowledge that 2:1 turns the argument 
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not just onto the Teacher, but onto ‘any such judger’ (548).  C. E. B. Cranfield, 
echoing the worryingly anti-Semitic implications of the conventional reading, 
sees it as addressing ‘the man who sets himself up to judge,’ ‘the typical Jew,’ in 
Romans 1-8, International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001 
[1975]), 142.  So it can be read as qualifying the individual man as a universal 
possibility, as it is usually read; but it seems more likely that πᾶς, which is put in 
the predicative position when read attributively (Glenn M. Balfour, A Step-by-
Step Introduction to New Testamant Greek [Mattersey, UK: Mattersey Hall 
Publications, 2005], 254), is intended to qualify the man as ‘entirely-judging,’ 
connecting him directly with 1:18-32.  Thus it has been translated as ‘all judging,’ 
with ‘all’ qualifying the Teacher as wholly judgmental, rather than quantifying the 
object of his judgment as universal. 
 
Romans 7:7-8:2 
The words in italics are intended to be read in the voice of ‘the Teacher.’  
Greek English 
[7] Τί οὖν ἐροῦµεν; ὁ νόµος ἁµαρτία; µὴ 
γένοιτο· ἀλλὰ τὴν ἁµαρτίαν οὐκ ἔγνων εἰ µὴ 
διὰ νόµου· τήν τε γὰρ ἐπιθυµίαν οὐκ ᾔδειν εἰ 
µὴ ὁ νόµος ἔλεγεν· οὐκ ἐπιθυµήσεις. 
What then shall we say?  That the law is sin?  
May it never be!  But I did not know sin except 
through law, for I would not have known 
excessive desire except for the law saying ‘Do 
not desire excessively.’ 
[8] ἀφορµὴν δὲ λαβοῦσα ἡ ἁµαρτία διὰ τῆς 
ἐντολῆς κατειργάσατο ἐν ἐµοὶ πᾶσαν 
ἐπιθυµίαν· χωρὶς γὰρ νόµου ἁµαρτία νεκρά. 
But sin, through the law, took its opportunity and 
worked up in me every kind of excessive desire; 
for apart from the law, sin is dead. 
[9] ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων χωρὶς νόµου ποτέ, ἐλθούσης 
δὲ τῆς ἐντολῆς ἡ ἁµαρτία ἀνέζησεν, 
And I was once alive apart from the law, but 
when the law came sin revived, 
[10] ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπέθανον καὶ εὑρέθη µοι ἡ ἐντολὴ 
ἡ εἰς ζωήν, αὕτη εἰς θάνατον· 
 
and I died, and the law ‘that leads to life’ was 
found in me, leading to death; 
[11] ἡ γὰρ ἁµαρτία ἀφορµὴν λαβοῦσα διὰ τῆς 
ἐντολῆς ἐξηπάτησέν µε καὶ δι’ αὐτῆς 
ἀπέκτεινεν. 
for sin, taking its opportunity through the 
commandment, deceived me, and through [the 
commandment] killed me. 	  	  420	  
	   421	  
 
 
 
 
[11] ἡ γὰρ ἁµαρτία ἀφορµὴν λαβοῦσα διὰ τῆς 
ἐντολῆς ἐξηπάτησέν µε καὶ δι’ αὐτῆς 
ἀπέκτεινεν. 
for sin, taking its opportunity through the 
commandment, deceived me, and through [the 
commandment] killed me. 
[12] ὥστε ὁ µὲν νόµος ἅγιος καὶ ἡ ἐντολὴ ἁγία 
καὶ δικαία καὶ ἀγαθή. 
[But you have said] ‘So on the one hand the law 
is holy and the commandment is holy and just 
and good…’ 
[13] Τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν ἐµοὶ ἐγένετο θάνατος; µὴ 
γένοιτο· ἀλλ’ ἡ ἁµαρτία, ἵνα φανῇ ἁµαρτία, 
διὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ µοι κατεργαζοµένη θάνατον, 
ἵνα γένηται καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἁµαρτωλὸς ἡ 
ἁµαρτία διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς. 
Did the good, therefore, cause my death?  May it 
never be!  But sin, so that it may be made 
apparent as sin, through the good, worked death 
in me, so that sin might become inordinately 
sinful through the commandment. 
[14] Οἴδαµεν γὰρ ὅτι ὁ νόµος πνευµατικός 
ἐστιν, ἐγὼ δὲ σάρκινός εἰµι πεπραµένος ὑπὸ 
τὴν ἁµαρτίαν. 
For we know that the law is spiritual, but I am of 
flesh, being enslaved under sin. 
[15] ὃ γὰρ κατεργάζοµαι οὐ γινώσκω· οὐ γὰρ 
ὃ θέλω τοῦτο πράσσω, ἀλλ’ ὃ µισῶ τοῦτο 
ποιῶ. 
For that which I bring about I do not know; for 
that which I do not want is what I practice, but 
that which I hate I do. 
[16] εἰ δὲ ὃ οὐ θέλω τοῦτο ποιῶ, σύµφηµι τῷ 
νόµῳ ὅτι καλός. 
But if that which I do not wish is what I do, then 
I agree that the law is good. 
[17] νυνὶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζοµαι αὐτὸ 
ἀλλ’ ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐµοὶ ἁµαρτία.  
But it is no longer I that brings it about, but sin 
that lives within me. 
[18] Οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν ἐµοί, τοῦτ’ 
ἔστιν ἐν τῇ σαρκί µου, ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ θέλειν 
παράκειταί µοι, τὸ δὲ κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλὸν 
οὔ· 
For I know that the good does not live in me, that 
is, in my flesh; for the will is present within me, 
but to bring about the good is not. 
[19] οὐ γὰρ ὃ θέλω ποιῶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ὃ οὐ 
θέλω κακὸν τοῦτο πράσσω. 
For I do not do the good I want, but the bad I do 
not want is what I practice. 
[20] εἰ δὲ ὃ οὐ θέλω [ἐγὼ] τοῦτο ποιῶ, οὐκέτι 
ἐγὼ κατεργάζοµαι αὐτὸ ἀλλ’ ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν 
ἐµοὶ ἁµαρτία. 
Now if that which I do not want is what I do, then 
it is no longer I that brings it about, but sin that 
dwells within me. 
[21] εὑρίσκω ἄρα τὸν νόµον, τῷ θέλοντι ἐµοὶ 
ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν, ὅτι ἐµοὶ τὸ κακὸν 
παράκειται· 
Therefore I find [it to be] a law that when I want 
to do the good, the bad lies close at hand. 
[22] συνήδοµαι γὰρ τῷ νόµῳ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ 
τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, 
For I delight in the law of God in my inmost 
being! 
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[7:7-25]  In A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, & Gentiles (London: Yale 
University Press, 1994), from which I draw the basics of my reading of Rom 7, 
Stanley Stowers does not comment on any shifts in voice within the passage, 
except on p. 270 where he supposes that Τί οὖν ἐροῦµεν; ὁ νόµος ἁµαρτία; µὴ 
γένοιτο might still be in Paul’s voice (I read only the µὴ γένοιτο as Pauline 
interjection, as well as in v. 13), and 282 where he reads the benediction in v. 25a 
as Pauline (I read it as the Teacher’s, echoing his benediction in 1:25, but now, by 
way of concession, referring to Christ as Lord).  I have also tried, where relevant, 
to remain consistent with the language of the Teacher in 1:18-32, with the way 
this passage is translated by translators of Lacan, with the way I have translated 
other passages above and with common translations of Stoic terms and phrases.  
In order to avoid debates about whether ‘sin’ and ‘the law’ should be capitalised, I 
have not capitalised either, even when preceded by a definite article. 
[23] βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόµον ἐν τοῖς µέλεσίν 
µου ἀντιστρατευόµενον τῷ νόµῳ τοῦ νοός µου 
καὶ αἰχµαλωτίζοντά µε ἐν τῷ νόµῳ τῆς 
ἁµαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς µέλεσίν µου. 
But I see a different law in my members, warring 
with the law of my mind, capturing me in the law 
of sin, which exists in my members. 
 
[24] Ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος· τίς µε 
ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώµατος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου; 
What a miserable man am I!  Who will rescue 
me from this body of death? 
[25] χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ 
κυρίου ἡµῶν. Ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ µὲν νοῒ 
δουλεύω νόµῳ θεοῦ τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόµῳ 
ἁµαρτίας. 
Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our 
Lord!  Therefore on the one hand I myself am I 
slave to the law of God with my mind, but with 
my flesh [a slave] to the law of sin. 
[8:1] Οὐδὲν ἄρα νῦν κατάκριµα τοῖς ἐν 
Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. 
Therefore there is now no condemnation for 
those who are in Christ Jesus. 
[2] ὁ γὰρ νόµος τοῦ πνεύµατος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν 
Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἠλευθέρωσέν σε ἀπὸ τοῦ 
νόµου τῆς ἁµαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου. 
For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus 
has set you free from the law of sin and death. 
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[7:7-8]  ἐπιθυµία, as argued in Chapter 3, is translated as ‘excessive desire.’   
[7:12]  This sentence does not seem to flow with the argument no matter whose 
voice it is; I read it as Paul interjecting with a reminder of the sorts of things the 
Teacher has said.  As Jewett notes (Romans, 453), this sentence is only one half of 
an anacoluthon, a phrase beginning ‘on the one hand.’  This justifies the decision 
to see it as a fragment of a quote. 
[7:14]  It is striking that with πεπραµένος Paul uses a perfect participle instead of 
an aorist participle.  The verb refers to being sold into slavery.  Had he used an 
aorist participle it would simply mean ‘having been sold into slavery.’  Instead, 
the perfect participle emphasises the present state as the effect of past action: not 
merely having been sold, but presently being enslaved because of having been 
sold.  This emphasises the Teacher’s anxiety and anguish at the present situation: 
he is not just lamenting at the fact of having been sold into slavery under sin, but 
the present state of being enslaved because of this historical transaction.  The 
problem is not that he was born into sinful flesh, but that the flesh (unconscious 
desire aroused by law) enslaves him now, and has ever since he was sold to it (in 
a Lacanian view, the moment he entered language and jouissance became 
prohibited).  For these reasons it is translated above not as though it were an aorist 
participle, as in most modern translations, but as a perfect participle: ‘being 
enslaved under sin.’  This emphasises the present sense of the perfect, but retains 
the reference to the past in the implications of the word ‘enslaved.’ 
[7:15]  Verse fifteen is strange in that the last two phrases are held in contrast, 
with the contrasting conjunction ἀλλὰ, but are nearly identical in meaning.  I have 
not attempted to correct this in my translation. 
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Appendix C: St Paul’s View of Physis 
 
The following is a selection from a thesis that was submitted by the author 
as part of the requirements of an MA in Biblical Studies to Durham University in 
2010, supervised by Prof. Francis Watson.  It is included here because the 
arguments of chapters 4 and 5, above, expand upon it and make reference to it.  
While the work above is developed in such a way as to stand on its own without 
reference to previous work, this earlier work offers additional background, and 
some more detail on the use of the signifier physis in Paul’s time.  All that is 
included here are the sections on Stoic, Cynic and Epicurean physis, the section 
on Hellenistic Jewish physis and the conclusion to the first part (which originally 
also included sections on common and Peripatetic uses of physis).  It has been 
mildly updated to keep grammar and language consistent, to correct some errors 
and to translate or transliterate some of the Greek so that its readership is less 
restricted.  Throughout it the phrase ‘common physis’ refers to times when the 
word physis is used in a basic, non-philosophical or instinctive, sense, such as in 
‘naturally I was amazed,’ or ‘he is by nature difficult.’  ‘Local physis’ designates 
uses of physis specifically to do with the individual nature of a person or thing, 
such as ‘It is the nature of a rock to be heavy.’   ‘Universal physis’ is when physis 
is used to refer to nature as a totalising abstract concept, as in ‘It is not possible 
for nature to produce evil.’  ‘Naturalistic physis’ refers to physis in the sense of 
the environment of earth, in ‘The house has been abandoned for decades and is 
now completely overtaken by nature.’  All un-cited references and translations are 
to the Loeb Classical Library editions, published in London by Harvard 
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University Press, whichare included in the bibliography in Appendix D.  
Individual works by classical authors can all be found in the collections and 
volumes first cited. 
One criticism received about this text was that it generalises Stoicism to an 
excessive extent, attempting to pin concepts that widely frequented Hellenistic 
thought to Stoicism in particular.  This is done partially consciously, in the 
decision to use the term ‘Stoic physis’ for Stoic, Cynic and Epicurean uses of 
physis, because their meanings are determined to be identical; but, in retrospect, 
the designation ‘Stoic’ is applied too liberally in other ways as well.  This is 
something that the present study seeks to correct, through more careful choice of 
words, and more importantly through the psychoanalytic investigation of the 
structure of the Stoic use of physis in particular. 
 
* * * * * 
1.3.  Stoic Physis 
 Of all the Stoic, Cynic and Epicurean authors from the centuries prior to 
and immediately following Paul, only Lucretius, Seneca, Dio Chrysostom and 
Epictetus are widely extant.  All of these authors except Lucretius are either exact 
contemporaries of Paul or wrote within a century of his lifetime.  Our goal is not 
to establish intertextual links or potential sources for Paul, but to demonstrate the 
general structure of Stoic discourse as Paul would have been aware of it.  Marcus 
Aurelius and Pseudo-Lucian are slightly too late to serve much use.  We may be 
able to seek further understanding of ‘the Stoic physis’ from other Romans who 
subscribed to Stoic philosophy, such as Cicero.  As we will see, the Stoics, Cynics 
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and Epicureans shared an identical meaning of physis, despite the differing 
conclusions they drew from it.  Thus we can say ‘the Stoic physis’ referring to the 
way physis was talked about in the time period when Stoicism was the dominant 
philosophical power, even when looking at particularly Cynic or Epicurean 
sources. 
 Unlike his Stoic and Cynic counterparts, Lucretius’s2 view of nature is not 
connected to views of divine creation, divine purpose or afterlife.3  Further, unlike 
the Peripatetics, Lucretius and the Epicureans did not believe in the Unmoved 
Mover or that everything is working toward a final telos, but rather that the 
universe, and the number of atoms in it, are infinite. 
 Lucretius, in typical Epicurean fashion, writes that ‘all nature [natura] 
barks for is… that pain be removed from the body, and that the mind, kept away 
from care and fear, enjoy a feeling of delight.’4  Just further, in the line Ergo 
corpoream ad naturam pauca videmus esse opus omnino, where corpoream 
naturam refers to ‘bodily nature,’ some sort of local nature of the body is in 
reference.  This ‘nature’ refers to that which is necessary, which in this case we 
discover is that which takes away pain or causes delight.  This leads to the 
statement that natura ipsa (nature herself) does not ever desire more pleasure than 
is necessary, followed by a list of vices that Lucretius sees as beyond what nature 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Lucretius and Seneca wrote in Latin.  However, because we are discussing the way Paul uses the 
word physis, not its specific definition within his language, this frees us up to look at the way 
natura, its Latin equivalent, was used in the discourses in question. 
3 The Stoics considered the existence of the afterlife irrelevant, but unlike the Epicureans, did not 
generally argue specifically against it. 
4 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, trans. by W. H. D. Rouse, Loeb Classical Library (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1975), 2.17-19. 
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requires, including the use of torches for nocturnal revelry, and all forms of 
luxury.  Lucretius's use of natura here is exactly the same as Seneca's Letter 122 
(see below), and for both of them their appeal to natura is an appeal to simple 
physical/biological reality over ‘unnatural’ excess: that which is beyond what our 
natural bodies require to survive and be happy. 
 It is also important to point out that for Lucretius natura does not mean the 
state in which one was were born, at least as far as the social or economic 
situation into which one is born.  In 2.37-38 he states that ‘treasures profit nothing 
for our body, nor noble birth nor the glory of royalty.’  This comes immediately 
after the section above, where all things in excess of nature are condemned.  He 
sees noble birth (nobilitas) and the glory of royalty (gloria regni) as being of no 
value in forming our ethics, but rather as ethical negatives.  This is similar to the 
stance Paul takes toward the physei Ioudaioi in Gal. 2.15, except that Lucretius 
sees economic and social situations gained by birth as being in excess of nature, 
but Paul sees them as being nature itself. 
 Seneca has several extended discourses regarding natura in his letters, 
along with giving us regular use of the word outside of direct discourse about it.  
In one of his most extensive and emotive discussions of life according to natura, 
Letter 90, he begins defending the task of philosophy to ‘discover the truth about 
things divine and things human’ by describing the ways of the ‘first men and 
those who sprang from them.’5  Three times he looks to Virgil's Georgics for his 
primal narrative.6  Primal men ‘followed nature, having one person as their leader 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, trans. by Richard M. Gummere, Loeb Classical Library 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1925),  90.3, 4, 5.  Hereafter abbreviated to Ep. Mor. 
6 Ibid., 90.9, 11, 37. 
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and their law.’7  Seneca defends this as being the best way of doing things, as long 
as that person is actually chosen because he is the person with the best natural 
qualities for the position.  Thus, we might say, it is the philosopher king who 
naturally rules, as ‘government was under the jurisdiction of the wise.’8  
Importantly, in this ‘Golden Age’ under the philosopher kings ‘no one had the 
inclination, or the excuse, to do wrong, since the ruler ruled well and the subject 
obeyed well, and the king could offer no greater threat against his disobedient 
subjects than that they should depart from the kingdom.’9  Seneca explains that 
vices then entered the world, and unfortunately laws and democracies were 
established.  Then technology began to be invented, which Seneca is quite clear 
was not as a result of wisdom, but human ingenuity.10  He drives his point home 
with the statement that ‘A thatched roof once covered free men; under marble and 
gold dwells slavery.’11  From this it is clear that ‘nature has laid upon us no stern 
and difficult law when she tells us that we can live without the marble-cutter and 
the engineer.’12  ‘Nature suffices for all that she asks of us.’13  Thus, Seneca 
rejects the claim that one can invent new technology by observing nature, seeing 
technology itself as preventing us from living according to nature.14  In this letter 
natura is used in a similar sense to how it often is today, in reference to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid., 90.4. 
8 Ibid., 90.5.  Here Seneca is quoting someone else in agreement. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 90.7-13.  This is very different to 1 Enoch 8 where the evils of technology first enter the 
world because of a fallen angel, Azaz’el. 
11 Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, 90.10. 
12 Ibid., 90.15. 
13 Ibid., 90.19.  Translation from Seneca: Letters from a Stoic, trans. by Robin Campbell (London: 
Penguin, 2004 [1969]), 168. 
14 Ibid. 
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natural world.  Further, it is connected with ‘simple’ life and a mythological pre-
technologised state.  One should also note here the clear connection between 
physis and origin: one looks to one's origin for one’s physis 
 In Letter 122 Seneca rails against those who act against nature.  The chief 
act he condemns is living at night and sleeping during the day.  He goes on to 
condemn a whole host of acts and effects that he connects with this one initial 
flaw: unnatural people abandon the proper order of things by drinking without 
having eaten and thus eating while drunk, drinking in naked groups in the bath-
house, ‘exchanging one's clothes for women’s,’ desiring flowers out of season, 
growing trees on tops of mansions, and desiring hot baths built sunken into the 
ocean.15  He concludes that ‘We therefore… should keep to the path which nature 
has mapped out for us and never diverge from it.  For those who follow nature 
everything is easy and straightforward, whereas for those who fight against her 
life is just like rowing against the stream.’16  So, once again natura is connected 
with the natural world and the order inherent in it.  In this letter Seneca again 
quotes Virgil's Georgics.17 
 An important dimension to these physis-ethics comes into light in Letter 
47.  Rather than simply seeing order and hierarchy as elements of physis as one 
might expect from an Aristotelian perspective, Seneca instead tells Lucilius that 
‘he whom you call your slave sprang from the same stock, is smiled upon by the 
same skies, and on equal terms with yourself breathes, lives, and dies.’18 Then, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid., 122.5-14.  Translation from Seneca, trans. by Campbell, 222. 
16 Ibid., 122.19.  Translation from Seneca, trans. by Campbell, 226. 
17 Ibid., 122.4. 
18 Ibid., 47.10. 
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after commending him to treat his slaves as he would like his master to treat him, 
he demonstrates that everyone is a slave to something.19  For Seneca physis does 
not lead to statements about social hierarchy and order as much as it does to 
statements about equality before nature.  A similar attitude is apparent in Cicero, 
who states that ‘For a man to take something from his neighbour and to profit by 
his neighbour’s loss is more contrary to Nature than is death or poverty or pain or 
anything else that can affect either our person or our property.’20  And later, 
‘Loftiness, greatness of spirit, and courtesy, justice, and generosity are much more 
in harmony with nature than are the selfish pleasure, riches, and life itself.’21  We 
can see in the Stoics a firm sense of social justice arising out of the desire to live 
in accordance with nature, which seems more related to notions of simple 'natural' 
life than to notions of social order. 
 There are many more Letters with relevant discussion, but only a few 
more points need to be gleaned from Seneca.22  Firstly, on at least eight occasions 
Seneca makes positive mention of Epicurus, all regarding physis-ethics!23  For 
example, he concludes Letter 27 with the quote from Epicurus, ‘Poverty brought 
into accord with the law of nature is wealth.’  Epictetus also (though more rarely) 
positively quotes Epicurus.24  While the Stoics did not draw the same ethics from 
nature as the Epicureans, their conclusions did frequently overlap, and the way 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid., 47.11-17. 
20 Cicero, De Officiis, trans. by Walter Miller, Loeb Classical Library (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1966), 3.5.21. 
21 Cicero, De Officiis, 3.5.24. 
22 Some of the best examples are letters 11, 41, 48, 63, 65, 78 and 91. 
23 Letters 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 18 and 27. 
24 Epictetus, Disc. 1.23.1. 
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they used physis to produce ethics was quite similar. 
 Dio Chrysostom is important because he was taught by Gaius Musonius 
Rufus, who was teaching in Rome at the time of Paul’s letter, and also because he 
was an admirer and follower not only of Stoic philosophy, but also of Cynic 
philosophy.25  His work mostly survives in the form of eighty discourses.26  Most 
of his uses of physis are in discourses 1-4, 7, 12, 31, and 32.  Nearly half of his 
discourses never use the word at all, and only twelve use it more than four times. 
 In his first discourse he uses physis in no unremarkable way.  In fact, it 
would better be called the common use than the Stoic use: every reference is to a 
local physis; many of them have connotations of ‘that which one is because of 
one’s origin’ and there is no hint of physis leading to ethics, or of physis as ‘the 
natural world.’  It is also worth noting that within this common use he uses the 
dative case once, the accusative four times, and genitive five times, all of which 
have a simple local sense.  The lack of any in the nominative case makes sense 
because he never makes statements about physis where it is the subject of the 
sentence (there are no appeals to universal or naturalistic physis).  The single use 
of the dative in the sentence ‘He is by nature so inclined’ (v. 20) does not appear 
to be any different from the meaning of physis in the accusative in the later phrase 
‘though naturally covetous of honour’ (v. 27).  When employing the common use 
of physis different cases are not used to designate different meanings of physis, 
but depend entirely upon grammatical context.  In the following three discourses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Robert Browning, ‘Dio (I) Cocceianus,’ in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, eds. N. G. L. 
Hammond and H. H. Scullard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 345. 
26 Two of these, numbers 37 and 64, are now known not to be his.  Neither of them contains any 
references to physis. 
	  432	  
(2-4) he continues to talk about what should be the nature of a king, and his uses 
of physis continue on in the common or local sense. 
 In Discourse 7 Chrysostom harshly condemns the use of slaves, even 
barbarian slaves, for sex, demanding that all brothels be closed (v. 133).  In 7.135-
152 he twice condemns homoeroticism, first in v. 135 where ‘normal [κατὰ 
φύσιν] intercourse and union’ is between a male and female, and again in vv. 149-
152 where the transgression is clearly put in terms of excess, and men seek out 
other men because they disregard the ‘clear and sufficient limit... set by nature,᾽27 
and are comparable to drunk men who get bored of unmixed wine and go on to 
create ‘unnatural thirsts by the stimulus of sweatings, salted foods, and 
condiments.’28  The emphasis is not only that same-sex love is against biological 
nature, but that seeking to go beyond biological nature is unnatural because it is a 
frivolous excess. 
 In his twelfth discourse he maintains his common use of physis, but 
suddenly begins to sound very Stoic whilst railing against the Epicureans.  He 
begins by saying that knowledge of the nature of God arises in all people 
naturally, κατὰ φύσιν (v. 27).  He expands on all the ways that everyone is aware 
of God, and then launches into his attack:  
 
How, then, could they have remained ignorant and conceived no inkling of him 
who had sowed and planted and was now preserving and nourishing them, 
when on every side they were filled with the divine nature [θείας φύσεως] 
through both sight and hearing, and in fact through every sense? They dwelt 
upon the earth, they beheld the light of heaven, they had nourishment in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Dio Chrysostom, Dio Chrysostom, trans. by J. W. Cohoon, Loeb Classical Library (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1939), discourse 7.149. 
28 Ibid., discourse 7.152. 
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abundance, for god, their ancestor, had lavishly provided and prepared it to 
their hand.29 
 
Here, in a very Stoic fashion, the chief wrongdoing of those in question is that 
they have denied the God who has been revealed to them and resides inside them, 
as he is revealed in and dwells within nature.  The revelation that should have 
taken place is through physis, the natural world.   
 The uses of physis in Discourse 31 are all common.  In Discourse 32.46 a 
wild partying life is referred to as ‘outside of the harmony prescribed by nature’ 
(ἔξω τῆς ἁρµονίας τῆς κατὰ φύσιν γιγνόµενοι). 
 Epictetus is important not only because of his prominence among Stoic 
writers and close proximity to Paul, but also because he is another student of 
Rufus.30  The driving theme of his thought is that we should only seek to affect 
that which is under our control, and should not take pride in or try to control that 
which is not under our control (things ‘external’, φαντασία).  This is how 
Epictetus enacts the Stoic quest to discover physis, and Epictetus would not see a 
distinction between these two quests.  His first saying in the Encheiridion is 
‘Some things are under our control, while others are not under our control… the 
things that are under our control are by nature free [φύσει ἐλεύθερα], while the 
things not under our control are weak, servile, subject to hindrance, and not our 
own.’  By only seeking to possess that which is truly yours, no harm can touch 
you.  Thus, we should say to all φαντασία, ‘you are external, and not at all what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ibid., discourse 12.29-30. 
30 Kurt von Fritz, ‘Epictetus (2),’ in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, eds. N. G. L. Hammong and 
H. H. Scullard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 390. 
	  434	  
you appear to be.’31 
 As expected, physis is used in a universal-naturalistic sense, and local 
senses are all connected to this.  So, at the beginning of his twenty-third fragment, 
physis is ‘wonderful’ and ‘fond of her creatures.’  He uses the widest possible 
local sense, the ‘nature of the universe’ (κόσµου φύσις).32  Ench. 30 refers to 
being a father φύσει, meaning that physis has given one to be a father.  There is no 
distinction made as to whether this means ‘the universal physis has given him to 
be a father’ or ‘his local physis is that of “fatherhood”.’  However, these are the 
same thing, especially in a philosophy as determinist as the Stoic one, where to 
discover something’s local physis is to discover what was given it by physis,33 and 
where everything that happens is in accordance with providence and reason when 
examined closely.34  Because of this, advantage can be gained from everything, 
even φαντασία, when examined with reason.35 
 In Epictetus, as in the other Stoics, physis is far more the centre of ethics 
than it could ever be claimed that it is in Paul.  For example, Ench. 27: ‘nothing 
that is natural in the universe arises out of evil.’36  Epictetus asks, ‘What is it I 
want?  To learn nature and to follow her.’37  When Epictetus is asked why ‘there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Epictetus, Ench.1.5.  This is also the theme of Ench. 8-14. 
32 Epictetus, Frag. 8.1. 
33 Epictetus, Frag. 3.  Also, Ench. 29.4-7, where physis gives one natural abilities and talents, that 
are one’s physis.  Even more strongly, in Disc. 2.20.15, where ἡ φύσις ἔλκουσα ἐπι τὸ αὐτῆς 
βούληµα. 
34 Epictetus, Disc. 3.17.1. 
35 Epictetus, Disc. 3.20.1-15. 
36 Author’s translation. 
37 Epictetus, Ench. 49. 
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was more progress made in former times,’38 he responds that it is because in those 
times more effort was expended on ‘maintaining the governing principle in a state 
in accord with nature’ (κατὰ φύσιν).39 
 Some key observations we can make about the Stoic physis are that (1) the 
Stoics do not differentiate between a strictly common use of physis (referring to a 
local physis without overt reference to universal physis) and an ethical use or a 
universal-naturalistic use by grammatical form, but seem to use different 
grammatical forms freely and interchangeably; (2) the strongly deterministic 
nature of their philosophy means that ‘local’ uses generally infer a connection to 
the universal-naturalistic physis; (3) despite the differences between them, the 
Stoics, Epicureans and Cynics all used the word physis in the same way, and 
generally meant the same thing by it; (4) physis-ethics were not merely a part of 
Stoic ethics, but were Stoic ethics, to a similar extent that interpreting the Torah 
was Jewish ethics; (5) unlike Peripatetic physis, it does not necessarily refer to a 
sense of order and hierarchy, but only does so inasmuch as order and hierarchy 
may be observed to be a part of nature; (6) there is occasionally a sense in which 
physis refers to that which one is because of one’s origin, though this sense is 
nowhere near as strong as in Aristotle; (7) often physis is personified and given a 
will of its own, to the point where in Epictetus, Disc. 3.20.16 it is even given 
speech and (8) generally, the sense is not of order but of egalitarianism, as all 
humans are subject equally to Fate. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Epictetus, Disc. 3.6.1. 
39 Epictetus, Disc. 3.6.3. 
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1.4.  Hellenistic Jewish Physis  
 In Paul's contemporary Jewish authors we find a repository of physis 
quotes that scholars often like to use as an appropriate context of Paul's own 
words.40  How exactly do these sources talk about physis and what is their 
relationship to their contemporary philosophers, and to Paul? 
 From the outset of De Opificio Mundi Philo41 sounds like the perfect 
combination of Judaism and Stoicism: ‘The law corresponds to the world and the 
world to the law, and… a man who is obedient to the law, being by so doing, a 
citizen of the world, arranges his actions with reference to the intention of nature 
[τὸ βούληµα τῆς φύσεως],42 in harmony with which the whole universe is 
regulated.’43  However, as he goes on, he specifically counters the Epicureans in a 
way that the Stoics would not have pushed so far: 
 
For some men, admiring the world itself rather than the Creator of the world, 
have represented it as existing without any maker, and eternal; and as 
impiously as falsely have represented God as existing in a state of complete 
inactivity, while it would have been right on the other hand to marvel at the 
might of God as the creator and father of all, and to admire the world in a 
degree not exceeding the bounds of moderation.44   
 
This direct refutation of Epicurean theology and cosmology goes much further 
than Seneca is willing in his Letter 41, where ‘God is near you, he is with you, he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 [This foonote referred back to an earlier part of the essay, not included here, as evidence.] 
41 All English translations are from The Works of Philo, trans. C. D. Yonge (Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 1993), and the Greek is from Philo, Philo, trans. by F. H. Colson, Loeb Classical 
Library (London: Harvard University Press, 1962). 
42 Cf. Epictetus, Disc. 2.20.15-16. 
43 1.3.  This is Philo summarising Moses. 
44 2.7.  Cf. Dio Chrysostom, discourse 12.29-30, quoted above. 
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is within you.’45  While Stoics disagree with Epicurean atheism, they see 
questions of God as less relevant than Philo does, because to them God is in 
nature and in us, and accessed via nature.46  So, to be precise, Stoics access God 
via nature, and Epicureans look to nature for ethics in the same way as the Stoics 
but disregard [the] God[s], but for Philo (in chapter 8) one learns ‘from the oracles 
of God … the principles of nature.’ 
 In Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit 1.3 Philo infers that he is one who has 
'studied philosophy in a genuine spirit'.  His work alludes to the fact that he has 
personally studied philosophy, and he himself specifically states it.  Having seen 
that he had knowledge of Stoic and Epicurean thought, and presumably other 
philosophical schools,47 the way he uses physis is a part of the same discourse.  
What stands as unique is his specific subordination of physis to God, and his use 
of the Genesis account of Creation, rather than a Greek or Roman primal 
narrative, as the original descriptor of physis. 
 The extent of the Stoic influence on Philo comes out clearly in his 
commentary on the Sodom narrative, found in De Abrahamo 133-141.  He 
skillfully combines a biblical view, where the sin of Sodom is ‘arrogance’ and 
‘not supporting the poor and need’ (Ezek 16:49 cf. Isa 1:9-10, 17) with a Stoic 
ethic where sexual sin is a case of unnatural excess.  Thus the men of Sodom 
‘discard the laws of nature, pursuing a great and intemperate indulgence of 
gluttony; for not only did they go mad after women, and defile the marriage bed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, 41.1. 
46 Epictetus speaks less often of ‘God in us,’ but for him the will of God is whatever nature is 
(Disc. 1.1.17).  Thus he speaks more frequently of nature than the will of God, but they are to 
some extent synonymous. 
47 He speaks of the Pythagoreans in Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit 1.2. 
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of others, but also those who were men lusted after one another.’48 
 The main point to take from Philo is that he has not invented a new use of 
physis.  He has only attempted to show that the Stoic use of physis is shown even 
clearer through Torah, and that Torah actually teaches physis.  He proudly 
appropriates Stoic thought, and his narratives are not either Jewish or Stoic, but 
always a combination of both. 
   Josephus's use of physis does not appear to be heavily influenced by 
philosophical discourse, but sticks tightly to the common use, or to a simple 
universal physis.49  In De Bello Judaico 1.13.3 a collective of people can have an 
innate character:  φύσει γὰρ ἀπίστους εἶναι τοὺς βαρβάρους.  In Josephus physis 
does not act as a source of ethics.  Where it does act as an independent force, i.e., 
as ‘the natural world,’ this is in reference the facts of nature and not to a source of 
ethical imperatives.  For example, in De Bello Judaico 3.8.5, Josephus says that 
‘those who depart out of this life according to the law of nature [κατὰ τὸν τῆς 
φύσεως νόµον]… enjoy eternal fame.’  Even when speaking of a natural law, he is 
not speaking of ethics, but of facts of nature (in this case, death).  Contrary to the 
Stoics, he sees humankind’s nature as inclined to self-love and the hatred of 
superiors.50  Josephus was aware of the Stoics and their doctrines,51 and joins 
them in ranting against the Epicureans.52  However, even if it can be shown that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Philo, De Abrahamo, 135. 
49 All English translations are from The New Complete Works of Josephus, trans. by William 
Whiston (Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 1999), and the Greek is from Josephus, Josephus, 
trans. by H. St. J. Thackery, Loeb Classical Library (London: Harvard University Press, 1927). 
50 Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae, 5.215; 6.59. 
51 Josephus, Vita 1.12. 
52 Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae, 10.277-281. 
	   439	  
he was influenced by Stoic determinism, his use of physis does not have a Stoic 
mark on it.  As Köster states, ‘The word physis… is part of his own vocabulary 
and reflects popular usage in the first century.’53  It is not used in dialogue with 
philosophical ethics at all, and thus sheds light on how the word may have been 
used by someone without philosophical education.  Even in Ad Apion 2.199 and 
2.273-275 where he does condemn same-sex sexual acts as against nature, 
possibly demonstrating some Stoic influence, his basic concern is with what is 
written in Lev 18:22 and 20:13, and his language is far more reflective of biblical 
terminology than Stoic. 
 The word physis is used in the Wisdom of Solomon three times (7:20, 
13:1, 19:20).  As with Philo, the author of this work is obviously proficient in 
philosophy.54  The use in 7:20 obviously refers to local nature, as it is a rare case 
of physis in the plural for the ‘natures of animals’ (φύσεις ζῴων).  However, it 
takes place within a wider discussion about physis in a Stoic universal-naturalistic 
sense.  The speaker of chapter seven (be he the narrator or the character Solomon) 
receives a ‘spirit of wisdom’ in verse seven, which in verse seventeen turns out to 
be a ‘knowledge of the things that exist… [and] of the world and the activity of 
the elements.’  It is in the middle of a list of attributes that the speaker (might we 
call him ‘the sapiens?’) has learned about nature that we find him boasting of his 
knowledge of the φύσεις ζῴων.   In 13:1 ‘all beings who are ignorant of God are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Helmut Köster, ‘φύσις,’ in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, 6, trans. by Geoffrey 
W. Bromiley, eds. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1968 [1959]), 
269. 
54 Lester Grabbe, Wisdom of Solomon (London: T&T Clark, 1997), 36-37. 
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by nature [φύσει] foolish.’55  This statement is embedded in 12-15, where the 
author launches a vehement attack on pagan idolatry often compared to Romans 
1:18-32.56  The use of physis in 13:1 is local, concerning those who do not who do 
not recognise God from his creation (universal physis).  This sort of thought 
occurs elsewhere in contemporary Jewish texts, but not always intertwined with 
Stoic thought.57  Lastly, in 19:20, the physis refers to a local nature, but is once 
again in the context of discussions about universal physis.  In the Wisdom of 
Solomon, every use of physis is strictly local, though two of the three are in the 
context of discussing the natural world, and the other (13:1) accuses those who do 
not know God of foolishness.  So, although the exact usage of the word itself is 
not perfectly congruent with the Stoic use (because there is no direct reference to 
universal-naturalistic physis and local physis is not directly connected to it), the 
author is clearly attempting to form arguments using Stoic logic, regardless of his 
skill at perfectly appropriating Stoic use of language.   
 Physis appears nine times in 3 and 4 Maccabees.58  The only occurrence in 
3 Maccabees, 3:29, perhaps fits snugly into the Stoic use, referring to ‘all who are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 This cannot be a reference to human nature because it is restricted to those who do not know 
God.  This is actually slightly discontinuous with the specifically Stoic use of physis, which would 
not speak of someone having a ‘negative physis,’ (since, at least according to Epictetus, nature 
does not give rise to evil) or of not being naturally oriented towards the knowledge of God.  
Rather, it signals that we are not dealing with a purely Stoic text, but with a Jewish author using 
Greek language and thought in an academic way, as part of an attempt to fuse Stoic logic with an 
assault on pagan idolatry. 
56 One example of this is Peter Stuhlmacher, Paul’s Letter to the Romans (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1994), 34-35. 
57 2 Baruch 54:17-22 is an example of this sort of thought where it is not overtly combined with 
exclusively Stoic ides. 
58 3 Macc 3:29; 4 Macc 1:20; 5:8, 9, 25; 13:27; 15:13, 25; 16:3. 
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by nature mortal,’59 though it is no more explicitly Stoic than the use quoted 
above from De Bello Judaico 3.8.5.  It is in humanity's local physis that we are 
mortal, but this operates also as one of the laws of the universal physis: that 
everything dies.  There is no reason to suspect that the author of 3 Maccabees is 
unlocking philosophical discourse with his use.  The whole of the first chapter of 
4 Maccabees reveals the author’s heavy appropriation of Stoic thought, so it is not 
surprising that we find here a use of physis parallel to that of the Stoics.60  
Specifically, in 5:8-9 a physis-ethic congruent with Stoic ethics is found, and in a 
way much akin to Philo, v. 25 concludes the section by stating that physis-ethics 
are in line with Torah.  Only 1:20 and 16:3 refer to a local physis without 
reference to the natural world (and ethics that are in line with it), but this is 
consistent with Stoic use. 
 By Paul's time it had become commonplace for Jewish academics to adopt 
Stoic ways of thinking and mix them their own in order to defend Torah to a 
pagan world.  Often they steeped themselves in Stoic thought so much that even 
the way they spoke of physis changed.  This went alongside a complete adoption 
of Stoic physis-ethics, where the Law was seen to reveal nature, and thus those 
who do not follow Torah are not actually following nature. 
 
1.5.  Conclusions About Physis in Paul’s Time 
 Firstly, we can see that physis is not a word that can be analysed apart 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Author’s translation. 
60 This leads T. Witton Davies to make the blunt statement that ‘The author’s philosophical 
standpoint is that of Stoicism,’ in ‘Books of Maccabees,’ in International Standard Bible 
Encyclopaedia 2nd Edition, vol. iii, ed. James Orr (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), 1955. 
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from the discourses of which it was a part.  Though we may be able to seek 
simple dictionary-definitions for some words, physis is a word that lies at the 
centre of Paul’s contemporary ethical debates.  The sole measure of sound 
practice and doctrine in Stoic, Cynic, Epicurean and Peripatetic philosophical 
schools was the question of whether or not an action is κατὰ φύσιν, though the 
application of this approach was as varied as the schools that claimed it. 
 Secondly, this explains the necessity of the approach taken by Paul’s 
contemporary Jewish thinkers.  In order to participate in the philosophical 
conversations of the time Philo and the authors of 4 Maccabees, Wisdom of 
Solomon and other contemporary Jewish works all needed to show that the Torah 
rightly reveals physis. These authors do not represent a unique Jewish 
understanding of what physis is and how it should be used in ethics, but rather 
they adopt the full Stoic use of the word, and set out to show that physis is 
actually revealed in the Torah.  Our question cannot be whether or not Paul adopts 
the Hellenistic Jewish understanding of physis but must rather be comparative, 
asking how Paul also dialogues with Stoic philosophy.  To assume a priori that 
Paul shares an understanding of physis with his Jewish contemporaries, whilst 
their understanding of it is fully bound up in nomistic ethics and observance, is 
surely a fatal assumption that must be tested. 
 Thirdly, we note that in our Stoic, Epicurean, Cynic and Jewish sources 
there is occasional use of a common sense of physis without the word being 
specifically tied into its philosophical purposes.  However, there are often also 
common uses in close proximity to a universal-naturalistic use of the word, or to 
an ethical discourse that is about universal physis whether it is directly mentioned 
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or not.  This ethical use is at times quite developed and abstract (as in the cases of 
Cicero or Epictetus), but at its heart is a simple quest to discover the basic realities 
of the natural world and a desire for harmonious life with(in) it. 
 Lastly, it is plain across all of the Stoic, Epicurean, Cynic and Hellenistic 
Jewish thinkers surveyed that there is no specific distinction implied by the 
varying grammatical constructions of physis (i.e., whether it be in the dative, 
accusative or genitive case), although these three uses tend to be of a different sort 
than uses in the nominative (and some in the accusative) case, which tend more 
often to refer to a universal-naturalistic sense than a local one. 
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